A Comparative Study of Mainland Chinese and Hong Kong Students' Civic Participation, Political Trust and Political Efficacy

by

WANG, Yiping

A Thesis Submitted to

The Education University of Hong Kong

in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirement for

the Degree of Master of Philosophy

March 2019

Statement of Originality

I, WANG, Yiping, hereby declare that I am the sole author of the thesis and the material presented in this thesis is my original work except those indicated in the acknowledgement. I further declare that I have followed the University's policies and regulations on Academic Honesty, Copyright and Plagiarism in writing the thesis and no material in this thesis has been submitted for a degree in this or other universities.

Abstract

This study aims to investigate civic participation, political trust and political efficacy between Mainland Chinese and Hong Kong secondary students with a quantitative and comparative methodology. Research questions are (1) what are Mainland Chinese and Hong Kong students' intentions for future civic participation regarding illegal protest, legal protest, electoral participation, and informal political participation and what differences, if any, are there between the two groups of students? (2) how strong are Mainland Chinese and Hong Kong students' levels of political trust and political efficacy and what, if any, are the differences between the two groups of students? (3) how do political trust and political efficacy influence Mainland Chinese and Hong Kong students' intentions for future civic participation?

Studies on political attitudes and civic participation are mainly based in democratic regimes and seldom are conducted in the authoritarian regime such as Mainland China or the hybrid regime such as Hong Kong. The current study has the potential to test the application of Western attitude-behavior framework in the Chinese contexts. A healthy democratic society requires citizens actively and responsively participate in politics. *Political trust* and *political efficacy* as political attitudes are important components in influencing citizens' political engagement. There are four types of civic participation are to be examined including unconventional participation such as *illegal protest* and conventional participation such as *legal protest, electoral participation* and *informal political participation*. This study utilized secondary data analysis with large samples. Hong Kong dataset came from ICCS 2009 with a sample size 2528 and Mainland China dataset were from CCCS 2012 with a sample size 1475. Results suggested that illegal protest was the form of future civic participation that both groups were not likely to take part in. In contrast, both groups endorsed conventional forms of future civic participation

positively. Mainland Chinese students showed stronger intentions for conventional forms of future civic participation than their Hong Kong counterparts. Students from both groups endorsed political trust and political efficacy positively; again Mainland Chinese students endorsed these two scales stronger than their Hong Kong counterparts. Political trust was negatively associated with illegal protest but positively associated with legal protest, electoral participation and informal political participation. Political efficacy had a positive influence on all four modes of civic participation. Cluster analysis created profiles based on both students' political attitudes and the preference of civic participation, which illustrated the heterogeneity of the population. Four clusters emerged among Mainland Chinese and Hong Kong students and were labeled *Alienated-Radical Participators*, *Supportive-Active Participators*, *Loyal-Minimal Participators* and *Critical-Active Participators*. There were more *Alienated-Radical Participators* among Hong Kong students and there were more *Supportive-Active Participators* among Mainland Chinese students. In conclusion, Mainland Chinese students demonstrated a more active citizenship than their Hong Kong counterparts. Explanations has been made from both regime type and civic education policy. Mainland China as an authoritarian regime has a stronger capacity in cultivating regime-supporting citizens than Hong Kong as a hybrid regime.

Key words：civic participation, political trust, political efficacy, citizenship education, political culture

Acknowledgments

This work would not have been possible without the assistance of my supervisors Professor David Coniam, Professor Kerry Kennedy, and Dr. Theresa Alviar-Martin. Tracey helped me to formulate the initial idea of this study. Dave was concerned about my progress and helped me in improving the language of this thesis. Kerry is a fantastic supervisor and a role model, from whom I learned a lot about working as a researcher. He knew what a good work would be like and encouraged me to achieve that step by step. Kerry devoted a great deal of effort and exhibited lots of patience by giving valuable comments on each draft of each chapter of this thesis.

Also I would like to take this chance to thank colleagues in Centre for Governance and Citizenship of EdUHK who collected the CCCS 2012 data, including Professor Li Jun, Dr. Chong King Man and Dr. Cheung Hin Wah. This thesis would not been possible without their contribution. Proferror Carole Hahn also shared her thoughts on this thesis which I appreciated.

Finally, I would like to thank my parents for their love and support. I would also like to thank my friends Junge, Yangyi, Tiantian, Charlene, Lichee, Cat, Huanhuan, Wuyuan, Shaynar , Kuralay and Aysu for their company and the good time we spent.

Table of Contents

Statement of Originality ii

Abstract iii

Acknowledgments v

Table of Contents vi

List of Abbreviations xi

List of Figures xii

List of Tables xiii

Chapter 1 1

Introduction 1

1.1 Introduction 1

1.2 Theoretical background 1

1.3 Significance of the study 4

1.3.1 Secondary study of ILSA 4

1.3.2 Western framework's application in the Chinese contexts 5

1.3.3 Comparison between Hong Kong and Mainland China 6

1.3.4 Mainland Chinese students' political attitudes and civic participation 7

1.4 Organization of the thesis 7

1.5 Conclusion 13

Chapter 2 15

Literature Review 15

2.1 Introduction 15

2.2 Political participation 15

2.2.1 Forms of political participation 15

2.2.2 Tendency and explanations of political participation 19
2.3 Political trust 20
2.3.1 Theories and conceptualization of political trust 20
2.3.2 Trends and empirical studies of political trust 22
2.3.3 Political trust and political participation 23
2.4 Political efficacy 26
2.4.1 Political efficacy and political participation 27
2.5 Political and educational context 28
2.5.1 Political context 28
2.5.2 Educational context 33
2.6 Conclusion 36
Chapter 3 39
Methodology and method 39
3.1 Introduction 39
3.2 Methodology 39
3.2.1 Comparative and quantitative methodology 39
3.2.2 Secondary data analysis based on ILSA 41
3.2.3 Variable-centered approach and person-centered approach 42
3.3 Method 42
3.3.1 Instrument: validity and reliability 42
3.3.2 Missing value 52
3.3.3 Sampling 52
3.3.4 Normal distribution of the data 53
3.4 Conclusion 54
Chapter 4 55

Results 55
4.1 Introduction 55
4.2 Demographic description 56
4.3 Future intentions for civic participation 58
4.3.1 General comparison 58
4.3.2 Future intentions for illegal protest 59
4.3.3 Future intentions for legal protest 59
4.3.4 Future intentions for electoral participation 60
4.3.5 Future intentions for informal political participation 61
4.4 Political trust and political efficacy 62
4.4.1 Political trust 62
4.4.2 Political efficacy 63
4.5 Effects influencing civic participation 65
4.5.1 Effects influencing illegal protest 66
4.5.2 Effects influencing legal protest 66
4.5.3 Effects influencing electoral participation 67
4.5.4 Effects influencing informal political participation 68
4.6 Civic participation: a person-centered approach 69
4.7 Conclusion 74
Chapter 5 76
Discussion 76
5.1 Introduction 76
5.2 Research Question 1 77
5.2.1 Weak endorsement of illegal protest 77
5.2.2 Strong endorsement of electoral participation 79

5.2.3 Mainland Chinese students' higher endorsement of conventional participation 81
5.3 Research Question 2 84
5.3.1 Students' endorsement of political trust 84
5.3.2 Students' endorsement of political efficacy 86
5.4 Research Question 3 88
5.4.1 Political trust and political efficacy on civic participation 88
5.4.2 Four types of participators 91
5.5 Implications 96
5.5.1 Implications for theory 96
5.5.2 Implications for policy 99
5.5.3 Implications for school practice 105
5.6 Conclusion 106
Chapter 6 108
Conclusion 108
6.1 Introduction 108
6.2 Summary of the main points 108
6.3 Contribution 115
6.3.1 Western framework's applicability in the Chinese contexts. 115
6.3.2 Comparison between Hong Kong and Mainland China 116
6.4 Limitations 118
6.5 Implications for future study 119
6.6 Conclusion 120
References 122
Appendix 143
Appendix A: Partial invariance test results 143

Appendix B: Detailed reliability test results 144

Appendix C: Histogram of normal distribution of scales 145

Appendix D: Missing data description 147

Appendix E: Hierarchical regression results 148

Appendix F: Original ICCS and CCCS questionnaire 152

Original ICCS 2009 questionnaire 152

Original CCCS 2012 questionnaire (in Chinese) 155

List of Abbreviations

RQ	Research Question
CivEd	Civic Education Study
ICCS	International Civic and Citizenship Education Study
IEA	International Association for the Evaluation of Education Achievement
CCCS	Civic and Citizenship Education Study
ILSA	International Large Scale Assessments
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CDC	Curriculum Development Committee
NES	National Election Studies
CFA	Confirmatory Factor Analysis
RMSEA	Root Mean Square Error of Approximation
NFFI	Non-Normed Fit Index
TLI	Tucker Lewis Index
CFI	Comparative Fit Index
ML	Mainland China
HK	Hong Kong
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
OLS	Ordinary Least Squares
BIC	Bayesian Information Criterion
ANOVA	Analysis Of Variance
HKSAR	Hong Kong Special Administrative Region

List of Figures

Figure 1. Scale score of political trust and political efficacy across clusters. 71

Figure 2. Scale scores of intentions for future civic participation. 74

List of Tables

Table 1 *Democracy Index and Freedom House Index for Hong Kong and Mainland China* 3
Table 2 *Construction of original ICCS 2009 and CCCS 2012 scale* 44
Table 3 *Results of Confirmatory Factor Analysis of each scale (before modifying)* 46
Table 4 *Results of Confirmatory Factor Analysis of each scale (after modifying)* 46
Table 5 *Results of measurement invariance test* 49
Table 6 *Summary of invariant items of each scale* 49
Table 7 *Reliability of each scale* 50
Table 8 *Finalized measurement instrument of the current study* 50
Table 9 *Results of normal distribution test of scales* 54
Table 10 *Distribution of participants by demographic variables* 57
Table 11 *Comparison of Hong Kong and Mainland Chinese students' future intentions for civic participation* 58
Table 12 *Comparison of Hong Kong and Mainland Chinese students' future intentions for illegal protest* 59
Table 13 *Comparison of Mainland and Hong Kong students' future intentions for legal protest* 60
Table 14 *Comparison of Mainland and Hong Kong students' future intentions for electoral participation* 61
Table 15 *Comparison of Mainland and Hong Kong students' future intentions for informal political participation* 62
Table 16 *Comparison of Hong Kong and Mainland Chinese students' political trust* 63
Table 17 *Comparison of Hong Kong and Mainland Chinese students' political efficacy* 64
Table 18 *Effects on Hong Kong and Mainland Chinese students' future intentions for illegal protest* 66
Table 19 *Effects on Hong Kong and Mainland Chinese students' future intentions for legal protest* 67
Table 20 *Effects on Hong Kong and Mainland Chinese students' future intentions for electoral participation* 68
Table 21 *Effects on Hong Kong and Mainland Chinese students' future intentions for informal political participation* 69

Table 22 *Fit indices of different cluster solutions*..... 70
Table 23 *Cluster proportion for the 4 cluster solution* 71
Table 24 *Comparison of political trust, political efficacy and civic participation of different clusters among Hong Kong students*..... 72
Table 25 *Comparison of political trust, political efficacy and civic participation of different clusters among Mainland Chinese students*..... 72
Table 26 *Framework for comparison between Hong Kong and Mainland China* 109
Table 27 *Regimes' expectation of students' political attitudes and civic participation*..... 111

Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to provide an introduction to the current study. There are five sections in this chapter. Section 1.1 is the introduction. Section 1.2 outlines the theoretical background and identify the research questions. Section 1.3 addresses the significance of the study. Section 1.4 provides a description of the organization of the thesis. Section 1.5 draws the chapter to a close.

1.2 Theoretical background

Citizens in a democratic society are expected to be actively involved in politics, as Pericles claimed:

> An Athenian citizen does not neglect the state because he takes care of his own household; and even those of us who are engaged in business have a fair idea of politics. We alone regard a man who takes no interest in public affairs, not as a harmless, but as a useless character; and if few of us are originators, we are all sound judges of policy. (quoted from Sabine & Thorson, 1973, p. 28)

Accordingly, those who withdraw from political participation are thought as not committing their civic duty properly: "to use a religious analogy, not voting can be constructed as a venial sin: it is wrong, one that weak human beings should be urged not to commit but maybe forgiven for if they indulge in it" (Blais, 2000, p. 92). Citizens' involvement in the decision-making process is the foundation of a democratic society and it legitimates the democratic regime (Dalton, 2000).

Citizens' political participation is not generated in a vacuum. Rather, it is largely shaped by their political attitudes (Almond & Verba, 1963; Fraser, 1970; Paige, 1971; Shingles, 1981). Political efficacy (a feeling of effectiveness and capacity in joining political affairs) and political trust (the belief that the political system will produce a preferred result) as political attitudes are important components in influencing citizens' political engagement (Newton & Deth, 2010). Political efficacy and political trust are the two dimensions of the interaction between citizens and the state. Political efficacy represents citizens' '*input*' regarding influencing a government's functioning while political trust represents citizens' perception of a government's '*output*' (Almond & Verba, 1963; Gamson, 1968, Paige, 1971). For example, those who believe that they are able to influence a government's decisions and trust the government would act in their interests are more likely to be active in political participation. These people might be more likely to engage in regime-supporting participation and be less involved in regime-challenging activities (Paige, 1971).

The political attitude-behavior framework originates from democratic contexts. The current study, however, has attempted to understand what political attitudes and participation mean to young students in contexts that are not democratic such as Mainland China and Hong Kong. Mainland China is an authoritarian regime while Hong Kong is a hybrid regime. This distinction of the regime type is made based on the Freedom House Index (Freedom House, 2017) and the Democracy Index (The Economist, 2018), which are evaluations of the democratic level towards the polities (see Table 1). The Democracy Index evaluated electoral process and pluralism, functioning of government, political participation, political culture and civil liberties of the regimes. According to the Democracy Index, Hong Kong is a 'flawed democracy' and Mainland

China is an ‘authoritarian regime’. The Freedom Index categorized Mainland China as ‘not free’ and Hong Kong as ‘partly free’ based on the political rights and civil liberty of the regime.

Table 1

Democracy Index and Freedom House Index for Hong Kong and Mainland China

		Hong Kong	Mainland China
Democracy Index[1]	Democratic status	Flawed democracy	Authoritarian
	Rank	71	139
	Overall score	6.31	3.10
	Electoral process and pluralism	3.92	.000
	Functioning of government	6.07	5.00
	Political participation	5.56	2.78
	Political culture	7.50	6.25
	Civil liberties	8.53	1.47
Freedom House Index[2]	Democratic status	Partly free	Not free
	Freedom rating	3.5	6.5
	Overall score	59	14
	Political rights	5	7
	Civil liberties	2	6

The target population of the study were adolescents rather than adults. The study has assumed that fourteen-year-old students have already developed some attitudes towards their political system and perceptions of their role in civic affairs. More importantly, political attitudes and values established in people’s adolescent period through the political socialization process would have an impact on their future choices as citizens (Bandura, 1986; Granberg & Holmberg, 1990; Hooghe & Wilkenfeld, 2008; Jennings & Stokers, 2004). Adolescents have been perceived as ‘future citizens’ in the current study. On the one hand, the study may contribute to predicting citizens’ political attitudes and behaviors in the future. On the other hand, it acknowledges that

[1] Overall score and all evaluated items were on a 10 point scale: 0 = least democratic and 10 = most democratic. The total number of countries for ranking was 167.

[2] Political rights, civil liberty and freedom rating used a 7 point scale: 1 = most free and 7 = least free; Overall score explanation: 0 = least free, 100 = most free

the process of political socialization is ongoing and intervention from civic education may be possible. Furthermore, it is worth noticing that the current study focuses on students' *intentions* for future civic participation instead of their *actual* political behaviors, considering adolescents might not have many chances to interact with government institutions directly due to their age limit.

Employing a comparative quantitative methodology, the current study attempts to answer the following research questions:

RQ1. What are Mainland Chinese and Hong Kong students' intentions for future civic participation regarding illegal protest, legal protest, electoral participation, and informal political participation and what differences, if any, are there between the two groups of students?

RQ2. How strong are Mainland Chinese and Hong Kong students' levels of political trust and political efficacy and what, if any, are the differences between the two groups of students?

RQ3. How do political trust and political efficacy influence Mainland Chinese and Hong Kong students' intentions for future civic participation?

1.3 Significance of the study

1.3.1 Secondary study of ILSA

Many cross-national studies have explored how students are prepared as future citizens by studying their political attitudes and behaviors. These studies have been mainly conducted in democratic or partially democratic societies (Hahn, 1998; Schulz, Ainley, Fraillon, Kerr, & Losito, 2010, Schulz, Ainley, Fraillon, Losito, Agrusti, & Friedman, 2018; Torney-Purta, Lehmann, Oswald, & Schulz, 2001). For example, Hahn (1998) studied adolescents' political

efficacy, trust, confidence and interest in five Western countries including England, Denmark, Germany, Netherlands and the United States. The IEA Civic Education Study (CivEd, 1999) (Torney-Purta et al., 2001) and the International Civic and Citizenship Education Study (ICCS, 2009) (Schulz et al., 2010) conducted by the International Association for the Evaluation of Education Achievement (IEA) evaluated students' civic knowledge, political attitudes and behaviors across 28 and 38 countries separately. CivEd 1999 and ICCS 2009 are International Large Scale Assessments (ILSA). The rich database of ILSA, provides opportunities for follow-up studies about adolescents political attitudes and behaviors (Chow 2013; Kennedy, Hahn, & Lee, 2007; Quintelier & Hooghe, 2013; Torney-Purta, Barber, & Richardson, 2004). The current study is a secondary study of ILSA.

1.3.2 Western framework's application in the Chinese contexts

There is a dichotomy about understanding civic education in Western and Chinese contexts. Civic education in the Chinese contexts emphasizes students' moral development while civic education in Western contexts focuses on fostering students' democratic values and civic participation. The current study attempts to break the dichotomy by examining a Western attitude-behavior framework's applicability in the Chinese contexts, which was a challenging task. For example, political participation has deep roots in democratic regimes but faces constraints in non-democratic regimes. What is considered as passive citizenship in democratic contexts might not be passive in non-democratic contexts. Therefore, different standards to evaluate students' attitudes and behaviors need to be set in different contexts. Such standards might have their roots in regime types and civic education policy. One purpose of the current study was, therefore, to explore the standards for civic participation in non-democratic contexts.

1.3.3 Comparison between Hong Kong and Mainland China

As addressed in the previous paragraph, one significance of the current study was that it attempted to understand the development of students' political attitudes and behaviors in the Chinese contexts. It is worth noting that within the Chinese contexts, there are variations in terms of levels of democracy, orientations to civic education and students' citizenship development. Therefore, another object of the current study was to illustrate such variations. Mainland China and Hong Kong provide ideal settings for this purpose. Both Mainland China and Hong Kong are influenced by Confucian culture, yet they represent different regime types with Mainland China as an authoritarian regime and Hong Kong as a hybrid regime. Regime type can influence the orientation of civic education and have further implications on students' political attitudes and behaviors. For example, civic education in an authoritarian regime plays an important role in cultivating loyal citizens. Civic education orientation in a hybrid regime might be contested as there are different political groups competing in society (Li, 2015).

There have been studies examining the difference between Hong Kong and Mainland Chinese students' political attitudes (Fairbrother, 2003; Li, 2015). Fairbrother (2003) compared Mainland Chinese and Hong Kong students' understanding towards patriotism and national attitude using mixed methods, which combined interview and survey. His survey sample size, however, was not in a large scale with only 260 Hong Kong students and 275 Mainland Chinese students. Li (2015) studied Mainland Chinese and Hong Kong students' construction of the 'good citizen' with a qualitative research methodology. The current study, therefore, aims to address comparisons between Mainland China and Hong Kong utilizing quantitative research methodology with a large sample size, which was an innovative aspect of the current study.

1.3.4 Mainland Chinese students' political attitudes and civic participation

When it comes to civic education in Mainland China, moral education has long been the focus of scholars (Fairbrother, 2014; Wang & Tan, 2014; Yu, 2014). Although there have been some studies addressing issues of citizenship in China, most of them concentrated on policy or curriculum levels (Xu, 2014; Zhong & Lee, 2008). For example, Zhong and Lee (2008) analyzed official documents and summarized that democracy, law education and psychological health are the main themes of current civic education in China. Little attention, however, has been paid to understanding civic education from students' experiences, perceptions and constructions towards citizenship. Zhao, Haste, Selman, and Luan (2017) studied Chinese students' meaning-making of civic role using a qualitative approach. Their study illustrated how Chinese students understand the relationship between government and citizens and identified three narratives (complaint, critical and cynical) among Chinese students. By investigating students' political attitudes and behaviors, the current study can provide a different perspective to understand civic education in Mainland China.

1.4 Organization of the thesis

This thesis is divided into 6 chapters. Chapter 1illustrates the theoretical background and the innovation of the current study.

Chapter 2 reviews the relevant literature about political participation, political trust and political efficacy, both theoretically and empirically. Empirical studies about political participation can be traced to the 1960s in the United States. Earlier studies about political participation focused on voting and political campaigns, which have been the most conventional and widespread forms of political participation (Almond & Verba, 1963; Berelson, Lazarsfeld, & McPhee, 1954). From the 1960s to the 1980s, new forms of political participation such as

protests, street demonstrations and boycotts emerged and these expanded the repertoire of political participation. These activities were labeled as 'unconventional participation' in order to be distinguished from conventional participation (Barnes et al., 1979). Apart from this conventional and unconventional division, political participation has also been divided into elite-directed participation and elite-challenging participation (Inglehart, 1997); citizen-oriented actions and cause-oriented actions (Norris, 2003). There has been a tendency for participation in conventional forms of political participation such as voting and political campaigns, to be decreasing (Putnam, 2001; Wattenberg, 1996) whereas unconventional participation such as protests to be increasing (Barnes et al., 1979; Dalton, 2008; Inglehart, 1997; Klingemann & Fuchs, 1995) in established democracies. The trend has been explained in different ways. Pessimistic opinion was concerned that withdrawing from conventional participation would undermine the foundation of the democracy (Putnam, 2001). Optimistic opinions regarded the trend as a shift in political participation patterns, accompanied by a shift in values, rather than a crisis of democracy (Dalton, 2008; Norris, 1999).

The literature about political trust and political efficacy are also reviewed in Chapter 2. Political trust refers to citizens' evaluation of a political system based on whether the government's operation meets their normative expectations. (Hetherington, 1998; Miller, 1974; Newton, 2001). Empirical studies have suggested that there has been a decline of political trust in the United States since the 1960s (Catterberg & Moreno, 2006; Craig, 1980; Dalton, 2000; Newton & Norris, 2000). In contrast to the decline of political trust in established democracies, especially in the United States, researchers have observed a high level of political trust in authoritarian countries such as China (Chen, 2004; Shi, 2001; Wang, 2005; Wong, Wan, & Hsiao, 2011). Various explanations towards people's level of political trust has been made from

both institutional theory (Coleman, 1990; Hetherington, 1998) and cultural theory (Almond & Verba, 1963; Putnam, 1993). The trend of erosion of political trust and the decline of conventional participation in the United States overlapped which motivated many studies about the relationship between political trust and political participation. Some researchers believed that the erosion of political trust would decrease conventional participation and bring political alienation and cynicism (Almond & Verba, 1963; Seligson; 1983); other researchers, however, argued that the erosion of political trust leads to a change in political participation pattern from conventional participation to unconventional participation (Citrin, 1974; Hooghe & Marien, 2013). Political efficacy means "the feeling that political and social change is possible, and that the individual citizen can play a part in bringing about change" (Campbell, Gurin, & Miller, 1954, p. 187). This definition of political efficacy is consistent with what referred as 'internal political efficacy' as opposed to 'external political efficacy' which refers to citizens' perceived responsiveness of the authorities (Balch, 1974). Political efficacy was first used to predict people's participation in U.S. presidential elections. Low political efficacy is linked with political indifference while high political efficacy is seen as a precondition for voting (Almond & Verba, 1963). Later studies found that political efficacy is a positive predictor of both conventional participation and unconventional participation (Balch, 1974; Diemer & Rapa, 2016; Finkel, 1985; Schulz et al., 2010; Shingles, 1981).

Chapter 2 also introduces the background of both Mainland China and Hong Kong in terms of political context and orientations of civic education. As an authoritarian regime, China's ruling authorities are not generated through electoral procedures and power is highly centralized. The control of the state belongs to a single party, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Although there might be some freedom in economic development or cultural issues, political reform has

been slow and rare and CCP's authority hasn't faced serious challenges (Roskin, Cord, Medeiros, & Jones, 1991). The National People's Congress is the legislative institution. The National People's Congress is not directly elected by people while members of the county and town levels of the People's Congress can be directly elected (Nathan, 1986). Protests in Mainland China are constrained and characterized by "playing by the rule" (Perry, 2010, p. 11). They are small scale, limited to certain groups (i.e., villagers or workers) and can hardly be mobilized into social movements to generate wider influence. Hong Kong is a former British colony and now a Special Administrative Region of China. As a hybrid regime, it combines the features of both democratic regimes and authoritarian regimes (Heywood, 2002). The hybrid regime means that different ideologies compete in society with a conservative group preferring to maintain the status quo and the democratic group demanding a higher level of democratization. Hong Kong has a partial democracy (Lau & Kuan, 2000). District Councils and half of the Legislative Council's seats are directly elected. Yet Hong Kong has an 'executive-led' government meaning that the non-direct elected administrative branch has a monopoly in policy-making (Lau & Kuan, 2000; Lee, 2005). In terms of unconventional participation, protest participation in Hong Kong is regime-challenging in nature, although it is regarded as a violation of social stability by the ruling authorities. Hong Kong has more tolerance towards protest participation. Protests in Hong Kong are larger in scale and have wider influence in society than in Mainland China. Hong Kong citizens attempt to use protests as a way to effect political agenda and influence policy.

Civic education in Mainland China is referred to moral and political education. As the name conveys, it has a politicized characteristic. Politicized characteristics are reflected by the emphasis on patriotic education and education for democracy. Being patriotic in the Chinese

context means not only loving the country, but also supporting a socialist system and the leadership of the CCP (Fairbrother, 2003). Democracy education aims to enhance students' understanding towards law and democracy by introducing political knowledge about China's constitution and political system to students and encouraging students to exercise their political rights and responsibilities such as voting in local elections, joining political discussions and give suggestions to the government (Zhong & Lee, 2008). Politicized moral and political education functions as an instrument to foster loyalty and support of the regime from students (Fairbrother, 2003).

Civic education in Hong Kong has had different features in different periods. Civic education in the colonial period had a 'depoliticized' nature (Bray & Lee, 1993). The content related to politics was missing in textbooks and the discussion about politics in schools was regarded as sensitive. During the transition period, civic education policy became 'politicized' (Leung & Ng, 2004). The official document *Guidelines on Civic Education in Schools* (Curriculum Development Council (CDC), 1996) aimed to facilitate civic values, civic attitudes, civic beliefs, and civic competence among students. After the transition of sovereignty, the HKSAR government adopted a 'redepoliticized' policy towards civic education (Leung & Ng, 2004). The *Learning to Learn* (CDC, 2001) official education reform document put more emphasis on students' moral development than political awareness and democratic values. Although students are expected to develop national identity in the official document, national identity was emphasized in an apolitical form by introducing the cultural and historical aspects of China rather than the political aspect.

Chapter 3 describes the broad methodological stance taken in the thesis as well as the research methods and techniques. The current study adopted a quantitative and comparative methodology

using secondary data analysis. The Hong Kong dataset was from ICCS 2009 with a sample size of 2528. The Mainland Chinese dataset was from CCCS 2012 with a sample size of 1475. Three scales common to both questionnaires were used: political efficacy scale, political trust scale and civic participation scale. The civic participation scale has four subscales including both conventional participation (*voting, legal protest and informal political participation*) and unconventional participation (*illegal protest*). Scales have good reliability (Cronbach's α is above 0.7). Confirmatory factor analysis suggests that the scales have good construct validity, although not all of the items were invariant across the two groups. Both a variable-centered approach and a person-centered approach were used for data analysis.

Chapter 4 report the results of the study. The variable-centered approach illustrated the average differences and similarities between the two groups. The current study found that Mainland Chinese students were significantly more politically efficacious and trustful of governmental institutions than Hong Kong students. Mainland Chinese students' intentions for informal political participation and legal protest (both are forms of conventional participation) were significantly stronger than Hong Kong students. Both Hong Kong students (M = 3.08) and Mainland Chinese students (M = 3.14) positively endorsed voting as a future civic intention. Both groups negatively endorsed illegal protests as a future civic intention (M = 1.44; M = 1.48) respectively. Political trust was positively associated with conventional participation and negatively associated with unconventional participation. Political efficacy was positively associated with both conventional and unconventional participation. The person-centered approach identified the heterogeneity within the population. Students were clustered into four groups (*Alienated-Radical Participators, Supportive-Active Participators, Loyal-Minimal Participators and Critical-Active Participators)* based on their political attitudes and intentions

for future participation. There were more *Alienated-Radical Participators* in Hong Kong (10.5%) than in Mainland China (25.7%). There were more *Supportive-Active Participators* (38.4%) in Mainland China than in Hong Kong (9.2%).

