

Unpacking Public Perceptions of Effectiveness in Anti-Corruption Agencies: The Case of Hong Kong

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Abstract

Anti-corruption agencies (ACAs) serve the important function of protecting society's moral and legal standards. How does the public perceive their effectiveness? What variables influence these perceptions? To what extent does perceived effectiveness interact with the level of trust in a government institution? Using the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) in Hong Kong as a case and based on a disaggregated approach, this study attempts to unpack and understand public perceptions of ACA's effectiveness in controlling corruption. It argues that the perceived effectiveness of the ICAC has two dimensions: an organizational dimension reflecting public perceptions of its structure, functions, procedures and the integrity of personnel and an environmental dimension focusing on its ability to deal effectively with the changing social environment. The study also shows that trust may serve as a moderating variable to substitute or complement the impact of these dimensions on perceptions of institutional effectiveness. The data of this study are drawn mainly from a large-scale original survey conducted in Hong Kong in June 2019 and from official documents of the ICAC and the Hong Kong government.

Key words: anti-corruption agency, corruption, institutional effectiveness, trust

Introduction

Positive public perceptions of effective corruption prevention are an important element in maintaining government efforts to keep corruption under control. If citizens do not perceive an anti-corruption agency (ACA) to be effective, they will lose, or never develop, sufficient confidence in the institution to give their active support to its efforts to control corruption. Positive perceptions of effectiveness also have systemic benefits, generating trust in the ACA and the political system (Mishler & Rose, 1997; Choi, 2017; Isbell, 2017). Negative perceptions, by contrast, have considerable adverse implications for the erosion of trust in government, the legitimacy of the political system, and the integrity of the social fabric (Rose-Ackerman, 2001; Seligson, 2002; Uslander, 2017).

Measuring and unpacking public perceptions of effectiveness presents similar problems to measuring corruption itself. It is not always clear, for example, what is meant by public perceptions. There are often difficulties in conducting sample surveys of the population and issues regarding relevant questions and how to interpret survey findings. Transparency International avoids the issue by constructing its well-known Corruption Perceptions Index largely on the basis of expert assessments and business surveys. But this, at best, is a snapshot of some public views and has been criticised for its restricted scope (Thompson & Shah, 2005; Heywood & Rose, 2014). Even when population surveys are used, questions arise about whether they can be reliable measures of perceptions of effectiveness and indicators of the level of corruption (Feldman, 2020). Assessments are usually also based on an aggregated response to overall institutional performance: an institution is thought to be effective if most survey respondents think that it has been successful in performing its duty. The perceived effectiveness is regarded as a one-dimensional, dichotomy, either positive or negative (Cameron, 1986).

This study takes a different and disaggregated approach to understanding public perceptions of effectiveness in controlling corruption. Perceived effectiveness is taken to encompass two dimensions: perceptions of the ACA's organizational capacity as reflected in its structure, functions, procedures, and the integrity of its personnel; and perceptions of the agency's capacity to adapt to, and make changes in, the surrounding environment. While these dimensions of the ACA's capacity influence public perceptions of its effectiveness, there is a third, moderating factor: the extent to which the public trusts the agency. Trust enhances the perception of institutional effectiveness on both dimensions, but plays different roles in doing so: it may have a complementary effect or a substitute effect. *Complementary effect* means that trust increases the impact of the perceived capacity of the agency on people's perception of its effectiveness. A *substitute effect*, on the other hand, occurs when trust replaces the effect of the perceived capacity of the agency to exert a positive impact on perceptions of its effectiveness. By unpacking perceptions of institutional effectiveness, this study contributes to a better understanding of how and why the perceptions of effectiveness are multifaceted. Practically, it helps illustrate the ways through which ACAs may improve their performance.

