

Competitive Political Socialization?

Explaining the Failure of Chinese Nationalist Education in Hong Kong, 1997-2020

by

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Statement of Originality

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Abstract

School education is always an important domain for promoting nation-building, regardless of whether the country is authoritarian, hybrid or democratic. Existing education studies indicated that the structures and contents of school curricula in Hong Kong have become more in line with Mainland China's practices since the handover of its sovereignty by Britain to China in 1997, demonstrating Beijing's official nationalist agenda to cultivate in Hong Kong students a sense of belonging to the Chinese nation. Ironically, two decades after the handover, the number of Hong Kong youth identifying themselves as Chinese has remained on the low side and even dropped to a historic low in recent years. This leads to the question of why the Chinese nationalist school curricula and textbooks fail to build a solid Chinese national identity among Hong Kong's youth.

This thesis hypothesizes that the failure of Chinese nationalist education after 1997 is the result of Hong Kong's "competitive political socialization environment". A mix-methods research strategy was used to test this hypothesis through a self-administered campus survey conducted in three secondary schools (which covered 1,146 valid questionnaires from students in Forms 3-6, the final four years of the six-year secondary school structure) and extended interviews with survey respondents (a total of 14 interviews). Based on these quantitative and qualitative findings:

- (a) Peer, local social media, and local online forums were found to be strong predictors of Hong Kong youth's stronger sense of identity as Hongkongers than as Chinese. Together these factors have created a competitive political socialization environment, competing with, or even pushing back the official Chinese nationalist education.
- (b) Family socialization was found to have some impact on the sense of national identity

of the youth only before their secondary schooling— that is also before they can engage efficiently with peers, the local social media, and local online forums using their mobile phones.

(c) The teacher factor was found to have a limited impact on the youth's national identity.

This result was related primarily to the scarcity of students' opportunities for political discussion or co-participation with their teachers.

(d) The failure of nationalist education initiatives has its own uncertainties, as the

curriculum and extra-curricular activities have not been effective in promoting national identity among young students. This is further compounded by the offsetting external competitive political socialisation environment, which further affects young people's national identity.

This study pioneered a comprehensive analysis of the failure of Chinese nation-building for Hong Kong's youth, based on an integrated assessment of family, peers, teachers, and media factors.

Keywords: Chinese national building, national education, political socialization, China, Hong Kong

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List of Abbreviations

CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CDC	Curriculum Development Council
CMI	Chinese as medium of instruction
CPC	Communist Party of China
EMI	English as medium of instruction
HKSAR	Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
ICAC	Independent Commission Against Corruption
KMT	Kuomintang
MI	Medium of instruction
MNE	Moral and National Education
MOE	Ministry of Education
NI	National identity
OCTS	One country, two systems
PMIC	Putonghua as the medium of instruction for teaching the Chinese Language Subject
PORI	Hong Kong Public Opinion Research Institute
PRC	People's Republic of China
QEF	Quality Education Fund
SCNPC	Standing Committee of the National People's Congress
SCOLAR	Standing Committee on Language Education and Research



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Chapter 1

Introduction:

In search of an explanation for Hong Kong youth's national identity

In the eyes of China's leaders in Beijing, the “return of hearts” of Hong Kong people is still an uncompleted mission, even though it is more than 20 years since Hong Kong was returned to China. Hong Kong people still do not have a strong sense of belonging to China, and this is especially the case for Hong Kong youth, even though most of them have grown up and been educated in the post-colonial period (HKPORI, 2020). The “1 July Demonstration” in Hong Kong in 2003 opposed the National Security Law, which was deemed as suppressing Hong Kong's freedom to defend the central authority, and campaigned to safeguard the freedom of Hong Kong. Following this, protesters in Hong Kong launched an “Anti-National Education Movement” (反國教運動) in 2012 and the “Umbrella Movement” (雨傘運動) in 2014.

Another protest was the “Anti-Extradition Bill Movement” during 2019-2020. These movements are described in the following section. These social movements hinted the resistance of the Hong Kong people, particularly the youth, to identify themselves as Chinese, or in other words, their preference to adopt a “Hongkonger” (香港人) identity with a sense of alienation from or even rejection of the identity of “Chinese” (中國人) (Holbig, 2020; Kwong, 2016; Veg, 2017; Yew & Kwong, 2014).

1.1 Localist Movements in Hong Kong

2010 Anti-High Speed Railway Movement

The resistance by some Hong Kong people to integrate with Mainland China (hereafter

referred to as “the Mainland”) was reflected in a campaign against the high-speed railway project in 2009-10. In 2009, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) Government planned to build a high-speed railway in Hong Kong to connect with the mainland’s high-speed rail network. It would shorten the travel time between China and Hong Kong and facilitate exchanges across the border to integrate Hong Kong into the national construction of China’s high-speed rail network. The project was expected to create jobs in China and Hong Kong, especially in the wake of the global financial crisis of 2008. After the opening of the railway, the improvement in traffic was expected to promote economic integration between Hong Kong and the Pan-Pearl River Delta region in South China (now referred to as the “Great Bay Area”).

Although the authorities claimed that this would be of great benefit to the future development of Hong Kong from a cost-effective point of view, they failed to convince the opposition in the Hong Kong community. Opponents accused the Government of treating land only as a profitable commodity and ignoring the meaning of the land (S. K. L. Chan, 2017). In particular, there was a plan for one small village to be demolished along the railway line, and this triggered a social movement against the high-speed rail project (S. K. L. Chan, 2017). The village stakeholders participated, along with some young people and public figures who had no personal interests in the project.

The anti-high-speed rail movement reduced Hong Kong people’s support for this project’s construction from 84% to 40%¹. The event marked a new understanding of Hong Kong’s

¹ Poll on XRL conducted by the City University of Hong Kong and released in May 2009 and Poll on XRL conducted by the University of Hong Kong and released on 14 January 2010.

identity, which later evolved into a response to China's growing dominance of Hong Kong's political and economic affairs and heralded boycotts of the subsequent integrative arrangements (N. Ma, 2011; Yew & Kwong, 2014). It showed that, apart from a culture of Hong Kong people attaching importance to economic interests, for the local community land/agriculture has also attracted people's attention (Xia, 2016). This highlights a consciousness of a Hongkonger identity.

2011-2013 local protests against Mainland

Since 2003, when travel restrictions were relaxed under the Individual Visit Scheme, mainland tourists have flocked to Hong Kong. Apart from ordinary tourists, a large number of parallel traders crowded in Hong Kong to shop and bring back to the Mainland for sale as there were many goods in Hong Kong that are scarce or more expensive in the Mainland. While mainland tourists shopping in Hong Kong promoted its economic development, it also pushed up local prices and rental markets and even affected the life order of Hong Kong residents. For example, some businesses previously serving local residents have been converted for tourists. During this period there was a scandal in China with infant milk powder adulterated by unscrupulous manufacturers, which prompted these traders to purchase large quantities of "safe" products in Hong Kong, thus causing a shortage for the local Hong Kong residents. There was also an influx of mainland residents coming to Hong Kong to give birth, so that their children could have the citizenship (namely permanent residence), resulting in the unavailability of maternity hospital beds for the locals. All of these contradictions aroused the dissatisfaction of some Hong Kong people.

On 23 October 2011, about 1300 people in Hong Kong took to the streets to oppose pregnant mainland women coming to Hong Kong to give birth. On 1 January 2012, about 1500 pregnant Hong Kong women marched to protest against 'birth tourism' from mainland China

(AFP, 2012). On 5 September 2012, at the call of netizens in Hong Kong, more than 100 demonstrators confronted parallel traders outside the Sheung Shui train station, one of the sub-points of parallel imports, prompting the police to intervene. This eventually turned into a conflict (J. Ng & Nip, 2012). This resistance to mainland tourists reflects the distinction between Hong Kong residents and mainlanders, who are the “others”. This also highlights Hong Kong people's sense of local identity.

2012 Anti-National Education Movement

In July 2007, Hu Jintao, then the President of China, visited Hong Kong and delivered a speech stressing that "attention should be paid to national education for young people" (Hu, 2007). In the following three years, the Chief Executive at the time, Donald Tsang, proposed in policy addresses to strengthen national education. In his 2008 Policy Address, Tsang explicitly proposed the establishment of an independent "Moral and National Education" (MNE) subject in secondary and primary schools, and the Select Committee on MNE was set up. This aroused social concern after the promulgation of the relevant syllabus and teaching kits of the course cause revealed that it tended to eulogize China in order to cultivate students' patriotism. Furthermore, the HKSAR Government intended to make the course compulsory, which caused various stakeholders, including parents and students, to question and oppose what they considered to be "brainwashing" education and to protest against it. In this movement, some young students came to the front of the stage. On May 29, 2011, Joshua Wong, a junior secondary school student, convened a student organization called "Scholarism"(學民思潮) that opposed the national education. Wong and his "Scholarism" became the backbone of the Anti-National Education Movement and launched various protest activities from its founding to 2012. Finally, under pressure from all walks of life, the HKSAR Government eventually decided to set MNE as an elective subject decided by

schools.

The Anti-National Education Movement was an indicator of the resistance to the Chinese identity in a political sense, since it was concerned mainly with what it termed political “brainwashing” through curricula content its supporters believed to present biased political issues. Most studies describing the Anti-MNE have considered it to be a sign of tension between values in Hong Kong and Beijing. Some people described the MNE dispute as a conflict between promoting nationalist patriotism and strong local civic values (Kerry John Kennedy, 2013). Chan (2012) believed that this resistance reflected the identity of Hong Kong people, constructed against the mainland and the CCP as an alien “other”. Others represented it as an attempt to inculcate Chinese nationalism that contradicts the more universalistic values of the Hong Kong people (Y. W. Leung, 2012; K. W. Ma, 2012); the promotion of uncritical patriotism that undermines officially promoted critical thinking and active learning (Y. W. Leung, 2012); and the conflict between the values of mature civil society and the authoritarian party-state (Y. W. Leung, 2012). All of these explanations acknowledged a fundamental tension between the opposing concepts of identity and citizenship. Morris and Vickers (2015) argued that the Anti-MNE movement indicated that the localism of Hong Kong, which is rooted in ethnocultural qualities and civic attributes, contradicts the official discourse of political socialization. The evolving sense of “Hongkonger” was ultimately more rooted in popular culture than official propaganda—at least, it failed to convince young people in Hong Kong. Veg (2017) also argued that a previously uncontroversial rejection of the ethnocultural Chinese identity could be seen in the 2012 Anti-MNE movement. The young generation in Hong Kong “shift[ed] to a civic identity as citizen[s] of Hong Kong (公民) rather than of China (國民)” (Veg, 2017, p. 338), opposing the Central and HKSAR governments’ programme to boost identification with the Chinese

state, and contesting the cultural-ethnic definition of the Chinese nation inherent in it.

2014 Umbrella Movement

Two years after the Anti-National Education movement, a more significant anti-government movement with youth as the backbone, the Umbrella Movement (also known as the Occupy Central Movement, because of its main location in Hong Kong's Central district), broke out in 2014. On 31 August 2014, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress formally adopted "*The Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on the Selection of the Chief Executive by Universal Suffrage in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and the Method for the Formation of the 2016 Legislative Council*" (8.31 Decision), which set the framework for the method of universal suffrage for appointing Hong Kong's Chief Executive in 2017. However, the proposal imposed restrictions on the nomination of candidates for the Chief Executive, which was a far cry from the aspirations of the Hong Kong people, thus triggering a series of protests with the cumulative participation of more than one million people. The Umbrella Movement ran for more than two months continuously (J. Chan, 2014; Ortmann, 2015). In this movement, the youth group, as the hard-core group, stood in the spotlight. After adopting the 8.31 decision, two student organizations, the *Hong Kong Federation of Students* (HKFSU) and the *Scholarism*, launched a strike in academic circles from September 22 to September 26 to protest the decision. After that, the young students became the backbone of the Umbrella Movement. A survey conducted from late October to early November 2014 found that 44% of people between the ages of 18 and 29 participated in the movement, but only 17% and 8% of those were aged 30-49 and 50 and above, respectively (Chung & Pang, 2014). This large-scale civic movement further demonstrated the dissatisfaction of young people with the central policy.

Hongkongers share one of the core values of Hong Kong, democracy. Differing from the regime in the mainland, this contributes to Hongkonger's common values, memories and experiences. The suffrage issues that triggered the Umbrella Movement carried the Hong Kong people's demands for democracy, "While the overwhelming focus of the movement was universal suffrage, identification with Hong Kong and expressions of 'localist' discourse were well-represented within it" (Veg, 2017, p.339). "The 2014 Umbrella Movement was driven by and began to shape the students' constructive Hong Kong identity because it raised the desire to participate actively as members of the local political community while reducing interest in the Chinese national identity" (Ortmann, 2021, p.1).

2019 Anti-Extradition Bill Movement

In February 2019, because of a murder committed by a Hong Kong citizen in Taiwan, the HKSAR Government promoted an amendment to the Fugitive Offenders, which enabled the surrender of fugitives in Hong Kong to Taiwan, but also to mainland China and Macao. This triggered a series of conflicts and ongoing large-scale protests, known as the "Anti-Extradition Bill Movement". The movement has been deemed the most significant political crisis since the handover, with the enormous scale and number of participants in Hong Kong's history; allegedly more than two million people participated in the largest demonstration on 16 June 2019. Young students once again became the main force of the social movement. The groups of young students, including college and secondary school students, launched strikes and parades. In particular, outbreaks of protests in several public universities triggered fierce clashes between the police and the public (Purbrick, 2019). During the movement that from June 2019 to May 2020, 8,981 arrests were made in connection with the protests. Among those arrested, 1,707 were under 18, including 1,602 secondary students and eight primary school pupils. Another 5,640 arrestees were between 18 and 30 years old (Adolfo, 2020).

These figures show the numbers of Hong Kong youth participating in movements and highlight both their enthusiasm for their cause and their mistrust of the mainland government (Holbig, 2020).

The participation of Hong Kong youth in the political movement has contributed to strengthening the identity of the local community and weakening China's identity (Ortmann, 2021). Western democracies have always advocated the enthusiasm of young people to participate in politics to maintain the operation of democratic systems (Kymlicka, 1997; Kymlicka & Norman, 1994). The typology of political participation holds that identity precedes political participation because it can be regarded as a potential form of political participation (Ekman & Amnå, 2012). On the other hand, some studies have suggested that identity may also result from political participation, which fosters and strengthens the individual's sense of identity with the political community (Richey, 2011). In short, identity and political participation interact and strengthen each other.

The events above reflect Hong Kong people's protection of Hong Kong's "core values" embodied in the identity of "Hongkonger", which include human rights, the rule of law, clean government, freedom and democracy (F. F. Cheung et al., 2015; N. Ma, 2011). The *anti-national education movement* was aimed directly at the so-called "political brainwashing". The Hong Kong people want to protect their inherent political attitude, which is very different from that of the mainland, thus resisting the political identity of "Chinese". The same is true of the "Umbrella Movement" in 2014. As explained above, this movement was striving for democratic "universal suffrage", mainly to safeguard the core value of "democracy". The primary purpose of the Anti-Extradition Bill Movement in 2019 was to maintain the "rule of law". The above three social movements all pointed to the resistance to the identity of "Chinese" in the political sense, as well as the particularity of the

"Hongkonger" identity, especially the maintenance of "core values", which leads to the rise and fall of the "Hongkonger" and "Chinese" identities respectively.