Chapter 5 provides the discussion of the results and attempts to provide a plausible explanation of students' political attitudes and intentions for future civic participation in Mainland China and Hong Kong. The regime-challenging nature of unconventional participation appears to have undermined most students' willingness for involvement in illegal protests. In contrast, voting is elite-directed in nature. Civic education as well as daily life experience such as observing parents voting might have contributed to students' high endorsement. Mainland Chinese students appeared to demonstrate a more 'active citizenship' than their Hong Kong counterparts with higher political trust, political efficacy and stronger endorsement of conventional participation. It is suggested that the differences may be related to regime type and civic education policy.

Chapter 6 draws the study to a close. Apart from summarizing the main points of the study, this chapter also demonstrates the contributions and limitations of the current study. By comparing Hong Kong and Mainland Chinese students' political attitudes and intentions for future civic participation, the current study has expanded the scope of secondary analysis of the International Large Scale Assessments and tested the applicability of an attitude-behavior framework in a non-democratic context.

1.5 Conclusion

Political participation is an important feature of democratic societies and contributes to regime legitimacy. Citizens' political involvement is largely shaped by their political attitudes. *Political efficacy* and *political trust* as political attitudes are important components in influencing citizens'

civic participation. Previous studies of political attitudes and civic participation were mainly based in democratic regimes and have seldom been conducted in authoritarian or partial democratic regimes such as Mainland China and Hong Kong. The current study aims to test the applicability of a Western attitude-behavior framework in the Chinese contexts. In addition, by comparing students' political attitudes and intentions for future participation in Mainland China and Hong Kong, the current study has been able to illustrate the variation within the Chinese contexts differentiated by regime type.

Chapter 2 will provide a literature review related to the main issues of the current study.

Chapter 2

Literature Review

2.1 Introduction

The previous chapter gave a brief introduction to the current study. It described the primary focus, the significance and organization of the current study. This chapter presents the literature review. It is divided into six sections. Section 2.1 is the introduction of the chapter. Section 2.2 will review the literature about political participation: how different modes of political participation have emerged from the 1960s to the 21st century and how the pattern and tendency of political participation have changed over time. Section 2.3 reviews the literature about political trust. It will introduce the theoretical foundation of political trust and show how people's confidence in the political system has changed over time. Furthermore, it will review the relationship between people's political trust and their political behaviors. Section 2.4 reviews the literature about political efficacy, including the conceptualization of political efficacy and its impact on political participation. Section 2.5 introduces the political and educational context of both Hong Kong and Mainland China, including a description of their political systems, citizens' practice of conventional and unconventional political participation as well as the characteristics of civic education in both societies. Section 2.6 draws the chapter to a close outlining the research gap from the literature and the specific research questions addressed.

2.2 Political participation

2.2.1 Forms of political participation

Political participation is of great importance in democratic societies. Citizens in democratic societies are expected to take an active role in public affairs through political discussion, popular

interest and political engagement. Citizens' involvement in the decision-making process provides legitimacy for democratic regimes (Dalton, 2000).

There has been an expansion of forms of political participation since the 1940s (Van Deth, 2001). Voting and political campaigns have been the most conventional and widespread forms of political participation in representative democracies (Almond & Verba, 1963; Berelson et al., 1954). Citizens express their opinion, take positions and make decisions on public issues by voting for the party or candidate they support. Voting in elections is regarded as the "duty of citizens" (Blais, 2000; Wolfinger & Rosenstone, 1980). At the same time, it provides an opportunity for people to become involved in politics and exercise their rights. Compared with other forms of political participation, voting is less intensive and less demanding for participants' cognition skills (Inglehart, 1997, Schulz et al., 2010). Voting behaviors used to be shaped by long-term predisposition and party loyalty but now short-term factors such as voters' position on a particular issue, are more decisive. Accordingly, voting behaviors have become less predictable (Dalton, 2000).

From the 1960s to the 1980s, protest activities such as sit-ins, street demonstrations, boycotts and blocking the traffic have emerged. Such new forms of political participation, at first, were associated with political unrest, violence and system change, also known as riot participation (Paige, 1971). The underlying assumption is that these activities are illegitimate and might threaten the stability of democracy. Barnes et al. (1979) defines these activities as unconventional political participation so that they may be distinguished from conventional electoral participation. More importantly, they conveyed the idea that political protests should be understood as the expansion of the political participation repertoire. It is true that protests and demonstrations have later been absorbed into mainstream political participation and become

conventional in established democracies. For example, 40% of the public have participated in demonstrations in Sweden, Belgium and The Netherlands[3] (Norris, 1999, 2003). Inglehart (1997) uses elite-directed participation and elite-challenging participation to describe electoral actions and protest participation. Electoral activities are seen as bureaucratized and mobilized by hierarchical groups such as political parties. It is the political elites rather than the voters who play a more important role in making the decision or taking the position on a certain issue. Elite-challenging participation, on the contrary, targets political authorities. People express dissent towards government policies, exert pressure on political elites and attempt to have more voice in the decision-making process. Inglehart's definition implies the tension between political elites and mass, which is consistent with the discrepancy between 'electoral democracy' and 'liberal democracy'. Electoral democracy values elites' agreement more than the mass's preference whereas liberal democracy believes that democracy is more than vote and the mass voice matters (Welzel & Inglehart, 2008). Inglehart took a positive position towards elite-challenging participation and connected it with postmaterialists and self-expression values (Inglehart & Catterberg, 2002). Dalton (2008) points out the advantage of elite-challenging participation that it allows citizens to exert more direct and effective influence on policy. People who are not satisfied with the current policy or incumbent government do not need to wait until the next election to make a difference by voting for another party. Nevertheless, compared with voting, non-institutional political participation has a higher requirement of participants' political knowledge, skills and motivations (Marien, Hooghe, & Quintelier, 2010).

Since the 1990s, social engagement and civic participation have expanded the repertoire of political participation and blurred the boundary between political participation and social

[3] From the 1999-2001 World Value Survey

participation (Van Deth, 2001). For example, Varba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995) took association membership into consideration in their studies. Also, political participation has become more individualized and expressive-oriented. Buying or boycotting certain products itself may not belong to the category of political actions but it becomes political behavior when people are motivated by a political reason (Norris, 2003). Such a development have challenged the previous conventional/unconventional conceptual framework of political participation. Accordingly, Norris (2003) suggests that political participation should be divided into citizen-oriented actions and cause-oriented actions. Citizen-oriented actions are consistent with conventional participation. Cause-oriented actions emphasize specific issues and policies that are concerned beyond the electoral arena. Van Deth (2014, p. 351) presents a more comprehensive conceptual framework for political participation which is helpful to our understanding. He defines political participation as "an abstract concept that covers voluntary activities by citizens usually related to government, politics, or the state." The activities that satisfy this category are regarded as a "*minimalist definition* of political participation" (e.g., voting and party membership). In addition, there is a '*targeted definition*'. It contains actions that either target at the sphere of government, state and politics (e.g., protests) or target at solving community problems (e.g., volunteering). Moreover, a '*motivational definition*' refers to individualized participation such as boycotts.

In the 21st century, the development of the Internet has raised a new perspective concerning political participation. There have been debates about whether the Internet itself brings new channels for people to participate in politics such as 'online petitions' (Bakker & De Vreese, 2011; Van Laer & Van Aelst, 2010) or whether the Internet is only a medium for conventional political participation. Many scholars have suggested that there is a positive connection between

Internet use and political participation (Bakker & DeVreese, 2011; Moy & Scheufele, 2000; Zhang, Johnson, Seltzer, & Bichard, 2010). They argue that informational oriented and communicative social media use such as discussing politics online, can make a contribution towards greater political participation (Holt, Shehata, Strömbäck, & Ljungberg, 2013; Li & Chan, 2017).

2.2.2 Tendency and explanations of political participation

There is a tendency that the traditional forms of political participation such as voting and political campaigns, have been decreasing in established democracies (Dalton & Wattenberg; 2002; Putnam, 2001; Wattenberg, 1996; Whiteley, 2011).

Putnam (2001) attributes the decrease in electoral behaviors to the decrease in social capital. He accuses television of occupying people's time and impeding people from actively participating in civic affairs. He is concerned that disengagement might threaten the foundation of democracy. However, Dalton (2008) holds a more optimistic attitude towards the changes in voting behaviors. He argues that the decline of voting is less serious than it is perceived by many scholars and there is more of a shift in the pattern of political participation than a general decline (Dalton 2008). Dalton's assertion does have some evidence from other empirical studies. In contrast with the decline of institutional forms of political participation, scholars have found that there is an increase of non-institutional political participation (Barnes et al., 1979; Dalton, 2008; Inglehart, 1997; Klingemann & Fuchs, 1995). Such a shift in political participation is connected with a more profound and fundamental change in values: it reflects the weakening of the duty-based citizenship norm and the growing of the engaged citizenship norm (Dalton, 2008); the emergence of 'critical citizens' (Norris, 1999); and the embrace of postmaterialists values (Inglehart, 1997). However, more recent studies have held a rather pessimistic attitude towards

political engagement. Foa and Mounk (2016) have questioned the shift of political participation modes as highlighted by Dalton. According to them, the younger generations are less likely to participate in both conventional and unconventional participation compared with older generations.

2.3 Political trust

Trust has long been an important focus of social scientists (Fukuyama, 1995; Putnam, 1993). Trust is an individual external evaluation towards the trustworthiness of the outside world rather than an internal trait or social characteristic of the individual (Levi & Stoker, 2000; Newton, 2001). Political trust, therefore, reflects how citizens view the performance of their political system. The public makes an evaluation based on whether the government's operation meets their normative expectations (Hetherington, 1998; Miller, 1974; Newton, 2001). There seems to be a paradox about political trust. On the one hand, political trust is the precondition of democracies. It can strengthen legitimacy and effectiveness of democratic regimes and lack of political trust undermines the rule of law. On the other hand, too much blind trust can be as harmful to democracy as too little. A healthy democracy requires critical and skeptical citizens who are rationally willing to question the decisions made by the government (Hardin, 1999; Mishler & Rose, 1997; Norris, 1999; Wang, 2005; Wang & You, 2016).

2.3.1 Theories and conceptualization of political trust

Two dominant theories explain the origin of political trust. Institutional theorists have argued that institutional performance such as contribution to the economic growth, or implementing satisfactory policy, is the reason for regime support (Coleman, 1990; Hetherington, 1998). Political cultural theorists believe that values and norms deeply rooted in a culture that people learn through socialization in their early time shape their trust towards the regime. Values and

norms can pass from the older to the younger generations, which exert a stable influence on people (Almond & Verba, 1963; Putnam, 1993). Based on the divergence of institutional theory and cultural theory, Mishler and Rose (2001) further have developed a distinction between macro-oriented and micro-oriented political trust. Macro-cultural theory emphasizes the influence of national culture on political trust of a society while micro-cultural theory is concerned with the individual construction of political trust through political socialization. Macro-institutional theory uses actual government performance as an indicator for political trust while micro-institutional theory stresses individual perception of governmental performance.

Many scholars have believed that political trust should be understood as a multi-dimensional concept (Easton, 1975; Grönlund & Setälä, 2007; Norris, 1999). Easton (1975) highlights the distinction between *specific trust* and *diffuse trust*. Specific trust refers to the evaluation towards political authorities and their performance while diffuse trust refers to the support towards the foundational aspects of the political system. Diffuse trust allows people to maintain their faith in their political system even when they are not satisfied with the elites who are in charge. Norris (1999) points out that neglecting the object of political trust would confuse. She develops the conceptual framework of political trust by distinguishing people's trust towards *political community*, *regime principles*, *regime performance*, *regime institutions* and *political actors* within a range from diffuse support to specific support. Support towards political community is related to national attachment and sense of belonging. Democratic regime principles include values such as freedom, participation, tolerance and moderation, respect for rights and the rule of law. Support for democratic regime principles, therefore, reflects people's faith in the 'ideal' perspective of democracy. Support for regime performance, on the other hand, adopts a more 'realistic' perspective of democracy. It shows how people evaluate the political system's

function in practice. Trust towards political institutions such as parliaments, courts of justice, political parties and the police is more concrete and closer to specific support. Norris (1999) argues that specific trust may fluctuate according to incumbent performance, but the diffuse support could be rather stable.

2.3.2 Trends and empirical studies of political trust

Empirical studies have suggested that there has been a decline of political trust in the United States (Catterberg & Moreno, 2006; Dalton, 2000; Newton & Norris, 2000). The trend have started since the 1960s (Craig, 1980). National Election Studies (NES) in the United States have found a dramatic decline of political confidence from 1964 to 1972 (Citrin, 1974; Levi & Stoker, 2000). In the 1980s, there was an increase of political trust toward the incumbent government, at least in the first half of the decade, according to Miller and Borrelli (1991). In the 1990s, political trust fluctuated and reached its lowest point (Dalton, 1999; Norris, 1999). Similar widespread erosion of political trust, however, has not been found in Europe (Kaase, 1999).

There have been debates about whether the decline of political trust in established democratic countries is the dissatisfaction with incumbent governments or a crisis of democratic values (Citrin, 1974; Miller, 1974; Norris, 1999). The latter is a more severe problem than the former for threatening the stability of democratic regime. Optimistic scholars believe that although Americans showed distrust towards incumbents as well as political institutions, they still hold faith towards democratic principles (Dalton, 1999). Norris (1999) associates the decline of political confidence with the emergence of more sophisticated citizens who are more critical towards the government rather than cynical. More recent studies, however, have suggested that there is a danger of democratic deconsolidation and distrust might have expanded from the institutional level to democratic principle. Foa and Mounk (2016) observed a decline in diffuse

support and a widening generational gap in political cynicism in the United States and Europe. According to them, the younger generations showed less confidence in regime legitimacy than the older generations.

In contrast to the decline of political trust in democracies, the authoritarian regime such as China, enjoys a high level of political trust (Chen, 2004; Shi, 2001; Wang, 2005; Wong, Wan, & Hsiao, 2011). Newton (2001) suspects that the high political trust of China is a result of social pressures and political controls. Many Chinese scholars, however, have understood this phenomenon differently. Shi (2001) studied political trust in Mainland China and Taiwan and found the origin of political trust differed in each case. Government performance explained political trust in democratizing Taiwan while traditional values contributed to the variation of political trust in China. He further noted that respect towards authority, maintaining harmony and avoiding conflict are values deeply rooted in Chinese culture, which contribute to the high trust among Chinese. Wang (2005) argues that economic performance was the reason for the high political trust in China in 2005. However, with series data, he observed a decline of political trust in China after a decade. He contributs the decrease of political trust in China to the emerging liberal democratic values and modernization, similar to what happened in advanced democratic regimes (Wang & You, 2016).

2.3.3 Political trust and political participation

There has been overlapping of the decline of political trust and decrease in voting in the United States that has attracted much attention from researchers to study the relationship between political trust and political participation.

Almond and Verba (1963) see political trust as a prerequisite for political participation. Lack of trust towards the political system could cause political cynicism or alienation which would in

the end harm legitimacy and stability of the system. Seligson (1983) argued that lack of diffuse support is associated with the decline of electoral behaviors using a Mexican sample. The positive association between electoral participation and diffuse support was further confirmed by Dalton (2004). Torney-Purta et al. (2004) examined this relationship among adolescents across five countries (Bulgaria, Chile, Colombia, England and the United States). They found political trust is a moderate positive predictor of political participation such as voting, conventional political participation beyond voting and informal political participation. An opposing opinion argues that there is no relationship between voting and political trust. People who trust the government are not more active in voting than those who do not (Citrin, 1974; Miller, 1980).

Other scholars indicate that the erosion of political trust leads to a change in political participation pattern. People are more likely to join non-institutional forms of political participation than institutional forms when they do not trust the government (Levi & Stoker, 2000). This statement was based on overlapping the unrest of American politics and a sharp decline of political trust between the 1960s and the 1970s. Many scholars tested this hypothesis (Citrin, 1974; Hooghe & Marien, 2013; Kasse, 1999). Hooghe and Marien's (2013) study confirms the hypothesis that political trust is negatively linked with non-institutionalized participation. However, some scholars have only found the relationship between political distrust and non-institutionalized political participation was weak and unsystematic. Citrin (1974) argues that political cynicism plays a minor role in fostering involvement in illegal protest. Kasse (1999) found that the correlation between political trust and engagement in direct participation such as petitions, boycotts and demonstrations was rather small. He further explained that engagement in non-institutionalized action is more of a result of the expansion of political participation repertoire rather than the consequence of distrust towards the government. The

relationship between political trust and political participation in an authoritarian regime is dynamic. Chinese rural citizens tend to use petitions as a way to express their dissatisfaction towards the local government, such participation, nevertheless, is based on political trust of the higher level government. If their petition succeeds, non-institutional political participation would be institutionalized, but if the petition activities fail, petitioners' political trust towards the central government may disappear accordingly (Li, 2008).

The relationship between political trust and political participation becomes more complicated when another variable, political efficacy, is taken into consideration. If citizens' political trust is understood as the people's perception of an '*output*' of the government's decision-making, then the function of political efficacy is not negligible because it represents an '*input*' in the interaction between government and individuals (Almond & Verba, 1963; Gamson, 1968, Paige, 1971). There is a disagreement on what kind of combination of political trust and political efficacy leads to radical participation. Some believe that alienated citizens who have low political trust and low political efficacy, also understood as political alienations are more likely to become radical (Finifter, 1970; Lipest, 1960). Others, however, argue that a combination of political distrust and a high level of political efficacy contributes to unconventional participation (Gamson, 1968).

The famous mistrust-efficacy assumption started with Gamson (1968, p. 48). As he stated: "a combination of high political efficacy and low political trust is the optimum combination for mobilization- a belief that influence is both possible and necessary." This assumption has been examined by many scholars (Abravanel & Busch, 1975; Fraser, 1970; Hawkins, Marando, & Taylor, 1971; Hooghe & Marien, 2013; Paige, 1971; Sigelman & Feldman, 1983). Paige supported Gamson's statement after studying black male' political activities and found that the

dissident people (featured with high political efficacy and low political trust) instead of alienated people engaged more in riot participation. Paige (1971) argues that political efficacy is more decisive in influencing whether individuals are politically active or not, but whether the action is radical relies more on political trust. There are studies against the mistrust-efficacious assumption. Sigelman and Feldman (1983) examined the hypothesis with cross-national data from Europe and the United States but only found a weak connection between mistrust-efficacious orientation and unconventional political activities.

2.4 Political efficacy

Self-efficacy is a concept that originates from Bandura's (1986) social cognitive theory. It is a psychological disposition referring to people's beliefs about the outcomes of their actions. People are more likely to act if they believe that their action can produce a satisfied result. When self-efficacy is applied to the context of political practice, it becomes political efficacy. Political efficacy means "the feeling that political and social change is possible, and that the individual citizen can play a part in bringing about change" (Campbell, Gurin, & Miller, 1954, p. 187). At first, political efficacy was a unidimensional concept. Campbell and Converse (1972) found a divergence in the measurement of political efficacy[4] and indicated there might be another dimension of the concept. Balch (1974) confirmed this assumption and named the two dimensions 'external political efficacy' and 'internal political efficacy'. Internal political efficacy

4 Four items (No say, No care, Voting only, Politics complicated were used to measure political efficacy as a scale used by the Survey Research Center (SRC). 1 No say: people like me don't have any say about what government does. 2 No care: I don't think public officials care much what people like me think. 3 Voting only: voting is the only way that people like me can have any say about how the government runs things. 4 Politics Complicated: sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't understand what's going on.

refers to people's evaluation on their political capacities while external political efficacy refers to the perceived responsiveness of authorities and institutions.

2.4.1 Political efficacy and political participation

Political efficacy was first used to predict people's participation in U.S. presidential elections. Low political efficacy is linked with political indifference while high political efficacy is seen as a precondition for actively engaged political behaviors (Almond & Verba, 1963). Many scholars have argued that internal political efficacy is a positive predictor of both conventional participation and unconventional participation (Balch, 1974; Diemer & Rapa, 2016; Finkel, 1985; Schulz et al., 2010; Shingles, 1981). For example, Schulz (2005) found political efficacy is a positive predictor for both electoral participation and political activities beyond voting such as writing letters to newspapers and joining the party. The relationship between internal efficacy and political participation is not a 'one-way street' but reciprocal. Participatory activities such as voting and political campaigns involvement, have positive consequences on individual political efficacy, both internal efficacy and external political efficacy. People obtain political skills as well as self-competence by joining political activities (Finkel, 1985; Kahne & Westheimer, 2006; Richardson, 2003; Schulz, 2005). Some argue that the result of political activities matters (Bowler & Donovan, 2002). Successful experiences of political participation are more likely to make people feel efficacious while frustration experiences might work oppositely and decrease people's political efficacy (Kahne & Westheimer, 2006).

The relationship between external political efficacy and participation is not clear. Some have suggested external efficacy has almost no correlation with political participation (Balch, 1974; Diemer & Rapa, 2016). Dalton (1996) found that external efficacy is linked with radical activities. Wattenberg (2002) suggests that low external efficacy contributes to a decrease in

voting in the United States. Contradictory evidence from Hong Kong has associated low external efficacy with a higher probability of voting. Lee (2005) describes this as "protest voting" with Hong Kong character: Hong Kong people used voting for the anti-government (pro-democracy camp) representatives in the Legislative Council as a way to express their dissatisfaction towards the government. Here in Lee's study, the high voting rate could be considered similar to protesting on the street in nature.

2.5 Political and educational context

This section aims to provide a description of the political and educational backgrounds of both Mainland China and Hong Kong. Political background and civic education orientation can be seen as the mediation of the interaction between regimes and citizens: they are shaped by the regime type and have influence on students' political socialization. Political background includes structure of the political system and citizens' practice of conventional and unconventional political participation. Civic education is reviewed from the perspective of civic education policy.

2.5.1 Political context

Civic participation in Mainland China and Hong Kong may differ from how they are perceived in democratic societies considering both Mainland China and Hong Kong are not completely democratic regimes with Mainland China an authoritarian regime and Hong Kong a hybrid regime. The literature review in this section, therefore, can show what different forms of political participation *actually* mean to students in the authoritarian and hybrid regime rather than what these concepts *supposedly* mean in democratic regimes.

Conventional political participation

Conventional participation such as elections have an essential function in democratic regimes. Elections make the representative democracy legitimate. Citizens express their opinions, take positions and make decisions on public issues by voting for the party or candidates they support. Elections, however, function differently in hybrid Hong Kong and authoritarian Mainland China. Both regimes have direct elections at the local level. Elections in Hong Kong are more democratic and receive less interference from the ruling authorities than in Mainland China.

As a hybrid regime, which combines the characteristics of democracy and authoritarianism, Hong Kong has a partial democratization (Lau & Kuan, 2000). The electoral system in Hong Kong is fragmented, meaning that universal suffrage has not been achieved yet and elections only play a minor role in changing political agenda. Direct elections at the district level (District Council) were introduced to Hong Kong in 1982. There are partially direct elections for higher level institutions such as the Legislative Council with half of the seats allowed to be directly elected. Although there are channels for the public to elect representatives in the Legislative Council, the Legislative Council itself has limited power in policy making because Hong Kong has an 'executive-led' tradition. Although the Chief Executive as the leader of the administrative branch is elected by an election committee rather than by the public, the Chief Executive has the monopoly in policy making (Lau & Kuan, 2000; Lee, 2005). As a hybrid regime, Hong Kong has a multi-party system, meaning that parties from different camps (i.e., pro-Beijing and pro-democracy) can contest. Nevertheless, the development of political parties is still handicapped and most of the political parties are small, weak, lack adequate finance and exert limited influence on society (Lau & Kuan, 2000).

Unlike Hong Kong whose legislative branch is partially elected by citizens, the National People's Congress of China as a legislative branch in Mainland China is not elected through

direct elections. Members of the People's Congress above the county level are produced through indirect elections, which are strongly manipulated by the CCP. Similar to the 'executive-lead' tradition in Hong Kong, the political system in China can be described as 'Party-lead'. The People's Congress system plays a role in mobilizing people to implement the policy from the Party and government rather than making decisions (McCormick, 1990; O'Brien, 2001). Direct election is available at village level (Nathan, 1986). Direct elections in Mainland China, however, at best can be understood as semi-competitive since elections and nominations are controlled by Party-dominated local election committees. Furthermore, it is unlikely for elected officials to change the central government's policy or monitor the executive authorities. Although the current direct elections are far from being claimed as fully democratic, they do provide an opportunity for the masses to get involved in politics. Many Chinese people take the opportunity to exercise their political right by voting out corrupt leaders, suggesting people's aspirations towards democratic values and practices (Shi, 1999).

Unconventional political participation

Demonstrations and protests once regarded as social unrest now have become mainstream forms of political participation in Western countries (Norris, 1999, 2003). People use unconventional political participation to express their dissent towards government policies and seek more direct impact in political agendas. Protests vary in terms of purpose, scope and influence in Hong Kong and in Mainland China. Generally, protests in Hong Kong share a more 'regime-challenging' nature and have stronger influence in society than in Mainland China.

Mass participation such as protests and social movements plays an active part in Hong Kong's democratization process and represents the democratic aspect of the hybrid regime. Considering the conventional forms of political participation are underdeveloped to some extent,

unconventional forms of political participation are, therefore, important to provide another channel for the public to get involved in politics. Protests in Hong Kong concentrate on the issues in the political sphere such as democratization and national identity. The largest protest during the colonial period happened in 1989. There were about 1.5 million Hong Kong people who participated in that protest to support the democratic movement in Beijing (Hung, 2014). The first biggest protest after the 1997 handover broke out in 2003. About half a million activists were opposed to the implementation of the Anti-Subversion Law by the Hong Kong government. Their actions successfully suspended the government's plan (Ortmann, 2015). In 2012 the Hong Kong government attempted to implement Moral and National Education as a compulsory subject, raising protest among secondary students and their parents. Students and their parents thought the new subject was biased by only presenting a positive picture of China and they were worried the new subject would become indoctrination. Anti-National Education Movement also ended with success and schools were allowed to choose to implement the new subject based on their own will (Garrett & Ho, 2014). In 2014, students were mobilized in the Umbrella Movement, the purpose of which was to pursue a more representative electoral reform. The goal of universal suffrage, however, was not achieved because of the obstruction from an ally of local business elites and the Chinese government (Ortmann, 2015). Although the Hong Kong government compromised to people's demands in some protests, protests in Hong Kong have not been as widespread as in democratic regimes. Protest is still a marginalized form of political participation and considered to threaten stability by the ruling authorities.

Protests in Mainland China seldom challenge the authority or legitimacy of the political leadership, which illustrates a subtle balance between the ruling authorities and the protestors. There have been a large number of protests taking place in China. According to Lorentzen

(2013), the number of protests and ‘mass incidents’ increased from about 10000 in 1994 to more than 80000 in 2008. Large numbers of protests did not lead to the collapse of the regime which raised the interest of many scholars (Lorentzen, 2013; O’Brien & Li, 2006; Perry, 2010). Perry (2010) describes the characteristics of protests in Mainland China as ‘playing by the rules’, underlining the non-regime-challenging nature of the protests. The purpose of many protests is to seek protection towards an individual’s legal rights or economic interests instead of pursuing political democratization reform. These protests are small-scale, limited with certain groups (i.e., villagers or workers) and can hardly be mobilized into social movements to generate wider influence. The target of dissent are either cadres, grassroots government officials or factory owners instead of the central government. For example, rural petitioners might express their grievance towards local cadres who disregard the policy and violate petitioners’ interests using letters of complaint. Their protest actions, however, are established on the trust towards the central government. Protestors expect the central government to give the response to their demands and to punish corrupt local officials (O’Brien & Li, 2006).

The ruling authorities develop different strategies towards different types of protest. A strategic mix of concession and repression has been used to deal with social unrest (Carnesecca, 2015). When a protest is mobilized into large scale or regime-challenging in nature, the authoritarian regime will not hesitate to repress. The Tiananmen incidence in 1989 is an example. For small-scale economic protests as previously mentioned, instead of repressing, the authoritarian regime shows a certain level of tolerance or even encouragement. Protests are seen as important feedback from society, which could be used to gather information from society and monitoring lower level government by the state (Lorentzen, 2013; Weller, 2008). This strategy is also described as ‘responsive authoritarianism’ (Carnesecca, 2015). As expected by protestors,

sometimes the ruling authorities give a response to public grievances expressed in protests. Such feedback can prevent outraged citizens from feeling there is 'no other way out' (Goodwin, 2001) and avoiding discontent that might exacerbate more radical activities.

2.5.2 Educational context

Civic education in Hong Kong

Civic education in Hong Kong has had different characteristics in different periods. Civic education in the colonial period had a depoliticized feature (Bray & Lee, 1993; Fairbrother, 2003). Social stability and economic prosperity rather than politics were given more priority by policy makers. This met the interests of different stake holders. The colonial government preferred a depoliticized society to resist the influence of the Communist Party. Local businessmen also favored a depoliticized society so that their economic activities could benefit from the stable environment (Bray & Lee, 1993; Fairbrother, 2006). New Chinese immigrants who were political refugees would also stay away from politics due to political phobia from the Cultural Revolution (Lee, 2004). The depoliticized nature of civic education was also reflected in the textbooks and civic education classrooms. Any content related to politics was missing in the textbooks and discussing politics in school was considered to be sensitive (Bray & Lee, 1993).