The study draws on the case of the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) in Hong Kong to test its propositions. While most ACAs are regarded as ineffective (Quah, 2009; Jamil et al., 2016), the ICAC is an exception. It has played an important role in transforming Hong Kong from a place where corruption was endemic to one that has a clean public sector, very limited opportunities for bribery, and a watchful and supportive community (Manion, 2004). Over the years, the ICAC has almost always received positive public perceptions (ICAC, 1993-2018). To examine how and why the ICAC has been perceived as effective has theoretical implications for

understanding public perceptions of institutional effectiveness and may also shed light on building, measuring, and increasing anti-corruption effectiveness in other jurisdictions.

Perceptions of effectiveness: A two-dimensional analytical framework

ACAs are seen as an antidote to the problem of corruption and their effectiveness is consequently key to success in corruption control (Quah, 2015). How the public perceives ACAs' effectiveness is important because it influences, *inter alia*, citizens' willingness to engage in fighting corruption (Isbell, 2017), the development of a zero-tolerance culture towards corruption (Gong & Wang, 2013), and confidence in the political leadership's ability to enact anti-corruption reforms (Heilbrunn, 2004). A better understanding of public perceptions of ACAs' effectiveness helps to develop actionable policy recommendations and to build broad alliances of like-minded organizations and individuals for collaborative and sustained corruption control (Iroghama, 2011; Li et al., 2016).

However, scholars are divided on how to interpret public perceptions of ACAs' effectiveness. Failure to deal with corruption may be the most obvious reason for negative perceptions of ACAs since they were created to fulfil that role (Head, 2012). Empirical studies provide strong evidence of the negative correlation between perceived levels of corruption and public confidence in ACAs (Baniamin & Jamil, 2018) and of the strong effect of corruption on satisfaction with political institutions (van der Meer & Hakhverdian, 2017). Although it is well accepted that the level of corruption affects public perceptions of an ACA's performance, this perspective fails to explain why in the same society, irrespective of whether the level of corruption is high or low, there can be significant variations in perceptions of institutional effectiveness. Some citizens may consider an ACA highly effective; others may be skeptical about its performance;

and still others may hold very negative views. A study conducted in China (Li et al., 2016), for example, found that the public held mixed views about the government's anti-corruption efficacy despite its unprecedented efforts to control corruption in recent decades. Even in the same institutional context, the public may react differently to the ACA's call for support; some citizens are more willing to report suspected corruption than others, regardless of what the perceived or actual level of corruption is (Gong & Xiao, 2017).

Other scholars emphasize the impact of micro-level socio-demographic variables on public perceptions of ACAs' effectiveness. It is suggested, for example, that a person's age, gender and socio-economic status may influence how s/he perceives the government's anti-corruption effort (Kofanova & Petukhov, 2006; Sööt & Rootalu, 2012; Walton & Peiffer, 2017). Yet, different perceptions may still exist among people with similar demographic backgrounds. Perceptions of institutional effectiveness can be randomly distributed in any population, particularly when social issues, such as corruption, are taken into account (Newton & Norris, 2000).

Differing from these perspectives, this study develops a two-dimensional analytical framework. It argues that – similar to corruption – the actual or perceived effectiveness of control mechanisms should not be treated as a one-dimensional phenomenon (Andersson, 2017), but may be measured from different perspectives. Following Hakhverdian and Mayne (2012), citizens may assess the effectiveness of ACAs based on at least two sets of performance criteria: one relating to their organizational or procedural capability of maintaining organizational integrity, which is referred to as organizational dimension, and the other pertaining to their capability to deal with changes in patterns of corruption in the external environment, which may be called environmental dimension.

Specifically, the organizational dimension of effectiveness relates to the internal or intrinsic characteristics of an ACA, including whether the ACA is empowered to act forcefully against corruption, whether it has appropriate procedures, whether it possesses organizational integrity, and whether it is independent. The environmental dimension relates to whether it can adapt effectively to the changing political and social environment when more or new corruption arises. The ability to take appropriate and timely measures to meet the demands of new social conditions affects public perceptions of ACA effectiveness.