This rejection of "Chinese" stands in stark contrast to the upsurge of nationalist sentiment in the mainland (Pang & Jiang, 2019), even though the Chinese nation-building project, which has worked well on the mainland and in Macao, has been present in Hong Kong for several years.

1.2 Chinese nationalist education initiatives since the handover

There is no sufficient reason to attribute the anti-China sentiment among Hong Kong youth, especially the students, to any negligence in relation to education. Since the reunification, the HKSAR Government has been making great efforts to promote Hong Kong youth's understanding of the mainland and cultivate their positive feelings towards it in the education domain.

The Beijing authority has spared no effort to strive for the return of the hearts and minds of Hong Kong people since it was confirmed that Hong Kong would return to China in the form of "one country, two systems" (OCTS). It is challenging to cultivate Hong Kong people's feelings for China and recognition of the central government because of the segregation of the "two systems", hindering Hong Kong's exchanges with and understanding of the mainland. On the other hand, under the constitutional arrangement of "one country", the Central Government should not only bear the responsibility of maintaining the long-term prosperity and stability of Hong Kong but also guard against this former colonial city, with its close international ties, becoming a base for western countries to carry out a "peaceful revolution" against China (S. Jiang, 2017, p.162). However, because of the legal segregation of the "two systems", the Central Government cannot interfere directly in the political and

social operation of Hong Kong. It is essential to win the hearts and minds of the Hong Kong people and seek their emotional recognition and support to the central authority, that is, the national identity (S. Jiang, 2017).

After the retrocession, the HKSAR government proposed to foster the Chinese national identity of Hong Kong people through a nationalistic project (Ortmann, 2016; Zheng & Tok, 2007). The authorities officially and repeatedly stressed that younger generations need to develop a Chinese national identity (Morris & Vickers, 2015; Tse, 2013a). In the year following the reunification, the HKSAR Government began to promote the mother tongue (Cantonese) as the main medium of instruction and set up Putonghua, the official language of the mainland, as a curriculum in primary and secondary schools. There was even a tendency to use Putonghua as the medium of instruction, to promote the integration of China and Hong Kong through the unification of language (E. Chan, 2002; Evans, 2002; Poon, 2013).

The *Education Commission Report* issued in 1999 recommended that students should learn more about China and feel a part of it. Two years later, The Hong Kong Curriculum Development Council (CDC) published a curriculum reform document entitled *Learning to Learn - The Way Forward* (CDC, 2001), in which Moral and Civic Education (MCE) was identified as one of the Four Key Tasks to help students become good citizens. The following year, it issued the *Basic Education Curriculum Guide - Building on Strengths* (Primary 1 to Secondary 3) (CDC, 2002), which proposed a renewed focus on MCE, with national identity as one of the “Five Priority Values” (i.e. perseverance, respect for others, responsibility, national identity and commitment).

A core curriculum in senior high schools, named “Liberal Studies”, was implemented from 2009 onward. In this course the Modern China module focuses on issues of mainland China in the contemporary era. In 2010, the HKSAR Government launched a controversial

curriculum, “Moral and National Education”, to promote positive emotions towards China, but this was discontinued for boycott of the aforementioned Anti-National Education Movement.

During a visit to Hong Kong in 2007, the Chinese President at that time, Hu Jintao, called for the need to "attach importance to national education for young people and strengthen exchanges between young people in Hong Kong and the mainland" (Hu, 2007), and since then the HKSAR Government has made great efforts to promote such exchanges. By 2018, the cumulative investment had exceeded HK \$570 million and nearly 460,000 students had been involved.²

1.3 The question: Why has Chinese nationalism education failed to work in Hong Kong?

The perceived dilemma between rising localist movements and expanded official Chinese nationalist education in post-handover Hong Kong gives rise to a critical research puzzle: Why has the expansion of Chinese nationalist education initiatives failed to promote the Chinese nationalist identity of Hong Kong students? Is it because of the limited impact of education in the development of national identity? Or is it influenced by factors other than education? What are the factors that affect the national identity of young people in the Hong Kong context? These are the mysteries that this study seeks to unravel.

² Compiled by the author from the replies to initial written questions raised by Finance Committee Members in examining the Estimates of Expenditure-Director of Bureau over the years.

1.4 Research framework: re-examining Chinese nation-building in Hong Kong amid competitive political socialization environment

Existing literature on Chinese nationalism education in Hong Kong and its limitation

-Limitations of existing Chinese nationalism literature

Although there are many in-depth studies of Chinese nationalism, these nation-building means cannot be applied directly to Hong Kong due to the OCTS model. Under the CCP-state, those in power hold adequate control of all relevant departments to manipulate education and media information to serve the Chinese nationalism exercise. However, these nation-building approaches, which have been influential in the mainland, cannot be implemented directly in Hong Kong because of the OCTS arrangement.

Based on the OCTS formula and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Basic Law, Hong Kong, as an autonomous territory, has a separate executive, legislative and judicial system coupled with higher freedom of speech and press and human rights protection, all of which can complicate the implementation of Chinese nation-building measures in Hong Kong. First, it is difficult for the CCP regime to “interfere in the affairs which the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region administers on its own” (Basic Law Art 22)³ under the OCTS arrangement. Second, the separate legislative and judicial systems maintain judicial independence in Hong Kong, making it a vital force in restricting administrative power (B. C. H. Fong, 2018; Morris, 2009). In addition, the "opposition" of the Legislative Council and

³ The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China, Chapter-II, Article 22.

civil society all play a role in restricting the government's policies. The aforementioned "Anti-National Education Movement" could be taken as the case, which forced the national education plan to be withdrawn due to mass protests. In addition, Hong Kong enjoys high freedoms and human rights, which renders information control more difficult to implement effectively in Hong Kong (Morris, 2009; Morris & Vickers, 2015). Such factors make it difficult to apply the methods of Chinese nationalism and nation-building, which are effective in the mainland, to Hong Kong. Therefore, we need to examine the process of Chinese nationalism and nation-building in Hong Kong from the perspective of the latter.

-Limitations of existing literature on nationalism education in Hong Kong

Existing studies focus mainly on the impact of Chinese nationalism on the education, curricula and textbooks of Hong Kong. However, most of them have yet to examine if it has worked well or why such reforms failed to strengthen Chinese identification among Hong Kong's youths.

Some scholars, especially Thomas Kwan Choi Tse, Paul Morris and Edward Vickers, have systematically analysed the issue of national education and people's identity in Hong Kong. These scholars have probed deeply into and discovered the process of Chinese nation-building in the education domain in Hong Kong in the shadow of mainland China. Tse's studies (2007, 2013) have made extraordinary contributions to the issues of the SAR Government's policies and measures for implementing national education and the evolution of national education in Hong Kong (T. C. Lau et al., 2016).

Kan and Vickers (2002) carried out a thorough analysis of some Hong Kong History textbooks, mainly the Chinese History textbooks, which have targeted the orientation of Chinese nationalism. Morris and Vickers (2015) analysed the 2012 "national education" crisis

and pointed out some reasons for its ineffectiveness in Hong Kong, such as the impact of media information. They argued that the failure of the National Education proposition for *Chineseness* might be attributed to a clash with the derived civic identity in which *Hongkongeseness* is rooted, apart from the common ethnocultural identity shared with their counterparts in mainland China.

However, these studies have not pointed out why reforms of education policies and curricula have failed to achieve the expectations of national education, i.e., the “return of hearts” of Hong Kong people. As far as academic research is concerned, there is a pressing need to explore the factors that have operated outside the official Chinese nationalist education system and impacted upon the national identity of Hong Kong youth. In a significant sense, the national identity of Hong Kong people is an issue of political identity (F. L. F. Lee & Chan, 2005), so it might be valuable to explore this issue from the perspective of the “political socialization environment” of Hong Kong.

Although some studies (F. L. F. Lee & Chan, 2005; Y. W. Leung, 2006) have explored the young Hong Kong people’s social movement participation from the perspective of political socialization, research targeting their national identity is scarce. Leung (2006) just focused on the school factors in the political socialization process and did not explore the issues more comprehensively. Lee’s (2016) study brought up one more important factor, the peers, into the analysis. Multiple linear regression analysis that tests the impact of multiple socialization variables, rather than not just one single socialization variable, on the national identity of Hong Kong youth is crucial.

Research questions

Why has the expansion of Chinese national education initiatives in Hong Kong failed to build

a Chinese national identification among Hong Kong's youth; and whether and to what extent is this failure related to the competitive political socialization environment in the territory?

This thesis addressed these critical research puzzles by exploring the following research questions:

- Studying the Chinese nation-building projects in post-1997 Hong Kong schools: How has Chinese official nationalist discourse been introduced into Hong Kong's school education from formal curriculum reforms to extra-curricular activities?
- Studying the contestation of Hong Kong's political socialization environment: How have Chinese official nationalist discourses been contested by the political socialization environment in Hong Kong?
- Studying the limitations of Beijing's ideological indoctrination: Whether (and to what extent) has the political socialization environment of Hong Kong shaped the national identity of Hong Kong youth, and how can we measure such effects?

Original contributions of this thesis: Competitive political socialization environment in Hong Kong


Given the dilemma between the rising localist movement and expanded official Chinese nationalist education in Hong Kong since 1997, there is a pressing need to examine the intervening variables that influence the national identity of Hong Kong youth alongside the Beijing and Hong Kong government's efforts to promote Chinese nationalist education in Hong Kong.

According to established literature, the formation of a national identity is usually led by the processes of political socialization which are aimed at promoting "civic orientation" and

fostering "psychological attachment to the polity and the community" of young people (Crystal & DeBell, 2002), since the regimes are always concerned with the people's attitudes supportive of the political system and the nation (Dawson et al., 1977). Therefore, the factors that influence national identity formation can be borrowed from the agents of political socialization, including families, media, peers, teachers, and religions (Glasberg & Shannon, 2010).

In this study, I conceptualized that Hong Kong youth's national identity formation process is influenced by two different sets of variables, namely the official education curriculum and the political socialization environment. The former is the essential field for nation-building narratives and has long been regulated extensively by the authority (the Education Bureau of the Hong Kong Government), which can be assumed as constant and applied consistently to all Hong Kong youth. The latter, which consist of family, teachers, peers and media, are the primary agents of political socialization (Figure 1-1).

Figure 1-1. The model of influencing factors to national identity formation



Source: Compiled by the author

Examinations of the influence of these four agents should utilize contact with youth as the foothold of the investigation. The influence of official education on youths' national identity is reflected mainly in the formal curriculum and extracurricular activities. The influence of families, peers and teachers can be measured through their discussions with youths about political issues. The influence of the media can be assessed by examining youths' media preferences, that is, their exposure to different media on the political spectrum.

Young people's political and civic participation with their parents, and the parents' roles as models of political and civic behaviour, are related to improvements in the children's behaviour (Zukin et al., 2006). Citizen conversations in daily life are of great significance for youths to cultivate political knowledge, democratic values and different forms of civic practice. Civic discussions with peers can make unique contributions to all aspects of young people's civic orientation (Ekström & Östman, 2013).

The roles, personal beliefs and teaching methods of civic education teachers can help students to establish civic concepts of active participation (Feldman et al., 2007). Promoting discussion and the use of the Internet in class can improve students' knowledge and political participation. Discussing politics openly in class can also increase their future voting participation (D. Hess, 2000). Civic education teachers in Hong Kong prefer to be cultural or cosmopolitan more than authoritarian, which is far different from their counterparts in mainland China (K. E. Chong et al., 2020; Y. W. Leung & Print, 2002).

In Hong Kong, pro-democracy protesters tend to see their peers as the most important motivators to mobilize them to join protests (F. L. F. Lee & Chan, 2011). Peers influence political socialization mainly through interpersonal communication within peer groups and mobilization to join major political events (C. W. Lee, 2016).


Since 1997, alternative media have created a virtual public space for Hong Kong people to express their discontent because of the flexibility and convenience these media offer (F. L. F. Lee, 2018a). People who have high respect for freedom of the press tend to obtain social and political information through social media (Centre for Youth Studies, 2017; P. S. N. Lee et al., 2017). Exposure to alternative media is related to radicalness. Alternative media consumption has been related to the radical idea of using guerrilla tactics in social movements in Hong Kong (F. L. F. Lee, 2018b).

Given the considerable influence of the political socialization environment on people's political sense and the political environment that is habitually at odds with the Chinese nationalist agenda, a number of hypotheses emerged relating to this study, for further testing through a multiple linear regression model.

Previous studies have focused mainly on the changes in the domains of official education curricula. Few studies have extended the scope of research into the broader political socialization environment. The official education curriculum is an integral part of political socialization, but not all of it. The influence of media and families on students' national identity is often more significant than schooling (Fairbrother, 2003). When discussing patriotism education, Hong Kong teachers in civic education also deem that the impact of school education on students may be changed easily by the media outside (Mathews et al., 2008).

Based on the existing research, and in view of the gaps in this research, this study was a pioneering attempt to discuss the contestations of Chinese nationalist discourses in the official education curriculum and political socialization environment within the broader context of Hong Kong as a semi-democratic territorial autonomy from 1997 to 2020 (Figure 1-2).

Figure 1-2. Contestations of Chinese nationalist discourses between official education curriculum and competitive political socialization environment



First of all, this study explored the extent of the Chinese nationalism process in the official


education domain of Hong Kong through an analysis of education policies. Second, analyses of the effects of Hong Kong's political socialization environment, which consists of family, teachers, peers and media, on the national identity of Hong Kong youth explored some reasons why Chinese nation-building through education is effective in the mainland but has failed or is even counterproductive in Hong Kong.

1.5 Research design of the thesis

Mixed research methods

To address the research questions of this study, a mixed-methods approach was adopted, combining quantitative and qualitative research methods and specifically the *Explanatory Sequential Mixed Methods Design* (Creswell & Creswell, 2017) (Figure 1-3). These methods were used to explore the diverse Chinese nation-building discourses in textbooks and media, in particular the relationship between Hong Kong youths' national identity and media exposure, and their influence on each other.

Figure 1-3. Explanatory Sequential Mixed Methods Design



Source: Creswell & Creswell (2017)

In the *Explanatory Sequential Mixed Methods Design*, the first step is to collect and analyse data using a quantitative approach and then follow up with qualitative methods for data collection and analysis, which can “help to explain the quantitative results” and “provide more depth, more insight into the quantitative results” (Creswell & Creswell, 2017).

In this study, the first step was to use a campus survey to investigate the correlation between the national identity of Hong Kong youth and their political socialization environment. First, however, it was necessary to analyse the context of Chinese nation-building related education policies and reforms in Hong Kong, for which an analysis of the archives was deployed.