Between 1984 and 1997, civic education policy became more politicized (Leung & Ng, 2004). The signing of the Sino-British Joint Declaration in 1984 represented a beginning of colonial transition. The *1984 White Paper on Further Development of Representative Government in Hong Kong* (Hong Kong, 1984) outlined the necessity of the public to be educated more effectively in political and constitutional matters. One year after, *Guidelines on Civic Education in School* (CDC, 1985) were published aiming to smooth the process of the transition by promoting Western democratic values as well as a sense of belonging to China and

Hong Kong among students. The *1985 Guidelines* was revised in 1996. *Guidelines on Civic Education in School (CDC, 1996)* reflected the tensions between nationalism and liberalism and a common theme of anti-colonialism (Bray & Lee, 2001; Lee & Sweeting, 2001). One goal of the *1996 Guidelines* is to promote civic awareness and human rights through civic education:

> Developing in young people not only the basic political knowledge, but also skills, attitudes and competence necessary for them to observe their civic rights and responsibilities, to acquire critical thinking dispositions and civic awareness and to become rational and responsible citizens who can play a constructive role in the civic mission of the nation, the state and the world (CDC, 1996, p. 5).

Facilitating students' national identity is another goal of the guideline, which reflects Chinese sovereignty in Hong Kong:

> Politically speaking, one's civic identity is defined by one's national identity. The national community therefore constitutes the ultimate democratic context of one's civic learning. National sprit such as nationalism and patriotism is essential not only for one's national identity and sense of belonging, but also cohesion and strength of one's own nation (CDC, 1996, p. 23).

Civic education in the post-handover period has a re-depoliticized feature (Leung & Ng, 2004). The political content about democracy and human rights in the document is outweighed by non-political and moral content in the official document *Learning to Learn: Life Long Learning and Whole-person Development* (CDC, 2001). Moreover, national identity was identified as the key value to be addressed by citizenship education. National identity was expressed in an apolitical way that only the historical, cultural and environmental aspects of

China were emphasized and political aspects relating to China were avoided. There were concerns that a focus of nationalistic education would undermine the importance of democratic values or become indoctrination (Leung & Ng, 2004).

Civic education in Mainland China

Civic education in China is known as ideological education (sixiang zhengzhi jiaoyu) and ideomoral education (sixiang pinde jiaoyu). Such naming underlines the politicized nature of civic education in Mainland China. Patriotic education is an important agenda item in civic education in Mainland China. 'Love the country' was addressed in the *1988 Outline of Moral Education in Secondary School* (State Education Commission, 1988). Students were taught to put state interests before personal interests. Later in the *1995 Revised Outline of Moral Education in Secondary School* (Ministry of Education, 1995), patriotic education developed a broader content. Students were taught about Chinese culture, revolutionary heroes, contemporary achievements and national unity. The 2001 *Revised Curriculum Standards for the Primary Ideomoral and Junior Secondary Ideopolitical Curriculum of the Nine-year Universal Education* (Ministry of education, 2001) further addressed the importance of patriotic education by cultivating 'culture identity' among students. Students are expected to develop an affection towards the motherland and learn that individual development is strongly associated with the fate of the country (Zhong & Lee, 2008). Fairbrother (2003) holds a critical attitude towards patriotic education in Mainland China. According to him, being patriotic in the Chinese context means not only loving the country, but also supporting a socialist system and the leadership of the CCP. Patriotic education, therefore, functions as an ideological instrument used by the ruling authorities to preserve its legitimacy, political control and social order, which reflects the hegemony of the regime.

Democracy education is another theme of civic education in the post Mao era. It should be noted that democracy need to be understood within the Chinese context, which is not the same as Western liberal democracy. To be more specific, it means 'socialist democracy with Chinese characteristics' with CCP holds the power and leadership. The purpose of democracy education is to enhance students' understanding towards law and democracy. Both the 1988 Outline and 1995 Revised Outline contain content about the legal system in China to facilitate students' legal awareness. In order to promote students' understanding of democracy, political knowledge and political rights and freedom were emphasized in the 2001 Revised Curriculum Standard. Chinese students were expected to learn about the 'socialist democratic system with Chinese characteristics' including the role of the People's Congress, China's election system and negotiated democracy in China (Ministry of Education, 2001). Students have been encouraged to exercise their political rights by voting in elections, joining political discussion and giving suggestions to the government. Meanwhile, students were reminded to enjoy the political freedoms within the boundary of the law (Zhong & Lee, 2008).

As mentioned above, civic education in post-handover Hong Kong is depoliticized in nature. In contrast, civic education in Mainland China is more politicized. Moreover, civic education in Hong Kong is implemented by a non-compulsory and cross-curriculum approach whereas civic education in Mainland China is implemented by a compulsory and subject-based approach. Both the characteristics of civic education and the implementation approach might influence its capacity in shaping students' political socialization.

2.6 Conclusion

This chapter reviewed the relevant literature about political participation, political trust and political efficacy, both theoretically and empirically. There has been a tendency that

conventional participation such as voting and political campaigns, have been decreasing whereas unconventional participation such as protests have been increasing in established democracies. The decline of conventional participation has been overlapped with the erosion of political trust in the United States which motivated many studies about the relationship between political attitude and political participation. Some believed that the erosion of political trust would decrease conventional participation and bring political alienation and cynicism. Others, however, argued that the erosion of political trust leads to a change in political participation pattern from conventional participation to unconventional participation. There were also studies examining the relationship between political efficacy and political participation, suggesting that political efficacy is a positive predictor of both conventional participation and unconventional participation.

This chapter also introduced the background of both Mainland China and Hong Kong in terms of political context and orientations of civic education. Both regimes have direct elections at the local level. Elections in Hong Kong are more democratic and receive less interference from the ruling authorities than in Mainland China. Protests in Hong Kong share a more 'regime-challenging' nature and have a stronger influence on society than in Mainland China. Civic education in post-handover Hong Kong is depoliticized in nature. In contrast, civic education in Mainland China is more politicized.

Three knowledge gaps have been identified in the literature review. First, most of the literature which has been reviewed is focused on political attitudes and political participation in Western democratic countries. Few studies have examined the attitude-behavior framework in the Asian context, especially in incomplete democratic societies such as Mainland China and Hong Kong, the former being an authoritarian regime while the latter being a hybrid regime. Second, most of

the studies that attempted to understand political participation have paid more attention to political participation of adults but have ignored the political attitude and engagement of adolescents. Considering that political attitudes are established in people's adolescent period through a political socialization process would have an impact on their future choices as citizens, it is worth investigating adolescents' intentions for future participation. Third, many cross-national studies about political attitudes and political participation have been from a macro perspective and used society as their analysis subject. The current study addresses the question about political participation from the individual level and shows how different groups emerge within each society based on their political attitudes and participation.

According to the knowledge gap previously highlighted, the current study attempts to answer the following research questions:

RQ1. What are Mainland Chinese and Hong Kong students' intentions for future civic participation regarding illegal protest, legal protest, electoral participation, and informal political participation and what differences, if any, are there between the two groups of students?

RQ2. How strong are Mainland Chinese and Hong Kong students' levels of political trust and political efficacy and what, if any, are the differences between the two groups of students?

RQ3. How do political trust and political efficacy influence Mainland Chinese and Hong Kong students' intentions for future civic participation?

Chapter 3 will describe the methodology and methods used in the current study to address the previously-mentioned research questions.

Chapter 3

Methodology and method

3.1 Introduction

The previous chapter presented the literature review of the current study. This chapter introduces the methodology and method of the study. This chapter includes 4 sections. Section 3.1 is the introduction of the chapter. Section 3.2 provides the methodology foundation of the current study. This is a quantitative comparative study utilizing secondary data analysis of International Large Scale Assessments. Both the variable-centered approach and person-centered approach were used for analyzing the data. Section 3.3 illustrates the method used by the current study, in terms of measurement instrument, missing values, sampling and the normal distribution of the data. Section 3.4 draws this chapter to a conclusion.

3.2 Methodology

3.2.1 Comparative and quantitative methodology

The methodology used in the current study represents an integrated comparative and quantitative approach to understanding social phenomena. It seeks to compare the responses of two samples of students to a common set of survey questions related to civic values and understandings. With these foci, the study is an example of what Hahn (2010) referred to as "comparative civic education", an area of research which she believes deserves greater attention.

As a comparative study, the current study follows the framework put forward by Phillips and Schweisfurth (2007). It starts with conceptualization, neutralizing the question from any context to gain a comprehensive knowledge about the addressed questions or concepts. A general question addressed by the current study is '*what are students' level of political trust, political*

efficacy and intentions for future civic participation'. The next step is contextualization, which means to understand the issue in the local context. In this stage, students' political attitudes and behaviors are understood in the context of an authoritarian regime and a hybrid regime. The third step is to identify the differences through direct comparison. Mainland Chinese students' political efficacy, political trust and intentions for future civic participation are compared with their Hong Kong counterparts. The fourth step is to develop the explanations of the differences. The differences of Mainland Chinese and Hong Kong students' political attitudes and behaviors are explained by regime type and civic education orientation. This explanation framework originates from Li (2015) who developed a three-level comparative inquiry based on Bray and Thomas' (1995) model: level 1 is the regime type, level 2 is curriculum and policy formulations and level 3 is students' personal experience.

Comparability is of great importance in a comparative study. Information from the different countries needs to be matched to ensure equivalence (Beredy, 1967). Quantitative methodology can provide such guarantee by using precise hypotheses, standard techniques, and numerical measurements to control the consistency of the measurements in different settings (Neuman, 2006). International Large-Scale Assessments (ILSA) is an example of a comparative quantitative study. ILSA collaborates with policymakers, local government and local schools to collect data in different countries. The cross-national nature of ILSA makes it possible to examine how norms, values, cultural traditions influence the individual in different contexts (Turney-Purta & Amadeo, 2013). The Large cross-nation sample of ILSA represents a wide population and allow the results to be generalized into a large scope. Rich database of ILSA motivates a considerable number of follow-up secondary studies (Chow 2013; Kennedy, Hahn, & Lee, 2007; Quintelier & Hooghe, 2013; Torney-Purta, Barber, & Richardson, 2004).

3.2.2 Secondary data analysis based on ILSA

The current study is a secondary data analysis based on ILSA. The data for the current study consists of two parts. The Hong Kong data came from International Civic and Citizenship Education Study (ICCS) conducted by the International Association for Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA) in 2009, which is an ILSA study. The Mainland China data came from Chinese Civic and Citizenship Education Study (CCCS, 2012), a modeled study of ICCS 2009. Therefore, the current study can be seen as complementary to existing ISLA studies with the benefit of including data from China that has not participated in other ILSA studies concerned with civics and citizenship. There are advantages of using secondary data analysis such as being inexpensive, allowing comparisons across groups, raising new questions, facilitating replication and stimulating open sources (Greenhoot & Dowsett, 2012; Neuman, 2006, Trzesniewski, Donnellan, & Lucas, 2011). Secondary data provides a good solution to challenges in the data collection process. Researchers who lack funding, resources, or experience of data collection may benefit from the secondary analysis of public data, the quality of which are well controlled. In addition, secondary data analysis of ILSA can benefit from its large sample size. A large sample makes it possible for researchers to examine more complex research hypothesis and use more advanced statistical methods such as structural equation modeling for data analysis. More importantly, a large sample allows researchers to conduct studies about subpopulation group (Greenhoot & Dowsett, 2012). It is common that subpopulation groups are divided based on demographic factors such as gender, ethnicity and social economic status. The current study attempts to differentiate subpopulation groups by their political attitudes and political behaviors, and illustrate the characteristics of the subpopulation groups.

3.2.3 Variable-centered approach and person-centered approach

The current study adopts both the variable-centered approach and personal-centered approach for data analysis. A variable-centered approach assumes that the population is homogeneous. The purpose of this approach is to understand the relationship between variables (Laursen & Hoff, 2006). Each individual's answer contributes to an average score that eventually represents the overall level of achievement for a particular scale. Extreme values of the variable may not be identified when using a variable-center approach. Descriptive analysis, comparative means and regression analysis belong to variable-centered analysis. A person-centered approach, on the other hand, assumes the population is heterogeneous. Instead of the relationship between variables, a person-centered approach emphasizes the relationship between individuals. The principle of a person-centered approach is to classify individuals with similar characteristics into the same group and put individuals with different features into various groups (Jung & Wickrama, 2008). Similarity within groups and the differences between groups are both highlighted in a person-centered approach. A variable-centered approach and person-centered approach are complementary to each other. The different aspects of the data, therefore, can be illustrated by using the two approaches together.

3.3 Method

3.3.1 Instrument: validity and reliability

As a secondary study, the current study does not develop the questionnaires, rather, the measurement instruments are established based on the original ICCS 2009 and CCCS 2012 studies. The instrument of the Hong Kong questionnaire came from ICCS 2009, the largest ever cross-national study about how students are prepared to become citizens. ICCS 2009 evaluated students' comprehension of civic knowledge, development of political dispositions, and

intentions for future civic participation using a 45-minute questionnaire. A 4-point Likert scale was used in the questionnaire (Schulz et al., 2010). The original instrument was in English and a translated traditional Chinese version was adopted for Hong Kong students.

The instrument of the Mainland China questionnaire came from CCCS 2012, which adopted a modified version of the ICCS 2009 questionnaire. Scholars from the Center for Governance and Citizenship of The Education University of Hong Kong made a contribution to developing the questionnaire by tran slating the language into simplified Chinese and modifying the questions to adjust to the Chinese context (Chong, Kennedy, Chan, & Cheung, 2014).

Table 2 shows the construction of the original ICCS 2009 and CCCS 2012 scales and details of the original instruments are in Appendix F. The political efficacy scale and the political trust scale are each one dimensional scale. The civic participation scale has five subscales including *Illegal protest, Legal protest, Electoral participation, Expected political activities and Informal political participation*. There are several principles in adapting the original measurement instrument in the current study. First, considering the current study is comparative, the scales of the two questionnaires are supposed to be equivalent and matched. Items which only appeares in ICCS 2009 but not CCCS 2012 such as ‘trust towards local government’ (27B) and ‘taking part in a peaceful march or rally’ (31D), were excluded. Second, the scales need to fit the theoretical framework of the current study. Irrelevant items were deleted from the original scale. For example, the current study defines political trust as citizens’ evaluation towards the political system, however, students were asked about their trust towards a wider range of agents, including media (27G), United Nations (27I), schools (27J) and people in general (27K) in the original political trust scale. These items were excluded for irrelevance. Moreover, among the five subscales of civic participation, *Expected political activities* subscale was abandoned in the

current study because the questions asked in this scale are more suitable for the democratic context featured with competitive party and campaign systems rather than authoritarian or hybrid contexts. Finally, the scales were adjusted based on the results of the validity and reliability tests. The details are as follows.

Table 2

Construction of original ICCS 2009 and CCCS 2012 scale

Scale	Subscale	Item no.	Item label
Political efficacy	/	6	23A, 23B, 23C, 23D, 23E, 23F
Political trust	/	6 (*10*)	27A, 27C, 27D, 27E, 27F, 27H (*27B, 27G, 27I, 27J, 27K*)
Civic participation	Illegal protest	3	31G, 31H, 31I
	Legal protest	5 (*6*)	31A, 31B, 31C, 31E, 31F (31D)
	Electoral participation	3	32A, 32B, 32C
	(*Expected political activities*)	0 (*4*)	(*32D, 32E, 32F, 32G*)
	Informal political participation	5	33A, 33B, 33C, 33D, 33E

Note: scales or items in brackets were excluded in the current study.

Validity

Confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) were conducted to examine the construct validity of the instrument. CFA can indicate how well the measures reflect the intended constructs by comparing the estimated population covariance matrix based on the theoretical framework and the observed covariance matrix. The smaller the difference means the better model fit and indented constructs are more likely to be achieved (Schreiber, Nora, Stage, King, Barlow & King, 2006).

There are various indicators for model fit. Chi-square is the most commonly used indicator that an insignificant Chi-square value suggests a good model fit (Hooper, Coughlan, & Mullen, 2008). Chi-square test as a statistically significant test, however, is very sensitive to sample size;

when there is a large sample size, a reasonable model can be rejected (Bentler & Bonnet, 1980; Hooper et al., 2008; Schoot, Lugtig, & Hox, 2012). Considering there is rather a large sample size in the current study, other fit indices were chosen to evaluate the goodness of model fit, including Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA), Non-Normed Fit Index (NFFI), also called Tucker Lewis Index (TLI) and Comparative Fit Index (CFI). RMSEA is regarded as one of the most informative fit indices by Diamantopoulos and Siguaw (2000). RMSEA is an absolute fit index, which can illustrate the goodness of model fit without the need to compare the model to a baseline model. REMSA is sensitive to the number of estimated parameters in the model (Hooper et al., 2008). It is considered that with a RMSEA value of less than 0.05, it provides a close fit; between 0.05 and 0.08 means a reasonable fit; and more than 0.1 suggests an inadequate model fit (Browne & Cudeck, 1993). TLI and CFI are incremental fit indices or comparative fit indices, which compare Chi-square values with a baseline model rather than using raw Chi-square values (Hooper et al., 2008). TLI is preferable for simpler models. TLI is sensitive to sample size and it may show poor model fit with a sample size smaller than 200 (Hopper et al., 2008). CFI, on the other hand, is not sensitive to sample size. TLI and CFI value ranges from 0 to 1 and a value larger than 0.95 indicates good model fit (Hooper et al., 2008; Hu & Bentler, 1999; Schoot et al., 2012).

CFA were used to examine the validity of the three scales for both groups separately. Table 3 illustrates the goodness of model fit of each original scale before modification. Model fit indices suggest that the construct of political efficacy scale and political trust scale were not satisfied. RESMA values were above the cutting point and TLI values were below the cutting point. This suggests that some items might not belong to the scale. Therefore, a post-hoc modification was necessary and some items (23E and 27E) were removed to achieve a better model fit. The civic

participation scale appears to have reasonable goodness fit indices. Three items (31B, 31 E and 33A) were deleted from the scale for having low factor loadings. Model fit indices after modification were reported in Table 4 with a significant improvement of model fit. Apart from the political trust scale of the Mainland Chinese sample still had a problematic model fit (RESMA value was above the cutting point and TLI value was below the cutting point), other scales had an acceptable model fit.

Table 3

Results of Confirmatory Factor Analysis of each scale (before modifying)

Scale	No. items	χ^2	df	p	TLI	CFI	RMSEA
Efficacy HK	6	137.041	9	.000	.956	.974	.075
Efficacy ML	6	205.084	9	.000	.898	.939	.122
Trust HK	6	410.869	9	.000	.848	.909	.133
Trust ML	6	413.354	9	.000	.902	.941	.175
Participation HK	16	1051.700	98	.000	.947	.957	.062
Participation ML	16	470.384	98	.000	.957	.965	.051

Table 4

Results of Confirmatory Factor Analysis of each scale (after modifying)

Scale	No. items	χ^2	*df*	*p*	TLI	CFI	RMSEA
Efficacy HK	5	74.646	5	.000	.967	.983	.074
Efficacy ML	5	51.315	5	.000	.964	.982	.079
Trust HK	5	73.315	5	.000	.957	.978	.074
Trust ML	5	255.468	5	.000	.911	.956	.184
Participation HK	13	578.991	59	.000	.964	.973	.059
Participation ML	13	179.107	59	.000	.983	.987	.037

Although the model for both Mainland China and Hong Kong data had configural variance (with the same structural form), the equivalence of item measurements and underlining

theoretical structure across the two groups could not be guaranteed. Therefore, measurement invariance test was conducted to examine whether the data supported the model across the two groups. This step is important because the invariance of the measurement determines to what extent the data are comparable.

The first step of measurement invariance test was to develop a baseline model. A baseline model is the hypothesis model working as a base for comparison with the stricter constrained model. Baseline model is an unconstrained model, of which factor loadings, variances, covariance and residuals are allowed to differ across two groups. Unlike in the previous section where models of Hong Kong and Mainland China were tested **separately**, the baseline model (model type 1 in Table 5) could be tested for two groups **simultaneously**, estimating the parameters of two groups at the same time (Byrne, 2004).

The second step of measurement invariance test was to compare baseline model with a stricter model such as a model with all factor loadings constrained to be equal across the two groups. This test, also referred to as metric invariance, examines whether all factor loadings are equal across the two groups; it can indicate whether respondents from different groups understand the latent construct in the same way (Hox & Bechger, 1998). Table 5 suggests that all factor-loading constrained models (model type 2) were rejected due to significant Chi-square change values, meaning that there was a significant difference between the baseline model and factor-loading constrained model. Full measurement invariance could, therefore, not be achieved in the current study and a partial measurement invariance test is necessary.

The purpose of a partial measurement invariance test is to identify which factor loadings of items are invariant and which differ across groups. The partial measurement invariance test follows a cumulative procedure put forward by Byrne (2004). It starts with building a partial

constrained model by constraining one factor loading across groups to be equal. Following this, the partial constrained model is compared with the baseline model. Insignificant Chi-square change value indicates the tested item is invariant across groups whereas significant Chi-square change value suggests the tested item is variant. Accordingly, the partial constrained model with identified invariant item becomes the new baseline model. The whole process needs to be repeated until all the remaining items are tested and all invariant items are identified. Table 5 reports the indices of the final partial constrained model (model type 3). Further details about the cumulative process of partial measurement invariance test can be found in Appendix A.

Table 6 is the summary of invariant items across the groups. Partial invariance was achieved in the political efficacy scale and in the four civic participation subscales. No item, however, in the political trust scale was invariant across the group. The partial invariance test results suggest that there were some similarities in the constructs across the two groups, making it possible and meaningful to make comparisons across the two groups. Variant items, especially in the political trust scale, need to be noticed in the following data analysis section. Those variant items might indicate that the two group of students understood the items in a different way and might lead to a theoretical insight. Such differences could be possible since the questionnaire was originally designed for students in liberal democratic countries and when applied to Mainland Chinese and Hong Kong students, the measurement might be twisted somehow. To work out in what way both two groups understood the questionnaire differently is also a purpose of the current study.

Table 5

Results of measurement invariance test

Model	Type	Constraint	χ2	df	p	TLI	CFI	RMESA	Δχ2
Illegal	1	0	781.889	124	.000	.966	.973	.036	
	2	13	998.810	137	.000	.959	.964	.040	216.921***
	3	4	786.404	128	.000	.967	.973	.036	4.515
Protest	1	0	792.963	124	.000	.958	.966	.037	
	2	13	981.056	137	.000	.952	.957	.039	188.092***
	3	4	799.281	128	.000	.959	.966	.036	6.317
Electoral	1	0	843.309	124	.000	.963	.971	.038	
	2	13	1036.897	124	.000	.958	.963	.041	193.588***
	3	5	850.671	129	.000	.964	.971	.037	7.239
Informal	1	0	989.511	148	.000	.956	.964	.038	
	2	14	1167.857	162	.000	.952	.957	.039	178.346***
	3	6	998.308	154	.000	.958	.964	.037	8.797

Note: Model type 1 = baseline model; 2 = all factor-loading constrained model; 3 = partial constrained model

Table 6

Summary of invariant items of each scale

Scales	Total item No.	Invariant item No.	Invariant item label
Political efficacy	5	3	23C, 23D, 23F
Political trust	5	0	/
Illegal protest	3	1	31G
Legal protest	3	1	31A
Electoral	3	2	32B, 32C
Informal	4	3	33B, 33D, 33E

Reliability

Internal reliability of the scales was examined by calculating Cronbach's Alpha for both groups. Table 7 illustrates the reliability of the scales. All scales had an acceptable Cronbach's Alpha (above 0.7). Details of the reliability test can be found in Appendix B.

Table 7

Reliability of each scale

Scales	No. items	Hong Kong Cronbach's α	Mainland China Cronbach's α
Political efficacy	5	.829	.837
Political trust	5	.777	.919
Illegal protest	3	.907	.885
Legal protest	3	.754	.782
Electoral participation	3	.885	.862
Informal participation	4	.843	.822

Final instrument

The final measurement instrument consisted of 3 scales: the political efficacy scale, the political trust scale and the civic participation scale. The civic participation scale had four subscales including the illegal protest subscale, the legal protest subscale, the electoral participation subscale and the informal participation subscale. The make-up of the final measurement instrument is shown in Table 8.

Table 8

Finalized measurement instrument of the current study

Scale	Subscale	Item no.	Item label
Political efficacy	/	5	23A, 23B, 23C, 23D, 23F
Political trust	/	5	27A, 27C, 27D, 27F, 27H
Civic participation	Illegal protest	3	31G, 31H, 31I
	Legal protest	3	31A, 31C, 31E
	Electoral participation	3	32A, 32B, 32C
	Informal participation	4	33B, 33C, 33D, 33E

Political efficacy scale measured students' evaluation of their knowledge and skills that related to political issues and activities. Students were asked to indicate their agreement with the following five statements: (a) I know more about politics than most people my age; (b) When

political issues or problems are being discussed, I usually have something to say; (c) I can understand most political issues easily; (d) I have political opinions worth listening to; (e) I have a good understanding of the political issues facing this country.

Political trust scale measured students' trust towards political institutions. Students were asked about how much they trust the following five institutions: (a) National government; (b) Courts of justice; (c) The police; (d) National parliament; (e) The armed forces.

Illegal protest subscale measured students' willingness of involvement in illegal protests in the future. Illegal protest activities included (a) Spray-painting protest slogans on walls; (b) Blocking traffic; (c) Occupying public buildings.

Legal Protest subscale measured students' willingness regarding involvement in legal protests in the future. Legal protest activities included (a) Writing a letter to a newspaper; (b) Contacting an elected representative; (c) Collecting signatures for a petition.

Electoral participation subscale measured students' intentions for voting in the future. Electoral activities included (a) Voting in local elections; (b) Voting in national elections; (c) Getting information about candidates before voting in an election.

Informal participation subscale measured students' intentions for informal political participation in the future. Informal political particapation included (a) Talking to others about your views on political and social issues; (b) Writing to a newspaper about political and social issues; (c) Contributing to an online discussion forum about social and political issues; (d) Joining an organization for a political or social cause.

3.3.2 Missing value

The respective databases contained the survey responses of 1631 Mainland Chinese students and 2902 Hong Kong students. Listwise deletion was used prior to the data analysis to deal with missing data so that only complete cases would be analyzed while cases with absent values were removed. This method was also used in ICCS 2009 (Schulz et al., 2011). Using Listwise deletion results in a loss of 9.5% of cases from the Mainland China sample and 12.9% from the Hong Kong sample. Given the initial sample sizes, this loss was considered acceptable resulting in a sample of 1475 Mainland Chinese students and 2528 Hong Kong students. Appendix D shows the number and percentage of missing values for each item.

3.3.3 Sampling

ICCS 2009 adopted a stratified two-stage probability sampling design. Schools in the ICCS 2009 were sampled in the first stage from identified strata with the probability of selection proportional to size. An intended sample size of schools was 150. For countries with less than 150 schools, all schools were targeted. In Hong Kong, 76 schools participated in the ICCS student survey. In the second stage, a systematic random sampling was used to select a class within sampled schools. Students from one intact class from the schools were sampled. If the total number of students in one class was small, then more than one class in a particular school was selected. The chance for each student to be selected in each school was equal. Following this sample design, 2902 students were selected to participate in the survey representing the whole population of Grade 8 Hong Kong students (Schulz et al., 2011). After excluding the missing value, there are 2528 Hong Kong students as participants of the current study, with 1267 male and 1261 female students.

CCCS 2012 also adopted a two-stage sampling strategy and collected the data from students in two cities of Mainland China. In the first stage, schools from Shenzhen and Xinyang were randomly sampled. In the second stage, intact classes from each sampled school were selected. There were 857 students from 9 schools in Xinyang and 774 students from 9 schools in Shenzhen (Chong et al., 2014). After excluding the missing values, there are 1475 Mainland Chinese secondary school students as participants of the current study, among which 737 are male and 738 are female.

3.3.4 Normal distribution of the data

The normality of the data is a precondition for most parametric tests. The normality of the data was tested on each scale across two different groups using SPSS. Table 9 shows the skewness and kurtosis of the scales. Skewness ranged from -0.726 to 1.781 while the range for kurtosis was between -1.023 to 2.751. Figures in Appendix C illustrate how the data were distributed. The results suggest that there was a normal distribution for political efficacy, informal participation, electoral participation and legal protest scales for both Hong Kong and Mainland China data. The political trust scale for Hong Kong data wasd approximately normally distributed while the political trust scale for the Mainland China data had a skewed distribution, which could be consistent with the literature, suggesting a very high political trust among Chinese people. The illegal protest scales was not normally distributed for both groups which is also consistent with the reality since both regimes are not fully democratized and illegal protests are hindered by the ruling authorities.