The organizational dimension

If effectiveness is defined conventionally as the ability to produce a desired result, then the extent to which the ACA is empowered to do so will be a critical element in any assessment. An immediate and visible factor influencing public perceptions of effectiveness will be the ACA's power to arrest, prosecute and secure convictions of the corrupt (Jamil et al., 2016). In Hong Kong, since the ICAC was created in 1974, it has been given substantial powers to pursue and prosecute the corrupt, which has helped to dispel public concerns about its effectiveness. The ICAC is believed to be one of the world's most powerful anti-graft organizations, one which has made "the right psychological impact on the general public" (Lam, 2014).

Second, institutional effectiveness carries with it the notion of achieving desired output by following correct procedures. For ACAs, procedural justice is important to the treatment of corruption reports because it involves direct interactions between the agency and the public. Many ACAs fail at this point. Some are unable to provide good protection for those who reported corruption; others have opaque reporting mechanisms and processes. Consequently, citizens do not know how or where to report corruption. A survey conducted by Statistics South Africa reveals

that 43.1% of households considered it pointless to report corruption (Statistics South Africa, 2014, p. 55). In Hong Kong, the ICAC processes corruption reports quickly, deciding whether or not they will be investigated. A Report Centre operates on a 24-hour basis and passes on the complaints to a daily morning meeting of senior investigative personnel. The ICAC has a target of contacting complainants within 48 hours, which has been fully met in recent years (Hong Kong Government, 2016). This transparent, linear and rapid process enables the ICAC to respond effectively to corruption reports and contributes to public perceptions of its effectiveness.

Third, for an ACA to be considered effective, it must have the ability to act independently of other government institutions and of any political interference with its operations. Based on a study of Hong Kong and Singapore in comparison with ineffective agencies in many underdeveloped countries, Meagher (2005) concludes that independent, centralized, single agencies are likely to be more effective under conditions of good governance than in places with poor governance. The ICAC was created as an independent body because it was believed that the public was more likely to have confidence in the agency if it were separate from government (Hong Kong Hansard, 17 October 1973). Article 57 of the Hong Kong Basic Law, which took effect on the resumption of Chinese sovereignty in 1997, affirms that the ICAC “shall function independently”. In the recent highly polarized political situation in Hong Kong, all institutions concerned with the implementation of the rule of law have been perceived to have performed poorly, but the ICAC lost less ground than others such as the judiciary and the police (Bauhinia Foundation, 2019).

Lastly, public perceptions of an agency’s effectiveness are affected by the integrity of its personnel. Integrity is at the heart of the success of regulatory agencies because it helps them avoid “capture” by the regulated (Dal Bó, 2006) and restrains the possible misuse of power (Al-Mutairi

et al., 2019). Any adverse reports suggesting that ACA personnel are corrupt or engage in unethical activities would seriously undermine perceptions of its effectiveness.

Based on the analysis of ACAs' organizational capacities outlined above, this study develops its first hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1 Strong organizational capacity of an ACA contributes to public perceptions of its effectiveness

The environmental dimension

The effectiveness of ACAs is conditioned by the character of the broader institutional environment in which they operate (Head, 2012; Okafor et al., 2020). For them to be perceived effective, ACAs must not only develop organizational capabilities, but also be able to adjust to the external environment, which sometimes can be hostile (Prasser, 2012). As patterns of corruption become more sophisticated, ACAs cannot remain confined to a single approach or follow conventional strategies; otherwise, they will lag behind public expectations. They must develop the capacity to respond to new forms of transgression and to control environments that nurture corruption.

After the resumption of Chinese sovereignty in Hong Kong in 1997, there were growing fears that the new social environment, characterized by increasing economic interactions between Hong Kong and Mainland China, would create more opportunities for corruption. There were also concerns that the new political order might take a more lenient attitude towards corruption and that the emergence of serious conflicts of interest would pose unprecedented problems (Hong Kong Hansard, 26 January 1994). Arrests for corruption offences rose in successive years from 686 in 1996 to 1468 in 2001 and corruption reports also surged (ICAC, 1998, 1999, 2000). To respond,

the ICAC actively engaged in cross-border cooperation with government agencies in Mainland China, developed more sophisticated technologies to catch offenders and strengthened corruption awareness campaigns among new immigrants. These efforts were successful. A good indicator of confidence in the ICAC was that the percentage of the public who were willing to report corruption increased steadily over the years, reaching 70-80% of those surveyed between 2006 and 2018 (ICAC, 1993-2018).