The interviewees were selected from the questionnaire sample. The purpose of these interviews was to investigate how these agents of political socialization affect their national identity. The methodology of the questionnaire survey and interview is described in detail below.

Unit of analysis: Hong Kong youth (operationalized as students in Forms 3 to 6, the latter four years of the six-year secondary schooling)

1.6 Limitation of this study

First, it was not feasible to use a randomly-selected survey sample owing to insufficient resources and budget. A quota-sampling was adopted, targeting two Chinese-medium schools and one English-medium school, selected from the Education Bureau's total distribution of schools by the medium of instruction. This meant that the sampling method used for this study was not diversified enough to cover schools of different brandings (i.e., Band 3 schools) or religious backgrounds. Therefore, a certain degree of sample bias was unavoidable, and this study cannot be claimed to be fully, statistically representative of the overall situation of Hong Kong youth. However, the study was not intended to depict a comprehensive picture of the political socialization environment facing Hong Kong youth, but to explore the impact of different socialization agents on their national identity and investigate why the expansion of Chinese nationalist education has been ineffective. It will provide the foundation for more comprehensive, rigorous surveys of Hong Kong youth's

national identity in future research.

Second, the survey data for this study may have been affected by the political climate at the time of the study. The questionnaire survey was conducted from November to December 2020, a time when the 2019 Anti-Extradition Bill Movement had only just settled. The Hong Kong National Security Law (Officially Law of the People's Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region) had been implemented, and this political atmosphere may have had a specific impact on the interviewees' political attitudes and responses, thus affecting the accuracy of the data of this study. Furthermore, in my survey, some questions that have been used commonly in previous surveys of this nature were declined by the schools due to being considered politically sensitive. As a result, some questions had to be removed from the questionnaire, thus making it difficult to analyse some issues in depth.

In June 2020, Hong Kong was also still in the haze of the COVID-19 epidemic, and the mainland urgently enacted and passed the Hong Kong National Security Law, which was promulgated and implemented on the anniversary of Hong Kong's handover. This move seriously touched the nerves of the people of Hong Kong, given that the proposal of the HKSAR Government to implement the National Security Law in 2003 had triggered a large number of public protests. Hong Kong people were worried that this would have an impact on the freedom of expression. This time, the National Security Law was directly formulated by the National People's Congress (NPC) in Beijing, bypassing the legislature of Hong Kong, and was added to the Basic Law in the form of Annex III to come into effect immediately. The National Security Law triggered a series of reactions, such as the urgent dissolution of radical political groups such as *Demosisto*, the exile of key members Nathan Law Kwun-chung, the conviction of young political leaders such as Joshua Wong Chi-fung, the arrest of

Jimmy Lai Chee-ying, the founder of the Apple Daily newspaper, the removal of politically sensitive books from bookstores and many citizens considering emigration. The "chilling effect" caused by this move may worsen the perceptions of many Hong Kong people towards the Central Government, the SAR Government and the mainland, and even affect the national identity of the young students surveyed in this study.

Third, the findings of this study may best explain the national identity of Hong Kong youth before 2020 and may not be directly applicable to the future situation following the paradigm-shifting of Hong Kong in the post-National Security Law period. The principal focus of this thesis is to examine whether and to what extent the competitive political socialization environment has structured the national identity of Hong Kong youth, despite the expanded official Chinese nationalist education. Following the introduction of the National Security Law in June 2020, the Beijing and Hong Kong government have put into practice many initiatives, such as refining the electoral system of the Hong Kong Legislative Council (HKSAR, 2021; C. Lau & Cheung, 2021; NPC, 2021). At the time of writing, it is still uncertain to what extent the paradigm-shifting since 2020 will change the degree of "competitiveness" of Hong Kong's political socialization environment and how it will result in a corresponding change in the national identity of Hong Kong youth. Yet, this study has firmly laid the foundation for the empirical relationship between the political socialization environment and national identity for Hong Kong youth. It can facilitate future scholars' analyses of the impact of the changing political socialization environment. For example, a second round of research could be conducted a few years later to examine the political socialization environment in the post-National Security Law period, again using the similar mix-methods research adopted in this thesis. By doing so, future scholars can compare the findings between the pre- and post-National Security Law periods in an attempt to examine the impact of the changing political socialization environment on Hong Kong youth's

national identity.

Finally, this study only explains the influence of external factors, namely the competitive political socialization environment and its conflict with Chinese nationalism education outside the school domain. However, how Chinese nationalism education is actually taught by teachers and absorbed by students in the classroom has remained a "black box" that cannot be easily addressed by scholarly research. Nevertheless, given the sensitivity of class teaching and privacy issues, researching the actual implementation of Chinese nationalism education within the classroom and school settings remains difficult. It is a matter that awaits future researchers' exploration.

In addition to the objective constraints, there were also some deficiencies in the study itself. There were some shortcomings in the questionnaire, such as the lack of detail in the questions on national identity and the lack of a survey on courses related to nationalist education. It is advisable to seek advice and suggestions from a variety of sources before conducting future surveys, so that the questionnaire can be as detailed as possible.

1.7 Organization of the thesis

Chapter	Title
Chapter 1	Introduction: In search of an explanation for Hong Kong youth's national identity
Chapter 2	Background: Modern Chinese nation-building from the late-Qing era to the People's Republic of China period
Chapter 3	Research Question: Chinese nation-building project in Hong Kong and its failure

Chapter 4 Research Design: Theories, hypotheses, and operationalization

Chapter 5 Research findings and analysis: How does the competitive political
socialization in Hong Kong push back against the Chinese nation-building

Chapter 6 Conclusion: Rethinking Chinese nation-building under the One Country Two
Systems model



Chapter 2

Background:

Modern Chinese nation-building from the late-Qing era to the People's Republic of China

2.1 Revisiting the theories of nation and state

The definitions of nation and state have been lacking unified views in academic circles, for their connotations have changed in different periods and schools of thought (Minahan, 2016). What is more likely to be misunderstood is that, in the Chinese context, on the one hand, both nation and state are usually translated in the same way, as "國家" (country), but on the other hand, nation is sometimes translated as "民族", which can be confused with "ethnic" and "race". For example, in the Chinese version of president Xi Jinping's Report at the 19th CPC National Congress, both "National security" (國家安全) and "Chinese nation" (中華民族) were translated with "nation", but "ethnic and religious affairs" also corresponded to "民族" which has the same meaning as "Chinese nation" (Xi, 2017). Indeed, both nation and state contain some meanings related to "country" (國家), which includes a definite territory wherein many people share the same past, traditions, values and culture, and advocate autonomy. However, the critical difference is that the state has the physical force to maintain territorial boundaries and autonomy, while the nation does not have this. At the same time, "nation" and "ethnic" also share some the same elements, considering that the term "ethnic" is regarded as the basis of the nation. Because of these varied interpretations of the Chinese characters, it was necessary to make the concepts clear for this study before going ahead.

- Nation

A nation is a stable community of people formed based on a common language, territory, economic life, ethnicity, or psychological make-up manifested in a common culture. A nation is distinct from a people (Garner, 2014) and is more abstract and more overtly political than an ethnic group (James, 1996). It is a cultural-political community that has become conscious of its autonomy, unity, and particular interests (Smith, 1986).

“To be or not to be recognized as a nation entails different rights for the community which claims to be one, since being a nation usually implies the attachment to a particular territory, a shared culture and history, and the vindication of the right to self-determination” (Guibernau, 2004, p.1251).

A nation is a human group conscious of forming a community, sharing a common culture, attached to a demarcated territory, having a shared past and a joint project for the future and claiming the right to rule itself. This definition attributes five dimensions to the nation: psychological (consciousness of forming a group), cultural, territorial, political and historical (Guibernau, 2004).

- Nationalism

“Nationalism” means the sentiment of belonging to a community whose members identify with a set of symbols, beliefs and ways of life and have the will to decide upon their common political destiny (Guibernau, 1996). As a modern concept, nationalism “combines the political idea of territorial self-determination, the cultural idea of the nation as one’s primary identity, and a moral idea of justification of action to protect the rights of the nation against the other” in the anarchical world (Barrington, 1997, p.713).

“Nationalism” is generally thought to have three origins, functionalist, culturalist, and constructivist (W. Tang & Darr, 2012). Functionalists think that the nationalism of modern society produced nation through the function of the state in order to develop the economy (Gellner, 2008). Culturalists believe that the national culture is rooted in the pre-modern period of religion, culture, customs, blood, and other factors, and that states use these existing elements to shape the nations to maintain the legitimacy of their regimes (Smith, 1986). Moreover, constructivists argue that a nation is merely imaginary, with the elite or ruling classes selectively extracting or even "inventing" elements according to their own needs. The nation is a kind of imagination that exists in the public consciousness through propaganda and education (Anderson, 2006).

- State

Weber’s definition of a “state” is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory (Weber, 2009). However, not all states have accomplished this, and some of them do not even aspire to accomplish it.

- Nation-state

The nation-state is a modern institution characterized by the formation of a kind of state which has the monopoly of what it claims to be the legitimate use of force within a demarcated territory and seeks to unite the people under its rule through cultural homogenization (Guibernau, 2004).

As can be seen from the definition above, a state is a coercive ruling force containing multiple nations. Nevertheless, if a state is based on a unified or even a single nation it is more convenient for it to obtain representation and access to power and for the ruling to have

a stronger cohesion and legitimacy. Therefore, nation building is the task that the states are committed to accomplishing to create a situation more conducive to their rule.

However, globalization causes communities to connect and influence each other and forces many states to cede some of their power, such as transferring part of their economic power to the WTO (Keating, 1996; Wenhua, 2008). This process weakens the independence of the nation-state and encourages regional nationalism processes (Smith, 1986). The nation's tendency towards autonomy conflicts with the state's nation-building project since the establishment of one or more nations within a state may cause the state to relinquish some of its power, and some nations may even seek autonomy from their states. Since nation and state belong to different concepts and the nation has a tendency towards autonomy, nations that have not established themselves as states or are ruled by other states can be called stateless nations or nations against/without states.

“Nations without states” are those which, despite having their territories included within the boundaries of one or more states, by and large, do not identify with them. “The nation's members lacking a State of their own regard the State containing them as alien, and maintain a separate sense of national identity generally based upon a common culture, history, attachment to a particular territory and the explicit wish to rule themselves” (Guibernau, 2004, p.1254). A nation without a state is an independent community without a state based on its own nation. Typical examples are Scotland and Wales to Britain, Catalonia and the Basque Country to Spain, and Quebec to Canada, in which the communities fit the definition of the nation given their unique histories, languages, religions, cultures and customs as well as territories, and claims to autonomy, but do not have a state built based on a nation of their own (Keating, 1997).

According to the United Nations, only about 3% of the recognized ethnic and nationality

groups in the world have achieved statehood (Minahan, 2016), which means most states in the world are not single-nation states. For the multi-nation states, the potential threat of "stateless nations" seeking independence has made nation-building a high priority on the authorities' political agenda. Even for the single-nation states, nationalism is also listed in the authorities' efforts since it can make the regimes sturdier. Education plays an essential role in nation building as a powerful tool to propagandize and cultivate national consciousness and sentiment.

Nation building through school education

Educational institutions, particularly schools, are critical sites where national curricula are implemented in order to construct national identity. Some studies have highlighted the role of school and national education in creating national consciousness and the potential/use for intensifying or relaxing political conflicts amongst the nations (Apple, 2003; Durrani & Dunne, 2010; Leach, 2007; Tormey, 2006). Children's mental and emotional susceptibility during school years, which Jenks (2005, p.11) calls a period of "structured becoming", affords the ideologue a primal bedrock for cultivating national feelings. These feelings are discursively constructed "through [the] processes of imaginative ideological labor" (Eley & Suny, 1996, p.8) and are situated in the historicity of socio-political milieus. De Cillia et al. (1999, p.156) maintained that "it is largely through its schools and education system that the state shapes ... national common sense". Hence, the study of these critical years in Hong Kong's history as a means to understand (national) identity construction is of fundamental importance.

An essential part of nation-building is to shape a nation's shared memory (Podeh, 2000, p.65). The school is the primary social institution for transmitting the official discourse and national narratives of the past and is even a part of the state machinery under the authoritarian system.

In both democracies and non-democracies, all nation-states focus on teaching their national history to unite the individual and the state (E. A. Cole & Barsalou, 2006; L. Hein & Selden, 2000; Podeh, 2000). As the primary carrier of educational content, the textbooks have no comparable social instruments for transmitting the unified official ideology (Mehlinger, 1985). Therefore, education and curriculum reform has become an essential means of nation-building in various countries and regions.

- Singapore: Experiences of a hybrid regime

Building a national identity has been a top priority for the Singapore Government since Singapore became independent in 1965. As part of this process, the national education system plays a vital role in the socialization of students as future citizens. The educational administration authority of Singapore is highly centralized in the Ministry of Education (MOE) and political leaders who often wield direct influence over the citizenship education programmes (C. Han, 2000; Koh, 2002). Therefore, the citizenship education of Singapore is mainly subject to political leaders' wills and serves political purposes (Sim & Print, 2005).

From its attainment of self-government in 1959 until 1976 after its separation from Malaysia in 1965, Singapore promoted citizenship education taught initially as Ethics, and later as Civics at the lower secondary school level (Ong & Singapore Moral Education Committee, 1979). Civics aims to foster a sense of social and civic responsibility, and love for the country and people (Chew, 1998; Ong & Singapore Moral Education Committee, 1979). Since 1967, a series of citizenship education programmes with different themes was launched in succession, from the "Education for Living" in the 1970s and religious knowledge in the 1980s to the "shared values and the introduction of Civics and Moral Education" in the early 1990s - and the list goes on and on. These citizenship education programmes were designed to regulate students' behaviour, cultivate their understanding of the history and current

situation of the country, and teach them to devote themselves to nation-building and development (Sim & Print, 2005). However, independent and critical thinking, which are essential to citizenship education in a democracy, are not reflected in citizenship education in Singapore (M. N. C. Han, 1997). To understand the Singapore approach better, it is useful to consider an example, such as the National Education programme launched in 1997.

In 1997, Singapore's Deputy Prime Minister, Lee Hsien Loong, citing young people's lack of understanding of the country's history, launched the National Education programme, which significantly promoted the development of civic education in Singapore. The explicit goal of this national education was "to develop national cohesion, the instinct for survival and confidence in the future" (H. L. Lee, 1997), with the aim of socializing young people and forming an ideal set of attitudes and values (Tan, 1998). These values included patriotism, loyalty and the will to defend the country.

All teachers in Singapore were required to "infuse" the National Education information into the formal curriculum. The press and television widely covered issues relating to national education and Singapore's history. At the cost of \$10 million, the Government produced and displayed a multimedia exhibition of Singapore's history to attract young students and the whole community.