Table 9

Results of normal distribution test of scales

		Hong Kong		Mainland China	
Scales	No. items	Skewness	Kurtosis	Skewness	Kurtosis
Political efficacy	5	-0.105	0.699	-0.261	0.782
Political trust	5	-0.497	0.695	-1.023	0.793
Illegal protest	3	1.527	1.988	1.781	2.751
Legal protest	3	-0.307	-0.236	-0.377	0.018
Electoral participation	3	-0.858	0.740	-0.876	0.721
Informal participation	4	-0.233	-0.021	-0.367	0.301

3.4 Conclusion

This chapter described the broad methodological stance as well as the research methods and techniques used in the study. The current study adopts a quantitative and comparative methodology using secondary data analysis. The Hong Kong dataset came from ICCS 2009 with a sample size of 2528 and the Mainland China dataset was from CCCS 2012 with a sample size of 1475. The questionnaire of the current study was established based on ICCS 2009 and CCCS 2012 with three scales: the political efficacy scale, the political trust scale and the civic participation scale. The civic participation scale had four subscales that included both conventional participation (*voting, legal protest and informal participation*) and unconventional participation (*illegal protest*). The scales had good reliability (Cronbach's α is above 0.7). Confirmatory Factor Analyses suggest that the scales had good construct validity, although not all of the items were invariant across the two groups.

Chapter 4 will present the results of the current study.

Chapter 4

Results

4.1 Introduction

The previous chapter described the methodology and research methods used in the current study. This chapter presents the results of the study. This chapter includes seven sections. Section 4.1 is the introduction of the chapter. Section 4.2 illustrates the demographic backgrounds of the Mainland Chinese and Hong Kong students. Section 4.3 describes the results of the Mainland Chinese and Hong Kong students' intentions for future civic participation. Section 4.4 illustrates the results of the Mainland Chinese and Hong Kong students' political attitudes. Section 4.5 presents the relationship between political attitudes and civic participation. Section 4.6 shows the heterogeneity of the population with a personal-centered approach. Section 4.7 draws the chapter to a close.

This chapter attempts to provide the answers to the following questions:

RQ1. What are Mainland Chinese and Hong Kong students' intentions for future civic participation regarding illegal protest, legal protest, electoral participation, and informal political participation and what differences, if any, are there between the two groups of students?

RQ2. How strong are Mainland Chinese and Hong Kong students' levels of political trust and political efficacy and what, if any, are the differences between the two groups of students?

RQ3. How do political trust and political efficacy influence Mainland Chinese and Hong Kong students' intentions for future civic participation?

Descriptive statistics were analyzed to address RQs 1 & 2 and a t-test was used to assess any differences between the two groups with Cohen's *d* statistics to measure the effect size of any differences. RQ 3 was addressed using ordinary least squares regression and cluster analysis.

4.2 Demographic description

Students' demographic information is presented in Table 10. 1475 Mainland Chinese students and 2528 Hong Kong students participated in the survey. The number of males and females in both groups were almost equal. Students were asked about their parents' education background, their expected future education and the amount of books in their home. These variables were used to indicate students' social economic status. Most students' parents had a junior school level of education (about 30%) and most students wished to complete undergraduate or postgraduate study in the future (about 70%). The number of books in most Hong Kong and Mainland Chinese students' homes ranged from 26 to 100.

Table 10

Distribution of participants by demographic variables

Variable	Type	Mainland China		Hong Kong	
		n	%	*n*	%
Gender	Male	737	50	1267	50.1
	Female	738	50	1261	49.9
Father's education	5A or 6[5]	129	8.7	330	13.1
	4A or 5B	124	8.4	143	5.7
	3	356	24.1	801	31.7
	2	605	41.0	897	35.5
	1	189	12.8	278	11.0
	<1	72	4.9	79	3.1
Mother's education	5A or 6	78	5.3	198	7.8
	4A or 5B	108	7.3	134	5.3
	3	292	19.8	880	34.8
	2	609	41.3	945	37.4
	1	225	15.3	283	11.2
	<1	163	11.1	88	3.5
Students expected education	5A or 6	1123	76.1	1879	74.3
	4A or 5B	195	13.2	334	13.2
	3	92	6.2	154	6.1
	2	59	4.0	154	6.1
	< 2	6	.4	7	.3
Books in the home	0-10	139	9.4	452	17.9
	11-25	385	26.1	552	21.8
	26-100	553	37.5	856	33.9
	101-200	225	15.3	315	12.5
	201-500	111	7.5	230	9.1
	> 500	62	4.2	123	4.9
Total		1475	100	2528	100

[5] The level of students' mother's education, father's education and expected education was based on categories from the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED). Level 6 = Second stage of tertiary education; Level 5 = First stage of tertiary education (Level 5A = research preparatory or professional oriented education; Level 5B = technical or occupational oriented education); Level 4 = post-secondary non-tertiary education; Level 3 = upper secondary education; Level 2 = lower secondary or second stage of basic education; Level 1 = primary education or first stage of basic education (UNESCO, 2006). <1 = did not complete level 1 education.

4.3 Future intentions for civic participation

4.3.1 General comparison

Table 11 indicates that both Hong Kong and Mainland Chinese students endorsed electoral participation more strongly than other forms of likely future civic participation. Mainland Chinese students endorsed the scale more strongly than the Hong Kong students although the differences between them were significant ($p < 0.05$)[6] but not substantial ($d = 0.09$)[7]. Both legal protest and informal political participation were endorsed positively by both groups, although moderately. Again, Mainland Chinese students endorsed these scales more strongly than Hong Kong students. The effect size ($d = 0.37$) suggested a small to medium significant difference on legal protest but a medium to large difference on informal political participation ($d = 0.75$) between the two groups. Illegal protest was endorsed negatively by both groups of students suggesting this was not a form of civic participation either groups favored for the future. There was no significant difference between the two groups on the illegal protest scale.

Table 11

Comparison of Hong Kong and Mainland Chinese students' future intentions for civic participation

	Hong Kong			Mainland Chinese				
	n	*M*	*SD*	*n*	*M*	*SD*	*t*	*d*
Illegal protest	2528	1.443	0.645	1475	1.483	0.734	-1.744	0.058
Legal protest	2528	2.403	0.683	1475	2.662	0.716	-11.342***	0.370
Electoral	2528	3.078	0.738	1475	3.141	0.728	-2.641**	0.086
Informal	2528	2.366	0.651	1475	2.858	0.668	-22.842***	0.746

Note: * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

[6] A p value less than 0.05 is regarded as a *significant* difference.

[7] Cohen's d is used to describe effect size with 0.2 indicates a small effect, 0.5 a medium effect and 0.8 a large effect. A Cohen's d value larger than 0.2 is regarded as a *substantial* difference.

4.3.2 Future intentions for illegal protest

As shown in Table 12, the scale score of illegal protest was 1.44 for Hong Kong students and 1.48 for Mainland Chinese students, indicating that students from both groups had a very negative attitude towards any future engagement in illegal protest. There was no substantial difference between the two groups at the general level as well as on each item ($d < 0.2$).

Table 12

Comparison of Hong Kong and Mainland Chinese students' future intentions for illegal protest

	Hong Kong			Mainland Chinese				
	n	*M*	*SD*	*n*	*M*	*SD*	*t*	*d*
Paint protest slogans	2528	1.509	0.732	1475	1.565	0.850	-2.126*	0.071
Block traffic	2528	1.411	0.681	1475	1.464	0.809	-2.133*	0.071
Occupy buildings	2528	1.408	0.693	1475	1.419	0.784	-4.37	0.015
Scale scores	2528	1.443	0.645	1475	1.483	0.734	-1.744	0.058

Note: * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

4.3.3 Future intentions for legal protest

Table 13 shows the descriptive and comparative statistics of students' responses to legal protest as a possible form of future participation. The scale score for Mainland Chinese students (M = 2.66) was higher than that for Hong Kong students (M = 2.40) and the difference was small to medium (d = 0.37). As shown in Table 13, Mainland Chinese students indicated they would be more likely to '*write a letter to the newspaper*' (d = 0.40) and '*contact an elected representative*' (d = 0.60) than Hong Kong students. Although Hong Kong students scored higher than Mainland Chinese students on '*collect signature for petitions*', the difference was not substantial (d = 0.07). Overall, both Hong Kong and Mainland students appeared to be moderately positive towards possible future engagement in legal forms of protest activity.

Table 13

Comparison of Mainland and Hong Kong students' future intentions for legal protest

	Hong Kong			Mainland Chinese				
	n	*M*	*SD*	*n*	*M*	*SD*	*t*	*d*
Write letter to newspaper	2528	2.395	0.797	1475	2.717	0.806	-12.239***	0.402
Contact a representative	2528	2.221	0.828	1475	2.734	0.877	-18.522***	0.602
Collect signatures for petition	2528	2.593	0.882	1475	2.534	0.891	2.034*	0.067
Scale scores	2528	2.403	0.683	1475	2.662	0.716	-11.342***	0.370

Note: * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

4.3.4 Future intentions for electoral participation

Table 14 shows that the electoral participation scale score for Mainland Chinese students (M = 3.14) was higher than that for Hong Kong students (M = 3.08) and the difference was statistically significant ($p > 0.01$) but not substantial (d = 0.09). Mainland Chinese students would be more likely to '*get candidate information*' than Hong Kong students with a small difference (d = 0.36). There was no substantial difference on '*vote in local elections*' and '*vote in national elections*' between the two groups. Of all four electoral behaviors, Hong Kong students endorsed the item '*vote in local elections*' (M = 3.16) most strongly while Mainland Chinese students endorsed most strongly the item '*get candidate information*' (M = 3.22). Overall, students from both groups were strongly positive towards their future engagement in electoral political activities.

Table 14

Comparison of Mainland and Hong Kong students' future intentions for electoral participation

	Hong Kong			Mainland Chinese				
	n	*M*	*SD*	*n*	*M*	*SD*	*t*	*d*
Vote in local elections	2528	3.158	0.793	1475	3.121	0.795	1.429	0.047
Vote in national elections	2528	3.153	0.795	1475	3.078	0.839	2.825**	0.092
Get candidate information	2528	2.924	0.865	1475	3.226	0.830	-10.846***	0.357
Scale scores	2528	3.078	0.738	1475	3.141	0.728	-2.641**	0.086

Note: * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

4.3.5 Future intentions for informal political participation

Table 15 shows that Mainland Chinese students ($M = 2.86$) scored significantly higher than Hong Kong students ($M = 2.37$) on informal political participation and the differences were medium to large ($d = 0.764$). The Mainland Chinese students endorsed all items more strongly than Hong Kong students. There was a small to medium practical difference on '*contribute to online discussion about social and political issues*' ($d = 0.40$) but a medium to high difference on '*talk to others about your views on political and social issues*' ($d = 0.63$), '*write to a newspaper about political and social issues*' ($d = 0.67$) and '*join an organization for a political and social cause*' ($d = 0.71$). Hong Kong student endorsed the item '*contribute to online discussion about social and political issues*' ($M = 2.56$) most strongly while Mainland Chinese students endorsed the item '*talk to others about your views on political and social issues*' ($M = 3.04$) most strongly. Both Hong Kong students ($M = 2.09$) and Mainland Chinese students ($M = 2.69$) had the lowest endorsement on the item '*join an organization for a political and social cause*'. Overall, both

groups were positive towards future informal political participation with Mainland students appearing somewhat more positive than Hong Kong students.

Table 15

Comparison of Mainland and Hong Kong students' future intentions for informal political participation

	Hong Kong			Mainland Chinese				
	n	*M*	*SD*	*n*	*M*	*SD*	*t*	*d*
Talk about political/social issues	2528	2.558	0.767	1475	3.037	0.753	-19.256***	0.629
Write to newspaper about political/social issues	2528	2.257	0.784	1475	2.801	0.831	-20.710***	0.673
Contribute to online discussion about social/political issues	2528	2.560	0.816	1475	2.908	0.826	-12.904***	0.424
Join an organization for a political/social cause	2528	2.089	0.791	1475	2.687	0.895	-21.273***	0.708
Scale scores	2528	2.366	0.651	1475	2.858	0.668	-22.842***	0.746

Note: * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

4.4 Political trust and political efficacy

4.4.1 Political trust

Table 16 shows that Mainland Chinese students endorsed all trust items more strongly than Hong Kong students; the differences were significant ($p > 0.001$) and large ($d = 0.71$). Mainland Chinese students had more trust in all five government institutions than their Hong Kong counterparts. There were small to moderate differences on trust towards '*national government*' ($d = 0.49$), '*courts of justice*' ($d = 0.22$) and '*the police*' ($d = 0.31$). There were large differences on trust towards '*national parliament*' ($d = 0.79$) and '*the armed forces*' ($d = 1.04$). Both Hong Kong students ($M = 3.22$) and Mainland Chinese students ($M = 3.39$) and endorsed trust towards

'*courts of justice'* most strongly. Hong Kong students had the least trust towards '*the armed forces*' (*M* = 2.48) while Mainland Chinese students had the least trust towards 'the police' (*M* =3.18). Generally, Hong Kong students showed a moderately positive attitude to government institutions and Mainland Chinese students showed a strong positive attitude to all government institutions.

Table 16

Comparison of Hong Kong and Mainland Chinese students' political trust

	Hong Kong			Mainland Chinese				
	n	*M*	*SD*	*n*	*M*	*SD*	*t*	*d*
National government	2528	2.812	0.738	1475	3.199	0.851	-14.584***	0.487
Courts of justice	2528	3.223	0.746	1475	3.387	0.770	-6.592***	0.217
The police	2528	2.923	0.813	1475	3.176	0.841	-9.296***	0.306
National parliament	2528	2.695	0.763	1475	3.311	0.789	-24.095***	0.793
The armed forces	2528	2.481	0.862	1475	3.334	0.770	-32.351***	1.044
Scale scores	2528	2.827	0.571	1475	3.281	0.700	-21.176***	0.712

Note: * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

4.4.2 Political efficacy

Table 17 shows that Mainland Chinese students endorsed political efficacy items more strongly than Hong Kong students. The differences were statistically significant ($p > 0.001$) and medium ($d = 0.56$). Mainland Chinese students indicated they would be more likely to '*know more politics than people in my age*', '*have something to say about politics when it is discussed*', '*have political opinion worth listening to*' and '*have a good understanding of the political issues facing this country*' than their Hong Kong counterparts. Although Mainland Chinese students endorsed

the item '*I am able to understand most political issues easily*' more strongly than Hong Kong students, the difference was not substantial (d = 0.09). Both Hong Kong students (M = 2.45) and Mainland Chinese (M = 2.78) and had a positive evaluation of their political efficacy. Hong Kong students endorsed '*I have political opinion worth listening to*' (M = 2.53) most strongly and had the lowest endorsement on '*know more politics than people in my age*' (M = 2.30). Mainland Chinese students had a moderately positive attitude on all items. The strongest endorsed item for Mainland Chinese students was '*have a good understanding of the political issues facing this country'* (M = 3.00) and the lowest endorsement was '*I am able to understand most political issues easily'* (M = 2.58).

Table 17

Comparison of Hong Kong and Mainland Chinese students' political efficacy

	Hong Kong			Mainland Chinese				
	n	*M*	*SD*	*n*	*M*	*SD*	*t*	*d*
Know more politics than people of my age	2528	2.299	0.679	1475	2.618	0.766	-13.257***	0.441
Have something to say about politics	2528	2.357	0.730	1475	2.732	0.780	-15.255***	0.495
Understand most political issues easily	2528	2.517	0.735	1475	2.582	0.762	-2.668**	0.087
Have political opinions worth listening to	2528	2.533	0.731	1475	2.946	0.748	-16.986***	0.558
Have a good understanding of the political issues facing this country	2528	2.525	0.727	1475	3.002	0.744	-19.758***	0.649
Scale score	2528	2.446	0.555	1475	2.776	0.591	-17.701***	0.575

Note: * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

4.5 Effects influencing civic participation

In order to answer RQ3, a number of OLS regression models were estimated. The independent variables were demographic variables and attitudinal variables (political efficacy and political trust). The dependent variables were illegal protest, legal protest, electoral participation and informal political participation respectively. Demographic factors, political trust, political efficacy and the interaction effect between political trust and political efficacy entered the regression models in four separate blocks. Therefore, four regression models were generated. A detailed summary for the regressions are presented in Appendix E. Here, only the final model and the significant predictors are reported.

Political trust was negatively associated with illegal protest ($\beta = -0.072$; $\beta = -0.072$[8]) but positively associated with the legal protest ($\beta = 0.173$; $\beta = 0.179$), electoral participation ($\beta = 0.407$; $\beta = 0.180$) and informal political participation ($\beta = 0.160$; $\beta = 0.185$). Political efficacy had a positive influence on illegal protest ($\beta = 0.102$; $\beta = 0.068$), legal protest ($\beta = 0.342$; $\beta = 0.294$), electoral participation ($\beta = 0.475$; $\beta = 0.280$) and informal political participation ($\beta = 0.458$; $\beta = 0.369$). Attitudinal variables were able to best explain informal political participation ($R^2 = 27.8\%$; $R^2 = 24.0\%$) and less able to explain illegal protest ($R^2=4.6\%$; $R^2= 2.7\%$). Political efficacy played a more important role in predicting civic participation than political trust. The relationship between political trust, political efficacy and civic participation was stronger for Hong Kong students than Mainland Chinese students.

[8] First β is for Hong Kong data and the second β is for Mainland Chinese data; this also applies to the following discussion.

4.5.1 Effects influencing illegal protest

The results in Table 18 suggests that for both Hong Kong and Mainland Chinese students, positive views about their political efficacy (β = 0.102; β = 0.068) were likely to exert positive influences on their willingness to engage in illegal protest activities. Adolescent males in both groups were more likely to do this than girls (β = -0.117; β = -0.088). On the other hand, students had high levels of political trust (β = -0.072; β = -0.072) and higher aspirations for future education (β = -0.122; β = -0.079) and would be less inclined to consider illegal protest as a form of civic participation. The effects were somewhat stronger for Hong Kong students than they were for Mainland Chinese students. Yet the model as a whole proved to be quite weak in explaining the variance of students future inte0.06ntions for engaging in illegal protest (R^2 = 4.6%, R^2 = 2.7%).

Table 18

Effects on Hong Kong and Mainland Chinese students' future intentions for illegal protest

	Hong Kong			Mainland Chinese		
Factor	B	SE	β	B	SE	β
Gender	-0.151	0.025	-0.117***	-0.130	0.039	-0.088**
Expected Education	-0.089	0.015	-0.122***	0.072	-0.024	-0.079**
Political trust	-0.081	0.022	-0.072***	-0.076	0.029	-0.072**
Political efficacy	0.118	0.024	0.102***	0.084	0.034	0.068*
R^2	0.046			0.027		

Note: * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

4.5.2 Effects influencing legal protest

The results in Table 19 show that for both Hong Kong and Mainland Chinese students, positive views about their political efficacy (β = 0.342; β = 0.294) and political trust (β = 0.173; β = 0.179) exerted a significant positive influence on legal protest. Political efficacy contributed slightly more in explaining the variance of legal protest than political trust. Further, Mainland Chinese

students whose families possessed more books were more likely to join legal protest (β = 0.063). The overall effects of both factors were marginally stronger for Hong Kong students (R^2 = 17.3%) than they were for Mainland Chinese students (R^2 = 15.8%).

Table 19

Effects on Hong Kong and Mainland Chinese students' future intentions for legal protest

	Hong Kong			Mainland Chinese		
Factor	B	SE	β	B	SE	β
Amount of books	0.020	0.010	0.040	0.037	0.016	0.063*
Political trust	0.207	0.022	0.173***	0.183	0.026	0.179***
Political efficacy	0.422	0.023	0.342***	0.356	0.031	0.294***
R^2	0.173			0.158		

Note: * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

4.5.3 Effects influencing electoral participation

Table 20 shows that the model accounted for 16.8% of the variance in Mainland Chinese students' endorsement of electoral participation and 21.6% of the variance in Hong Kong students. For both groups, students with higher aspirations for future education (β = -0.117; β = -0.100) were more likely to take part in electoral participation. Both political trust (β = 0.407; β = 0.180) and political efficacy (β = 0.475; β = 0.280) exerted a positive impact on electoral participation for both groups. Political efficacy contributed slightly more in explaining the variance of legal protest than political trust. Female students from Hong Kong (β = 0.038) and male students from Mainland China (β = -0.064) were more likely to engage in electoral participation. Hong Kong students whose families possessed more books (β = 0.079) were more likely to join electoral participation. An interaction effect between political efficacy and political

trust was observed for Hong Kong students (β = -0.273), but the interaction effect only made a minor contribution to future intentions relating electoral participation (0.2%)[9].

Table 20

Effects on Hong Kong and Mainland Chinese students' future intentions for electoral participation

	Hong Kong			Mainland Chinese		
Factor	B	SE	β	B	SE	β
Gender	0.057	0.026	0.038*	-0.093	0.035	-0.064**
Expected Education	-0.099	0.015	-0.117***	-0.090	0.022	-0.100***
Amount of books	0.043	0.011	0.079***	0.029	0.016	0.049
Political trust	0.526	0.084	0.407***	0.187	0.026	0.180***
Political efficacy	0.631	0.094	0.475***	0.344	0.032	0.280***
Trust*Efficacy	-0.089	0.033	-0.273**			
R^2	0.216			0.168		

Note: * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

4.5.4 Effects influencing informal political participation

Table 21 shows that the model accounted for 24.0% of the variance in Mainland Chinese students' endorsements of the informal political participation scale compared to 27.8% for Hong Kong. The effects did not, however, always work in the same way for the two groups. One common effect was amount of books in the home which exerted a small positive effect on both groups (β = 0.038; β = 0.096). Yet aspirations for higher education exerted a positive effect only for Mainland Chinese students (β = 0.071). Both political trust (β = 0.160; β = 0.185) and political efficacy (β = 0.458; β = 0.369) exerted a positive impact on informal political participation. Political efficacy's impact (19.1%) was much stronger than political trust (5.9%) in explaining Hong Kong students' informal political participation[10].

[9] See R square change of model 4 in Tables 21 and 22
[10] See R square change of model 2 and model 3 in Table 23.

Table 21

Effects on Hong Kong and Mainland Chinese students' future intentions for informal political participation

	Hong Kong			Mainland Chinese		
Factor	B	SE	β	B	SE	β
Expected Education	0.018	0.013	0.024	0.059	0.019	0.071**
Amount of books	0.018	0.009	0.038*	0.053	0.014	0.096***
Political trust	0.183	0.020	0.160***	0.177	0.023	0.185***
Political efficacy	0.537	0.021	0.458***	0.417	0.028	0.369***
R^2	0.278			0.240		

Note: * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

4.6 Civic participation: a person-centered approach

In the previous sections, results have been presented using a variable-centered approach. This section will present results with a person-centered approach. Groups within the population with similar scores are highlighted with cluster analysis as well as the differences between clusters.

The current study adopts Twostep cluster analysis with SPSS 24. Cases were categorized into preclusters first, and then a hierarchical cluster analysis was run based on pre-clusters (Norusis, 2012). Initially, the number of clusters was equivalent to the number of cases. Hierarchical clustering merged one case at a time sequentially so that similar cases could be combined into homogenous clusters. The process was repeated until all the cases were allocated to a cluster (Blei & Laffeety, 2009; Norusis, 2010). The likelihood distance measure was adopted in this process as the similarity criterion allowing the change in distance between clusters to be checked. When the distance between two cases decreased, the similarity between them increased.

It was important to decide on the number of clusters in cluster analysis. Two scales (political efficacy and political trust) were used to generate clusters. Theoretically, there could be four

possible combinations of political trust and political efficacy (high efficacy-high trust; high efficacy-low trust; low efficacy-high trust; low efficacy-high trust) A previous study developed the trust-efficacy typology based on such combinations (Paige, 1971). Statistically, Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) and Log-likelihood Distance measure were used as goodness-of fit indices to identify the optimal cluster solution. The smallest BIC suggested the best statistical solution for the number of clusters and Log-Likelihood Distance indicated the distance between different clusters (Chow & Kennedy, 2014). Table 22 shows that the ratio of BIC change and ratio of distance measure dropped significantly from four-cluster solution to five-cluster solution, suggesting four-cluster solution might be the optimal solution for the number of clusters.

Table 22

Fit indices of different cluster solutions

Number of Clusters	Schwarz's Bayesian Criterion (BIC)	BIC Change	Ratio of BIC Changes	Ratio of Distance Measures
1	5581.515			
2	4336.833	-1244.683	1.000	1.546
3	3543.367	-793.466	.637	1.069
4	2803.034	-740.333	.595	1.965
5	2442.598	-360.436	.290	1.169

Figure 1 shows that Cluster 1 on average had the lowest political efficacy and the lowest political trust. By contrast, Cluster 4 had the highest political efficacy and highest political trust. Cluster 2 was featured with high political trust and low political efficacy. Cluster 3 was featured with low political trust and high political efficacy. Table 23 shows the distribution of students across clusters. Clusters 2 and 3 each contained about 30% of the population. Clusters 1 and 4 each accounted for about 20% of the total sample. There was a big difference between Hong Kong and Mainland Chinese students in terms of cluster membership. There were 25.7% of

Hong Kong students in Cluster 1 compared to 10.5% of Mainland Chinese students. There were 38.4% of Mainland students in Cluster 4 compared to 9.2% of Hong Kong students.



Figure 1. Scale score of political trust and political efficacy across clusters.

Table 23

Cluster proportion for the 4 cluster solution

Cluster	Proportion (%)	Hong Kong (%)	Mainland China (%)
Cluster 1	20.1	25.7	10.5
Cluster 2	29.3	31.8	25.0
Cluster 3	30.7	33.3	26.1
Cluster 4	19.9	9.2	38.4

Validity of the clusters

In order to establish the validity of the clusters, civic participation was used to test whether the clusters maintained their separateness. Civic participation was chosen because it was not used to generate cluster, yet it is relevant to the cluster-categorizing variable (i.e. political trust and political efficacy). An ANOVA test was applied to test the differences between the clusters regarding students' future intentions for civic participation. The results are shown in Tables 24

and 25. There was a significant difference among four clusters in terms of legal protest, electoral participation and informal political participation of both Hong Kong and Mainland Chinese students. As for illegal protest, significant difference was found among four clusters only of Hong Kong students but not Mainland Chinese students.

Table 24

Comparison of political trust, political efficacy and civic participation of different clusters among Hong Kong students

	Illegal		Legal		Electoral		Informal	
Cluster	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*
Cluster 1	1.513	0.686	2.086	0.714	2.654	0.841	2.012	0.676
Cluster 2	1.369	0.564	2.355	0.617	3.104	0.645	2.305	0.580
Cluster 3	1.441	0.627	2.576	0.601	3.261	0.614	2.572	0.546
Cluster 4	1.509	0.807	2.829	0.689	3.512	0.572	2.821	0.610
General	1.443	0.645	2.403	0.684	3.078	0.738	2.366	0.651
F value	6.879***		107.881***		133.775***		156.636***	

Table 25

Comparison of political trust, political efficacy and civic participation of different clusters among Mainland Chinese students

	Illegal		Legal		Electoral		Informal	
Cluster	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*
Cluster 1	1.587	0.777	2.183	0.855	2.645	0.957	2.395	0.849
Cluster 2	1.418	0.632	2.528	0.688	2.919	0.699	2.595	0.601
Cluster 3	1.513	0.722	2.650	0.646	3.196	0.631	2.887	0.568
Cluster 4	1.476	0.789	2.888	0.650	3.386	0.617	3.137	0.576
General	1.483	0.734	2.662	0.716	3.141	0.728	2.858	0.668
F value	2.238		50.865***		65.187***		91.037***	

While an important purpose of this analysis was to test the validity of the clusters, it also helped to provide support for labeling the clusters. Figure 2 shows that Cluster 1 had the highest intentions for illegal protest and had lowest intentions for other three modes of conventional participation. In addition, Cluster 1 had the lowest political trust and political efficacy (see

Figure 1). This group, therefore, was named *Alienated-Radical Participators*. This group accounted for 25.7% of Hong Kong students and 10.5% of the Mainland Chinese population.

Figure 2 shows that Cluster 4 had the highest intentions for three types of conventional civic participation. In addition, Cluster 4 had the highest political trust and political efficacy (see figure 1). Therefore, this group was named *Supportive-Active Participators*. This group accounted for the 9.2% of Hong Kong students and 38.4% of the Mainland Chinese population.

Cluster 2 students had high political trust and low political efficacy (see Figure 1). This group was least willing to get involved in illegal protest compared with other groups (see Figure 2). Students in this cluster were more willing to participate in legal protest, electoral and informal political activities than the cluster 1 (*Alienated Radical-Participators*), yet they were far from being identified as active since their intentions for all participation were under the average score (see Table 24). Therefore, this group was labelled *Loyal-Minimal Participators*. This group accounts for 31.8% of Hong Kong students and 25.0 % of Mainland Chinese population.

Figure 2 shows that Cluster 3 had relatively higher intentions for all four types of civic participation than Cluster 1 and Cluster 2. Further, this group had relatively low political trust and high political efficacy (see Figure 1). Therefore, this group was labeled *Critical-Active Participators*. This group accounted for 33.3% of Hong Kong students and 26.1% of the Mainland Chinese population.