Another significant change in the ICAC's ability to adapt to the changing environment is that from 1998 onwards, the agency began to prosecute under the common law offence of misconduct in public office. This new development supplemented the *Prevention of Bribery Ordinance* (POBO), which could not easily cover the increasing number of offences involving such matters as directing contracts towards friends and relatives and receiving future benefits for present services. With a wider remit than the POBO, prosecution under misconduct in public office was an innovative way of responding to significant changes in the pattern of corruption, providing more flexibility in dealing with serious conflict of interest cases.

New or recurring problems in the social environment suggest the need to go beyond ACAs' organizational characteristics to understand public perceptions of their effectiveness. The ability of ACAs to adapt to the changing environment is evidently important. This leads to the second hypothesis of this study:

Hypothesis 2 The capacity of an ACA to adapt to the changing social environment contributes to public perceptions of its effectiveness

Trust as a moderating factor

Political trust is a factor that is strongly related to perceptions of institutional performance (Van der Meer & Hakhverdian, 2017). If ACAs are trusted by citizens, their effectiveness will improve because social pressure for compliance will increase (Grimmelikhuijsen et al., 2019). In the early years of the ICAC, the public was not optimistic about its chances of success and both civil society organizations and businesses viewed its work with suspicion. Public confidence was also damaged by a partial amnesty granted to the police in November 1977, after which the ICAC was for a time perceived to be ineffective (Scott & Gong, 2015). In response to these public concerns, the ICAC launched massive campaigns to win back social trust and confidence (Scott & Gong, 2019, pp. 38-44). Its efforts were successful, judging by the increase in the public's willingness to report corruption, which can be seen as an important indicator of social trust in ACAs.

An additional measure of trust is the widespread belief among the public in Hong Kong that the ICAC deserves their support. The ICAC annual surveys show that the percentage of respondents who considered the agency deserving their support has always been higher than the percentage of those who considered the agency to be effective. Over the years, when asked the survey question "Does the ICAC deserve your support?", about 95-99% of respondents said "yes". However, when the respondents were asked "Do you consider the ICAC effective?", the percentage of "yes" answers ranged between 68% and 88% (ICAC, 2007-2018). The difference between the two indicates that whether an ACA is perceived as effective and whether it is trustworthy are two separate matters. The public may trust the agency but also understands that in some areas it is difficult or impossible to prevent corruption because corruption occurs in an environment beyond the agency's control. Thus, trust is not necessarily based on an agency's effective performance. But once trust in an institution is established, it may affect people's perceptions of its effectiveness.

Specifically, the impact of trust on perceptions of institutional effectiveness may be seen in two aspects. First, trust has a complementary effect; that is, a higher level of trust in the ACA enhances the impact of perceived institutional capacity on people's perceptions of its effectiveness. Alternatively, trust may have a substitute effect when people do not think the ACA has strong institutional capacity but still consider it effective because they trust it. In the latter scenario, trust replaces institutional capacity to exert a positive impact on people's perception of the ACA's effectiveness. Hence, this study has two additional hypotheses:

Hypothesis 3a: Trust works as a complement to boost the impact of an ACA's capacity on the perception of effectiveness.

Hypothesis 3b: Trust works as a substitute to replace the impact of an ACA's capacity on the perception of effectiveness.