- Russia: experiences from an authoritarian/hybrid regime

As an authoritarian regime, Russia has had many nations under its state since it inherited the political heritage of the former Soviet Union. In the middle and late 1980s in the former Soviet Union, the education under the leadership of President Gorbachev's Government had begun to liberalize and to carry out the idea of democratization. Then the educational field became an experimental place for democracy. For example, some education management

power was devolved to schools, and respect for minority cultures and "universal human values" were advocated. In the early 1990s, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Government of the Russian Federation, led by President Yeltsin, continued to promote human rights and legal education in school curricula, but on the other hand, re-emphasized solidarity and loyalty to the state. In this, there was a certain contradiction in culturing citizens and patriots at the same time (Janmaat & Piattoeva, 2007; Piattoeva, 2005). Then, by the time of President Putin after 1999, the status of nation-building and patriotism education had been further enhanced (Janmaat & Piattoeva, 2007; Piattoeva, 2005; Zajda, 2012).

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1992, the newly established Government of the Russian Federation promulgated its first bill, the Education Act, which stated that humanitarian character and the priority of universal human values was the primary principle of State education policy, along with protecting the educational rights and interests of ethnic minorities and using their own languages for teaching. Nevertheless, the bill also stated that Russian should be taught in all state-licensed schools except pre-school (Zamyatin, 2012). Although the federal curricula promulgated in 1993 declared Russian to be a federal language that needs to be taught in all schools, it is up to the regions and schools to decide at their discretion (Zamyatin, 2012). Legal education received sufficient attention during 1994 and 1999, emphasising the study of the Constitution, elections and human rights. For example, the two circulars issued by the Ministry of Education in 1995 and 1996, *On Citizenship Education and the Study of the Constitution of the Russian Federation* and *On Citizenship and Legal Education of Students in Comprehensive Schools of the Russian Federation*, both emphasized the importance of legal education.

In the mid-1990s, Moscow's elite was concerned that it would move from cultural renaissance to political independence, given the nation-building attempts by some of the

country's ethnic minorities (Tishkov, 1997). While carrying out aspects of democratic education such as the rule of law, the Russian government gradually emphasised unifying national ideology. Although *The Development Strategy of Historical and Social Science Education in Comprehensive Schools*, promulgated in 1994, emphasized the education of ethnic, national and universal values, it prioritized Russian national values.

Based on the concerns about national unity, the Putin administration placed greater emphasis on the importance of patriotic education from the late 1990s. In 1999, the Ministry of Education implemented *The Upbringing Development Programme, 1999/2001* and this was followed by another programme for 2002/2004, by which citizenship and patriotic education became one of the main objectives of the national education policy. In addition, the Russian language received further attention by increasing the number of Russian hours in secondary schools and promoting the teaching of national symbols (Janmaat & Piattoeva, 2007). In particular, the implementation of *The State Program of Patriotic Education* in 2001 and subsequently *The Concept of Patriotic Upbringing* in 2003 clarified the importance of patriotic education. Clearly, it emphasized the cultivation of love and dedication to the Fatherland, which elevated this patriotism towards Russia above the "minor Motherland". All of the approaches focused on Russia's unified national identity. Resources from the Government supported patriotic education projects while democratic education continued simultaneously (Janmaat & Piattoeva, 2007).

Although the Government of the Russian Federation initiated democratic reforms and respect for ethnic minorities, it has shifted gradually in favour of the nation-building process since the mid-1990s. Furthermore, education plays a different and vital role in this process with the change of policy.

- France: experiences from a democratic regime

Civic education has played an essential role in the integration of different groups and ethnicities into a unified Republican national culture in France, by instilling universal values such as the concept of liberty, equality, fraternity and human rights to young people from different family backgrounds and integrating this diverse population (Osler & Starkey, 2001; Starkey, 2000). The school is the Republic's primary institution for socializing its citizens. Students from different backgrounds have a consistent understanding of the rights and obligations as citizens through the indoctrination of the school curriculum and participate in social practice based on understanding the concepts of democracy and the republic.

French civic education can be traced back to the Third Republic of the 19th century (Starkey, 2000). In order to consolidate its democratic institutions, the Third Republic began to attach importance to civic education at the beginning of its establishment (Lemaire, 2009). It even prioritized civic and moral instruction over reading, writing, and literature in the first *Compulsory Primary Education Curriculum Statement* published in Article 1 of the *Jules Ferry Law of March 28, 1882* (Osler & Starkey, 2001). Since 1981, the new Socialist government has been committed to reformulating civic education and explicitly supporting human rights education, and in 1985 detailed official instructions, study projects and time schedules were published by ministerial decree. In 1996, the right-wing Government of the time put forward an official decree which linked civic education with the overall goal of running a school for secondary education. Officials believed that civic education in schools should unify social culture and look at the differences between ethnic groups based on the Republican idea of civic equality. The school itself should become a Republican site where everyone is equal to feel the idea of the Republic for themselves. For example, class councils are elected within the school following democratic principles, regardless of the actual nationality of the students, even if they do not have the right to vote in France (Starkey, 2000).

According to the guidelines published in 1999, moving from the near and concrete to the general and the abstract, the syllabus for the four-year lower secondary school introduced the concepts of citizenship step by step, from “the individual contrasted with the citizen” to “equality, solidarity, security”, to “freedoms, rights and justice” and finally to “the citizen and the republic”. The study of the French constitution and international human rights texts is emphasised. The national symbols of France, such as the Phrygian hat, the national day (14 July), Marianne (personification of the Republic), the flag, the national motto, and the national anthem are taught for nationalism (Osler & Starkey, 2009). The syllabus, based on advocating the basic principles of the Republic, does not shy away from citizens' possible objections to the regime and even advocates action such as strikes and demonstrations for civic movements (Starkey, 2000).

In the light of the above, France has a long tradition of using civic education to consolidate democracy which can be traced to the Third Republic of the 19th century. The civic education in France focuses mainly on the indoctrination of universal values such as freedom, equality, fraternity, and human rights, by which the different ideas of various ethnic groups can be integrated with the concept of democracy and republic to achieve national unity.

As can be inferred from the cases above, regardless of its position on the political spectrum from democracy to autocracy, the regime needs a nation-building project to carry out its will. At the same time, nation-building is an ongoing process since the states in which there are always new community members joining are also confronting changing situations in the world.

2.2 The origins of Chinese nation-building

According to the official narrative of the PRC, China's imperial era can be traced back to

more than 2000 years ago as Qin Shihuang (秦始皇) integrated the six Kingdoms (221 BC) into one unified empire. However, China did not start to build a nation-state in the western sense until the end of the 19th century (Ge, 2018; Zhao, 2004). Before that, China was not a nation-state in the modern sense, given that it did not have the consciousness of nation or nationalism (Hsü, 1960). The concept of nationalism did not exist in traditional China. Instead, focusing on the "loyalty" of the ruled culturalism was the ideological means the imperial power adopted to educate the people. The most famous is Confucianism, which has been revered by imperial powers since Emperor Wu of the Han Dynasty (漢武帝) (157-87 BC), advocating the concept of hierarchy and allegiance. In addition, the "Central Plains Civilization" (中原文明), which is also constituted by the cultural system of Confucianism, held itself to be the only centre of civilization in the whole world and "all under heaven" (天下) to enlighten and absorb the "barbarians" (蠻夷) around it. The places or people willing to accept Central Plains civilization, such as Mongolia and Manchuria in northern China, were brought within its cultural boundaries. This created a kind of culturalist territory extending from the centre to the periphery, rather than the well-defined and (often) strictly guarded geographical territories of nations nowadays. Therefore, the traditional Chinese practise is mainly "cosmopolitanism" (天下主義) or "culturalism" (文化主義), rather than "nationalism" (Ge, 2018). Even China had no country name until the early 20th century, when Liang Qichao pointed out this problem and gave the name "Zhongguo" (中國) (Liang, 1989). However, other scholars argued that China had always been an "unconscious nation" (自在的民族) and became a "self-conscious national entity" (自覺的民族實體) (Fei, 1989) in the one century of conflicts between the late Qing Dynasty and the west.

However, it should be kept in mind that the narrative of nationalism, described above, is

backed by a Han Nation-centred theme based on the idea of Han people holding the prerogative of narrating history. It is not the point here to debate the “theme” issue, but to keep moving to the discussion of nationalism being woken and constructed since the Qing Dynasty.

In the 17th century, the Manchu established their regime in China and further expanded its territory so that different nationalities (Manchu, Han, Mongol, Hui and Tibetan) were brought under a single governing system, forming a loose entity similar to a multi-nation (or rather multi-ethnic). The meeting of China's Emperor Qianlong (1711-1799), of the Qing Dynasty, with Britain's mission headed by George Macartney in 1793 might have been the first formal contact between China and the western nation-states and gave China's rulers access to another civilized system that claimed to be on an equal footing with them. Many decades later, the failure of the Opium War (the Opium War included the First Opium War (1839-1842) and the Second Opium War (1856–1860), both of which ended with defeats of Qing) in the late Qing Dynasty, especially the Sino-Japanese War in 1895, finally changed the traditional Chinese concept of "cosmopolitanism" and began to shift to the concept of "nationality" (Zhao, 2004, p.17).

The Manchu dynasty finally, officially ended its rule in 1912 after suffering several kinds of nationalist struggle. This empire, composed of different ethnicities, after different regime changes such as the Beiyang Government, the Republic of China and now the People's Republic of China, still almost wholly maintains its multi-ethnic pattern and has formed into an almost complete and unified multi-nation state. It is quite unique in the evolution of the nation-state, since other multi-ethnic empires that have undergone regime changes, such as the Ottoman Empire, tend to split into separate and relatively homogeneous nation-states or single-nation states. It went through a series of unique Chinese nationalist education

processes in China, from the Qing Dynasty to the People's Republic of China.

2.3 Clash of two brands of Chinese nationalism in the late-Qing period

In the late Qing Dynasty of the 19th century, the Chinese elite and intellectuals were disturbed by the weakness and incompetence of the Qing government and China in conflicts with other countries. Particularly when the Qing government was defeated in the Opium War in the 1840s, they had to admit the equal status of the "countries out of the civilized world" (化外之地) and that China was not the only centre of civilization in the world. However, the national elite attributed the failure to the "strong ships and artillery" (船堅炮利) of the west, so they launched the "Westernization Movement" (洋務運動) to develop science and technology and military industries. However, they still adhered to the idea of "Chinese-style Westernization" (中學為體，西學為用) and continued to uphold the superiority of Chinese culture. The failure of the Sino-Japanese war in 1895 shocked the Chinese cultural elite to observe how powerful the small countries that had long been seen as objects of China could be. China's view of "cosmopolitanism" was shaken. And then, the idea of "Chinese-style Westernization" was discarded. China looked for answers and methods from the west, so the idea of "nation-state" began to spread, such as the basic concept of territorial awareness, national equality. The construction of a modern "nation-state" has become necessary to unite the people, seek development, and resist foreign enemies.

The "loose sand" (一盤散沙) of the Chinese people has become a thorny problem in urgent need of improvement. Therefore, the establishment of a Nation-State based on Nationalism has been listed on the agenda following the example of the western countries and neighbouring Japan.

Liang Qichao: Chinese Nation

At that time, Liang Qichao, a famous scholar and reformer, put forward the concept of the "Chinese nation" (中華民族) (Liang, 1900). Liang called the nationalism with single nation/ethnic "narrow nationalism" (小民族主義) and the nationalism of the unity of all nationalities in the territory of the Qing Dynasty as "broad nationalism" (大民族主義) (Fitzgerald, 1995). Liang acknowledged the original differences and pluralistic phenomena among various historical and cultural groups in China, but at the same time, he was happy to see the trend of their integration. He hoped to build a nation like the United States and become a great nation without discrimination in the future. Liang expected that, under the concept of the "Chinese nation", different ethnic groups within China would be integrated and united to avoid separatism.

Sun Yat-sen: Han Nation

Sun Yat-sen, as a revolutionary, believes that the modern world is an era of nationalism on which all modern countries are based. Britain's dominance of the world stems from its Anglo-Saxon nationalism. The rise of Japan in East Asia is also inseparable from its Yamato nationalism. In contrast to Britain and Japan, the decline of China was due to the lack of nationalism. Sun thought the autocracy of the Manchu regime was the main reason why China was poor and weak, so he put forward the idea of "expelling the Manchu and restoring the Chinese nation" (驅除韃虜，恢復中華) in an attempt to overthrow the Manchu regime to establish a single Han nation-state. However, in order to inherit completely the territory of the Qing Dynasty, which included different ethnic groups, after the success of the 1911 revolution, Sun Yat-sen changed the concept of a mono-nation state to "five races under one union" (五族共和) in order to unify different ethnic groups such as Manchu, Han, Mongolian, Hui and Tibetan.

The main driving force of the transformation of the revolutionaries, represented by Sun Yat-sen, from a single nationality to multi-ethnic integration lay in the maintenance of territorial integrity, that is to say, the entire inheritance of the territory of the Qing Course (Leibold, 2007).

- Ethnic minority areas accounted for more than 60 per cent of the territory of the Qing Dynasty that contained rich natural resources, making it impossible for the newly established Republican Government to accept the consequences of abandoning this large area.
- The enthusiasm of the people for maintaining the integrity of the territory of the Qing Dynasty also forced the new Government to make even ostensible efforts to maintain the national territorial integrity and unity to enhance its legitimacy in power. In 1912, with the Qing government stepping down after the Revolution of 1911, Outer Mongolia became independent with the support of tsarist Russia, which ignited the anger of the Chinese people at home and abroad. Therefore, those in power must make a gesture of safeguarding national and territorial integrity (Leibold, 2007, p.40).
- The interference of foreign forces in the border areas endangered the interests of China's ruling government. In addition to the independence of Outer Mongolia with the support of tsarist Russia, Tibet, with the support of Britain, also declared its secession from the Republic Government. In addition, Japan also asked the Yuan Shikai Government to take over Germany's interests in Shandong, China. The series of events touched the nerves of those in power and the general public so that the maintenance of unity among the various ethnic groups had to be emphasized to maintain stability in the border areas.

2.4 Chinese nation-building under the KMT regime (1911-1949)

After the fall of the Qing government in 1912 and until the establishment of the PRC in 1949, the political situation in China was not stable, and the work of the Chinese nationalist education could not be implemented fully and deeply. Before the Kuomintang (KMT), headed by Chiang Kai-shek, roughly reunified the northern warlords in 1927, China did not have a robust central government wherein the local warlords ran their affairs. However, soon after that, Japan occupied the northeast of China in 1931 and then launched the war of aggression against China from 1937 until 1945. However, immediately, the civil war between the KMT and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) broke out and ended until 1949 with the retreat of the Kuomintang from Mainland China. Therefore, in the 30 years from the fall of the Qing government to the establishment of the PRC, the Chinese Government was not able to implement the Chinese nationalist education project effectively. However, the Central Government and social groups still launched the Chinese nationalist education campaign to a limited extent.