Figure 2. Scale scores of intentions for future civic participation.

4.7 Conclusion

This chapter provided the answers to the three Research Questions. For RQ1, results suggested that illegal protest was the form of future civic participation that both Hong Kong and Mainland Chinese students were not likely to take part in. In contrast, both groups endorsed conventional forms of future civic participation (legal protest, electoral participation and informal political participation) positively. Mainland Chinese students showed stronger intentions for conventional forms of future civic participation than their Hong Kong counterparts. For RQ2, both Hong Kong and Mainland Chinese students endorsed political trust and political efficacy positively; again Mainland Chinese students endorsed these two scales stronger than their Hong Kong counterparts. For RQ3, regression analysis results suggested that political trust was negatively associated with illegal protest but positively associated with legal protest, electoral participation and informal political participation. Political efficacy had a positive influence on all four modes of civic participation. Political efficacy played a more important role in predicting civic participation than political trust. Attitudinal variables could best explain informal political

participation and less able to explain illegal protest. The relationship between political trust, political efficacy and civic participation was stronger for Hong Kong students than Mainland Chinese students. Cluster analysis created profiles based on both students' political attitudes and the preference of civic participation. Four clusters were generated among Mainland Chinese and Hong Kong students labeled as Alienated-Radical Participators, Supportive-Active Participators, Loyal-Minimal Participators and Critical-Active Participators. There were more Alienated-Radical Participators among Hong Kong students and there were more Supportive-Active Participators among Mainland Chinese students.

Chapter 5 will presents the discussion of the results.

Chapter 5

Discussion

5.1 Introduction

The previous chapter presented the results of the study. This chapter will provide the discussion of the results in relation to the Research Questions that were outlined in Chapter 2:

RQ1. What are Mainland Chinese students and Hong Kong students' intentions for future civic participation regarding illegal protest, legal protest, electoral participation, and informal political participation and what differences, if any, are there between the two groups of students?

RQ2. How strong are Mainland Chinese students and Hong Kong students' levels of political trust and political efficacy and what, if any, are the differences between the two groups of students?

RQ3. How do political trust and political efficacy influence Mainland Chinese students and Hong Kong students' intentions for future civic participation?

This chapter is divided into six sections. Section 5.1 is the introduction of the chapter. Section 5.2 discusses the results in relation to RQ1. Section 5.3 discusses the results in relation to RQ2. Section 5.4 will discuss the results in relation to RQ3. Section 5.5 presents the main implications drawn from the current study. Section 5.6 brings the chapter to a conclusion and provides a summary of the chapter.

5.2 Research Question 1

This section will discuss the results in relation to Research Question 1. There were three main results based on RQ1:

(1) Illegal protest was the form of future civic participation that both Hong Kong and Mainland Chinese students endorsed most weakly.

(2) Electoral participation was the form of future civic participation that both Hong Kong and Mainland Chinese students endorsed most strongly.

(3) Mainland Chinese students endorsed conventional participation (legal protest and informal political participation) more strongly than their Hong Kong counterparts.

5.2.1 Weak endorsement of illegal protest

Illegal protest was the form of future civic participation in which both Hong Kong and Mainland Chinese students would be unlikely to engage. This is consistent with previous studies (Newton & van Deth, 2010; Schulz et al., 2010). Unconventional participation is rarely people's first choice for getting involved in politics. For example, The World Values Survey suggested that only a small group (less than 5 percent) of people have been actually involved in direct actions such as occupying buildings and unofficial strikes (Newton & van Deth, 2010). The ICCS 2009 study showed that across all participating counties, students showed a negative attitude toward future engagement in illegal protest (Schulz et al., 2010).

Plausible explanations for this result can be discussed from cultural, political and educational perspectives. First, the anti-authority nature of illegal protest is contradictory to the Confucian spirt (Shi, 2001). Illegal protest reveals the tension between citizens and political authorities. Confucian culture, on the other hand, emphasizes respect toward authorities. When there is a

conflict between individuals and authorities, people in Confucian cultures are more likely to sacrifice their own interests to avoid conflict in order to maintain harmony (Shi, 2001). Students tended to feel uncomfortable or dangerous when they feel they have to challenge the authorities in illegal protest. This is perhaps particularly true for young adolescents who made up the sample for the current study.

Second, illegal protest is not a mainstream form of political participation in both Mainland China and Hong Kong. Although there have been some practices of unconventional (or illegal) forms of political participation after the 1997 handover in Hong Kong (for example, the Anti-Subversion Law Movement, the Anti National Education Movement and the Occupy Movement), illegal protest remains a marginalized form of political participation (Ortmann, 2015) and is considered a threat to stability by authorities (Sing, 2004). Protests in Mainland China has been even weaker in terms of its overall influence in society. Protests have been small in scale, limited to certain groups (i.e., villager protestors or discontented workers) and seldom challenged the legitimacy of the political leadership (O'Brien & Li, 2006). A strategic mix of concession and repression has been used by the ruling authorities in Mainland China to deal with social unrest. The ruling authorities use 'responsive authoritarianism' to manage grievances from the public and avoid discontent that might exacerbate more radical activities (Carnesecca, 2015). Yet an important point to note is that this "responsiveness" does not apply to overt challenges to the regime, either real or perceived. Such challenges will not be tolerated.

Third, legally participating in civic affairs been emphasized by civic education. For example, although '*assembly and demonstration*' are portrayed as citizens' freedom in a moral and political education textbook for Mainland Chinese students; students are warned that they should exercise this right within a legal framework. Students are informed that any protest actions

without the permission of the government are illegal and would violate the stability of state and society. The following example is from a student textbook which implies that protest action is not encouraged:

> Mr. Wu had six houses located in the city center. His houses were going to be displaced due to urban demolition and construction. Wu was not satisfied with the compensation for housing demolition and had an argument with officers of demolition office. To express his dissent, Wu decided to post a poster on the wall of the demolition office. His behaviors were inappropriate and had bad consequences. Then two questions are provided for students' reflection: 'Is Wu's action allowed by law and regulation? How should Wu defend his own right?' (People's Education Press, 2008, p. 12)

5.2.2 Strong endorsement of electoral participation

Electoral participation was the form of future civic participation that both Hong Kong and Mainland Chinese students endorsed most strongly. Compared with other forms of political participation such as contacting politicians or protesting on the street, voting was considered less intensive and less demanding on participants' cognition as well as their motivation (Inglehart, 1997; Schulz et al., 2010). Therefore, students might consider voting an easy and accessible way to become involved in politics and accordingly showed a high endorsement.

Contextual information about the electoral systems in both regimes can make a contribution to understanding students' high endorsement towards voting. Both regimes enjoy a certain level of direct elections. Hong Kong has a more democratic electoral system than Mainland China. The election system in Hong Kong is partially democratic. District Council and half seats of the Legislative Council can be directly elected. Elections in the Legislative Council allow contests between parties from different political camps (i.e., pro-Beijing and pro-democracy). Direct

elections in Mainland China are available at village level (Nathan, 1986). Direct elections in Mainland China are semi-competitive which is strongly dominated by the Party in terms of the candidates' nomination. Although current direct elections are far from being fully democratic elections, they do provide an opportunity for citizens to become involved in politics and shapes people's perception of democratic values (Shi, 1999).

Students' strong endorsement might reflect their good comprehension of related knowledge, which they acquire from different channels (Schulz et al., 2010; Torney-Purta et al., 2001). Hong Kong students' civic knowledge scores in ICCS 2009 were among the highest rank (Schulz et al., 2010). Lee et al. (2011) found that Hong Kong students had a good comprehension towards the role of district council elections as well as the role of the Legislative Council (p. 77). Considering the depoliticized nature of civic education in Hong Kong (Leung & Ng, 2004), Hong Kong students might acquire knowledge about elections from other agents than solely from school. Hong Kong students could get familiar with electoral participation by following the news from the media, noticing posters for District Elections on the street or observing voting behaviors from their parents and teachers. Therefore, although a fully democratic election has not been achieved in Hong Kong, constrained elections can still have a positive impact on students' voting intentions. Unlike Hong Kong students who might acquire civic knowledge from informal education in society, Mainland Chinese students' endorsement of electoral participation can be explained by formal civic education in school. In Mainland China's moral and political education textbook, knowledge about elections is presented to Mainland Chinese students and voting is described as a citizen's right. Students are encouraged to vote in county or town level elections (People's Education Press, 2008).

The non-democratic political contexts of both Hong Kong and Mainland China may seem to contrast with students' strong endorsement of intentions for voting. This has some implications of understanding voting as a form of political participation in different regimes. Voting in elections in democratic regimes is understood as a citizen's duty (Dalton, 2008). Those who do not vote are regarded as apathetic. It could be speculated that voting is the baseline for participation in democratic regimes, reflecting a 'thin' concept of citizenship (Walzer, 1994) or minimal citizenship (McLaughlin, 1992, pp. 236–237). In contrast, elections in non-democratic contexts are usually led or controlled by the ruling authorities. It is not very likely for people to use voting to change the political leadership in non-democratic settings. Allowing voting in local elections reflects the ruling authority's efforts to improve its legitimacy by opening some channels for the public to engage in politics. Accordingly, choosing to vote illustrates citizens' support towards these efforts and possibly a willingness to maximize their constrained political rights. Voting in the authoritarian or hybrid regime, therefore, can be regarded as more of a civic virtue rather than a civic duty, a somewhat 'thick' citizenship (Walzer, 1994). This means that citizens are concerned about political affairs and seek to maximize their political influence. In conclusion, different regimes have different expectations of their citizens. What is described as 'thin citizenship' in a democratic regime may not be regarded as passive behaviors in the authoritarian or hybrid regime where there are constraints on other forms of participation. This is an important area for future research.

5.2.3 Mainland Chinese students' higher endorsement of conventional participation

Mainland Chinese students showed more positive intentions to engage in conventional civic activities such as contacting political representatives, writing letters to newspapers, talking about political and social issues and joining an organization for political or social reason than their

Hong Kong counterparts. This result seems to contradict a general perception that Mainland Chinese students are passive and obedient (Tu, 2011; Xia, 2011) while Hong Kong students are more 'democratic' (Kennedy, 2010). The results might be explained by differences in both political cultures as well as civic education in the two societies.

Although Mainland China is an authoritarian regime ruled by a single party, it does not necessarily mean that the ruling authorities repress all demands from the public or block all channels of political participation. Chen (2013) found the content about citizens' political participation outweighs non-political participation in the *People's Daily* (the official newspaper of the CCP), which illustrates the consideration for political participation from the state. Participation is, however, meant to be guided by the party-state. The political culture in Mainland China is shaped by Confucian culture. 'Paternalism' has been used to describe good governance in Confucian culture: "good government embodies parental qualities, good leaders exemplify moral virtues, and good citizens defer to authority figures" (Zhao et al., 2017, p. 1126). The ruling authorities in Mainland China have attempted to demonstrate some parental qualities to maintain social stability by showing its openness for public voice and granting citizens the right to express their grievances towards the government (Fairbrother, 2014; Shi, 1997). In other words, the ruling authorities have tried to convince people that they are responsive to people's demands and welcome people to participate in politics within its permission. Such a message is also conveyed to students through moral and political education where students' are encouraged to exercise their rights of supervision and advisory processes as a way of political participation:

> Chinese citizens enjoy a wide range of political rights guaranteed by the constitution and laws. Citizens are supposed to be concerned about political and social affairs happening in our

> country. Citizens should take an active part in politics. Citizens have the right to criticize and make suggestions to government officials. There are various way to exercise political rights of supervision and advice. For example, citizens can contact representatives of the People's Congress, write letters or emails to related governmental institutions, or reflect their problems through the media. It is a citizen's right as well as their responsibility to do exercise their right of supervision and advice (People's Education Press, 2008, pp. 82–83).

Through moral and political education, the ruling authorities of Mainland China seemed to have successfully conveyed an image of benevolent rulers. The results here suggested that Mainland Chinese students were convinced and they would be willing to take these opportunities to engage in conventional participation.

In Hong Kong, however, both political culture and civic education have had a depoliticized nature and consequently, it would appear that students hold a rather passive attitude toward civic participation (Bray & Lee, 1993; Fairbrother, 2006; Lam, 2015; Lee, 2004; Leung & Ng, 2004). After the transition to Chinese sovereignty, civic education in Hong Kong was characterized by '*re-depoliticization*' and '*emphasis on education for cultural nationalism*' (Leung & Ng, 2004, p. 55). The official reform document, *Learning to Learn: Life Long Learning and Whole-person Development* (CDC, 2001) demonstrated the attempts by the government to depoliticize civic education. The political content about democracy and human rights in the document was outweighed by non-political and moral content (Leung & Ng, 2004; Leung & Yuen, 2012). Similar evidence can be found in the *Basic Education Curriculum Guide* (CDC, 2012), which identified national identity rather than democracy as the one of the five priority values to be addressed by citizenship education (Fairbrother, 2005). The government illustrated its inclination to cultivate students' national identity, yet nationalistic education was also apolitical. The

Learning to learn (CDC, 2001) document only emphasized the historical, cultural and environmental aspects of China but avoided the political aspect of China (Leung & Ng, 2004). It remains questionable whether current depoliticized civic education in Hong Kong has been able to facilitate participatory citizens or cultivate Hong Kong students' commitment towards civic culture. Kennedy (2017) has suggested that civic education in Hong Kong is fragmented which cannot meet the demands of either democratic education or national education. Hong Kong students' relatively passive intentions towards conventional participation can perhaps be seen as a result of this fragmented civic education.

5.3 Research Question 2

This section discusses the results in relation to Research Question 2. The main results for RQ2 were:

(1) Both Hong Kong and Mainland Chinese students endorsed political trust positively with Mainland Chinese students endorsing political trust more strongly.

(2) Both Hong Kong and Mainland Chinese students endorsed political efficacy positively, with Mainland Chinese students endorsing political efficacy more strongly.

5.3.1 Students' endorsement of political trust

The results suggested that both Mainland Chinese and Hong Kong students showed moderate to high levels of political trust towards government institutions. This result is consistent with previous studies (Chen, 2004; Shi, 2001; Wang, 2005). High political trust among students can be explained by cultural elements. Despite the differences in the level of democratization, development of the economy and the performance of the government, both China and Hong Kong share a common Confucian cultural background. Shi (2001) argued that Confucian culture

is characterized by respect towards the authorities, maintaining harmony and avoiding conflict. The government as the authority dominates its interactions with individuals in a hierarchical system. Consequently, the populace tend to show a great level of tolerance towards the government. When the ruling government is a 'benevolent dictator' concerned with public welfare, it is easy for the government to gain public support. When the government is against the demands of individuals, people tend to compromise their personal interest to avoid conflict instead of developing a distrust attitude towards the government (Lee, 2005).

Torney-Purta et al. (2004) studied student trust towards government-related institutions. They found that students have more political trust in stable democracies with less corruption. For example, they found that students in Northern European countries had a higher level of political trust than students from the Russian Federation. This seems to contradict the evidence from the current study which suggested Mainland Chinese students had quite a high level of political trust towards the government, higher than their Hong Kong counterparts.

Mainland Chinese students' relatively high trust can be explained by the characteristics of authoritarian regimes. Authoritarian regimes tend to foster loyalty and support from the public, either by controlling sources of information or by emphasizing the historical role of political leaders (Almond & Verba, 1963; Shively, 2018). This is in line with the purpose of moral and political education in Mainland China which is to foster students' patriotism, support socialism and loyalty to the CCP. For example, in civic education classes, students are presented with the achievements China has been made since the 'open door policy', which is attributed to the leadership of the CCP (People's Education Press, 2008). In contrast, support towards the government was not highlighted in the civic education in Hong Kong.

Another explanation might come from the measurement. Political trust was measured by students' trust towards national government, courts of justice, the police, national parliament, and the armed forces. The results suggested that Hong Kong students and Mainland Chinese students endorsed these items differently. Mainland Chinese students had rather higher trust towards all institutions. Hong Kong students, however, had relatively higher trust on courts of justice, the police, but had relatively lower trust on national government, the armed forces and national parliament. This might indicate that Hong Kong students differentiated these institutions: the former two institutions were local institutions and the latter three were national institutions. Hong Kong students showed higher trust towards local institutions than national institutions. This might suggest the strength of local identity for Hong Kong students or it might simply be that local institutions are better known. The relatively low level of national identity has been observed in the early stage after the handover (Lee, 2003). Yuen and Byram (2007) argues that strong local identity might hinder students to develop a strong national identity. Ma (2015) has suggested that lower levels of trust towards national institutions might be connected with anti-China sentiments. This is an area that requires further research.

5.3.2 Students' endorsement of political efficacy

The results of the current study suggested that both Mainland Chinese and Hong Kong students showed moderate to high levels of political efficacy[11]. Political efficacy was defined by ICCS 2009 as 'individuals' confidence in their ability to understand politics and to act politically.' An item 'As an adult I will be able to take part in politics' from the original ICCS 2009 questionnaire was deleted for low reliability in the current study. The modified scale used in the

[11] The political efficacy scale was measured by five items: I know more politics than people of my age; I have something to say about politics; I can understand most political issues easily; I have political opinions worth listening to; I have a good understanding of the political issues facing this country.

current study is more of an assessment of students' confidence about their political knowledge than about participation. Therefore, the difference in level of political efficacy might reflect students' different confidence in their understanding of politics.

Cheung, Chong, and Kennedy's (2018) study showed that Mainland Chinese students thought moral and political education equipped them with political knowledge and supported them to make judgments about social and political issues. In contrast, there might be a 'deficit in civic knowledge' among Hong Kong students (Kennedy, 2005). Although Hong Kong students' civic knowledge score ranked quite high in ICCS 2009 (Schulz et al., 2010), it should be noticed that ICCS 2009 measured not only political knowledge but civic knowledge in a general sense. More detailed analysis suggested Hong Kong students' comprehension of local political knowledge is moderate. Some studies suggest that many Hong Kong students might not clearly understand the constitutional principles and workings of the government (Hong Kong Federation of Youth Groups, 2000, Lee et al., 2011).

Traditional classroom-based civic education has been shown to have a positive influence on students' civic knowledge (Galston, 2001). Therefore, the difference in political knowledge may be traced to the differences in civic education of the two societies in terms of both policy and implementation. Moral and political education in Mainland China has focused more on conveying political knowledge to students than civic education in Hong Kong. For example, Mainland Chinese students are taught about the 'socialist democratic system with Chinese characteristics', including the role of People's Congress, Mainland China's election system and negotiated democracy (People's Education Press, 2008). Such political knowledge provides students with basic materials to think about political issues and may have helped them to develop confidence in their political understanding. Moreover, the independent civic subject and

compulsory implementation of civic education further strengthen this effect. In contrast, civic education in Hong Kong has a depoliticized feature; the political content about democracy and human rights of the official document *Learning to Learn* (CDC, 2001) is outweighed by non-political and moral content. In terms of implementation, civic education in Hong Kong is implemented in a non-compulsory and cross-curriculum approach. Schools are left to implement the curriculum (Fairbrother, 2006). Lee (2005) indicates that schools face difficulties from both designing a systematic civic education program and apathy expressed by some teachers in teaching civic education. As a result, "enhancing civic education remains a slogan rather than reality" (Lee, 2005, p. 79) and limited political knowledge is presented to students (Lee, 2005; Leung & Ng, 2004; Leung & Yuen, 2012).

5.4 Research Question 3

This section discusses the results in relation to Research Question 3. First, it discusses the relationship between political efficacy, political trust and civic participation generated from the variable-centered approach. Second, it discusses the different attitude-behavior groups generated from a person-centered approach.

5.4.1 Political trust and political efficacy on civic participation

The results of the current study confirmed the hypothesis that political efficacy and political trust facilitate conventional forms of political participation, yet the relationship between political efficacy, political trust and civic participation needs to be understood separately in democratic and non-democracy settings.

Voting has been the most conventional and widespread form of political participation in representative democracies (Almond & Verba, 1963). Citizens are expected to express their

opinions, take positions and make decisions on public issues by voting for the party or the candidate they support. It is an important form of political participation because mass participation makes the democratic regime legitimate. Political efficacy in democratic settings means that citizens perceive they can make a difference and influence governmental decisions. This is in line with the characteristics of democratic regimes that allow citizens to vote out political leaders with whom they are not satisfied. Therefore, the more efficacious citizens are, the more likely they are to engage in conventional participation (Almond & Verba, 1963; Berelson et al., 1954; Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Stokes, 1980; Campbell et al., 1954; Diemer & Rapa, 2016; Schulz et al., 2010). Similar to political efficacy, political trust can strengthen legitimacy and effectiveness of democratic regimes. Previous studies have suggested that political trust had a positive influence on conventional participation (Dalton, 2004; Seligson, 1983; Torney-Purta et al., 2004).

In contrast, voting plays a less important role in non-democratic settings. Although the ruling authorities of both a hybrid regime and an authoritarian regime may not be opposed to elections at a certain level, very little power, nonetheless, is ceded to ordinary citizens by governments in non-democratic regimes. It is not likely that people can vote out the ruling political elites or make a big difference in policy-making. Therefore, voting in non-democratic regimes has more of symbolic function than a substantial function. Accordingly, it does not seem appropriate to define political efficacy in non-democratic settings in the same way as in democratic settings. Alternatively, political efficacy in non-democratic settings can be understood as personal political competence which is linked with political interest and political knowledge (Westholm & Niemi, 1986). The current study found both political efficacy and political trust to be positively associated with conventional participation among Mainland Chinese and Hong Kong students. In

other words, engaging in conventional forms of political participation is more likely to reflect citizens' political knowledge and interest as well as citizens' trust towards the ruling authorities. It does not necessarily mean 'changing the political policy or making a difference' but a reflection of citizens' concern towards public affairs.

Many studies have suggested that political efficacy and political distrust would contribute to unconventional political participation (Balch, 1974; Finkel, 1985; Hooghe & Marien, 2013; Kasse, 1999; Shingles, 1981). The current study, however, suggests that political efficacy and political distrust do not facilitate unconventional forms of political participation in non-democratic settings as strongly as in democratic settings. Protest activities such as sit-ins, street demonstrations, boycotts and blocking the traffic, were once seen as illegitimate and a threat to the stability of democracy but they have been absorbed into mainstream political participation in democratic regimes (Barnes et al., 1979; Norris, 1999). Unconventional participation, however, is a marginalized form of political participation in the authoritarian and the hybrid regime, and is more likely to be opposed by the ruling authorities. Therefore, involvement in unconventional participation requires a higher level of motivation, knowledge, or interest in an authoritarian and a hybrid regime. The weak link between political efficacy and unconventional participation suggests that the current level of people's political attitudes is not adequate to mobilize people to engage in protests. In an authoritarian context, people might regard protests as risky and dangerous. In addition, ruling authorities in non-democratic regimes use responsiveness to deal with people's discontent to deflect their behaviors from becoming 'radical'. Therefore, a lack of trust in people living in an authoritarian regime is more likely to lead to their withdrawal from political participation rather than the adoption of radical actions.

The link between political attitudes and unconventional participation is stronger in Hong Kong than in Mainland China, although the overall effect is rather weak. This seems to suggest that, in a hybrid regime, there may be a perception of greater tolerance and a less risky environment towards unconventional participation. Consequently, it is perhaps more likely for Hong Kong students to view protests as a way to affect the political agenda and influence policy when they are not satisfied with the incumbents. Hong Kong has witnessed several protests after the transition of sovereignty. Protests in Hong Kong have concentrated on the issues in the political sphere such as democratization and national identity. This might be in accordance with political activism as an element of political culture in Hong Kong (Lam, 2005). Compared with an authoritarian regime, protests in Hong Kong share more of the nature of elite-challenging and anti-authority as in democratic societies. The relatively tolerant political environment makes it possible for distrustful citizens to have an option to express their discontent on the street. Yet people's willingness for engaging in unconventional participation should not be exaggerated considering that the overall level of unconventional participation is quite low.

5.4.2 Four types of participators

The previous results were based on a variable-centered analytic approach, which highlighted the homogeneity in the data and focused on the relationship between variables. This section discusses the results of a person-centered analytic approach, which provides an alternative way to understand the relationship between political attitudes and forms of civic participation. Using such an approach, it was possible to observe the heterogeneity with the population. Different groups with different political attitudes and intentions for future civic participation in each society were identified.

Based on the analysis discussed in Chapter 4, four clusters were generated among Mainland Chinese and Hong Kong students, and labeled *Alienated-Radical Participators*, *Supportive-Active Participators*, *Loyal-Minimal Participators* and *Critical-Active Participators*. The labeling of the clusters reflected both the attitude orientations of students as well as their preference for civic participation. Taking '*Alienated-Radical Participators*' as an example, '*alienated'* reflected political attitude, which means students were characterized by both low political trust and low political efficacy. Low political trust means that students expressed dissatisfaction towards the current political system while a low level of political efficacy suggested they do not have much confidence in their political knowledge. '*Radical*' suggested this group favored radical political participation such as illegal protest. *'Supportive-Active Participators'* were the opposite of *Alienated-Radical Participators*. *'Supportive'* suggested that these students held a positive attitude toward both the political system and their political capacity, characterized by the highest political trust and political efficacy. *'Active'* indicated that these students had the highest level of intention for conventional participation. '*Loyal-Minimal Participators*' were students who showed a great level of support to political system but had lower level political efficacy. These students were not eager to engage in any kind of civic participation, especially illegal protest. That is why their participation intentions were described as '*Minimal*'. *Critical-Active Participators* were the students who were more confident about their political capacity and held a critical attitude towards the government. Their participation intentions were also described as '*Active'*[12] because these students felt they would devote themselves in the future to conventional forms of political participation.

[12] Critical-Active Participators had the second highest intentions for conventional participation among the four groups, lower than Supportive-Active Participators.

The results of a person-centered approach challenged existing theory. Paige (1971) argues that although alienated people are not satisfied with governments, they do not have enough political interest or political information to be motivated into political participation, both conventional and unconventional. He believes that people with an alienated political orientation are probably minimal participators. This is only partly true for the results of the current study. *Alienated-Radical Participators* had the lowest willingness to engage in conventional participation in the future, as expected. Alienated students, however, tended to be more eager, rather than passive, in attending illegal protests. Perhaps they felt that they might give up institutionalized forms of political participation due to the fragmented political system. Low efficacy suggested that students in this group might not be very well-informed about political issues or very interested in politics. Therefore, their intentions for radical participation may not aim to seek change in the political agenda, but more to express their dissatisfaction (Citrin 1974; Muller, Jukam, & Seligson, 1982).

Gamson (1968) and Paige (1971) suggest that a combination of low political trust and high political efficacy would lead to radical participation. They believe that *Mistrust-Efficacious* individuals are easily mobilized to challenge the current political system and lead to a revolutionary situation. The more distrustful citizens are, the more radical they could be. The results in the current study, however, found that students with low trust and high efficacy (*Critical-Active Participators*) would engage more in conventional participation rather than radical participation, which contradicts the theories of both Gamson (1968) and Paige (1971). This may illustrate the conservatism of the political cultures in Mainland China and Hong Kong. Although citizens might not be satisfied with the ruling authorities, they still prefer to maintain harmony and avoid conflict with the authorities.

Almond and Verba (1963) identify participant culture and indicate that citizens in participant culture are more aware of political knowledge and play an active role in politics. Paige (1971) further develops this theory and suggests that supportive orientations with high efficacy and high political trust are most likely to be found in democratic societies. It seems from the results of the current study, however, that supportive-active orientation does not necessarily need to be linked with democratic regimes. *Supportive-Active Participants* were identified in Hong Kong and Mainland China, neither of which are democratic regimes.

Apart from participant culture, Almond and Verba (1963) also identify subject culture. According to them, the relationship between people and the state in subject culture is hierarchical and the state is in a dominant position. While citizens have some political knowledge and are aware of governments, they do not participate much in politics. Paige (1971) further argues that subordinate orientation with high trust and low efficacy are more likely to be found in hierarchical and traditional political systems. *Loyal-Minimal Participators* in the current study tended to support this theory. *Loyal-Minimal Participators* might acknowledge that they do not have much influence on politics, but they believed the authorities would act on their behalf. As a result, they considered themselves willing to withdraw from participation in politics.

Proportion of clusters in Mainland China and Hong Kong

Comparing cluster membership, the current study found that there were more *Alienated-Radical Participators* (25%) among Hong Kong students than among Mainland Chinese students (9%). In other words, there were more students among the Hong Kong participants who would consider illegal protest as a form of future civic participation. This is consistent with the results of Kennedy, Li, and Ng (2018), who suggested that the activists among Hong Kong students in 2009 expressed more anti-China and anti-government sentiments than a decade ago. *Alienated-*

Radical Participators reflected the political activism as an element of political culture, which is much stronger in Hong Kong than in Mainland China.

The results indicated that there were more *Supportive-Active Participators* (38%) among Mainland Chinese students than Hong Kong students (9%). It seemed that a noticeable number of Mainland Chinese students were not passive citizens; instead, they saw themselves as being quite active towards future civic participation, especially in conventional form. Although China is an authoritarian regime, it does not necessary mean that all channels of civic participation are blocked. The regime attempted to convince people that they can apprise the government of their concern by establishing some '*input institutions*' (Nathan, 2003). In accordance, students are also informed that they can give suggestions to the government in moral and political education. This group suggested that many Mainland Chinese students had a high level of support towards the regime and they were willing to participate in politics within the constraints of the ruling authorities.