It should be noted that the relationship between trust and the perception of effectiveness so conceptualized does not pose an endogeneity problem. This study defines trust as expectation and confidence on an emotional as well as rational basis and as the "willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the *expectation* [emphasis added] that the other will perform a particular action important to the trustor" (Mayer et al., 1995, p. 712). So defined, trust in an institution is a subjective matter and is not necessarily based on the agency's performance. It may rest on the confidence, but not the certainty, that the institution concerned will act in an expected way although doubts may still exist (Rose-Ackerman, 2001). Research shows that many factors other than institutional performance boost political trust and that there are emotional rather than rational reasons for trust (Nooteboom, 2006; Anderson & Singer, 2008). An analysis of citizens' trust in ACAs in three Asian countries (Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka) shows little correlation between trust and institutional performance (Baniamin & Jamil, 2018).

Although the three countries had equally poor performance in controlling corruption, the level of trust in their respective ACAs varies. It is therefore necessary to distinguish trust in political institutions from evaluations of their performance (Catterberg & Moreno, 2006).

Data and measurement

A telephone survey was conducted in Hong Kong in June 2019 to test the hypotheses. Data was collected by a professional survey center at the University of Hong Kong which administered a random sample of all residences with fixed line phones. Using the next birthday rule, interviewees were drawn from those aged 18 or over who spoke Cantonese. The survey successfully collected 1,011 valid questionnaires. The response rate was 60.5%, with a standard error lower than 1.6%. This indicates that the percentage errors are less than $\pm 3.1\%$ under the 95% confidence interval.

The survey used five questions to measure the organizational dimension of the ICAC's capability. Respondents were asked whether they agreed with the following statements about the ICAC: 1) it is given sufficient power; 2) it has fair and reliable procedures; 3) it is committed to fighting corruption; 4) it is independent and not influenced by the wishes of the government; and 5) its staff have sufficient integrity. A five-point scale was used in which 1 means "strongly disagree," 2 "disagree," 3 "neutral," 4 "agree," and 5 "strongly agree." Factor analysis showed that the five items could be aggregated into only one factor with an eigenvalue of 2.97, larger than the threshold value of 1. The alpha coefficient was 0.805, higher than the acceptable level (0.70), indicating that these questions were reliable measurements. The average of these five questions was then used as the indicator of the perceived capacity of the ICAC on the organizational dimension.

Four other questions pertaining to the ICAC's capacity to deal with the changing environment were adopted to ask respondents to what extent they thought the ICAC was capable of tackling the following recurring or new forms of corruption in Hong Kong: illegal business commissions, government-business collusion, cross-border corruption and conflict of interest in government. Again, a 5-point scale was used, with 5 denoting "very effective" and 1 "not effective at all." Factor analysis showed that the four items could be aggregated into only one factor with an eigenvalue of 2.51, larger than the threshold value of 1. The reliability test of these four questions had a satisfactory level of alpha coefficient, 0.804. The average score of the answers to the four questions was used to measure the ICAC's capacity to adapt to the changing social environment.

For the perceived effectiveness of the ICAC, the question "Do you think the ICAC has been effective in controlling corruption?" was asked. There were four options for respondents to choose from: always effective; not effective in the past, but now effective; effective in the past but not now; never effective. These choices measure the changes in an individual's perception over time, if any, as well as the magnitude of effectiveness. As high as 62.4% of respondents said that the ICAC was "always effective," and 3.6% believed that it was "not effective in the past, but was now effective". However, 31.9% considered the ICAC "effective in the past, but not now" and 2.1% regarded it as "never effective." This may be because the recent polarized political atmosphere has drawn the ICAC into some cases where its actions might be judged negatively by one side or the other. Because the distribution of effectiveness was very uneven, we collapsed the answers to a dichotomous variable, with the positive answers coded as 1 and others 0.

As in other studies (Chen, 2017; Kang & Zhu, 2020), people's trust was measured by one question "Do you trust the ICAC?". There were four options for respondents to choose from:

always trust; did not trust before but trust now; once trusted, but do not trust now; never trusted. These options were collapsed into a dichotomous variable with positive and negative answers, and the result showed that 60.5% trusted the ICAC and 39.5% did not trust it.