From the mid-1910s to the 1920s, the cultural and literary innovation movements with the theme of "anti-tradition, anti-Confucianism, anti-classical Chinese" were launched by western-educated cultural elites such as Chen Duxiu, Li Dazhao, Cai Yuanpei, Lu Xun and Hu Shi. This was called the "New Culture Movement" (新文化運動) (Ouyang, 2016). Those in Chinese intellectual circles abandoned the self-centred cultural view and actively advocated the western (European) culture, especially democracy and science. The "New Culture Movement" clearly criticized and reflected on the traditional Chinese culture and thought represented by Confucianism, put away the traditional view of "all under heaven" (天下) and placed the Chinese nation among the various national groups in the world rather than regarding itself as a unique Confucian cultural community.

It was mentioned earlier that Sun Yat-sen advocated the establishment of a Han nation-state before the 1911 revolution, but he turned to the integration and reunification of all ethnic groups after the victory of the revolution. Sun intended to integrate the Han nationality with the ethnic minorities in order to establish a “great unitary nation-state” (大一統的國家). Chiang Kai-shek, Sun's successor, followed in his footsteps of national integration. Chiang even believed that all ethnic minorities are the large and small branches (大小宗支) under the same blood system (血統) so they belong to the same nation (Chiang, 1947). Therefore, during the Kuomintang rule, the Chinese nationalist education route was mainly through national integration and assimilation to integrate different ethnicities into the same (Chinese) nation. However, this integration and assimilation was essentially a plan centred on the Han nationality, and Chiang even proposed to "Sinicize" (漢化) all ethnic groups to achieve national unity (Chiang, 1947). This national unity plan led to many boycotts and conflicts from ethnic minorities because they felt their particularities were being ignored (Zhao, 2004, p.172).

2.5 Chinese nation-building under the CCP state (1949 – present)

Today, China is a multi-ethnic country united under the "Chinese nation" while granting certain autonomy to minority areas. Based on its multi-ethnic composition, China's national identity is not based on a strict racial basis but instead on a state of inter-ethnic "republic" or civic loyalty.

In addition to the majority group, the Han people, there are 55 ethnic minorities (identified by the PRC), including Manchu, Mongolian, Hui, Tibetan and Uygur. Several of the major ethnic minorities have their own languages. Dialects vary from place to place, and there are also different religious beliefs, including Christianity, Islam and Buddhism. It is a vast

Chinese nationalist education project to build a unified multi-nation state from these diversities.

Mao Zedong: "Victor" narrative in the class struggle

The first stage of Chinese nationalist education after the establishment of the PRC in Mao Zedong's time was the narrative of the "victor", in which socialism overthrows feudalism and capitalism, the proletariat conquers the bourgeoisie, the Chinese people defeat imperialism and so on (Gries, 1999). "The Chinese people have stood up" was the central theme of the propaganda. The CCP did not realize the role of nationalism (Zhao, 1998) during this phase. Instead, the necessary form of expression of Chinese nationalist education was the class struggle and socialist transformation to pursue a utopia of "egalitarianism". All the people, regardless of nationality, were brought into this tremendous political movement (Fitzgerald, 1995). Materialistic ideology replaced various religious beliefs, Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong thought replaced the position of traditional Chinese culture, and Confucianism was denied and criticized. In particular, the "Cultural Revolution", which lasted for ten years from the end of the 1960s, caused the Chinese society to fall into chaos and the communist ideal encountered the belief crisis.

Deng Xiaoping: Pragmatism and Nationalism

In the late 1970s, with the end of the Cultural Revolution and the abandonment of the communist ideals of the Mao Zedong era, the CCP leaders, with Deng Xiaoping at the helm, began to take a pragmatic road, carrying out reform and opening up, and economic development became the official theme. The disappointing Marxism-Leninism had to give way to *nationalism*, that is, the Chinese Nation, in order to maintain the relationships among all ethnic groups. The patriotism was moulded into a kind of glorious national tradition. The

authority spared no effort to demonstrate the correctness of the socialist road, the inevitability of the CCP to safeguard the nation-state and the necessity of maintaining a stable political order for economic development.

The market economy and the western liberal democratic trend of thought gradually corroded the communist ideology, and the ruling legitimacy of the Communist Party also began to be questioned gradually. Furthermore, a series of social problems, such as corruption, high inflation and unemployment rates, finally led to a social movement led by university students in the spring of 1989 that eventually suffered a violent crackdown called the *June 4th incident* (X. Deng, 1993, 2004). The CCP leader at that time, Deng Xiaoping, criticized the disturbance and argued that the foremost reason for this movement was that the authority “did not persist in doing ideological and political work well”, and that “our biggest mistakes are in education, we did not have enough education for kids and young students” (Deng, 1993, p.327).

The 4 June event and the disintegration of the Soviet Union sounded the alarm to the CCP to put the prevention of "bourgeois liberalization" on the agenda again. The concept that "The imperialists will never perish in their desire to destroy us" had begun to be instilled in the public consciousness. China's experience in the past century has been described as a humiliating history of being bullied by imperialists to alert people to guard against the destruction and peaceful evolution of external hostile forces. While deepening reform and opening up and developing the economy, it also needed to pay close attention to ideological and political education. Therefore, the integration of patriotism into socialism became the guiding idea of education. It should not only "rejuvenate the country through science

education", but also stick to patriotism and adhere to the "four Cardinal principles"⁴ (adhere to the socialist road, people's democratic dictatorship, the leadership of the CCP, and Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong thought) (Hughes, 2009).

Then the (Chinese) nationalism was rediscovered when communist ideals and ideologies failed, and "patriotism" became the new theme of political propaganda.

Jiang Zemin: "victim" narrative in Patriotic Education Campaign

Jiang Zemin, who was hand-picked by Deng Xiaoping as the state leader, inherited his predecessors' legacy of nationalism and patriotism education. Chinese officials launched a nationwide "patriotic education campaign" for young people in 1991 (Z. Wang, 2017; Zhao, 1998). After the subversive June 4th incident in 1989, the focus of the Chinese nationalist education shifted to the narrative of the "one century of national humiliation" (百年國恥) from the mid-1800s to mid-1900s when China was attacked and bullied by imperialists, emphasizing the humiliation and oppression suffered by the Chinese nation in modern history (Z. Wang, 2017). The narrative of "victor" switched to "victim". This narrative ascribes China's social problems at the time due to foreign aggression and oppression. The CCP, on the other hand, was regarded as the leader of the Chinese nation in resisting foreign enemies, and the people were encouraged to unite against foreign countries. China's traditional Confucian culture, which was criticized before, was once again venerated, and the "Chinese nation" was traced back to the common distant past. Through its comprehensive and extensive Chinese nationalist education project, it attempted to shape a unified multiple-

⁴ The "four Cardinal principles" were first put forward by Deng Xiaoping in 1979 and re-emphasized during the "southern tour" in 1992.

nation state.

In 1991, the Publicity Department of the CCP Central Committee issued the *Circular on Making Full Use of Cultural Relics to Educate in Patriotism and Revolutionary Traditions* (Ministry of Education, 1991), which was the first official document on patriotic education. However, it was not until 1992 that it began to be implemented fully, after Deng Xiaoping's southern tour. Since the CCP regime has a solid and deep control network and power in China, along with its policy documents, is often delivered with the same force as formal laws and regulations, thus mobilizing all relevant departments and agencies from the top down. Moreover, all public education institutions in China, from kindergartens to universities, are under the control of the CCP, and the state runs even the vast majority of primary and secondary schools and universities. As a result, the policies and decisions of the party committees can be implemented effectively and promptly.

The *Outline of Education Reform and Development in China* in February 1993 took patriotism as the guiding principle of China's educational reform (CCCPC & The State Council, 1993). In November, the Publicity Department of the CCP Central Committee (PDoCCPCC), the State Education Commission (SEC), the Ministry of Radio, Film and Television (MoRFT), and the Ministry of Culture (MoC) jointly issued the *Notice on the Education of Patriotic Movie and Television Work in Primary and Secondary Schools Across the Country*. This *Notice* required all primary and secondary schools to arrange for students to watch designated patriotic educational films and videos to promote "understanding of history and national conditions" and to "stimulate patriotic feelings and aspirations" (PDoCCPCC et al., 1993).

In June 1994, a national education conference adopted a document entitled *Guidelines for Patriotic Education*, which was distributed to all educational institutions, from kindergartens

to universities. The most important feature of this policy was that it replaced the old Marxist indoctrination with the patriotic theme. On 6 September 1994, the *Outline for the Implementation of Patriotic Education*, drafted by the Publicity Department of the CCP Central Committee and published by "People's Daily", set off a climax of the patriotic education movement. The *Outline* clearly set forth a series of goals for patriotic education, including

"invigorating the national spirit, enhancing national cohesion, building up national pride, and consolidating and developing the broadest patriotic united front, the patriotic enthusiasm of the masses should be directed and condensed to the great cause of building socialism with Chinese characteristics and to making contributions to the reunification, prosperity, and strength of the motherland".

For young people, in particular, the *Outline* called for the inclusion of patriotic education in all school curricula from kindergarten to university.

In 1995, on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the victory of the War of Resistance against Japan, the CCP leaders organized a wide range of activities to publicize the major theme of the patriotic education movement. According to official reports, there were more than 10,000 official and various celebrations to celebrate the victory. From July to September, Jiang Zemin and other senior party leaders took part in 17 such events (Zhao, 2004). The upcoming return of Hong Kong in 1997 was primarily a significant event in promoting the rise of China and arousing patriotic enthusiasm.

As the campaign was targeting young people, all schools were required to use their classrooms as platforms to cultivate patriotism and inculcate patriotic views in their curricula. Each school also added a new general education course, "National Conditions "(國情), as a

requirement parallel to the two major political education courses of Marxist Theory and Ideological and Political education. The education of "National Conditions" mainly introduced the realistic problems of China, and its historical roots emphasized "Chinese characteristics", thus negating the appropriateness of western thought such as democracy and freedom. In addition, China's problems were attributed mainly to obstruction and suppression by hostile international forces, and it was only by uniting around the CCP Central Committee that these oppressors could be resisted.

In order to create a social atmosphere conducive to patriotic education, all tourist attractions, such as museums, memorials, historical (especially revolutionary) sites, heritage reserves, popular architectural sites and even local community centres, were asked to stand up as patriots. Many historical sites were designated as "patriotic education bases", such as the Northeast region, where atrocities were suffered from the Japanese invaders during the Anti-Japanese War. Students attending the course "National conditions" were organized to visit these historical sites and various museums related to the course, such as the Museum of Revolutionary Martyrs. The National Flag Law, passed in 1990, was also highlighted in the "Outline". This decreed that, to cultivate patriotism, the primary and secondary schools and universities should hold flag-raising ceremonies on important occasions such as the opening of the school year, graduation, and the National Day.

The two main themes of this patriotic education campaign were "China's long history" and "national unity and territorial integrity" (Zhao, 1998). The history of the Chinese nation can be traced back to the legendary ancient tribal leaders, the Yan and Yellow Emperor, who unified all Chinese people under the concept of "Descendants of the Yan and Yellow Emperor" (炎黃子孫) and established common historical and cultural ties among all ethnic groups with a vague "theory of lineage". The National Unity, as a theme against Ethnic

Nationalism, maintains the unity of the various ethnic minorities. In order to conform to this request, this "campaign" specially aimed at the minority nationality areas, especially Tibet and Xinjiang, in which some special requests and the adjustment had been made, such as the inclusion of minority heroes in the compilation of textbooks to balance the relationship with the Han nationality. The officials emphasised that patriotism is not "narrow nationalism". The "territorial integrity" is used to oppose all forms of separatism, including several border areas and Taiwan.

Hu Jintao: Patriotism as moral code and national spirit

The patriotic education was brought to the fourth generation leadership alongside the political power passed to General Secretary (President) Hu Jintao in 2002. He continued the patriotic education line of his predecessor and further sublimated it from a personal moral code to the height of the Chinese national spirit.

In 2002, the 16th CCP National Congress proposed to "carry forward the national spirit" (弘揚民族精神), which emphasised that "...the Chinese nation has formed a great national spirit of unity, peace-loving, diligence and courage, and continuous self-improvement with patriotism as the core" (Z. Jiang, 2002). Patriotism education continues to play an essential role in "carrying forward the national spirit". "...we must take the promotion and cultivation of the national spirit as a crucial task of cultural construction and incorporate it into the whole process of national education" (Z. Jiang, 2002).

In February 2004, following the guideline of the "carry forward the national spirit", the CCP Central Committee and the State Council promulgated *Some Opinions on Further Strengthening and Improving the Ideological and Moral Construction of Minors* (CCCPC & The State Council, 2004), which began by emphasizing that "strengthening and improving

the ideological and moral construction of minors is a major and urgent strategic task". It was considered necessary to "carry out in-depth education about patriotism, collectivism, socialism and the spirit of the Chinese nation...". And then, in March, in response to the "opinions", the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the CCP and the Ministry of Education jointly issued the *Implementation Outline of Education for Carrying Forward and Cultivating National Spirit in Primary and Middle Schools* (Propaganda Department of the CCCPC & Ministry of Education, 2004). The Outline required that the education about the national spirit should be infiltrated into all school subjects and the whole process of primary and secondary education by "holding high the banner of patriotism", in addition to continuing and enhancing the patriotic education campaign started in the early 1990s.

In 2006, Hu Jintao put forward the *Eight Honors and Eight Shames* (八榮八耻), officially titled the *Socialist Concept of Honour and Disgrace* (社會主義榮辱觀), emphasizing the need to educate the broad masses of cadres and people, especially young people (CCCPC, 2006; Y. Dong, 2006; Propaganda Department of the CCCPC & Ministry of Education, 2004). The first code of the eight is "Honour to those who love the motherland, and shame on those who harm the motherland", which sets patriotism as the foremost place. Then at the beginning of the sixth Plenary session of the 16th CCP Central Committee in 2006, "the national spirit with patriotism as the core" was written into the socialist system with Chinese characteristics as the guiding principle of Chinese nation-building (CCCPC, 2006).

The Hu Jintao government regards patriotism as the core of the "national spirit" and strives to regard it as the spiritual core of the entire Chinese nation and the moral requirements for each individual. The patriotic connotation of Hu Jintao's era is like that of his predecessor, which is still used to safeguard the legitimacy of the CCP regime, socialist road, national unity, and

other elements for building the Chinese nation.

Xi Jinping: “Chinese Dream” and Ideological campaign

Taking the helm of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 2012 and rising as the paramount leader of China, President Xi Jinping has launched the most extensive campaign in post-Mao China to champion an official ideology mixing communism, nationalism, and Leninism under the theme of the “Chinese Dream” (中國夢) (Zhao, 2016).

Xi Jinping delivered his first public speech on the Chinese Dream when he visited the exhibition "The Road to Revival" with the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CCP Central Committee at the National Museum of China. The exhibition shows the national experience from the First Opium War to present China, with particular emphasis on the history of "one century of national humiliation" from the First Opium War (1839-1842) to the end of the Sino-Japanese War in 1945 (Xinhua, 2012). President Xi then formally proposed the "Chinese Dream" in his speech at the first session of the 12th National people's Congress in 2013, at which he was elected president (Xi, 2013). In that speech, he stressed again the need to regard "great rejuvenation" as the fundamental concept of the "Chinese Dream".