The results identified 31.8% of Hong Kong students and 25.0% of the Mainland Chinese population as *Loyal-Minimal Participators*. This group reflected the conservative aspect of the political culture in a non-democratic regime. This group would be favored by the authoritarian regime because one goal of moral and political education in Mainland China is to cultivate obedient and patriotic citizens who support the regime (Fairbrother, 2003; Li, 2015). This group would also be favored by conservative forces in the hybrid regime since the apolitical nature of this group would benefit social stability and economic prosperity in Hong Kong.

A noticeable number of *Critical-Active Participators* were identified in Mainland China (26%) and Hong Kong (33%). It was possibly not a surprise that this group was identified in Hong Kong considering that there is a more tolerant political environment in Hong Kong and

pluralistic political opinions coexist in society. The discovery of critical students in Mainland China, however, challenged the stereotype that Mainland Chinese students are passive and obedient together with some previous studies (Fairbrother, 2003; Zhao et al., 2017). Although one of the major purposes of moral and political education is to cultivate students' loyalty toward the CCP and the state, a resilient group was still identified. It is plausible that schooling is not the only agent which affects students' political socialization. Students' interactions with parents, peers or foreigners in daily life might also shape their civic value and intentions for future actions (Cheung et al., 2018; Li, 2009). The generation of a critical cluster shows the 'civic potential' (Chow, 2013) of Mainland Chinese students and it provides a new perspective to help understand Chinese students' civic role.

5.5 Implications

5.5.1 Implications for theory

For measurement theory

Secondary analysis allows researchers to analyze data in a more innovative way. The current study shows that a variable-centered approach and a person-centered approach are not contradictory, rather, they were compatible. The two approaches were able to capture the different aspects of the data.

A variable-centered approach showed the overall level of students' political attitude or intentions of civic participation from a specific region, which guaranteed the common metric for comparison across countries (Rutkowski & Engel, 2010). International large scale assessments such as ICCS focus on comparisons among different regions. Although China did not participate in the ICCS study, conducting the survey using a modeled questionnaire made it possible to compare Chinese students' political attitude and intentions for participation with the international

results. Using a variable-centered approach, the current study finds that Mainland Chinese students had a higher endorsement of political efficacy, political trust and conventional participation than their Hong Kong counterparts.

A person-centered approach, on the other hand, allows researchers to look more closely into the characteristics of students within each society. As Chow (2013) indicated, a person-centered approach expands the scope of comparative studies. The advantage of a person-centered approach makes it possible to identify different groups within each society. For example, the results suggested that both Hong Kong and Mainland students only weakly endorsed any future intentions of illegal protest. This does not necessarily mean, however, that all the students were reluctant to engage in illegal protests. The results from a person-centered approach suggested that there was a group of students in both Mainland China and Hong Kong who do support illegal protest more than other students. A person-centered approach yielded more information from the data. For example, the current study find that *Alienated-Radical Participators* coexist with *Supportive-Active Participators* within the same population. Such a finding has significant implications both for civic education policy and classroom practice.

A variable-center approach focuses on the relationship between variables. It usually starts with a hypothesis to be tested. The current study attempts to test the relationship between political attitudes and political participation. A person-centered approach usually does not have presuppositions and is more exploratory in nature. Therefore, it is possible to generate new findings beyond the positive/negative binary between independent and dependent variables and generate different combinations of students' political attitudes and political participation. Therefore, a person-centered approach can provide a new perspective to understand the attitude-behavior relationship.

For civic education theory

The current study finds unexpected 'civic potential' (Chow, 2013) among Mainland Chinese students. It would be tempting to think that Chinese students' might be characterized by a 'thin citizenship', which is focused on moral behavior, obeying the law and taking a passive role in society (Kennedy et al., 2007; Walzer, 1994). However, while the current study confirms a high level of political trust of Mainland Chinese students, which was in line with the regimes' effort to foster loyal and supportive citizens (Almond & Verba, 1963), it surprisingly observed a somewhat 'thick citizenship' among Mainland Chinese students. In other words, Mainland Chinese students in the current study demonstrated high political efficacy and positive intentions for future civic participation. This needs to be understood in the Chinese context.

The ruling authority in Mainland China attempts to demonstrate some parental qualities, showing attention and willingness to listen to people's views. Moral and political education in Mainland China also conveys such information to students by encouraging them to take conventional political participation such as giving suggestions to the ruling authorities, contacting representatives. It should be noticed that these forms of participation are 'elite-directed' in nature rather than 'elite-challenging' (Inglehart, 1977, pp. 317–321). Moreover, moral and political education provides students with some basic knowledge to think about social and political issues. This might increase student's confidence of their political knowledge and stimulate them to become interested in political affairs. As a result, Mainland Chinese students seem to have developed a high level of political efficacy and intentions for conventional participation. At the same time, most Mainland Chinese students were reluctant to participate in radical participation. Their participation intentions, were 'playing by the rules' and based on respect toward the authority, which met the expectations of the ruling authorities.

Another point about 'thick citizenship' is that *Critical-Active Participators* were represented among Mainland Chinese students. Not all Chinese students hold a high and unconditional trust towards the government and a number of Mainland Chinese students held a critical attitude towards the political system. This means that these students were not obedient subjects who accepted the ruling authorities' ideology through moral and political education, but they were able to develop their own political attitudes and intentions for future political participation.

5.5.2 Implications for policy

Results in the current study suggest that Hong Kong students have illustrated a relatively more passive citizenship than their Mainland Chinese counterparts. This seems to be not in line with expectations considering Mainland China is an authoritarian regime whereas Hong Kong has a relatively more democratic political system. This has some implications for understanding civic education policy in different regimes. Different regimes have different expectations for 'preferred citizens' and such expectations are conveyed through its civic education policy. Different regimes have different capabilities for cultivating 'preferred citizens'. To be more specific, the authoritarian regime has greater capability to cultivate the 'preferred citizens' than the hybrid regime (Li, 2015). Not all students, however, meet the expectations of a regime. In some cases, civic education is not very effective in shaping students' political attitude and intentions for civic participation. Based on regime type, purpose and effectiveness of the civic education, different suggestions can be made for civic education policy in Mainland China and Hong Kong.

The purpose of civic education is shaped by its regime. The goal of moral and political education in Mainland China is to cultivate obedient and patriotic citizens who support the regime (Fairbrother, 2003; Li, 2015). Patriotic education in Mainland China is used as an

ideological instrument to cultivate subordinate citizens who support socialism and the ruling of the CCP (Fairbrother, 2003). The importance of patriotism is reflected in official documents such as *2001 Revised Curriculum standards for the Primary Ideomoral and Junior Secondary Indeopolitical Curriculum of the Nine-year Universal Education* (Ministry of Education, 2001). Hong Kong's civic education policy has to be understood within its political context as a hybrid regime. The transition of sovereignty from Britain to China raised the demand of cultivating national identity among Hong Kong students. National identity was the center of debate in the transition period and further emphasized by the HKSAR government (Leung & Yuen, 2012). For example, 1996 *Guidelines on Civic Education in Schools* points out the importance of national identity: "National sprit is essential not only for one's national identity and sense of belonging, but also cohesion and strength of one's own nation" (CDC, 1996, p. 23). In addition, the official document *Learning to Learn* (CDC, 2001) identified national identity as the one of the five essential learning experiences to be addressed by citizenship education.

The civic education policy of Mainland China and Hong Kong shares the similarity of fostering regime-supporting citizens, although the focuses of civic education policy are expressed in different forms. In Mainland China, it is patriotism whereas in Hong Kong it is national identity. To what extent civic education policy is shaped by its regime is different in Mainland China and Hong Kong. In an authoritarian regime, the voice of the ruling authorities is dominant and civic education is used as an instrument to consolidate the ideology of the state. Civic education in Mainland China is politicized. In a hybrid regime like Hong Kong, there is a stronger civil society and more tolerance for pluralistic political views. Civic education policy does not reflect the willingness of the ruling authorities as strongly as in an authoritarian regime and adopts a depoliticized form. For example, it addresses the importance of national identity but

only focuses on cultural aspects of China rather than political aspects. In addition, there is another discourse about the role of civic education coexisting with the official discourse, the purpose of which is to cultivate active citizenship and democratic values among citizens. 1996 *Guidelines on Civic Education in Schools* (CDC, 1996) identified the importance of rational, critical and responsible citizens. This discourse provides an alternative perspective about what civic education policy could be in Hong Kong.

Different regimes have different capabilities in cultivating preferred citizens. Li (2015) suggests that the effectiveness of regimes to achieve their goals rely on their capability to control the desired outcome and the authoritarian regime have stronger capabilities than the hybrid regime. The results from the current study confirms this statement. The purpose of fostering supportive citizens has been achieved to a greater extent in the authoritarian regime. Mainland Chinese students demonstrated a great level of trust towards political institutions. In terms of students' civic participation, students showed a high endorsement towards conventional participation which is regime-supporting in nature. Meanwhile, students were reluctant to engage in regime-challenging participation such as illegal protest, which further illustrates the students' support towards the regime. The hybrid regime, on the other hand, has weaker capabilities in cultivating regime-supporting citizens. Despite the government's efforts regarding enhancing students' national identity, the results of the current study suggest this purpose has not been totally achieved. Hong Kong students had a relatively lower level of political trust towards national institutions than local political institutions, indicating that students' identity towards the political aspect of national identity maybe weak. As mentioned above, apart from the official discourse to cultivate regime-supporting citizens, there is an alternative discourse which aims to cultivate democratic citizens through civic education in Hong Kong, The purpose of this

discourse, however, also seems not to have been accomplished. Hong Kong students demonstrated a relatively lower level of political efficacy and were no more active in engaging in conventional participation than their Mainland Chinese counterparts. In conclusion, civic education in Hong Kong seems neither to facilitate strong national identity nor democratic values.

The relationship between civic education and its capability in cultivating an 'ideal citizen' is quite complicated. The population within each society is diverse. Some groups can meet the expectations of the regime and the purpose of civic education policy while other groups contradict the official discourse. For example, a large number of *Loyal-Minimal participators* and *Supportive-Active participators* emerged among Mainland Chinese students which meet the dominant regime-supporting discourse. A noticeable number of *Critical-Active Participators* and a small number of *Alienated-Radical Participators*, however, illustrates the students' resilience towards the official discourse. As for Hong Kong, *Loyal-Minimal participators* meet the expectations of the official discourse while *Supportive-Active participators* and *Critical-Active participators* might reflect a more democratic inclination. A noticeable amount of *Alienated-Radical Participators*, however, can be regarded as a resilient group in Hong Kong. Although their higher endorsement of illegal protest illustrated the regime-challenging features, which seems to be favored by democratic groups, their political attitudes was indifferent and apolitical, making them hardly defined as 'ideal democratic citizens.'

Multiple views coexist in Hong Kong and the consensus on what civic education should be like is absent (Kennedy, 2017). Depoliticized civic education policy weakens the effectiveness of civic education to cultivate 'preferred citizens'. What could be the possible solutions towards this challenging situation? The following discussions attempt to give some suggestions.

The first solution is to emphasize patriotism in civic education. To achieve this purpose, perhaps Hong Kong can learn something from its Mainland Chinese counterpart and adopt a politicized civic education policy. Not only the cultural and historical aspect but also the political aspect of both Mainland China and Hong Kong can be introduced to students. It is not likely that students will trust the political institutions, both locally and nationally if they have little knowledge about them. When the role of civic education is absent in the process of students' political socialization, students will rely on other sources to develop their political attitudes such as the media (Fairbrother, 2003), which might not necessarily have a positive impact on students' national identity. As a matter of fact, this option has been tried by the government. In 2012, the Hong Kong government attempted to implement the *Moral and National Education Curriculum Guide*. The government's effort, however, raised strong resistance from civil society. The failure of implementing national education suggests that the 'hard' policy for patriotism (Kennedy, 2017) might not be an ideal approach for Hong Kong.

The second solution is to cultivate democratic values among students. A democratically oriented civic education aims to develop students' political knowledge, attitudes, competence and engagement. To achieve this purpose, knowledge about the political system, democratic values and human rights need to be presented to students. Political knowledge functions as a foundation for students to make reflections on political and social issues. Moreover, civic education needs to cultivate critical thinking dispositions among students so they can make rational judgments on social and political issues. Finally, civic education is supposed to help students transfer knowledge and attitude into participation so they can take an active and responsible role in local, national and global communities. This solution, however, might also face challenges from local conservative forces.

Unconditional patriotism might not be a good solution in Hong Kong considering that there is a strong civil society. Cultivating liberal democratic citizens in Hong Kong society might also be unrealistic, ignoring the fact that Hong Kong is under the sovereignty of China. Therefore, the third solution is to combine patriotic values and liberal democratic values in civic education and to foster liberal patriotic citizens as indicated by Chan and Chan (2014). Liberal patriotic citizens are characterized with affection towards the homeland and embracement of liberal democratic values. Instead of emphasizing unconditional support towards the regime, this notion stresses on patriotism with condition. To be more specific, liberal patriotic citizens would develop a strong sense of cultural identity, national identity, state consciousness and pride in state's achievements, yet they might not regard criticizing the central government and enhancing human rights as unpatriotic actions. Liberal patriotic citizens might shed some light on the co-existence of democratic values and patriotism in Hong Kong.

As for Mainland China, there are two approaches to understand its moral and political education. Realistically, it meets the expectations from the regime as an instrument to produce preferred loyal citizens to a great extent; idealistically or critically, regime-sanctioned civic education hinders the possibility for building a more democratic society. It is possible that only political knowledge and values favored by the ruling authorities are delivered to students and pluralistic political views are not presented through civic education. The regime-controlled nature of moral and political education makes it even harder to facilitate critical thinking and democratic values through curricula because such values potentially contradict a regime's authority.

It is nonetheless worth noticing that there are future critical citizens among Mainland Chinese students. This suggests that moral and political education is not always effective in cultivating

regime-supporting citizens. It would be over simplified to assume that students in the authoritarian regime accept what they are taught by civic education passively. More possibly, students, at least some of them, are able to develop their own political attitude, which is contradictory to the official discourse. This also suggests that moral and political education is not the sole agent that influences students' political socialization. Students might gain information from various channels such as the media, family and peers. Both the heterogeneity of the Mainland Chinses students' political attitude and behaviours and their political socialization process are important areas for future research.

5.5.3 Implications for school practice

The purpose of this section is not to give suggestions to schools. Instead, this section attempts to illustrate the challenges that schools might face when implementing the civic education curriculum in Hong Kong and Mainland China.

Civic education in Hong Kong is designed to be a cross-curriculum approach and schools are left to implement the civic education curriculum. It means that schools need to decide what civic knowledge to teach, what values to convey, and most importantly, what kind of citizens to cultivate. There are difficulties that schools might face when implementing cross-curriculum civic education such as designing a systematic civic education program and integrating civic knowledge in existing subjects. Challenges might also come from the apathy expressed by some teachers who feel political issues are too controversial to teach (Lee, 2005).

As for Mainland China, it adopts a centralized and fixed civic education curriculum. Civic education is implemented with a subject-based and conclusory approach. The knowledge and values are somewhat controlled by the state with little autonomy are left to schools. Previous studies suggested that an open classroom environment that allows the free exchange of opinion

can foster more informed citizens (Campbell, 2008; Knowles & McCafferty-Wright, 2015). In addition, presenting controversial issues and different positions can cultivate students' appreciation for political conflict. In this light, the challenges for teachers would be how to interpret current fixed knowledge and deliver knowledge in a more innovative way.

5.6 Conclusion

This chapter attempted to provide a plausible explanation of students' political attitudes and intentions for future civic participation by analyzing the political context and civic education policies and practices in Mainland China and Hong Kong.

A variable-centered approach was able to illustrate the similarities and differences between Mainland Chinese and Hong Kong students. Students from both societies showed a weak endorsement of illegal protest but a strong endorsement of voting. Illegal protests are a marginalized form of political participation in both regimes. The regime-challenging nature of them undermines students' willingness for participation. In contrast, voting is elite-directed in nature, and students' high endorsement of voting might be the result of civic education or vicarious experiences in their daily lives. Mainland Chinese students demonstrated a more active citizenship than their Hong Kong counterparts with higher political trust, political efficacy and stronger endorsement of conventional participation. Civic education in Mainland China is politicized and controlled by the regime. Mainland Chinese students' political attitudes and intentions for civic participation demonstrate their support towards the regime. Civic education in Hong Kong is depoliticized in nature, which might hinder Hong Kong students from developing a more active citizenship. In conclusion, an authoritarian regime has a stronger capacity in cultivating regime-supporting citizens than a hybrid regime.

A person-centered approach was able to identify the different groups have emerged from each society. Four groups were generated among Mainland Chinese students and Hong Kong students were labeled as *Alienated-Radical Participators*, *Supportive-Active Participators*, *Loyal-Minimal Participators* and *Critical-Active Participators*. The person-centered approach suggests the heterogeneity of the population and illustrates some students' support and resilience towards the official discourse.

Chapter 6 will present the conclusion of the study.

Chapter 6

Conclusion

6.1 Introduction

The previous chapter provided an explanation of students' political attitudes and intentions for future civic participation. This chapter will bring the study to a conclusion. This chapter is divided into six sections. Section 6.1 is the introduction of the chapter. Section 6.2 presents a summary of the main points made throughout the thesis. Section 6.3 highlights the main contribution of the study. Section 6.4 discusses the limitations of the study. Section 6.5 assesses the implications for future studies. Section 6.6 draws the chapter and thesis to a close.

6.2 Summary of the main points

The purpose of the study was to identify the differences and similarities in the political attitudes and intentions for future civic participation of students in Mainland China, an authoritarian regime and Hong Kong, a hybrid regime. The results suggest that Mainland Chinese students have higher levels of political trust and political efficacy with stronger intentions to engage in conventional participation than Hong Kong students. Plausible explanations have been made based on the varied political contexts and the nature of civic education in each context. Table 26 is a framework for comparison between Mainland China and Hong Kong based on Li's (2015) work. She suggested that regime type has a direct influence on civic education policy and practice. The current study took a further step by arguing that regime type and civic education policy have implications for students' political attitudes and intentions for civic participation. China is an authoritarian regime. The authoritarian regime aims to foster loyalty and support among its citizens through civic education. Politicized civic education in Mainland China

provides students with political knowledge and cultivates political awareness and interest among them. At the same time, civic education in Mainland China is sanctioned by the regime as a means to support the regime so its potential for fostering Western-style democracy is limited. Hong Kong, on the other hand, is classified as a 'hybrid regime'. Civic education in Hong Kong has been described as 'depoliticized' which, it has been argued, caused a 'civic deficit' among Hong Kong students in terms of knowledge and willingness to engage. As a result, Mainland Chinese students in the current study showed more active citizenship than their Hong Kong counterparts. The following paragraphs give a more detailed explanation concerning this conclusion.

Table 26

Framework for comparison between Hong Kong and Mainland China

	Hong Kong	Mainland China
Regime type	Hybrid regime	Authoritarian regime
Civic education policy goal	National identity and morality	Support for socialism, patriotism and party; morality
Civic education policy feature	Depoliticized	Politicized
Political attitudes	Less efficacious and less trust	Efficacious and trustful
Civic participation	Less active in conventional participation	Active in conventional participation

Note: Only the official discourse of civic education policy is represented here.

As an authoritarian regime, Mainland China is characterized by strong centralized power. The ruling authority is not generated through electoral procedures. The control of the state belongs to a single party and power is not shared. While there might be some economic or cultural freedom, the legitimacy of the ruling authority remains unchallengeable (Roskin et al., 1999).

The authoritarian regime attempts to foster loyalty and support from the public and prefers passive and obedient citizens (Almond & Verba, 1963). There are nonetheless some chances for citizens to participate in politics, as long as the activities do not challenge the existing political structure (Banks, 2008). To maintain stability, the ruling authorities demonstrate some parental qualities, paying attention and a willingness to listen to the people's demands. Consequently, constrained political participation, such as voting in local elections, giving suggestions to the government and contacting officials are allowed, even welcomed, but regime-challenging participation is not allowed by the ruling authorities.

The purpose of moral and political education in Mainland China is to cultivate loyal citizens who are compliant towards the ruling of the CCP and support the socialist state (Li, 2015). Moral and political education in Mainland China is highly politicized. In the moral and political education curriculum, Mainland China is portrayed as a democratic country which is ruled by the people and political knowledge about the Chinese political system (i.e., the election system and the system of people's congress) is provided to students. In addition, students are encouraged to engage in conventional participation such as voting in the People's Congresses and giving suggestions to the government. This is in line with the parental qualities that the ruling authorities want to convey. Based on the regime type and civic education orientation of Mainland China and Hong Kong, Table 27 illustrates the extent to which students' political attitudes and actions meet the expectation of the regimes.

Table 27

Regimes' expectation of students' political attitudes and civic participation

	Hong Kong		Mainland China[13]
Discourse	Non-official discourse	Official discourse	Official discourse
Political trust	√	√	√
Political efficacy	√	×	√
Active regime-supporting (conventional) participation	√	×	√
Active regime-challenging (unconventional) participation	√	×	×
Supportive-Active Participators	√	×	√
Critical- Active participators	√	×	×
Loyal-Minimal Participators	×	√	√
Alienated-radical participators	×	×	×

Note: '√' = certain political attitudes or behaviors are favored by certain groups; '×' = certain political attitudes or behaviors are not favored by certain groups.

Table 27 illustrates that Mainland Chinese students' positive endorsement of political trust, political efficacy and conventional participation would be supported by the authoritarian regime. On the other hand, unconventional participation would not be expected and certainly would not be encouraged. In terms of the attitude-behavior typology, students might be expected to engage as *Supportive-Active Participators* and *Loyal-Minimal Participators* rather than *Critical-Active participators* or *Alienated-Radical participators*.

To some degree, the authoritarian regime in Mainland China has succeeded in cultivating 'preferred citizens'. Students' political attitudes and intentions for future civic largely meet the

[13] Since Mainland China is an authoritarian regime where official discourse dominates, non-official discourse was not provided.

expectations of the regime and civic education orientation. The current study has shown that students developed a strong trust towards political institutions. Moral and political education has provided students with knowledge about political systems, developed students' political awareness and even transferred their political attitudes into intentions for future conventional participation. Compared with Hong Kong students, Mainland Chinese students were more likely to contact political representatives or write a letter to the newspaper for social and political reasons. In addition, Mainland Chinese students were reluctant to participate in illegal protests. This suggests that Mainland Chinese students trusted the authorities and believed that the authorities will respond to their demands. In conclusion, their participation intentions, similar to those of villager protestors, were 'playing by the rules' and were based on respect towards authority.

This does not, however, tell the whole story. The cluster analysis suggests that a small number of Mainland Chinese students held critical attitudes towards the political system. This means that some students were not obedient subjects who accepted the ruling authorities' ideology through moral and political education. These students have developed their own political attitudes and intentions for future political participation independently of the authorities. In a sense, this result challenges Li's (2015) framework that suggests the domination of the authoritarian state in civic education. While most students in the current study showed they were dominated by the state, not all were manipulated. There is a small space for individuality even in the authoritarian regime.

Hong Kong as a hybrid regime combines the features of both democracy and authoritarianism (Heywood, 2002). Hybrid regimes are not stable. Rather, there is a chance for a hybrid regime to slap back into authoritarianism or move forward to a higher level of democracy. In a hybrid

regime, different ideologies compete in society with the conservative group preferring to maintain the status quo and the democratic group demanding a more democratized society.

The official discourse of civic education in Hong Kong for the period covered by the current study reflected the preference of the conservative group. In order to maintain social stability and economic prosperity, civic education policy put forward by the government was depoliticized. This discourse put an emphasis on developing students' national identity and moral characteristics. For example, in the government official document *Learning to Learn* (CDC, 2001), content about morality overweighed political knowledge. Considering its conservative nature, it is likely that the official discourse would expect students to develop trust towards the political system. However, students may not be expected to be very efficacious or actively participate in political affairs. In terms of different types of participators, *Loyal-Minimal Participators* would tend to be favored by this discourse while the other three types of participators would not (see Table 27).

In a hybrid regime, more than one discourse about civic education can coexist. Apart from official discourse, there is a non-official discourse in Hong Kong which has an inclination for democracy. This discourse attempts to cultivate rational, responsible and participative citizens with democratic values. The standpoint of this discourse can be found in 1996 *Guidelines on Civic Education in Schools*:

> Developing in young people not only the basic political knowledge, but also skills, attitudes and competence necessary for them to observe their civic rights and responsibilities, to acquire critical thinking dispositions and civic awareness and to become rational and responsible citizens who can play a constructive role in the civic mission of the nation, the state and the world (CDC, 1996, p. 5).

It is plausible that the non-official discourse would expect students to trust the political system, have a high political efficacy and play an active role in civic participation. In addition, it could be possible that students might be expected to engage as *Supportive-Active Participators* and *Critical-Active Participators* rather than *Loyal-Minimal Participators* or *Alienated-radical Participators* (see Table 27).

The results from the current study suggest that Hong Kong students' political attitudes and intentions for future civic participation would appear to better reflect the inclination of the official discourse rather than the non-official discourse. Hong Kong students held rather conservative political attitudes and intentions for future civic participation, were not as efficacious as their Mainland counterparts and were less willing to engage in conventional participation. In addition, the person-centered approach suggests there were more *Loyal-Minimal Participators* and fewer *Supportive-Active Participators* among Hong Kong students than among Mainland Chinese students. The current civic education does not seem able to develop well-informed, active and participatory citizens which a democratic discourse would expect. A point worth making is that not even all the expectations of the official discourse have been achieved. For example, there were a noticeable number of *Alienated-Radical Participators* among the Hong Kong students who were inclined to endorse regime-challenging participation. Moreover, the Hong Kong students demonstrated a relatively low trust towards national institutions suggesting that the purpose of cultivating national identity might not be achieved.

In conclusion, there is a domination of the official discourse in the authoritarian regime. In a hybrid regime, such as Hong Kong, multiple discourses coexist in society with the official discourse having a conservative emphasis and a non-official discourse having a liberal inclination. Mainland Chinese students' relatively active citizenship and Hong Kong students'

relatively passive citizenship are in line with the distinction between 'politicized' and 'depoliticized' civic education in the two regimes. Students' political attitudes and intentions for civic participation, therefore, generally reflect the expectations of official discourse in both Mainland China and Hong Kong suggesting that regime has a strong capacity in influencing civic education and students' construction of citizenship. Such a capacity in an authoritarian regime is even stronger than in a hybrid regime. Heterogeneity groups within the population, however, suggest that not all the group of students were dominated by regime. *Critical-Active Participators* and *Alienated-Radical Participators* represented the students' resilience towards the official discourse in both Hong Kong and Mainland China.

6.3 Contribution

6.3.1 Western framework's applicability in the Chinese contexts.

The current study makes a contribution by testing the application of a Western attitude-behavior framework in the Chinese contexts. Both Mainland China and Hong Kong students endorsed voting as a form of future civic participation and rejected illegal protest. Yet in doing so, political participation in different regimes did not necessarily endorse the same ideas. The meaning of political participation varies in democratic contexts and in authoritarian and hybrid contexts. In democratic regimes, voting in elections is understood as a citizen's duty and as a somewhat passive form of citizenship. Those who do not vote are regarded as apathetic. Voting in an authoritarian or a hybrid regime, however, might be regarded as more of a civic virtue rather than a civic duty, which illustrates citizens' concerns towards public affairs. In the authoritarian regime, people might withdraw their participation because they feel their interests are well-represented by the ruling authorities or they believe participation is meaningless since the ruling authorities control all. Choosing to vote in local elections, nonetheless, means that citizens

cherish the limited opportunities they are given and are willing to exert their political influence as far as possible. In a hybrid regime such as Hong Kong, voting in District Councils or the Legislative Council can provide a healthy ground for the development of civic culture. Mass participation is essential for the transition from a hybrid regime to a democratic regime.

Unconventional participation such as protests and demonstrations, has been absorbed into the mainstream political participation repertoire in democratic regimes. Unconventional participation, however, is still a marginalized form of political participation in an authoritarian or a hybrid regime, although there is more tolerance towards protests in Hong Kong than in Mainland China. The ruling authorities might oppose protest activities since these may violate social stability and regime legitimacy. The results of the current study suggests that a Western attitude-participation framework can be partially applied in the Chinese contexts. The current study found that higher political trust and political efficacy contribute to conventional participation in both an authoritarian and a hybrid regime, which are consistent with the results from democratic regimes. Political efficacy and political distrust did not facilitate unconventional participation in Mainland China or Hong Kong as strongly as in democratic regimes.