In this study, some other variables were controlled for such as the perceived level of corruption, gender, age, education level, and employment status. The descriptive analysis of all the variables is presented in Table 1. It is noticeable that the level of perceived capacity on the organizational dimension (3.64) is higher than perceived capacity on the environmental dimension (3.04) and that the difference is statistically significant ($p=0.00$). This empirical finding supports the need to differentiate the two dimensions in measuring an ACA's capabilities.

Table 1 about here

Regression and discussion

Table 2 reports the regression results. The coefficients of the ICAC's capacity measured on the organizational dimension (1.252 in Model 1) and its capacity measured on the environmental dimension (1.322 in Model 2) are both higher than 1, suggesting that they have a positive correlation with perceived effectiveness. When the two variables are both introduced into Model 3, the results remain the same. Hypotheses 1 and 2 are thus supported. That is, a positive assessment of the ICAC's capacities, based on either the organizational dimension or the environmental dimension, is correlated with the perception of its effectiveness.

Table 2 about here

Following the literature (Cleary, 1999), and to test the effect of trust as a moderating variable influencing the relationship between the perceived capabilities of the ICAC and the

perception of its effectiveness, sub-group regression analyses were conducted on two groups, those who do not trust the ICAC (Model 4) and those who do trust it (Model 5). The coefficients of the two models were then compared. The coefficient of organizational capacity is 2.744 ($p=0.01$) for the non-trust group and 1.110 (not significant) for the trust group. This means that, for those who do not trust the ICAC, the agency's organizational capacity has a positive and significant impact on their perception of its effectiveness; a unit increase in the former boosts the likelihood of a positive perception of effectiveness by 174% ($2.744-1$). However, the positive impact does not hold water for those who trust the ICAC. As long as they trust the ICAC, how they assess the agency's capabilities becomes less relevant to their perceptions of its effectiveness. Here, the findings show a *substitute* effect of trust in the ICAC to replace the agency's organizational capacity as a determinant of perceived effectiveness. This again confirms the assumption of this study that trust in an institution is not necessarily based on its ability or performance.

The role of trust in the environmental dimension of the capacity-effectiveness relationship is different. The coefficient is 2.124 for the non-trust group and 4.740 for the trust group and both are statistically significant. Everything else being equal, a unit increase in the belief that the ICAC has strong capacity to adapt to the changing social environment increases the likelihood of considering the ICAC effective by 374% ($4.740-1$) for the trust group in Model 5, as compared to 112% ($2.124-1$) for the non-trust group in Model 4. This means that the perceived adaptability of the ICAC to the changing environment has a stronger impact on the perception of its effectiveness when trust is present. Thus, a *complementary* effect of trust is found, which strengthens the argument that perceived strong capabilities of an institution contribute to the perception of its effectiveness.

Hypotheses 3a and 3b are both partially confirmed. Whether trust exerts a complementary effect or a substitute effect depends on which dimension of the ACA capacity is at issue.

Conclusion

Using the Hong Kong ICAC as a case, this study has illustrated that the perceptions of effectiveness in corruption prevention may be gauged on two dimensions. The first relates to how an ACA's organizational capacity is assessed, including, for example, whether it has adequate powers and commitment to fighting corruption, is capable of developing appropriate procedures in preventing corruption, can act independently, and is staffed by people with integrity. The perception of ACAs' effectiveness subsumes an environmental dimension that is subtle and more difficult to detect than a simple loss of faith in the efficacy of the ACA. The capacity of the ACA to deal with the external environment goes beyond the power, structure and procedure of the agency itself and is embedded in the broader social context. Less favourable perceptions of effectiveness may stem, for example, from the belief that the agency is constrained not so much by its own capabilities but by certain political factors.