The theme of the Chinese Dream is "Chinese Revival", which earlier Chinese political leaders such as Sun Yat-sen have often taken to support their legitimacy, encourage the spirit of nationalism and mobilize people to support social change (Z. Wang, 2014). In addition, similar to the era of Jiang Zemin, the exposition of "one century of national humiliation" is still used as the background of the dream of Chinese revival. Xi's Chinese Dream continues the tradition of CCP to provide a bright future for the people. It is all to make the Chinese people believe that only under the leadership of the CCP can the dream of a better life be realized. The Chinese Dream's promotion campaign can be said to be the renaming of a new

round of patriotic education activities.

To some extent, the goal of the Chinese Dream is to play the role of an adhesive, to bring people together (Z. Wang, 2014). President Xi said in his speech at the 2013 session of the National People's Congress, "We 1.3 billion Chinese people should bear in mind our mission, unite as one, and unite into an invincible force with wisdom and strength" (Xinhua, 2013). In addition, not as individualistic as the "American Dream" that emphasizes personal success through effort, the "Chinese Dream" is collectivist or nationalistic, giving priority to the whole country while encouraging citizens' dreams to "integrate into the cause of the nation and the state" (People's Daily Online, 2013). President Xi's exposition on the Chinese Dream explicitly or covertly resorts to a variety of resources to persuade people to enter the imagination of a common community that supports the rule of the CCP (J. Wang, 2017).

Chinese nationalism, similar to its predecessors, is still included in the ideological campaign because it has provided the most reliable claim on the Chinese people's loyalty and the values shared by both the regime and its critics. Chinese people with different political views are usually unified under Chinese nationalism. That is, they regard themselves as patriots and safeguard the interests and unity of the country (S. Wang, 2014). Xi Jinping's Government has been vigorously promoting the historical mission and goal of "national rejuvenation", safeguarding national interests and maintaining political stability and economic prosperity as its main basis of ruling legitimacy to unify dissidents under its command. Beyond that, Xi has stressed the importance of ideology to the legitimacy of government. Drawing on the historical lessons of the collapse of the regime in the former Soviet Union, Xi believes that it is necessary to strengthen the construction of ideology and put forward such concepts as "two

cannot be negated" (兩個不能否定)⁵, "four self-confidence" (四個自信)⁶, "four consciousness" (四個意識)⁷ and "two to be safeguarded" (兩個維護)⁸. This emphasizes the necessity for the current development path and the legitimacy of the CCP regime from the past to the present. The proposal of these ideas and their corresponding measures can be seen as an ideological campaign, with further tightening of speech control on television, mass media and internet platforms. Under this requirement, the tradition of patriotic education has continued in the Xi era, and more emphasis is placed on uniting all the Chinese people with "loving the Party" and "loving socialism" as the core.

On November 12, 2019, the CCP Central Committee and the State Council issued the *Implementation Outline of Patriotic Education in the New Era* (CCCPC & The State Council, 2019). In addition to continuing the patriotism education measures of the Jiang era, such as integrating patriotism into all walks of life, and building and making use of patriotism education bases, the *Outline* defines the core role of ideological construction more clearly. The "guiding ideology" at the beginning of the *Outline* emphasizes the need to "enhance the 'four consciousnesses', strengthen the 'four self-confidences', and achieve the 'two maintenances'", that is, to uphold the leadership of Xi and the CCP under his leadership and adhere to the socialist road. Moreover, the document pointed out that "the essence of

⁵ That is, "It cannot use the historical period after reform and opening up to negate the historical period before it, nor can we use the historical period before reform and opening up to negate the historical period after it."

⁶ That is, "self-confidence in the road, theory, system and culture of socialism with Chinese characteristics"

⁷ That is, "political consciousness, overall situation consciousness, core consciousness and alignment consciousness"

⁸ That is, "Resolutely safeguard General Secretary Xi Jinping's core position of the CCP Central Committee and the whole Party, and resolutely safeguard the authority of the CCP Central Committee and centralized and unified leadership."

patriotism is to adhere to a high degree of unity of patriotism, loving the party and loving socialism" to negate the abstract patriotism model of "loving the country but not the Party." In terms of nation-building, the *Outline* proposes to

"...constantly strengthen the recognition of the great Motherland, the Chinese nation, Chinese culture, the Communist Party of China and socialism with Chinese characteristics, resolutely safeguard national sovereignty, security and development interests, and take a clear-cut stand against attempts to split the country and undermine national unity."

It further emphasizes the need to unite all ethnic groups with the leadership of the CCP and unite into the nation-state under the "Chinese nation". Specifically, it is shown as a blow to opinions that are at odds with the official ideology in the higher education domain.

Higher education is usually a field with relatively free speech. In the eras of Deng, Jiang and Hu, colleges and universities could enjoy a little more freedom of thought and speech than other institutions. However, given the frequent criticism of the authorities in colleges and universities, Xi responded at the national higher education party-building conference in December 2014. Calling for "positive energy" and a "bright attitude" toward the party and state, Xi urged the party to enhance ideological guidance to turn universities into breeding grounds of Marxist studies: "Institutions of higher education should shoulder the important tasks of studying, researching and publicizing Marxism, as well as training builders and successors of the socialist cause with Chinese characteristics" (H. Dong, 2014).

On January 19, 2015, the CCP Central Committee and the State Council issued nationally circulated *Document 30*, which relayed Xi's speeches, demanding strengthened party control and cleansing western-inspired liberal ideas from universities. This document called for

establishing the “three identities” (theoretical, political, and emotional) in university teachers and students. Specific measures included the creation and standardization of textbooks on socialist theory and the strengthening of political training sessions for faculty. Greater focus was put on moulding the social sciences—journalism, law, economics, political science, sociology, and ethnic studies—to be politically correct (CCCPC & The State Council, 2015).


Yuan Guiren, the Minister of Education, then proposed two “reinforcements” at a speech on January 29, 2015: “reinforce the management of ideology in universities” and “reinforce the management of the use of western teaching materials”. He specifically called for enhancing the management of western textbooks in the original language as well as translated. He emphasized that “there is no way that universities can allow teaching materials preaching western values into our classrooms, nor should slanders and smears against party leaders and socialism be tolerated on campuses” (Liu, 2015). (After Yuan’s speech, the Ministry of Education started running checks on western teaching materials, sending a notice on March 3 to universities in Beijing and provincial education departments (Cao, 2015)).

The campaign had a chilling effect on Chinese academia: scholars self-censored or avoided specific topics altogether. Ideological vigilantes played a pivotal role in the downfall of some university professors. It can be heard from time to time that college teachers are punished for disobeying ideological construction, such as criticizing the authorities. Political loyalty became the top priority not only for professors but also for students. An instruction from the Ministry of Education on the management of 2016 master’s degree student admissions required universities to interview applicants who passed written exams for the first time, to find out whether they were politically qualified (Thepaper News, 2015).

2.6 The effects of patriotic education

Some scholars (Gries, 2004; Pyle, 2007; Zhao, 2004) believed that the campaign for patriotic education contributed significantly to the rise of nationalism in China in the 1990s. The promotion of this nationalist program has achieved relatively noticeable results in all walks of life. First, according to a global survey, China has one of the highest levels of popular nationalism in the world, scoring the highest (80/100) on a national identity survey (Figure 2-1) (W. Tang & Darr, 2012).

Figure 2-1. Nationalism: An international comparison



Note: Nationalism is an imputed factor index of four survey questions. The scale ranges from 0 to 100.

Source: National Identity Survey II, International Social Survey Programme, 2003, and 2008 China Survey (W. Tang & Darr, 2012).

Second, although the young people who have received higher education have a lower sense of national identity (Li & Liu, 2018; W. Tang & Darr, 2012) and the college students who have gone through patriotism education still maintain the critical patriots (Fairbrother, 2003),

during the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, the Chinese students studying at home and abroad spontaneously launched a protest against the negative comments about China in the western media (L. Yang & Zheng, 2012), evidence to support the effectiveness of the patriotic education movement in China since the 1990s (Z. Wang, 2008). More importantly, the differences in national identity or patriotism between higher education groups and non-higher education groups may suggest the effectiveness of primary school education, which is the leading carrier of patriotism education.

2.7 The unfinished journey of Chinese nation-building

Following the regime of the Qing Dynasty, the Republic of China (ROC) Government claimed authority over all the territory of the Qing Empire in the 18th century. In fact, until the 1920s, Chiang Kai-shek's Government failed to have complete control over Xinjiang and other peripheral regions throughout the ROC regime in Mainland China (Hung, 2016). In 1949, the CCP replaced the Kuomintang (KMT) to establish the PRC in the mainland. Then they gave up the concept of federalism before the establishment of the Government because the "situation had fundamentally changed" (Y. Chen, 2009) and brought the ethnic minority areas under the central regime (Mullaney, 2011). However, there are still challenges in promoting Chinese nation-building, which has struggled to build a unified Chinese nation-state in regions with significant ethnic differences. Even in Hong Kong, where there seems to be no ethnic difference, there are many contradictions.

CCP China's nationalism didn't combine tradition with modern times, there was scholar argued that China still does not have real modern nationalism as the basis of Chinese nationalist education (Pye, 1993). Since the early 20th century, China had ever rejected the traditional culture (e.g. the New Cultural Movement) and the integration of China and the west (e.g. despised the East-meets-West culture that originated in the treaty ports of China),

but it failed to find a path of local nationalism with the combination of tradition and modern times (Pye, 1993). CCP China's class struggle model died down after the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution. After experiencing the flow of free thought in the 1980s, the ideological education based on Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong thought faded gradually, and the CCP regime turned to nationalism to or even equated it with patriotism and loyalty to the Communist Party. For example, filial nationalism fosters youth's unconditional loyalty to their country by emphasizing the filial duty of children to their families and parents (V. Fong, 2004). However, this patriotic and party-style nationalism has many defects.

First, the notion of "patriotism" is relatively vague since it does not provide a clear concept of "country", whether state, national or ethnic. Even in post-1949 China, the Han regime, which occupies a strong position, still has some confusion and ambiguity about how to deal with the history of ethnic minorities, which can be seen from how the middle school history textbooks define the concept of "China". How do middle school history textbooks describe the historical conflict between the Han regime in the Central Plains and the ethnic minorities under the current CCP regime rule, that is to say, whether the Xiongnu, Qidan, Nuzhen and other ethnic minorities belonged to China in history? There is some vagueness and even some contradiction in textbooks in dealing with this problem. On one hand, to safeguard the unity and integrity of all ethnic groups in the current territory, the textbook discusses the history of ethnic minorities with *jus soli* logic since they belong to China now. On the other hand, *jus sanguinis* logic highlights the internal unity and superiority of the Han nation, which accounts for the absolute majority (Lu, 2017).

Second, there are also some risks associated with the emphasis on "loving the party". Since the Cultural Revolution, the CCP has mainly taken China's economic development achievements under its leadership as the basis of its ruling legitimacy. However, with the

speed of economic development having slowed down in recent years, some social problems brought about by the previous rapid economic development, such as the gap between the rich and the poor (especially those in the backward ethnic minority areas), have challenged the legitimacy. Maintaining the identity of the Chinese nation in all ethnic groups in China may require a more solid nationalist foundation and a more effective path and model of Chinese nation-building.

The setbacks of the Chinese nation-building in Hong Kong are also part of its unfinished enterprise in China. Based on 150 years of colonial history and different understandings of nation, nationalism and national identity, many Hong Kong people disagree with the concept and measures of Chinese nation-building. The ethnic discourse of *jus soli* seems to be less potent for Hong Kong, with its history as a colony under the British regime from 1842 to 1997. Hong Kong distanced itself from Mainland China during colonial rule, especially in the turbulent decades after the establishment of the PRC (such as the *Great Famine* and *Cultural Revolution* during the 1950s-1970s). Coupled with the Hong Kong people's vagueness about and indifference to their national identity and the particularity of the "one country, two systems" model that was established after the reunification, there is still a need for adjustments if the people are to adopt a particular national identity. In addition, the argument on economic development as the legitimacy of governance seems to have limited appeal to Hong Kong, a developed economic entity. Furthermore, unconditional patriotism and even love for the Party also pose difficulties for Hong Kong people who have had freedom and advocated critical thinking for a long time.

The seemingly simple but contradictory problem of Chinese nation-building in Hong Kong will be discussed in detail in the next chapter.

Chapter 3

Research Question:

Chinese nation-building project in Hong Kong and its failure

“The majority of Hong Kong people have felt little sense of national belonging: China has been their cultural home, but also a dictatorship from which many in Hong Kong once fled; and Great Britain was felt as no home for most, but only a distant colonizer.” (Mathews et al., 2008, prologue)

Since the signing of the Treaty of Nanking in 1842 and other subsequent treaties, Hong Kong Island, Kowloon and the New Territories were all ceded or leased to Britain. Hong Kong was separated politically from China, but it continued to maintain close ties with the mainland culturally, economically and socially. In the century from the 1840s-1940s, people were free to come and go between China and Hong Kong, and they shared the same economic, cultural and social links. However, since a checkpoint between China and Hong Kong was established in the 1950s, the two places were increasingly alienated in economic, cultural and social exchanges. The contrast between the communist movement of the 1950s-1970s in the mainland and the capitalist construction in Hong Kong has also caused the social habits and economic development of the two places to deviate gradually from each other (S. Tsang, 2003). The colonial Government's discursive and institutional immigration practice also contributed to the boundaries and distinctions between Hong Kong people and others, which helped establish the indigenous identity of Hong Kong (Ku, 2004). On the other hand, the Chinese in Hong Kong also need a solid common identity to distinguish themselves from the "others", represented by the colonial rulers, so the traditional Chinese culture then became the identity of the Chinese in Hong Kong.

Hong Kong ushered in its Golden Years of the 1970s with a “growing economy, improving living standards, and increasing opportunities for social advancement” (Mathews et al., 2008, pp.36). The opening of the upper ladder of social class was the promise of the “Hong Kong dream” that hard work can change fate, which “gave the emergent Hong Kong identity the practical basis for the “market mentality” that sundered many Hong Kong people from the idea of “belonging to a nation” as the basis of one’s life” (Mathews et al., 2008, pp.36).

Furthermore, in the face of immigrants from “backward mainland China”, Hong Kong people began to make a distinction between “us” and “them”. There were social problems brought about by the new immigrants, and Hong Kong people had become defensive and self-protective in the late 1970s, drawing a line to define who belonged and who did not belong to the local community (Mathews et al., 2008, pp.37).


After the handover of Hong Kong's sovereignty to China in 1997, its Chinese identity was established politically, but the “Chinese” identity in Hong Kong was not strong, its local identity has been on the rise (Figure 3-1).

“Chinese + Chinese in Hong Kong” identity refers to respondents identifying with the Chinese or Chinese in Hong Kong, while “Hongkonger + Hongkonger in China” identity means answers of identifying with the Hongkonger or Hongkonger in China. As can be seen from the Figure above, the overall figure declined to 20.9% in 2019 after the “Chinese + Chinese in Hong Kong” identity peaked in 2008 (51.9%), which surpassed the “Hongkonger + Hongkonger in China” identity (47.3%) that went all the way up to 77.7% in 2019.