6.3.2 Comparison between Hong Kong and Mainland China

The Hong Kong participants of ICCS 2009 were chosen to be compared with those from Mainland China in terms of students' political attitudes and intentions for future civic participation. The current study, therefore, is complementary to comparative studies between Hong Kong and Mainland China (Fairbrother, 2003; Li, 2015) in both measurement and theory. In her study, Li (2015) argued that students' development of citizenship is in line with regime type: the authoritarian regime develops obedient citizens who lack democratic values, political interest and political awareness whereas the hybrid regime develops more contested citizens who

are willing to obey laws, vote and give suggestions for the government. Li (2015) also called for more quantitative research from non-democratic regimes to examine this notion. The current study can be seen as a response to that call. Interestingly, the current study found that students from an authoritarian regime such as Mainland China are not necessarily passive or obedient. In different ways, Mainland Chinese students developed relatively more active citizenship than their Hong Kong counterparts with higher political efficacy, political trust and intentions for conventional participation. This was contradictory to Li's finding to some extent and might imply that there is more than one approach can be taken to make comparisons across different regime types. Li (2015)'s study focused on the differences between the authoritarian and the hybrid regime and her study highlighted the democratic aspect of the hybrid regime. Her study confirmed the democratic values among the Hong Kong students and part of the reason could be that her study was conducted after the Anti-National Education Movement and Umbrella Movement when Hong Kong people's demands for democracy were stronger and the divergence between different political groups was deeper. The current study, on the other hand, has focused on the common ground of the authoritarian and the hybrid regime since there is a strong conservative force within both. The conservative forces in both regimes have the capacity in influencing students' political attitudes and behaviors, although such capacity is stronger in a authoritarian regime than in a hybrid regime. Mainland Chinese students' active citizenship is in line with politicized civic education and Hong Kong students' relative passive citizenship is consistent with depoliticized civic education. In addition, the Hong Kong data of the current study were collected in 2009, when the society was more stable and people's demands for democracy were not that strong. The current study has shown the importance of studying the multiple civic and political characteristics of individuals within different regimes and the

complexities behind it. Hopefully, this study can motivate more future comparative studies between Mainland China and Hong Kong.

6.4 Limitations

One limitation of the current study is that both the ICCS and the CCCS data were cross-sectional in nature, meaning that students' political attitudes and intentions for future political participation were evaluated simultaneously. Without longitudinal data, it is not likely to establish a cause and effect relationship between independent variables and dependent variables. Therefore, although the current study found a positive relationship between political attitudes and conventional participation, it cannot be inferred that political attitude can predict political participation.

Another limitation comes from the differences between the CCCS study and the ICCS study in terms of sampling and measurement, although the CCCS study was modeled on the ICCS study. The Hong Kong sample was more likely to be representative. The Mainland Chinese sample students came from two cities Xinyang and Shenzhen, which limited the possibility of generalization. In terms of measurement, measurement invariance tests suggested that items in the political trust factor were invariant across groups. This could be a threat to the validity of the measure if students from two groups viewed the construct differently.

The third limitation is that data for the Hong Kong students came from ICCS 2009, which was collected almost a decade ago. The social political context of Hong Kong has changed a lot since then. Social movements such as the Anti-National Education Movement, the Umbrella Movement and the increasing tension between Mainland China and Hong Kong might have an impact on Hong Kong's political culture and might have further implications on Hong Kong students' political attitudes and intentions for future civic participation. The current study was

not able to capture the most recent trends in Hong Kong students' political orientations. Although more recent data from ICCS 2016 are avaiable (Schulz et al., 2018), ICCS 2016 does not contain the same scales as those used in 2009. The more recent data, therefore, can not be used because the scales are not comparable to the scales used by the Mainland Chinese sample.

6.5 Implications for future study

The current study observed what might be described as intentions for an active citizenship among Mainland Chinese students. This raises many issues and questions for further study. First, how does this compare with Western conceptions of active citizenship? Is it simply a reflection of students' comprehension towards the political knowledge that they have been taught in moral and political education classes, or does it suggest some deeper participation-oriented civic potential among Mainland Chinese students? Further qualitative studies are needed to see how students perceive different types of civic participation.

Second, previous studies from democratic societies suggest that political attitudes established in the adolescent period through political socialization are rather stable and have an impact on people's future choice as citizens (Granberg & Holmberg, 1990; Hooghe & Wilkenfeld, 2008; Jennings & Stoker, 2004). Is this also applicable to an authoritarian regime? How likely is it that Mainland Chinese students still hold these positive orientations and intentions for participation when they become adults and realize the constraints of the political system? To address this issue, a longitudinal quantitative study may be required.

Third, the current study found that 25% of Hong Kong students were *Alienated-Radical Participators*. This could be a sign of political activism. Considering that students played an active role in the Anti-National Education Movement and Umbrella Movement which happened after the data collection of the current study, further studies might probably be conducted to

examine whether radicalization has become a trend among Hong Kong students by comparing Hong Kong students' political attitudes and participation across different time cohorts.

6.6 Conclusion

The current study has attempted to understand students' political attitudes and intentions for civic participation in Hong Kong and Mainland China. Mainland Chinese students illustrated a higher level of political trust, political efficacy and intentions for conventional political participation than their Hong Kong counterparts. Plausible explanations have been advanced related to both regime type and civic education policy. As an authoritarian regime, Mainland China attempts to demonstrate parental qualities by showing attention and willingness to listen to people's views and allowing conventional participation such as voting and contacting the government to some extent. Civic education in Mainland China aims to foster citizen's loyalty and support towards the regime which has resulted in high political trust among students. Politicized civic education has provided students with civic knowledge to consider political issues, develop students' political awareness and even transfer their political attitudes into intentions for future participation. While civic education in Mainland China meets the expectations to cultivate regime-supporting students, the regime-sanctioned nature undermines its potential for fostering democracy. In Hong Kong, a hybrid regime, different ideologies compete in society with conservative groups preferring to maintain the status quo and democratic groups demanding a higher level of democratization. Civic education in Hong Kong is depoliticized and contested. Depoliticized civic education leads to a civic deficit among Hong Kong students, which probably hinders them from developing a more active citizenship. Hong Kong students' political attitudes and intentions for future civic participation would appear to reflect the inclination of the official discourse than the non-official democratic-oriented

discourse. Despite the strong influence of the official discourse in both regimes, there was heterogeneity within the sample suggesting that not all students were dominated by the regime. Some students demonstrated resilience towards the official discourse, which might be interpreted as an aspiration towards democracy. For the authoritarian regime, this will be seen as a challenge; but for democratic aspirants within the hybrid regime, it will be seen as a sign of hope for the future. The research reported here signals the importance of understanding these trends and the way they are circumscribed by the characteristics of different regimes and the values they endorse.

References

Abravanel, M. D., & Busch, R. J. (1975). Political competence, political trust, and the action orientations of university. *The Journal of Politics*, *37*(1), 57–82.

Almond, G. A., & Verba, S. (1963). *The civic culture: Political attitudes and democracy in five nations*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Bakker, T. P., & De Vreese, C. H. (2011). Good news for the future? Young people, internet use, and political participation. *Communication Research*, *38*(4), 451–470.

Balch, G. I. (1974). Multiple indicators in survey research: The concept "sense of political efficacy." *Political Methodology*, *1*(2), 1–43.

Bandura, A. (1986). The explanatory and predictive scope of self-efficacy theory. *Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology*, *4*(3), 359–373.

Banks, J. A. (2008). Diversity, group identity, and citizenship education in a global age. *Educational Researcher*, *37*(3), 129–139.

Barnes, S., & Kaase, M. et al. (1979). *Political action: Mass participation in five Western democracies*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.

Bentler, P. M., & Bonett, D. G. (1980). Significance tests and goodness of fit in the analysis of covariance structures. *Psychological Bulletin*, *88*(3), 588–606.

Bereday, G. Z. (1967). Reflections on comparative methodology in education, 1964–1966. *Comparative Education*, *3*(3), 169–287.

Berelson, B. R., Lazarsfeld, P. F., & McPhee, W. N. (1954). *Voting: A study of opinion formation in a presidential campaign*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Blais, A. (2000). *To vote or not to vote?: The merits and limits of rational choice theory. Pittsburgh*, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Blei, D., & Lafferty, J. (2009). Topic models. In A. Srivastava & M. Sahami (Eds.), *Text mining: classification, clustering, and applications* (pp. 71–94). Boca Raton, FL: Taylor & Francis Group.

Bowler, S., & Donovan, T. (2002). Democracy, institutions and attitudes about citizen influence on government. *British Journal of Political Science*, *32*(2), 371–390.

Bray, M., & Lee, W. O. (1993). Education, democracy and colonial transition the case of Hong Kong. *International Review of Education*, *39*(6), 541–560.

Bray, M., & Thomas, R. M. (1995). Levels of comparison in educational studies: Different insights from different literatures and the value of multilevel analyses. *Harvard Educational Review*, *65*(3), 472–491.

Browne, M. W., & Cudeck, R. (1993). Alternative ways of assessing model fit. In K. A. Bollen & J. S. Long (Eds.), *Tests for structural equation models* (pp. 136–162). Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications.

Byrne, B. M. (2004). Testing for multigroup invariance using AMOS graphics: A road less traveled. *Structural Equation Modeling*, *11*(2), 272–300.

Campbell, A., Gurin, G., & Miller, W. (1954). *The voter decides*. Oxford, England: Row, Peterson, and Company.

Campbell, A., & Converse, P. E. (1972). *The human meaning of social change*. New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation.

Campbell, A., Converse, P. E., Miller, W. E., & Stokes, D. E. (1980). *The American voter*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Campbell, D. E. (2008). Voice in the classroom: How an open classroom climate fosters political engagement among adolescents. *Political Behavior*, *30*(4), 437–454.

Carnesecca, C. (2015). Voice of the masses: The internet and responsive authoritarianism in China. In L. Dong, H. Kriesi, & D. Kübler (Eds.), *Urban mobilizations and new media in contemporary China* (pp. 117–132). Surrey, England: Ashgate Publishing Limited.

Chan, E., & Chan, J. (2014). Liberal patriotism in Hong Kong. *Journal of Contemporary China*, *23*(89), 952–970.

Catterberg, G., & Moreno, A. (2006). The individual bases of political trust: Trends in new and established democracies. *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, *18*(1), 31–48.

Chen, J. (2004). *Popular political support in urban China*. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press.

Chen, S. (2013). The discrepancy of meaning of citizenship between the state and society in China: Implications for citizenship education and policymaking. *Education, Citizenship and Social Justice, 8*(3), 263–275.

Cheung, C. H. W., Chong, E. K. M., Kennedy, K. J., & Chow, P. C. F. (2018). The attitudes of mainland Chinese secondary students towards democracy and equality: Being a young citizen in twenty-first-century China. *Citizenship Teaching & Learning*, *13*(2), 209–225.

Chong, K.M., Kennedy, K.J., Chan, K., Cheung, H. W. (2014) *Chinese civic and citizenship education study report*. Hong Kong: The Hong Kong Institute of Education.

Chow, K. F. (2013). *The civic potential of students: An investigation of students' civic knowledge and conceptions of active citizenship in five Asian societies* (Unpublished PhD thesis). The Hong Kong Institute of Education, Hong Kong.

Chow, K. F., & Kennedy, K. J. (2014). Secondary analysis of large-scale assessment data: An alternative to variable-centred analysis. *Educational Research and Evaluation, 20*(6), 469–493.

Citrin, J. (1974). Comment: The political relevance of trust in government. *American Political Science Review*, *68*(3), 973–988.

Coleman, J. S. (1990). *Foundations of social theory*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Craig, S. C. (1980). The mobilization of political discontent. *Political Behavior*, *2*(2), 189–209.

Curriculum Development Council. (1985). *Guidelines on civic education in schools*. Hong Kong: Education Department.

Curriculum Development Council. (1996). *Guidelines on civic education in schools*. Hong Kong: Education Department.

Curriculum Development Council. (2001). *Learning to learn: lifelong learning and whole-person development*. Hong Kong: Curriculum Development Council.

Dalton, R. J. (1996). Citizen politics. *Public opinion and political parties in advanced western democracies,* Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House.

Dalton, R. J. (1999). Political support in advanced industrial democracies. In P. Norris (Ed.), *Critical citizens: Global support for democratic government* (pp. 57–77). New York: Oxford University Press.

Dalton, R. J. (2000). Citizen attitudes and political behavior. *Comparative Political Studies*, *33*(6-7), 912–940.

Dalton, R. J. (2004). *Democratic challenges, democratic choices: The erosion of political support in advanced industrial democracies*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Dalton, R. J. (2008). Citizenship norms and the expansion of political participation. *Political Studies*, *56*(1), 76–98.

Dalton, R. J., & Wattenberg, M. P. (Eds.). (2002). *Parties without partisans: Political change in advanced industrial democracies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Diamantopoulos, A., & Siguaw, J. A. (2000). *Introducing LISREL: A guide for the uninitiated*. London: Sage Publications.

Diemer, M. A., & Rapa, L. J. (2016). Unraveling the complexity of critical consciousness, political efficacy, and political action among marginalized adolescents. *Child Development*, *87*(1), 221–238.

Easton, D. (1975). A re-assessment of the concept of political support. *British journal of political science*, *5*(4), 435–457.

Fairbrother, G. P. (2003). *Toward critical patriotism: Student resistance to political education in Hong Kong and China*. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press.

Fairbrother, G. P. (2005). Power and right in Hong Kong's citizenship education. *Citizenship Studies*, *9*(3), 293–308.

Fairbrother, G. P. (2006). Between Britain and China: Hong Kong's citizenship education policy paradigm. *Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis*, *8*(1), 25–42.

Fairbrother, G. P. (2014). The Chinese paternalistic state and moral education. In K. J. Kennedy, G. P. Fairbrother, & Z. Zhao (Eds.), *Citizenship Education in China* (pp. 23–38). New York, NY: Routledge.

Finifter, A. W. (1970). Dimensions of political alienation. *American Political Science Review*, *64*(2), 389–410.

Finkel, S. E. (1985). Reciprocal effects of participation and political efficacy: A panel analysis. *American Journal of Political Science*, *29*(4), 891–913.

Foa, R. S., & Mounk, Y. (2016). The democratic disconnect. *Journal of democracy*, 27(3), 5–17.

Fraser, J. (1970). The mistrustful-efficacious hypothesis and political participation. *The Journal of Politics*, *32*(2), 444–449.

Fukuyama, F. (1995). *Trust: The social virtues and the creation of prosperity*. New York, NY: Free Press.

Freedom House (2018). *Freedom in the world 2018.* Retrieved from *https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-2018-table-country-scores*

Galston, W. A. (2001). Political knowledge, political engagement, and civic education. *Annual Review of Political Science*, *4*(1), 217–234.

Gamson, W. (1968). *Power and discontent*. Homewood, IL: Doesey Press.

Garrett, D., & Ho, W. C. (2014). Hong Kong at the brink: Emerging forms of political participation in the new social movement. In J. Y. Cheung (Ed.), *New trends of political participation in Hong Kong* (pp. 347–383). Hong Kong: City University of Hong Kong Press.

Goodwin, J. (2001). *No other way out: states and revolutionary movements, 1945–1991*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

Granberg, D., & Holmberg, S. (1990). The intention-behavior relationship among US and Swedish voters. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, *53*(1), 44–54.

Greenhoot, A. F., & Dowsett, C. J. (2012). Secondary data analysis: An important tool for addressing developmental questions. *Journal of Cognition and Development*, *13*(1), 2–18.

Grönlund, K., & Setälä, M. (2007). Political trust, satisfaction and voter turnout. *Comparative European Politics*, *5*(4), 400–422.

Hahn, C. (1998). Becoming political: Comparative perspectives on citizenship education. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.

Hahn, C. L. (2010). Comparative civic education research: What we know and what we need to know. *Citizenship Teaching & Learning*, *6*(1), 5–23.

Hardin, R. (1999). Do we want trust in government? In M. E. Warren (Ed.), *Democracy and trust* (pp. 22–41). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hawkins, B. W., Marando, V. L., & Taylor, G. A. (1971). Efficacy, mistrust, and political participation: Findings from additional data and indicators. *The Journal of Politics*, *33*(4), 1130–1136.

Hetherington, M. J. (1998). The political relevance of political trust. *American Political Science Review, 92*(4), 791–808.

Heywood, A. (2002). *Politics*. New York, NY: Palgrave Foundations.

Holt, K., Shehata, A., Strömbäck, J., & Ljungberg, E. (2013). Age and the effects of news media attention and social media use on political interest and participation: Do social media function as leveller? *European Journal of Communication*, *28*(1), 19–34.

Hong Kong. (1984). *White Paper: The further development of representative government in Hong Kong*. Hong Kong: Government Printer.

Hong Kong Federation of Youth Groups. (1997). *Youth's views on the three-tier system of representative government. Youth opinion polls, no. 49.* Retrieved from http://www. hkfyg. org.hk/yrc/english/yr-polls-49-e.html

Hooghe, M., & Marien, S. (2013). A comparative analysis of the relation between political trust and forms of political participation in Europe. *European Societies*, *15*(1), 131–152.

Hooghe, M., & Wilkenfeld, B. (2008). The stability of political attitudes and behaviors across adolescence and early adulthood: A comparison of survey data on adolescents and young adults in eight countries. *Journal of Youth and Adolescence*, *37*(2), 155–167.

Hooper, D., Coughlan, J., & Mullen, M. (2008). Structural equation modeling: Guidelines for determining model fit. *Electronic Journal of Business Research Methods*, *6*(1), 53–60.

Hox, J. J., & Bechger, T. M. (1998). An introduction to structural equation modeling. *Family science review, 11*, 354–373.

Hu, L. T., & Bentler, P. M. (1999), Cutoff criteria for fit indexes in covariance structure analysis: Conventional criteria versus new alternatives. *Structural Equation Modeling*, *6*(1), 1–55.

Hung, C. F. (2014). Political participation of students in Hong Kong. In J. Y. Cheng (Ed.), *New trends of political participation in Hong Kong* (pp. 241–284). Hong Kong: City University of Hong Kong Press.

Inglehart, R. (1977). *The silent revolution: Changing values and political styles among western publics*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Inglehart, R. (1997). *Modernization and postmodernization: Cultural, economic, and political change in 43 societies*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Inglehart, R., & Catterberg, G. (2002). Trends in political action: The developmental trend and the post-honeymoon decline. *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, *43*(3–5), 300–316.

Inglehart, R., & Welzel, C. (2005). *Modernization, cultural change, and democracy: The human development sequence*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Jennings, M. K., & Stoker, L. (2004). Social trust and civic engagement across time and generations. *Acta politica*, *39*(4), 342–379.

Jung, T., & Wickrama, K. A. S. (2008). An introduction to latent class growth analysis and growth mixture modeling. *Social and Personality Psychology Compass*, *2*(1), 302–317.

Kahne, J., & Westheimer, J. (2006). The limits of political efficacy: Educating citizens for a democratic society. *PS: Political Science & Politics*, *39*(2), 289–296.

Kasse, M. (1999). Interpersonal trust, political trust and non-institutionalized political participation in Western Europe. *West Europe Politics, 22*(3), 1–21.

Kennedy, K. J. (2005). *Changing schools for changing times: New directions for the school curriculum in Hong Kong*. Hong Kong: Chinese University Press.

Kennedy, K. J. (2010). Young citizens in Hong Kong: Obedient, active and patriotic? *Social Psychology of Education, 13*(1), 111–127.

Kennedy, K. J. (2012). Asian students' citizenship values and their relationship to civic understanding: An exploratory study comparing Thai and Hong Kong students. *Research in Comparative and International Education, 7*(2), 248–259.

Kennedy, K. J. (2017). Comparative insights on civics and citizenship education and curriculum: a view from Hong Kong. In A. Peterson & L. Tudball (Eds.), *Civics and Citizenship Education in Australia: Challenges, Practices and International Perspectives* (pp. 245–261). London: Bloomsbury Publishing.

Kennedy, K. J., Hahn, C. L., & Lee, W. O. (2007). Constructing citizenship: Comparing the views of students in Australia, Hong Kong, and the United States. *Comparative Education Review, 52*(1), 53–91.

Kennedy, K. J., Li, L. J., & Ng, H. Y. (2018). The development of Hong Kong students' civic attitudes under Chinese sovereignty. *Asian Education and Development Studies*. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1108/AEDS-04-2017-0035

Klingemann, H. D., & Fuchs, D. (Eds.). (1995). *Citizens and the State*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Knowles, R. T., & McCafferty-Wright, J. (2015). Connecting an open classroom climate to social movement citizenship: A study of 8th graders in Europe using IEA ICCS data. *The Journal of Social Studies Research*, *39*(4), 255–269.

Lam, W. M. (2005). Depoliticization, citizenship, and the politics of community in Hong Kong. *Citizenship Studies*, 9(3), 309–322.

Lam, W. M (2015). *Understanding the political culture of Hong Kong: The paradox of activism and depoliticization*. Oxford, England: Routledge.

Lau, S. K., & Kuan, H. C. (1995). The attentive spectators: Political participation of the Hong Kong Chinese. *Journal of Northeast Asian Studies*, *14*(1), 3–24.

Lau, S. K., & Kuan, H. C. (2000). Partial democratization, "foundation moment" and political parties in Hong Kong. *The China Quarterly*, *163*(9), 705–720.

Laursen, B., & Hoff, E. (2006). Person-centered and variable-centered approaches to longitudinal data. *Merrill-Palmer Quarterly*, *52*(3), 377–389.

Levi, M., & Stoker, L. (2000). Political trust and trustworthiness. *Annual Review of Political Science*, *3*(1), 475–507.

Lee, F. L. (2005). Collective efficacy, support for democratization, and political participation in Hong Kong. *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, *18*(3), 297–317.

Lee, W. O. (2003). Students' concepts and attitudes toward citizenship: The case of Hong Kong. *International Journal of Educational Research*, *39*(6), 591–607.

Lee, W. O. (2004). Citizenship education in Hong Kong: Development and challenges. In W.O. Lee, D. L. Grossman, K. J. Kennedy & G. P. Fairbrother (Eds.), *Citizenship education in Asia and the Pacific: Concepts and Issues* (pp. 59–80). Hong Kong: Comparative Education Research Centre, The University of Hong Kong.

Lee, W. O. (2005). Aspirations for democracy in the absence of a democracy: Civic education in Hong Kong before and after 1997. In S. Wilde (Ed.), *Political and citizenship education: International perspectives* (pp. 61–85). Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

Lee, W.O., Kennedy, K.J., Fairbrother, G. P., Bond, T., Law, W.W., Cheung, C. K., & Hui, E. (2011). *International civic and citizenship education study 2009 Hong Kong report*. Hong Kong: The Hong Kong Institute of Education and The University of Hong Kong.

Lee, W. O., & Sweeting, A. (2001). Controversies in Hong Kong's political transition: Nationalism versus liberalism. In M. Bray & W. O. Lee (Eds.), *Education and political transition: Themes and experiences in East Asia* (pp. 101–121). Hong Kong: Comparative Education Research Centre, The University of Hong Kong.

Leung, Y. W., & Ng, S. N. (2004). Back to square one: The "re-depoliticizing'of civic education in Hong Kong. *Asia Pacific Journal of Education*, *24*(1), 43–60.

Leung, Y. W., & Yuen, T. W. W. (2012). Competition between politicized and depoliticized versions of civic education curricula: The case of Hong Kong. *Citizenship, Social and Economics Education*, *11*(1), 45–56.

Li, H. (2015). *The relationship between regime "type" and civic education: The cases of three Chinese societies* (Unpublished PhD thesis). The Hong Kong Institute of Education, Hong Kong.

Li, J. (2009). Fostering citizenship in China's move from elite to mass higher education: An analysis of students' political socialization and civic participation, *International Journal of Educational Development*, *29*(4), 382–98.

Li, L. (2008). Political trust and petitioning in the Chinese countryside. *Comparative Politics*, *40*(2), 209–226.

Li, X., & Chan, M. (2017). Comparing social media use, discussion, political trust and political engagement among university students in China and Hong Kong: An application of the O–S–R–O–R model. *Asian Journal of Communication*, *27*(1), 65–81.

Lipset, S. M. (1960). *Political man*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday.

Lorentzen, P. L. (2013). Regularizing rioting: Permitting public protest in an authoritarian regime. *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, *8*(2), 127–158.

Ma, N. (2015). The rise of "anti-China" sentiments in Hong Kong and the 2012 Legislative Council elections. *The China Review*, *15*(1), 39–66.

Marien, S., Hooghe, M., & Quintelier, E. (2010). Inequalities in non-institutionalised forms of political participation: A multi-level analysis of 25 countries. *Political Studies*, *58*(1), 187–213.

McCormick, B. L. (1990). China's Leninist parliament and public sphere: A comparative analysis. In B. L. McCormick & J. Unger (Eds.), *China after socialism: In the footsteps of Eastern Europe or East Asia?* (pp. 29–53). New York, NY: Routledge.

McLaughlin, T. H. (1992). Citizenship, diversity and education: A philosophical perspective. *Journal of Moral Education*, *21*(3), 235–250.

Ministry of Education. (1995). *Zhongxue deyu dagang [Revised Outline of moral education for secondary school]*. Beijing: Ministry of Education

Ministry of Education. (2001). *Jiunian yiwujiaoyu xiaoxue sipinke ji chuzhong sixiangzhengzhi kechengbiaozhun (xiugai gao) [Revised Curriculum standards for nine-year compulsory ideomoral education in primary school and ideopolitical education in junior secondary school]*. Beijing: Ministry of Education.

Miller, A. H. (1974). Political issues and trust in government: 1964–1970. *American Political Science Review*, *68*(3), 951–972.

Miller, N. R. (1980). A new solution set for tournaments and majority voting: Further graph-theoretical approaches to the theory of voting. *American Journal of Political Science*, *24*(1) 68–96.

Miller, A. H., & Borrelli, S. A. (1991). Confidence in government during the 1980s. *American Politics Quarterly*, *19*(2), 147–173.

Mishler, W., & Rose, R. (1997). Trust, distrust and skepticism: Popular evaluations of civil and political institutions in post-communist societies. *The Journal of Politics*, *59*(2), 418–451.

Mishler, W., & Rose, R. (2001). What are the origins of political trust? Testing institutional and cultural theories in post-communist societies. *Comparative Political Studies*, *34*(1), 30–62.

Moy, P., & Scheufele, D. A. (2000). Media effects on political and social trust. *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly*, *77*(4), 744–759.

Muller, E. N., Jukam, T. O., & Seligson, M. A. (1982). Diffuse political support and antisystem political behavior: A comparative analysis. *American Journal of Political Science*, *26*(2), 240–264.

Nathan, A. J. (1986). *Chinese democracy*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Nathan, A. J. (2003). Authoritarian resilience. *Journal of Democracy*, *14*(1), 6–17.

Neuman, W. L. (2006). *Social research methods: Qualitative and quantitative approaches*. Boston, MA: Pearson Education.

Newton, K. (2001). Trust, social capital, civil society, and democracy. *International Political Science Review*, *22*(2), 201–214.

Newton, K., & Norris, P. (2000). Confidence in public institutions: Faith, culture or performance? Proceedings from *The 1999 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association,* Atlanta. Retrieved from https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/97e8/1919b1a8cece7d7676b4e142dcf830e947ac.pdf

Newton, K., & Van Deth, J. W. (2010). *Foundations of comparative politics*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

Newton, K., & Norris, P. (2000). Confidence in public institutions: Faith, culture or performance? Proceedings from *The 1999 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association,* Atlanta. Retrieved from https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/97e8/1919b1a8cece7d7676b4e142dcf830e947ac.pdf

Norris, P. (1999). Introduction: The growth of critical citizens? In P. Norris (Ed.), *Critical citizens: Global support for democratic government* (pp. 1–27) Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Norris, P. (2003). Young people & political activism. Proceedings from *Council of Europe symposium: Young people and democratic institutions: From disillusionment to participation*. Strasbourg. Retrieved from https://sites.hks.harvard.edu/fs/pnorris/Acrobat/COE.pdf

Norusis, M. J. (2010). *PASW Statistics 18 statistical procedures companion*. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.

O'Brien, K. J. (2001). Villagers, elections, and citizenship in contemporary China. *Modern China*, *27*(4), 407–435.

O'Brien, K. J., & Li, L. (2006). *Rightful resistance in rural China*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Ortmann, S. (2015). The umbrella movement and Hong Kong's protracted democratization process. *Asian Affairs*, *46*(1), 32–50.

Paige, J. M. (1971). Political orientation and riot participation. *American Sociological Review, 36*(5), 810–820.

People's Education Press. (2008). *Si xiang pin de [Moral and political education]* (Vols. 4–5). Beijing: People's Educational Press.

Perry, E. J. (2010). Popular Protest in China: Playing by the Rules. In J. Fewsmith (Ed.), *China today, China tomorrow: Domestic politics, economy and society* (pp. 11–28). Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

Phillips, D., & Schweisfurth, M. (2007). *Comparative and international education: An introduction to theory, method, and practice*. London: Continuum International Publishing Group.

Putnam, R. D. (1993). The prosperous community. *The American Prospect*, *4*(13), 35–42.

Putnam, R. D. (2001). *Bowling alone: The collapse and revival of American community*. New York, NY: Simon and Schuster.

Quintelier, E., & Hooghe, M. (2013). The relationship between political participation intentions of adolescents and a participatory democratic climate at school in 35 countries. *Oxford Review of Education, 39*(5), 567–589.