Unpacking public perceptions of anti-corruption effectiveness in a disaggregated way is theoretically and empirically important, especially because, as the findings show, perceived effectiveness is related to the issue of trust in government institutions. Countries with more corruption are often thought to have lower levels of trust in government while those with less corruption are believed to enjoy much higher levels of trust. As yet, there have not been sufficient objective measures to identify these circumstances. The difficulty lies in trying to understand why citizens think that corruption control is or is not effective. This study argues that it requires a nuanced understanding of how citizens perceive institutional effectiveness and why they perceive

it in that way. The findings confirm that developing both organizational and environmental capabilities is important for the public to be assured that the agency is able to perform effectively. Gaining public trust will also help as it increases people's confidence in the agency's effectiveness.

Understanding perceptions of effectiveness in preventing corruption has practical implications. ACAs should develop their capability to act effectively and independently against corruption through appropriate procedures. They need also to maintain their integrity to continue to receive public support. However, capacity-building limited to organizational or procedural improvements to the agency itself is far from enough. An ACA should also develop its capacity to adapt to the changing environment, especially the ability to identify and tackle new and emerging forms of corruption. It should also act proactively to change the existing environment to create better social conditions for integrity awareness and protection. This includes, but is not limited to, raising social awareness about building public integrity.

This study has limitations. It draws on the Hong Kong case to highlight the major factors influencing public perceptions of institutional effectiveness. The findings from this single case study should be further verified. The purpose of this study is not to draw any robust conclusions but to offer initial evidence for further exploration through comparative analysis of multiple cases.

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Table 1 **Descriptive analysis**

Variable	Mean (%)	SD	Min	Max
Effectiveness of ICAC (1=effective)	0.66	0.47	0	1
Capacity on the organizational dimension	3.64	0.90	1	5
Capacity on the environmental dimension	3.04	0.96	1	5
Trust in the ICAC (1=yes)	0.61	0.49	0	1
Perceived corruption level (5=very common)	2.57	1.06	1	5
Gender (1=male)	0.43	0.50	0	1
Age (7=aged 75 or above)	4.51	1.76	1	7
Education level (6=Tertiary (degree))	3.84	1.80	1	6
Employment (currently employed)	42%			
Employment (once employed)	54%			
Employment (never employed)	5%			

Sources: Authors' telephone survey in 2019.

Table 2 Regression analysis of effectiveness

Variables	DV: Perceptions of effectiveness (all models are logit regression)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Who do not trust ICAC	Who trust ICAC
Organisational capacity	3.496*** (0.615)		2.089*** (0.406)	2.744*** (0.670)	1.110 (0.412)
Environmental capacity		3.751*** (0.599)	2.777*** (0.493)	2.124*** (0.469)	4.740*** (1.448)
Trust in the ICAC (Reference=don't trust)	18.104*** (4.610)	21.376*** (5.266)	14.076*** (3.704)	-	-
Corruption level	0.716*** (0.079)	0.716*** (0.079)	0.723*** (0.082)	0.683** (0.105)	0.731* (0.134)
Gender (Reference=female)	1.284 (0.299)	1.459 (0.350)	1.473 (0.360)	1.137 (0.352)	3.253** (1.578)
Age	0.974	0.881	0.909	0.821*	1.061

	(0.079)	(0.073)	(0.077)	(0.090)	(0.155)
Education level	0.915	0.923	0.920	0.764**	1.146
	(0.068)	(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.081)	(0.149)
Employment status (Reference=have a job)					
Once had but not now	1.221	1.273	1.265	1.010	1.580
	(0.332)	(0.346)	(0.351)	(0.354)	(0.730)
Never have a job	3.004**	2.815**	2.897**	2.001	-
	(1.573)	(1.466)	(1.561)	(1.195)	
Constant	0.017***	0.042***	0.008***	0.026***	0.036***
	(0.016)	(0.032)	(0.007)	(0.031)	(0.064)
Prob>chi2	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Pseudo R2	0.529	0.547	0.559	0.233	0.199
Observations	868	864	860	337	502

Notes: Coefficients are odd ratios. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1

Sources: Authors' telephone survey in 2019.