At the beginning of the reunification, the Central Government gave a free hand to Hong Kong’s affairs and even offered policy assistance after the impacts on Hong Kong of the Asian financial turmoil in 1997 and SARS in 2003. For example, the signing of the “Mainland and Hong Kong Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement” (CEPA) and the

“Individual Visit Scheme” played a role in boosting Hong Kong's economy (Y. W. P. Chiu, 2006; Sung et al., 2015).

Figure 3-1. The national identity of Hong Kong people from 1997 to 2020



**Hongkonger + Hongkonger in China, Chinese + Chinese in Hong Kong*
Source: PORI, 2020

In addition, the progress of the mainland's space industry, the success achieved by competitors in the Olympic Games, and particularly the successful hosting of the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, enhanced the reputation of the mainland and pushed the "Chinese" identity of Hong Kong people to a high point. However, what started as the mainland's support for Hong Kong has increasingly been perceived by locals as interference, and its intention to assimilate Hong Kong has become increasingly prominent. This has caused the Hongkonger identity to fluctuate since around 2003. As the temporary boost from the 2008 Olympic Games faded, the Hongkonger identity quickly rebounded and rose.

The success of the Olympic Games and China's economic achievement had a positive but limited impact on the national pride of the people of Hong Kong (van Hilvoorde et al.,

2010). First, the Hong Kong people in the "post-material" era pay more attention to economic equity than only economic growth (B. C. H. Fong, 2017b; Yew & Kwong, 2014). Second, and especially crucially, the Chinese nationalist education exercise of Central Government only focuses on the assimilation of the Hong Kong people but ignores their uniqueness, including their values such as freedom, democracy and the rule of law as well as cultural habits such as the Cantonese language and the use of traditional written characters, while Mainland Chinese use Putonghua and a simplified version of the characters. This single focus has aroused vigilance and self-protection of the "Hongkonger" identity (Yew & Kwong, 2014). It is also believed that, from the perspective of the centre-peripheral relationship, the resistance in Hong Kong intensified, with Hong Kong people wanting to protect its uniqueness as the Central Government became more closely involved in its political, economic, ideological and other affairs from 2003 (B. C. H. Fong, 2017b). As a result, as Beijing gradually stepped up its intervention in Hong Kong, the "Hongkonger" identity began to rise, and rose sharply after 2008.

3.1 Cultural Chinese identification in colonial Hong Kong

Qian Mu and other mainland intellectuals who came to Hong Kong in the 1940s had continued to maintain and carry forward the traditional Chinese culture by running schools and pursuing academic studies in the territory. In the 1960s, the colonial Government depoliticized education to avoid talking about the KMT-CCP dispute. Therefore, classical Chinese culture came to be the only option to be propagated for the Chinese identity. Under these influencing factors, the "Hongkonger" identity based on traditional Chinese culture has been established; in other words, the Chinese identity of Hong Kong people is based mainly on their consciousness of the traditional Chinese culture.

First of all, before the founding of the CCP regime in 1949, there was a slight separation

between Hong Kong and the mainland, with frequent population movements and a large number of immigrants from the province of Canton going to work in Hong Kong, while most of their families remained in the mainland. These migrant workers only regarded Hong Kong as a place to earn a living and eventually returned to the mainland (M. K. Chan, 1995; S. Tsang, 2003). At that time, Hong Kong people had not yet formed any clear “Hongkonger” identity. Therefore, they mostly maintained the life and cultural habits of the mainland.

Besides that, the depoliticized education of the colonial Government strengthened the consciousness of “cultural China”. After the Chinese civil war, the Kuomintang Government retreated to Taiwan, while Hong Kong became the base of the struggle between the Kuomintang and the CCP. In order to avoid conflicts with the mainland CCP and the Taiwan Kuomintang Governments, after the pro-Kuomintang “double Tenth riots” in 1956 and the 1967 pro-CCP “June 7 riots”, the colonial government tried to depoliticize education and downplay issues related to the Kuomintang and the CCP. Therefore, Hong Kong textbooks only introduce the ancient history of China in order to avoid talking about the modern history related to the Kuomintang and the CCP. For example, the context of “Chinese History” mainly emphasized the ancient and abstract Chinese culture, which has continued and has influenced the curriculum reform since Hong Kong’s return to China. This content was intended primarily to maintain a Chinese cultural identity and even national identity after “Chinese History” became an independent subject in all years of schooling in the 1960s, but while trying to avoid the content of state identity so as not to cause disputes between the Kuomintang and the CCP. The aim was to maintain local stability rather than the colonial rule in the traditional sense (F. L. F. Kan, 2007).

Therefore, the maintenance and inheritance of traditional Chinese culture in Hong Kong and its deliberate cultivation by the British colonial Government have led the people of Hong

Kong to have a relatively strong cultural identity with China, which is an integral part of the “Chinese” identity, but not all of it.

3.2 The rise of Hongkonger identification in the post-war period

The “Hong Kong identity” began to germinate in the 1950s, was formed in the 1960s, and gradually consolidated in the 1970s. Since the Sino-British negotiations started in the 1980s, the people of Hong Kong began to take the initiative to protect their Hong Kong identity. As Beijing became more involved in Hong Kong affairs since 2003, Hong Kong people placed more emphasis on their local identity.

Hong Kong identity formation

After 1949, contacts between China and Hong Kong became rare, due to the establishment of checkpoints between the two. Then the Chinese who lived in Hong Kong began to settle and take root there (Hambro, 1955), and this laid a solid foundation for forming a Hong Kong identity. In particular, the refugees who fled to Hong Kong during the economic turmoil (e.g. the Great Leap forward, the Famine) and the political movement (e.g. the Cultural Revolution) in the mainland had negative perceptions of it and regarded Hong Kong as a permanent foothold, with no going back. Hence the Hong Kong identity began to take shape.

Identity consolidation

The 1967 riots marked the transition of immigrants from a refugee mentality to one of native status. They regarded themselves no longer as mere passers-by in Hong Kong but as entitled to express their dissatisfaction as masters of the territory (Mathews et al., 2008). Because of the causes and effects of the riots, The British Hong Kong Government also embarked on a series of social reforms in order to ease social conflicts and maintain the stability of colonial

rule, such as the formation of the City District Office to enhance communication with the people, increased advisory committees and consultative forums, establishment of basic welfare and rights, and setting up of the Hong Kong Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC). Besides giving Hong Kong a unique society, these reforms also enhanced the Hong Kong people's sense of ownership and localism (Bhattacharya, 2005; Yew & Kwong, 2014). At the same time, Hong Kong's post-war baby boom also occurred during this period. Born and raised in Hong Kong and "isolated" from the mainland, these Hong Kong people grew up under the colonial control and education system and identified with Hong Kong, thus the Hongkonger identity became a vital force (Ku & Pun, 2004).

Since the 1980s, because of the differences in development between China and Hong Kong, Hong Kong people started to resist the mainland "hillbillies" across the border who were regarded as uneducated and not abiding by the law (Mathews et al., 2008). The mainland Chinese were represented by an image of "Ah Chan" (阿燦), a symbolic pathetic and backward figure in a popular television programme during the 1980s (Siu, 1986). In Hong Kong films and TV productions they were mostly portrayed as "bumpkins", speaking poor Cantonese in sharp contrast to the fashionable and civilized Hong Kong people (Mathews et al., 2008, pp.58-77). This reflects the relatively mature status of Hong Kong people and the strict distinction of Hong Kong people from "others", and their sense of superiority. The formation of identity requires the establishment of opposites and 'others' whose actuality depends on the continuous interpretation and reinterpretation of their differences from 'us' (Said, 1995), which is clearly what was happening in Hong Kong at this time.

Identity defence

The Sino-British negotiations on the issues pertaining to Hong Kong began in 1982. Panic arose among the Hong Kong people when the Chinese side made it clear that it was

determined to recover all sovereignty over Hong Kong Island, Kowloon and the New Territories (So, 1993). This showed to the mainland Government the sense of a Hong Kong identity to the exclusion of the mainland regime. The Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984 and the proposal of "one country, two systems" also objectively recognized the uniqueness of Hong Kong.

The impact of the "4 June" incident in 1989 dealt a severe blow to the Hong Kong people's confidence in the implementation of "one country, two systems" and intensified their resistance to the Central Government. On May 28 of that year, 1.5 million Hong Kong people marched in support of the Beijing Students' Movement, and one million people marched to protest against the Central Government's crackdown on students on June 4. While maintaining the particularity of their own identity, under the influence of this incident, the Hong Kong people became more and more sensitive to the assimilation and interference of the mainland. Democratization emerged as a hot topic in Hong Kong, as an important feature that distinguishes Hong Kong from Mainland China. In response to Hong Kong's fierce opposition to it, the Central Government added a new last-minute provision, Article 23, to the Basic Law developed by the National People's Congress. This requires the of the HKSAR Government to legislate against acts endangering national security at an appropriate time, which also set the stage for the July 1st Demonstration in 2003.

The year 1997 witnessed the Asian financial turmoil, which caused a downturn in Hong Kong's economy, and the sudden SARS epidemic further damaged it in 2003. Hong Kong people's discontent rose with both of these events. At the same time, the Hong Kong Government proposed legislating the Basic Law Article 23, igniting this accumulating discontent and triggering a July demonstration in which 500,000 people took part. After this massive demonstration, the Central Government began to tighten its control over Hong Kong

(B. C. H. Fong, 2017b; So, 2011). Prior to this, the Central Government had earnestly implemented the principle of "Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong with a high degree of autonomy" and had very little involvement in Hong Kong affairs. Nevertheless, as the civil opposition grew stronger, the Central Government began to step up its intervention in Hong Kong, not only to further strengthen ties and influence in economic and social fields but also to try to exert influence in areas such as education (Tse, 2013a) in order to bring about the "return of people's hearts". However, some Hong Kong residents were wary of these moves, which led to a backlash against Chinese identity.

The signing of the CEPA in 2003, the implementation of the "Individual Visit Scheme", the opening of the Guangzhou-Shenzhen high-speed railway and the Hong Kong-Zhuhai-Macao Bridge in 2018, as well as the promotion of the "Belt and Road" and "Grand Bay Area" projects, have all promoted continuous economic exchanges between Hong Kong and the mainland. The Hong Kong people have shown, even more, their commitment to the preservation of their own local identity. In the early 2012, a newspaper advertisement with the image of "locusts" (蝗蟲) was raised to criticise the issue of mainland couples coming to Hong Kong to give birth and uncivilized behaviour of some mainland tourists in Hong Kong (V. Chow, 2015; WSJ, 2012).

In July 2007, Hu Jintao, then general secretary of the Central Committee of the CCP, visited Hong Kong and delivered a speech stressing the importance of "national education for young people". Within three years after that, Hong Kong's Chief Executive, Donald Tsang Yam-kuen, responded to the Central Government's insistence by proposing in his "Policy Address" to strengthen national education. In 2010, Tsang explicitly proposed an independent "Moral and National Education" in his policy address. In 2012, the Hong Kong Government claimed that, through continuous learning, students could become proud of the rapid development of

their country⁹ and build a national identity guided by values and attitudes to help them develop good character and national quality, thereby enriching meaning of life, and establishing personal identity in the family, community, country and the world (ISD of HKSAR, 2012a, 2012b). The Education Bureau (EDB) planned to introduce this subject as compulsory in the new academic year in September 2012, referring to it as a three-year development period (Education Bureau, 2011). The move ignited fierce opposition from teachers, students and parents in Hong Kong and sparked a march of tens of thousands of people against the plan on July 29 2012, along with a series of opposition movements. Finally, the HKSAR Government left it to individual schools to decide whether to implement the "Moral and National Education". The opposition to this subject highlighted the sensitivity of Hong Kong people to maintaining their Hongkonger identity.

3.3 The national identity taught before 1997

The main goal of the British Hong Kong Government, during the more than 150 years of the colonial period, was to prevent threats to its rule over Hong Kong and to maintain social stability and economic development, which also shaped its orientation towards civic education (Bray & Lee, 1993; Morris & Sweeting, 1991). It can be said that the British Hong Kong Government never deliberately cultivated a particular national identity in Hong Kong people but often actually played it down. Before the signing of the Sino-British Joint

⁹ Moral and National Education Curriculum Guide (Primary 1 to Secondary 6), p.153: "Affective Level: It aims to develop students' affection for the country and enable them to connect their personal emotions to the country's development by learning the real situation of the country and show concerns on their compatriots. In this way, apart from being proud of the country's rapid development, students will care about the challenges and adversities facing the country and be willing to take responsibilities in improving the future for the country". [https://www.edb.gov.hk/attachment/en/curriculum-development/moral-national-edu/MNE%20Guide%20\(ENG\)%20Final_remark_09102012.pdf](https://www.edb.gov.hk/attachment/en/curriculum-development/moral-national-edu/MNE%20Guide%20(ENG)%20Final_remark_09102012.pdf)

Declaration in 1984, the British Hong Kong Government was not interested in fostering the national identity of Hong Kong residents, and the educational content was mainly apolitical and a-nationalistic. Although it did promote the identity of "Chinese", this was only limited to the cultural sense and had nothing to do with the state (Luk, 1991; Vickers, 2003; Vickers et al., 2003). It was not until the signing of the Sino-British Joint Declaration, when the sovereignty of Hong Kong was preparing to return to China, that the British Hong Kong government gradually relaxed its restraint on the identity of the PRC.

The 1940s-1980s

Along with the establishment of the PRC in 1949 and the retreat of the KMT regime to Taiwan, the two sides continued to confront each other and fought both openly and secretly in Hong Kong, a "neutral" colony, refusing to yield to each other on the issue of Hong Kong people's national identity. Both sides set up educational institutions in Hong Kong to expand their influence. In the face of this struggle and the estrangement between the Communist regime and the British Government, the British Hong Kong Government tightened its control of Hong Kong's political issues. This included stricter regulation of local education to avoid provoking conflicts with either side of the Taiwan Strait (T. C. Lau et al., 2016).

The British Hong Kong Government revised the Education Ordinance 1948 to set up a Special Bureau to tighten curriculum design and teaching material selection and set up diploma examination bodies. The purpose of all of these measures was to restrict state-centred nationalistic education and the spread of communism (T. C. Lau et al., 2016; Morris & Sweeting, 1991; Tse, 2013b). Issues related to democracy and nationalism were also sidestepped in classroom teaching to avoid conflicts (S. Lau, 1993; Morris, 1997; T. W. W. Yuen & Mok, 2014). The British Hong Kong Government also took great care to integrate and emphasize Hong Kong's local culture and traditional Chinese culture in education to

prevent Hong Kong people from identifying with governments on either side of the Taiwan Strait (T. C. Lau et al., 2016; T.-H. Wong, 2002).