Richardson, W. K. (2003). *Connecting political discussion to civic engagement: The role of civic knowledge, efficacy and context for adolescents* (Doctoral dissertation). Retrieved from DRUM (http://hdl.handle.net/1903/40).

Roskin, M.G., Cord, R. L., Medeiros, J. A., & Jones, W. S. (1991). *Political science: An introduction* (4th ed.). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

Rutkowski, D., & Engel, L. C. (2010). Soft power and hard measures: Large-scale assessment, citizenship and the European Union. *European Educational Research Journal, 9*(3), 381–395.

Sabine, G. H. & Thorson, T. L. (1973). *A history of political theory* (4th ed.) Hinsdale, IL: Dryden Press.

Schreiber, J. B., Nora, A., Stage, F. K., Barlow, E. A., & King, J. (2006). Reporting structural equation modeling and confirmatory factor analysis results: A review. *The Journal of educational research, 99*(6), 323–338.

Schulz, W. (2005). Political efficacy and expected political participation among lower and upper secondary students. A comparative analysis with data from the IEA Civic Education Study. Proceedings from *ECPR General Conference*. Budapest. Retrieved from https://eric.ed.gov/?id=ED499264

Schulz, W., Ainley, J., Fraillon, J., Kerr, D., & Losito, B. (2010). *ICCS 2009 International Report: Civic knowledge, attitudes and engagement among lower secondary school students in thirty-eight countries*. Amsterdam: International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievements.

Schulz, W., Ainley, J., Fraillon, J., Losito, B., Agrusti, G., & Friedman, T. (2018). *Becoming citizens in a changing world: IEA International Civic and Citizenship Education Study 2016 international report*. Amsterdam: International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievements.

Seligson, M. A. (1983). On the measurement of diffuse support: Some evidence from Mexico. *Social Indicators Research*, *12*(1), 1–24.

Shi, T. (1997). *Political participation in Beijing*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Shi, T. (1999). Voting and nonvoting in China: Voting behavior in plebiscitary and limited-choice elections. *The Journal of Politics*, *61*(4), 1115–1139.

Shi, T. (2001). Cultural values and political trust: A comparison of the People's Republic of China and Taiwan. *Comparative Politics*, *33*(4), 401–419.

Shingles, R. D. (1981). Black consciousness and political participation: The missing link. *American Political Science Review, 75*(1), 76–91.

Shively, W. P. (2018). *Power & choice: An introduction to political science*. London, England: Rowman & Littlefield.

Sigelman, L., & Feldman, S. (1983). Efficacy, mistrust, and political mobilization: A cross-national analysis. *Comparative Political Studies*, *16*(1), 118–143.

Sing, M. (2004). *Hong Kong's tortuous democratization*. London: Routledge.

State Education commission. (1988). *Zhongxue deyu dagang [Outline of moral education for secondary school]*. Beijing: State Education Commission.

The Economist. (2017). *Democracy index 2017: Free speech under attack*. Retrieved from https://pages.eiu.com/rs/753-RIQ-438/images/Democracy_Index_2017.pdf

Torney-Purta, J., Barber, C. H., & Richardson, W. K. (2004). Trust in government-related institutions and political engagement among adolescents in six countries. *Acta Politica, 39*(4), 380–406.

Torney-Purta, J., Lehmann, R., Oswald, H., & Schulz, W. (2001). *Citizenship and education in twenty-eight countries: Civic knowledge and engagement at age fourteen*. Amsterdam: International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievements.

Torney-Purta, J., & Amadeo, J. A. (2013). International large-scale assessments: Challenges in reporting and potentials for secondary analysis. *Research in Comparative and International Education*, *8*(3), 248–258.

Trzesniewski, K. H., Donnellan, M., & Lucas, R. E. (2011). *Secondary data analysis: An introduction for psychologists*. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.

Tu, Y. (2011). Citizenship with Chinese characteristics? An investigation into Chinese university students' civic perceptions and civic participation. *Frontiers of Education in China*, *6*(3), 426–448.

UNESCO. (2006). *International Standard Classification of Education: ISCED 1997*. Montreal, Canada: UNESCO Institute for Statistics.

Van Deth, J. W. (2001). Studying political participation: Towards a theory of everything. *In joint sessions of workshops of the European Consortium for Political Research*, Grenoble. Retrieved from http://www.academia.edu/2233354/STUDYING_POLITICAL_PARTICIPATION_TOWARDS_A_THEORY_OF_EVERYTHING

Van Deth, J. W. (2014). A conceptual map of political participation. *Acta Politica*, *49*(3), 349–367.

Van de Schoot, R., Lugtig, P., & Hox, J. (2012). A checklist for testing measurement invariance. *European Journal of Developmental Psychology*, *9*(4), 486–492.

Van Laer, J., & Van Aelst, P. (2010). Internet and social movement action repertoires: Opportunities and limitations. Information, *Communication & Society*, *13*(8), 1146–1171.

Walzer, M. (1994). *Thick and thin: Moral argument at home and abroad*. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.

Wattenberg, M. P. (1996). *The decline of American political parties, 1952–1996*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Wang, X., & Tan, C. (2014). From ideopolitical indoctrination to real-life narration: Reform of textbooks for moral and citizenship education in China. In K. J. Kennedy, G. P. Fairbrother & Z. Zhao (Eds.), *Citizenship Education in China* (pp. 207–219). New York, NY: Routledge.

Wang, Z. (2005). Before the emergence of critical citizens: Economic development and political trust in China. *International Review of Sociology, 15*(1), 155–171.

Wang, Z., & You, Y. (2016). The arrival of critical citizens: Decline of political trust and shifting public priorities in China. *International Review of Sociology*, *26*(1), 105–124.

Wattenberg, M. P. (1996). *The decline of American political parties, 1952–1996*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Wattenberg, M. P. (2002). *Where have all the voters gone?* Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Weller, R. (2008). Responsive Authoritarianism. In B. Gilley & L. Diamond. (Eds.), *Political Change in China: Comparisons with Taiwan*, (pp. 117–33). Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

Welzel, C., & Inglehart, R. (2008). The role of ordinary people in democratization. *Journal of democracy*, *19*(1), 126–140.

Westholm, A., & Niemi, R. G. (1986). Youth unemployment and political alienation. *Youth & Society*, *18*(1), 58–80.

Whiteley, P. (2011). *Political participation in Britain: The decline and revival of civic culture*. London: Macmillan International Higher Education.

Wolfinger, R. E., & Rosenstone, S. J. (1980). *Who votes?* New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Wong, T. K. Y., Wan, P. S., & Hsiao, H. H. M. (2011). The bases of political trust in six Asian societies: Institutional and cultural explanations compared. *International Political Science Review*, 32(3), 263–281.

Xia. Y. (2011). *The philosophy of civil rights in the context of China*. Leiden, Netherlands: Koninklijke Brill NV.

Xu, R. (2014). Reforming the national character and the development of Chinese civic education in the early modern period. In K. J. Kennedy, G. P. Fairbrother & Z. Zhao (Eds.), *Citizenship Education in China* (pp. 39–51). New York, NY: Routledge.

Yu, T. (2014). Educating for world citizens in Chinese schools: Moral education in the cosmopolitan age. In K. J. Kennedy, G. P. Fairbrother & Z. Zhao (Eds.), *Citizenship Education in China* (pp. 97–111). New York, NY: Routledge.

Yuen, T., & Byram, M. (2007). National identity, patriotism and studying politics in schools: A case study in Hong Kong. Compare: *A Journal of Comparative and International Education*, *37*(1), 23–36.

Zhang, W., Johnson, T. J., Seltzer, T., & Bichard, S. L. (2010). The revolution will be networked: The influence of social networking sites on political attitudes and behavior. *Social Science Computer Review*, *28*(1), 75–92.

Zhao, X., Haste, H., Selman, R. L., & Luan, Z. (2017). Compliant, cynical, or critical: Chinese youth's explanations of social problems and individual civic responsibility. *Youth & Society*, *49*(8), 1123–1148.

Zhong, M., & Lee, W. O. (2008). Citizenship curriculum in China: A shifting discourse towards Chinese democracy, law education and psychological health. In D. L. Grossman, W. O. Lee, &

K. J. Kennedy (Eds.), *Citizenship curriculum in Asia and the Pacific* (pp. 61–73). Hong Kong: Comparative Education Research Centre, The University of Hong Kong.

Appendix

Appendix A: Partial invariance test results

The result of partial invariance test for illegal protest model

Model	Constrain	Comparison	$\chi 2$	df	Δdf	$\Delta \chi 2$	Sig
1	/	/	781.889	124			
2	23C	Model 1	784.057	125	1	2.168	.141
3	23C,23D	Model 2	784.571	126	1	.514	.473
4	23C,23D,23F	Model 3	785.122	127	1	.550	.458
5	23C,23D,23F,31G	Model 4	786.404	128	1	1.282	.257

The result of partial invariance test for legal protest model

Model	Constrain	Comparison	χ^2	df	Δdf	$\Delta \chi^2$	Sig
1	/	/	792.963	124			
2	23C	Model 1	794.930	125	1	1.966	.161
3	23C,23D	Model 2	795.355	126	1	.425	.514
4	23C,23D,23F	Model 3	796.264	127	1	.909	.340
5	23C,23D,23F,31A	Model 4	799.281	128	1	3.017	.083

The result of partial invariance test for electoral participation model

Model	Constrain	Comparison	χ^2	df	Δdf	$\Delta \chi^2$	Sig
1	/		843.309	124			
2	23C	Model 1	844.936	125	1	1.627	.202
3	23C, 23D	Model 2	845.325	126	1	.389	.533
4	23C, 23D, 23F	Model 3	846.395	127	1	1.070	.301
5	23C, 23D, 23F,32B	Model 4	847.191	128	1	.797	.372
6	23C, 23D, 23F,32B, 32C	Model 5	850.548	129	1	3.356	.067

The result of partial invariance test for informal participation model

Model	Constrain	Comparison	$\chi 2$	df	Δdf	$\Delta \chi 2$	Sig
1	/		989.551	148			
2	23C	Model 1	991.881	149	1	2.370	.124
3	23C,23D	Model 2	992.432	150	1	.551	.458
4	23C,23D, 23F	Model 3	993.735	151	1	1.302	.254
5	23C,23D, 23F, 33B	Model 4	996.563	152	1	2.829	.093
6	23C,23D, 23F, 33B,33D	Model 5	996.565	153	1	.001	.973
7	23C,23D, 23F, 33B,33D,33E	Model 6	998.308	154	1	1.744	.187

Appendix B: Detailed reliability test results

The detailed result of reliability test of each scale

		Hong Kong		Mainland	
Scales	Items	Item- total corr	if item deleted	Item- total corr	if item deleted
Efficacy	23A	0.640	0.791	0.647	0.801
	23B	0.637	0.791	0.677	0.793
	23C	0.611	0.799	0.632	0.805
	23D	0.643	0.790	0.621	0.808
	23F	0.598	0.802	0.613	0.811
Trust	27A	0.620	0.714	0.796	0.901
	27C	0.572	0.729	0.836	0.893
	27D	0.572	0.729	0.717	0.917
	27F	0.548	0.737	0.848	0.890
	27H	0.457	0.771	0.772	0.905
Illegal Protest	31G	0.765	0.911	0.690	0.915
	31H	0.856	0.833	0.834	0.784
	31I	0.827	0.857	0.811	0.807
Legal protest	31A	0.584	0.671	0.567	0.760
	31C	0.627	0.619	0.689	0.626
	31E	0.540	0.723	0.609	0.717
Electoral	32A	0.835	0.786	0.749	0.798
	32B	0.852	0.770	0.784	0.763
	32C	0.655	0.947	0.686	0.855
Informal	33B	0.681	0.800	0.641	0.779
	33C	0.743	0.772	0.731	0.735
	33D	0.694	0.794	0.677	0.761
	33E	0.597	0.835	0.548	0.825

Appendix C: Histogram of normal distribution of scales

























Appendix D: Missing data description

Number and percentage of the missing data

	Hong Kong			Mainland China		
Item	Total	Missing	Percent	Total	Missing	Percent
IS2G03	2810	92	3.2	1626	5	0.3
IS2G07	2724	178	6.1	1618	13	0.8
IS2G09	2663	239	8.2	1616	15	0.9
IS2G11	2810	92	3.2	1622	9	0.6
IS2P23A	2815	87	3.0	1608	23	1.4
IS2P23B	2815	87	3.0	1606	25	1.5
IS2P23C	2812	90	3.1	1607	24	1.5
IS2P23D	2813	89	3.1	1604	27	1.7
IS2P23F	2815	87	3.0	1604	27	1.7
IS2P27A	2813	89	3.1	1602	29	1.8
IS2P27C	2809	93	3.2	1602	29	1.8
IS2P27D	2810	92	3.2	1597	34	2.1
IS2P27F	2808	94	3.2	1605	26	1.6
IS2P27H	2805	97	3.3	1605	26	1.6
IS2P31A	2803	99	3.4	1607	24	1.5
IS2P31C	2799	103	3.5	1603	28	1.7
IS2P31E	2801	101	3.5	1604	27	1.7
IS2P31G	2802	100	3.4	1606	25	1.5
IS2P31H	2801	101	3.5	1608	23	1.4
IS2P31I	2803	99	3.4	1623	8	0.5
IS2P32A	2797	105	3.6	1613	18	1.1
IS2P32B	2797	105	3.6	1611	20	1.2
IS2P32C	2795	107	3.7	1612	19	1.2
IS2P33B	2797	105	3.6	1613	18	1.1
IS2P33C	2795	107	3.7	1611	20	1.2
IS2P33D	2796	106	3.7	1614	17	1.0
IS2P33E	2797	105	3.6	1611	20	1.2
GENDER	2790	112	3.9	1631	0	0.0
Total	2902	374	12.9	1631	156	9.5

Appendix E: Hierarchical regression results

Summary of hierarchical regression for Hong Kong students' future intentions for illegal protest

	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3			Model 4		
Variable	B	SE B	β	B	SE B	β	B	SE B	β	B	SE B	β
Gender	-0.169	0.025	-0.131***	-0.168	0.025	-0.130***	-0.151	0.025	-0.117***	-0.151	0.026	-0.117
Expected Edu	0.085	0.015	0.116***	0.083	0.015	0.112***	0.089	0.015	0.122***	0.090	0.015	0.122
Mother Edu	-0.012	0.014	-0.021	-0.011	0.014	-0.019	-0.011	0.014	-0.019	-0.011	0.014	-0.019
Father Edu	0.006	0.013	0.012	0.006	0.013	0.011	0.008	0.013	0.015	0.008	0.013	0.015
Book amount	-0.002	0.010	-0.005	-0.002	0.010	-0.005	-0.010	0.010	-0.021	-0.010	0.010	-0.020
Political trust				-0.060	0.022	-0.053**	-0.081	0.022	-0.072***	-0.045	0.081	-0.040
Political efficacy							0.118	0.024	0.102***	0.159	0.091	0.137
Efficacy* trust										-0.015	0.032	-0.053
R2		0.034			0.037			0.046			0.046	
R2 change		0.034			0.003			0.009			0.000	
F change		17.685***			7.430**			24.866***			0.218	

Summary of hierarchical regression for Mainland students' future intentions for illegal protest

	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3			Model 4		
Variable	B	SE B	β	B	SE B	β	B	SE B	β	B	SE B	β
Gender	-0.149	0.038	-0.102***	-0.147	0.038	-0.100***	-0.130	0.039	-0.088**	-0.129	0.039	-0.088**
Expected Edu	0.071	0.024	0.078**	0.068	0.024	0.075**	0.072	0.024	0.079**	0.072	0.024	0.079**
Mother Edu	-0.031	0.020	-0.053	-0.031	0.020	-0.052	-0.028	0.020	-0.047	-0.028	0.020	-0.048
Father Edu	-0.003	0.021	-0.005	0.001	0.021	0.002	0.000	0.021	-0.001	0.000	0.021	-0.001
Books in home	-0.021	0.017	-0.035	-0.022	0.017	-0.037	-0.029	0.017	-0.047	-0.029	0.017	-0.048
Political trust				-0.055	0.027	-0.052*	-0.076	0.029	-0.072**	-0.113	0.098	-0.108
Political efficacy							0.084	0.034	0.068*	0.040	0.116	0.032
Efficacy* trust										0.014	0.036	0.058
R^2		0.020			0.023			0.027			0.027	
R^2 change		0.020			0.003			0.004			0.000	
F change		6.128***			4.001***			6.016*			0.061	

Summary of hierarchical regression for Hong Kong students' future intentions for legal protest

	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3			Model 4		
Variable	B	SE B	β	B	SE B	β	B	SE B	β	B	SE B	β
Gender	-0.026	0.027	-0.019	-0.030	0.027	-0.022	0.033	0.025	0.024	0.033	0.025	0.024
Expected Edu	-0.030	0.016	-0.039	-0.018	0.015	-0.023	0.006	0.014	0.008	0.006	0.015	0.007
Mother Edu	0.007	0.015	0.011	0.003	0.015	0.005	0.004	0.014	0.006	0.004	0.014	0.007
Father Edu	-0.004	0.014	-0.008	-0.003	0.014	-0.005	0.003	0.013	0.006	0.003	0.013	0.005
Books in home	0.047	0.011	0.093***	0.047	0.011	0.093***	0.020	0.010	0.040	0.020	0.010	0.039
Political trust				0.282	0.023	0.235***	0.207	0.022	0.173***	0.170	0.080	0.142*
Political efficacy							0.422	0.023	0.342***	0.380	0.090	0.308***
Efficacy* trust										0.015	0.032	0.051
R^2		0.011			0.066			0.173			0.173	
R^2 change		0.011			0.055			0.106			0.000	
F change		5.650***			148.517***			324.083***			0.234	

Summary of hierarchical regression for Mainland students' future intentions for legal protest

	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3			Model 4		
Variable	B	SE B	β	B	SE B	β	B	SE B	β	B	SE B	β
Gender	-0.048	0.037	-0.033	-0.057	0.036	-0.040	0.016	0.035	0.011	0.016	0.035	0.011
Expected Edu	-0.066	0.023	-0.075**	-0.053	0.023	-0.060*	-0.037	0.022	-0.041	-0.037	0.022	-0.041
Mother Edu	0.012	0.020	0.020	0.007	0.019	0.012	0.018	0.018	0.031	0.018	0.018	0.031
Father Edu	0.019	0.020	0.032	-0.001	0.020	-0.001	-0.007	0.019	-0.012	-0.007	0.019	-0.012
Books in home	0.058	0.017	0.098**	0.064	0.016	0.108***	0.037	0.016	0.063*	0.037	0.016	0.063*
Political trust				0.270	0.026	0.264***	0.183	0.026	0.179***	0.199	0.089	0.194*
Political efficacy							0.356	0.031	0.294***	0.374	0.105	0.309***
Efficacy* trust										-0.006	0.032	-0.025
R^2		0.016			0.083			0.158			0.158	
R^2 change		0.016			0.068			0.074			0.000	
F change		4.704***			108.297***			129.486***			0.034	

Summary of hierarchical regression for Hong Kong students' future intentions for electoral participation

	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3			Model 4		
Variable	B	SE B	β	B	SE B	β	B	SE B	β	B	SE B	β
Gender	0.008	0.029	0.005	0.003	0.027	0.002	0.061	0.026	0.041*	0.057	0.026	0.038*
Expected Edu	-0.141	0.017	-0.167***	-0.124	0.016	-0.148***	-0.102	0.015	-0.121***	-0.099	0.015	-0.117***
Mother Edu	-0.004	0.016	-0.006	-0.009	0.016	-0.013	-0.008	0.015	-0.012	-0.009	0.015	-0.013
Father Edu	-0.011	0.015	-0.019	-0.009	0.014	-0.015	-0.004	0.014	-0.006	-0.002	0.014	-0.004
Books in home	0.067	0.012	0.123***	0.066	0.011	0.122***	0.042	0.011	0.077***	0.043	0.011	0.079***
Political trust				0.380	0.024	0.295***	0.311	0.023	0.241***	0.526	0.084	0.407***
Political efficacy							0.389	0.025	0.293***	0.631	0.094	0.475***
Efficacy* trust										-0.089	0.033	-0.273**
R^2		.052			.138			.216			.218	
R^2 change		.052			.086			.078			.002	
F change		27.578***			252.509***			250.335***			7.081**	

Summary of hierarchical regression for Mainland students' future intentions for electoral participation

	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3			Model 4		
Variable	B	SE B	β	B	SE B	β	B	SE B	β	B	SE B	β
Gender	-0.154	0.037	-0.106***	-0.163	0.036	-0.112***	-0.093	0.035	-0.064**	-0.094	0.035	-0.065**
Expected Edu	-0.119	0.024	-0.132***	-0.106	0.023	-0.117***	-0.090	0.022	-0.100***	-0.090	0.022	-0.100***
Mother Edu	0.004	0.020	0.007	0.000	0.019	-0.001	0.010	0.018	0.017	0.010	0.018	0.017
Father Edu	0.034	0.021	0.057	0.014	0.020	0.024	0.008	0.019	0.013	0.008	0.019	0.014
Books in home	0.049	0.017	0.082**	0.055	0.016	0.092**	0.029	0.016	0.049	0.031	0.016	0.051
Political trust				0.271	0.026	0.261***	0.187	0.026	0.180***	0.258	0.089	0.249**
Political efficacy							0.344	0.032	0.280***	0.429	0.106	0.349***
Efficacy* trust										-0.027	0.033	-0.112
R^2		0.034			0.100			0.168			0.168	
R^2 change		0.034			0.066			0.067			0.000	
F change		10.390***			107.655***			118.874***			0.704	

Summary of hierarchical regression for Hong Kong students' future intentions for informal political participation

	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3			Model 4		
Variable	B	SE B	β	B	SE B	β	B	SE B	β	B	SE B	β
Gender	-0.040	0.026	-0.030	-0.043	0.025	-0.033	0.036	0.022	0.028	0.034	0.022	0.026
Expected Edu	-0.061	0.015	-0.081***	-0.048	0.014	-0.065**	-0.018	0.013	-0.024	-0.016	0.013	-0.021
Mother Edu	0.002	0.015	0.003	-0.002	0.014	-0.003	-0.001	0.013	-0.001	-0.001	0.013	-0.002
Father Edu	-0.027	0.013	-0.051*	-0.025	0.013	-0.048	-0.018	0.012	-0.034	-0.017	0.012	-0.032
Books in home	0.052	0.010	0.109***	0.052	0.010	0.109***	0.018	0.009	0.038*	0.019	0.009	0.039*
Political trust				0.278	0.022	0.244***	0.183	0.020	0.160***	0.282	0.071	0.247***
Political efficacy							0.537	0.021	0.458***	0.650	0.080	0.554***
Efficacy* trust										-0.041	0.028	-0.143
R^2		0.028			0.088			0.278			0.279	
R^2 change		0.028			0.059			0.191			0.001	
F change		14.745***			163.567***			666.287***			2.107	

Summary of hierarchical regression for Mainland students' future intentions for informal political participation

	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3			Model 4		
Variable	B	SE B	β	B	SE B	β	B	SE B	β	B	SE B	β
Gender	-0.089	0.034	-0.067**	-0.099	0.033	-0.074**	-0.014	0.031	-0.010	-0.012	0.031	-0.009
Expected Edu	-0.091	0.022	-0.111***	-0.078	0.021	-0.094***	-0.059	0.019	-0.071**	-0.059	0.019	-0.071**
Mother Edu	-0.008	0.018	-0.015	-0.013	0.017	-0.024	0.000	0.016	-0.001	-0.001	0.016	-0.001
Father Edu	0.009	0.019	0.016	-0.011	0.018	-0.021	-0.019	0.017	-0.035	-0.019	0.017	-0.035
Books in home	0.078	0.015	0.142***	0.085	0.015	0.153***	0.053	0.014	0.096***	0.051	0.014	0.093***
Political trust				0.279	0.024	0.292***	0.177	0.023	0.185***	0.073	0.078	0.077
Political efficacy							0.417	0.028	0.369***	0.294	0.093	0.260**
Efficacy* trust										0.039	0.029	0.176
R^2		0.040			0.123			0.240			0.241	
R^2 change		0.040			0.083			0.117			0.001	
F change		12.398***			138.391***			226.437***			1.905	

Appendix F: Original ICCS and CCCS questionnaire

Original ICCS 2009 questionnaire

Political efficacy scale

Q 23 How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements about you and politics

1= Strongly agree; 2= Agree; 3= Disagree; 4= Strongly disagree

IS2P23A I know more about politics than most people my age

IS2P23B When political issues or problems are being discussed, I usually have something to say.

IS2P23C I am able to understand most political issues easily

IS2P23D I have political opinions worth listening to

IS2P23E As an adult I will be able to take part in politics

Political trust scale

Q 27 How much do you trust each of the following groups or institutions?

1= Completely; 2= Quite a lot; 3= A little; 4= Not at all

IS2P27A The <National government> of <country of test>

IS2P27B The <local government> of your town or city

IS2P27C Courts of justice

IS2P27D The police

IS2P27E Political parties

IS2P27F National parliament

IS2P27G The media (television, newspapers, radio)

IS2P27H The armed forces

IS2P27I Schools

IS2P27J The United Nations

IS2P27K People in general

Civic participation scale

Q31 there are many different ways how citizens may protest against things they believe are wrong. Would you take part in any of the following forms of protest in the future>

1= I would certainly do this; 2 I would probably do this; 3 I would probably not do this; 4 I would certainly not do this.

IS2P31A Writing a letter to a newspaper

IS2P31B Wearing a badge or t-shirt expressing your opinion

IS2P31C Contacting an <elected representative>

IS2P31D Taking part in a peaceful march or rally

IS2P31E Collecting signatures for a petition

IS2P31F Choosing not to buy certain products

IS2P31G Spray-painting protest slogans on walls

IS2P31H Blocking traffic

IS2P31I Occupying public building

Q 32 Listed below are different ways adults can take an active part in political life. When you are an adult, what do you think you will do?

IS2P32A Vote in <local elections>

IS2P32B Vote in <National elections>

IS2P32C Get information about candidates before voting in an election

IS2P32D Help a candidate or party during an election campaign

IS2P32E Join a political party

IS2P32F Join a trade union

IS2P32G Stand as a candidate in <local election>

Q33 Listed below are different actions that you as a young person could take during the next few years. What do you expect that you will do?

IS2P33A Volunteer time to help people in the <local community>.

IS2P33B Talk to others about your views on political and social issues.

IS2P33C Write to a newspaper about political and social issues.

IS2P33D Contribute to an online discussion forum about social and political issues.

IS2P33E Join an organization for a political or social cause.

Original CCCS 2012 questionnaire (in Chinese）

Political efficacy scale

Q 23 你如何同意以下各项？

1= 非常同意； 2= 同意； 3= 不同意； 4= 非常不同意

a) 我比大部分同龄人知道更多有关政治

的事情

b) 在讨论政治时，我经常会发表看法

c) 我能轻易地理解大部分政治议题

d) 我有值得听取的政治见解

e) 作为一个成年人，将来我能参与政治

f) 我对国家大事有良好的认识

Political trust scale

Q 27 你如何信任下述各种群体或机构？

1= 非常信任； 2= 颇信任； 3= 有点信任； 4= 完全不信任

a) 传媒 （电视、报纸、台、网络）

b) 学校

c) 联合国

d) 政府机构

e) 立法机构

f) 法院

g) 军队

h) 警察

i) 政党

j) 宗教团体

k) 普通人

Civic participation scale

Q 30 （equivalent to Q31 in ICCS）公民有很多途径对他们认为是错的事情表达意见。你对以下各种 表达方式采取何种态度？

1= 我绝对会这么做； 2= 我可能会这么做； 3= 我可能不会这么做； 4= 我绝对不会这么做

a)= 写信给报纸

b) 穿戴能表达自己观点的徽章或汗

衫

c) 向人大代表反映

e) 联名上诉

f) 选择不购买某些产品

g) 在墙上喷绘抗议的标语

h) 堵塞交通

i) 占据公共设施

Q 31 （equivalent to Q32 in ICCS）以下列出了一些成年人可以积极参与国家政治生活的不同途径。 你认为当你长大成人后，你会参与以下哪些活动？

1= 我绝对会这么做； 2= 我可能会这么做； 3= 我可能不会这么做； 4= 我绝对不会这么做

a) 在地方或基层人大代表选举中投票

b) 在全国人大代表选举中投票

c）在选举投票前收集有关选举人的资料

d) 在选举中协助某候选人或政党

e) 加入一个政党

f) 加入一个商会

g) 成为人大代表候选人

Q32 （equivalent to Q33 in ICCS）以下列出了一些你作为一个年轻人在未来数年可以做的事情。你 长大后期望自己会做哪些事情

1= 我绝对会这么做； 2= 我可能会这么做； 3= 我可能不会这么做； 4= 我绝对不会这么做

a) 志愿花时间帮助本地人

b) 与其他人谈论自己在国家大事上的看法

c) 给报纸写信发表有关国家大事的意见

d) 在因特网论坛上参与有关国家大事的讨论

e) 为某种政治或社会原因参加一个组织