From 1950s to the 1970s, subjects such as Social Studies (1953-1996) at primary school level and “Civics” (1942-1965 and later to become Economic and Public Affairs) in junior secondary school avoided politically sensitive subjects such as Hong Kong's colonial status, its links with mainland China, and contemporary Chinese issues (Tse, 2013b).

With the reform and opening up of mainland China, especially the signing of the Sino-British Joint Declaration in 1984, the British Hong Kong Government began to abandon the past passive and apolitical stance, and to promote civic education actively in preparation for Hong Kong's future "one country, two systems".

In 1997, the British Hong Kong Government promulgated *Guidelines on Civic Education in Schools* and introduced and revised most of the social subjects during the transition period of the reunification, in preparation for "Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong" after Hong Kong's return to the Motherland in 1997 (T. C. Lau et al., 2016; Morris, 1988; Morris & Chan, 1997). However, the focus on national identity still emphasized civic education rather than political orientation (Y. Leung & Ng, 2004; Tse, 1997; T. W. W. Yuen & Mok, 2014).

In 1996, on the eve of Hong Kong's return to the Motherland, the British Hong Kong Government promulgated the second and last civic education syllabus. The 1996 *Guidelines on Civic Education in Schools* emphasized critical thinking and education about human rights and democracy. In addition, the contribution of individual citizens to the national collective was mentioned, but there was still no particular emphasis on national identity (Y. W. Leung & Yuen, 2012b; T. W. W. Yuen & Mok, 2014).

In short, the British Hong Kong Government's handling of Hong Kong people's national

identity was based mainly on its regulatory interest to suppress nationalism and political identity, to avoid provoking conflicts with the locals and both sides of the Taiwan Strait. It regulated education utilizing education regulations, syllabi, examinations, textbook selection, and supervision of classroom teaching to avoid the political enthusiasm of Hong Kong people with a depoliticized orientation of education, especially of any bias towards either side of the Taiwan Strait. It was also confined in the cultural domain, with nothing to do with politics, even if there were Chinese education elements.

3.4 Chinese nation-building projects in education domain in post-1997 Hong Kong

Beijing's perspective of the need to impose Chinese nationalist identity in Hong Kong

The “return of heart” has long been a concern since Beijing regained Hong Kong's sovereignty in 1997, given that it was unable to directly control the latter's internal affairs under the OCTS arrangement. A former researcher of the Liaison Office of the CPC Central Committee, Jiang Shigong (2017), claimed that the central government had to devote itself to the cultivation of Hong Kong people's identity in order to maintain the political situation of “one country” because of the segregation of the “two systems”. Since then it has been difficult to cultivate Hong Kong people's positive feelings about China or their loyalty to the Central Government, as the segregation of the “two systems” hinders Hong Kong's exchanges and understanding with the mainland to a certain extent. Citizenship is not an abstract legal concept but a natural emotion closely related to one's life and destiny. The state is not an abstract symbol but an actual existence that people can feel in their daily lives (p.114).

However, under the constitutional arrangement of “one country”, on the one hand, the Central Government has to shoulder the responsibility of maintaining the long-term prosperity and stability of Hong Kong. On the other hand, it is also necessary to prevent this former colonial city, with its close international ties, from becoming a base for western countries to carry out

a "peaceful revolution" against China (p.162). Because of the legal segregation of the "two systems", the Central Government does not have financial, tax, or judicial sovereignty over Hong Kong and cannot exercise day-to-day governance. Therefore, it is vital to win the hearts and minds of the Hong Kong people, that is, the national identity, to seek their emotional recognition and support for the Central Government (p.200).

HKSAR Government's response to the call of Beijing

With the transfer of sovereignty to the PRC in 1997, the HKSAR Government introduced more education policies on the teaching of information about China and the "national education" theme. Starting with two former chief executives, Tung Chee-hwa and Tsang Yam-kuen, the Government has significantly increased its support for activities aimed at enhancing the pride of Hong Kong people in returning to the Motherland (Vickers, 2011). Through organising a series of activities to enhance the "national pride" of Hong Kong people, such as subsidised visits to the mainland, strengthening Putonghua education, raising the national flag and singing the national anthem at ceremonies, and having mainland astronauts and Olympic athletes visit Hong Kong.

After the reunification, with the HKSAR Government was more powerful than the British Hong Kong Government in proposing and implementing nationalization policies. For example, during the colonial period, the British Hong Kong Government encouraged secondary schools to use their mother tongue as the medium of instruction, but this was only a verbal arrangement, and the implementation was left to the discretion of each school. After the reunification, however, the HKSAR Government required all but 114 secondary schools to use Chinese as the medium of instruction. At the same time, the Government also cut the power of school sponsoring bodies, a measure that mainly affected religious groups who are the most prominent educational sponsors. The most apparent educational objective of the

HKSAR Government after the reunification was to gradually tighten the regulation of curricula to cultivate a stronger sense of patriotism and national identity. The curriculum reform initially focused on developing students' pride in China's long history and culture. The government's attempts to foster a sense of nation-state in students increased despite the resistance. Given that the mainland was also gradually downplaying its emphasis on Mao Zedong thought and Marxist-Leninist dogma, it can be said that the national education of Hong Kong and the mainland was gradually converging (Morris, 2009; Vickers, 2011).

After the handover, the Hong Kong government tightened its control over textbooks, requiring publishers to tailor the content to the syllabi and pass official approval before being listed as candidates. On the other hand, "developing identity" was regarded as one of the crucial objectives of civic education in Hong Kong. Tung Chee-hwa, the Chief Executive at that time, said that:

“...We must step up civic education so that our youngsters will have a better understanding of China, the Chinese culture and history, the concept of “one country two systems”, and the Basic Law. Through better understanding we hope to inculcate in them the passion, and the concern for China, the pride of being Chinese, and a constant readiness to contribute towards the wellbeing not just of Hong Kong but of the entire country.”

(Tung, 1997)

This was echoed by the 2002 Curriculum Guide, which interpreted national identity as the main theme: "The return of HK to China since 1997 calls for a deeper understanding of the history and culture of our motherland" (Curriculum Development Council, 2002). Under the guidance of this idea, the contents of textbooks should focus on introducing the positive aspects of China while avoiding the negative aspects such as the Cultural Revolution, the

Great Leap Forward, the Famine, and the 4 June incident (Vickers, 2003). The aim was to enhance student sentiment to the nation mainly through eulogizing "the motherland's excellent rivers and mountains" and the splendid cultural heritage. As a compulsory subject for secondary schools in Hong Kong, the content of Liberal Studies textbooks discussed the history and current situation of Mainland China with an entirely positive orientation, avoiding sensitive or controversial topics related to the mainland for trying to cultivate the identity of the national identity of students as well as the sense of trust with the mainland (Vickers, 2011).

In addition to the school curriculum, the Hong Kong Government also organised a series of activities to promote Hong Kong people's national identity and sense of pride. It included advocating the raising of the national flag in schools, organizing Hong Kong principals, teachers and students to visit and exchange in the mainland, Yang Liwei, the first Chinese astronaut and outstanding Olympic athletes visiting Hong Kong (M. Lee, 2003; Xinhua News Agency, 2008). The patriotic song "We Love China" was even promoted in kindergartens. The Chinese national anthem, accompanied by patriotic videos, was broadcast on major television channels in Hong Kong before the evening news. Schools were instructed to teach students to sing the national anthem in Putonghua and raise the national flag (Mathews et al., 2008, p.89).

In addition, as mentioned above, the Museum of History was a substantial "patriotic education base" in the Patriotic Education Campaign launched in the mainland in the 1990s, and Hong Kong's museums have also made some changes in this direction. For example, after the Hong Kong Museum of History's reopening in 1998, more patriotic elements were added to the Hong Kong Story themed exhibition (Vickers, 2003). The new Hong Kong Museum of Coastal Defence, which opened in 2000, also added more Chinese elements

(Vickers, 2011) and invited senior officers of the People's Liberation Army garrison in Hong Kong to attend the opening ceremony (HKSAR Gov, 2000).

For the common language: Putonghua promotion as the medium of instruction

As a communication tool within the community, a unified language is an integral part of nation-building, for that language is important, although not the only factor in defining a nation (Calhoun, 1997; Canovan, 1996; Miller, 1995). The CCP government has spared no effort to regulate and promote Putonghua over the whole country since its power was established (You, 2018), which the path also extends to Hong Kong after the handover.

Hong Kong people usually use Cantonese as a means of oral communication, which is quite different from the Putonghua used in most of the mainland (except the Cantonese area). As with many post-colonial societies, language is always connected with building up a national identity (W. M. Lam, 2005). In September 1997, two months after the handover, the Education Department of the HKSAR issued guidance for secondary schools on the medium of instruction. The guidance stipulated that all public-sector secondary schools were required to use Chinese as the medium of instruction for Secondary 1 to 3 students in the coming school year, except for those who had applied successfully for exemption (Education Department, 1997a).

Besides that, the Government introduced a funding scheme to promote “Using Putonghua as the medium of instruction for teaching the Chinese Language Subject” (PMIC) This aimed at promoting the national identity of Hongkongers. The idea was introduced by the Standing Committee on Language Education and Research (SCOLAR) in 2003 (SCOLAR, 2003). Its objective was to enhance students’ language abilities. The scheme was later proposed in 2008 by the SCOLAR. The participating schools were able to enjoy funding from the government

to promote the curriculum (SCOLAR, 2008). About 70% and 40% of primary and secondary schools respectively joined the scheme and adopted the PMIC in 2015. This was quite a considerable number since the scheme had only been promoted for eight years (Education Bureau, 2015). Whenever the SCOLAR or government officials mentioned PMIC, they were keen to emphasize the promotion of PMIC as a long-term goal (SCOLAR, 2003; Wiseman, 2014). The objective of the PMIC was clearly to enhance the level of Putonghua usage and better students' Chinese writing skills since Putonghua is almost identical to modern written Chinese, while Cantonese has always been used for dialogic purposes only (S. F. Tang, 2008). It was thought that the promotion of Putonghua could simultaneously develop the national identity (Yau & Yung, 2014).

In 2015, the Education Bureau released a document requiring primary school students to learn to read simplified Chinese — so that they could have a more expansive reading range and be more well-placed to capitalise on the booming Chinese economy — as another goal was to promote the widespread usage of simplified Chinese (Curriculum Development Panel, 2015). The government adopted a more conservative approach to teaching simplified characters than the PMIC, as the Education Bureau always emphasised that schools should adopt the “traditional Chinese characters first, simplified Chinese characters later” strategy (The Stand News, 2016).

The post-reunification language reform policy further consolidated the dominance of English and the predominance of Cantonese as the lingua franca of Hong Kong. Although some citizens had the urge to switch to Putonghua at certain moments, the Cantonese with creolized style continued to cultivate a localized Hong Kong identity in the context of decolonization and globalization (Kuah-Pearce & Fong, 2010).

Funding for national education projects

The Quality Education Fund (QEF), was established by the HKSAR Government “to finance projects for the promotion of quality education in Hong Kong” following Tung’s Policy Address in 1997, and approved 428 national education-related projects worth more than 205 million HK dollars during 1998-2016, according to incomplete statistics (Table 3-1). These projects were aimed mainly at experiencing and understanding the Mainland, and strengthening ties with the mainland in order to promote national identity.

Table 3-1. Grant projects related to national education

Year	No. of Approved Projects related to national education	Sum of Grant Approved (round to nearest \$000)
1998	52	14856
1999	51	45716
2000	39	44902
2001	2	10002
2002	20	9058
2003	12	3607
2004	13	3900
2005	11	6570
2006	2	556
2007	100	24630
2008	63	20628
2009	34	8620
2010	8	2648
2011	7	2861
2012	2	3120
2013	6	2139
2014	1	141
2015	3	940
2016	2	577
Grand Total	428	205471

(Source: Compiled by the author based on data from QEF website
https://www.qef.org.hk/en/project_info/info_approved_projects.php)

The titles of all of these funded projects were searched and screened according to keywords such as “national conditions”(國情), “nation”(國民), “motherland”(祖國), “patriotic”(愛國), “China”(中國), “mainland”(內地), “inspection”(考察), “exchange”(交流) and “Basic

Law”(基本法). Then the original application materials were checked to clarify the intentions of the projects. The number of relevant projects and the amount of funding after screening were as the Table 3-1 indicates.

3.5 Curriculum reforms for Chinese nation-building

The transmission of culture in schools is not a value-free or neutral process as curricula and pedagogies always reflect both the distribution of power and the ideology of the dominant groups. As part of a cultural-political package, education helps authorities maintain power through socialization on behalf of the ruling group, thereby obviating the need for coercion (Apple, 1996; Lall & Vickers, 2009; T. C. Lau et al., 2016). National education in Hong Kong is integrated into the nationalism-related education curriculum to develop young people's understanding of the (Chinese) nation-state, thereby shaping their sense of national identity, patriotism and loyalty to the nation-state (Y. W. Leung & Yuen, 2011).

The colonial Government intended to create a harmonious, stable and non-politicized civil society before the reunification (Tse, 2013b). Since the reunification in 1997, the Government of the HKSAR has been committed to promoting a comprehensive sense of China through the school curriculum (C. Chan, 2013; E. Chan, 2002; Kam, 2012; F. L. F. Kan, 2011; Y. W. Leung & Yuen, 2012a; S. M. Ma, 2010; Vickers & Kan, 2003). National or patriotic education advocated by the pro-Beijing camp was supported by resources, administrative backup and the propaganda machine of the Beijing and HKSAR Governments (Tse, 2007). Official recognition and support from the state shaped the orthodoxy of national education discourse and practice in Hong Kong. Nationalist education, with a focus on Chinese national culture, seems to be designed to subliminally strengthen young students' political identification with the PRC (Tse, 2007).

After Hong Kong's return to China, the SAR government adopted the reform to the personal and social education curriculum to add more Chinese elements, including abstract traditional culture and the current situation of contemporary China. It attempted to promote young students' Chinese identity by enhancing their understanding of China (Kam, 2012). The first outline of the education plan after the establishment of the HKSAR Government included “to develop pupils who can write English and Chinese and speak Cantonese, Putonghua and English” and “to promote the teaching of Chinese culture and heritage and to strengthen civic education” (Morris et al., 2000).

In the post-colonial era, national education was justified by the political reunification with the Motherland and “we should . . . enhance our understanding of our country, our culture, and strengthen our sense of belonging and commitment to our country” (Education Commission, 2000, p.2). The first three of five official documents were issued after the handover (the other two were promulgated before the handover).

(1) Learning to Learn: The Way Forward in Curriculum Development (1997-2008)

This policy made an official affirmation of nationalistic education. The document changed the term 'Civic Education' to 'Moral and Civic Education', integrating civic education with sex education, religious education, and ethics and healthy living, and minimising political content. Although the document proposed a national identity, it focused primarily on cultural rather than political identity. And values such as human rights and democracy were relegated to a position where they were only mentioned in the appendix (CDC, 2001). Cultural and ethnic education was promoted, as well as national identity and patriotism in a non-political sense. The document focused on the achievements of the PRC (the bright side) and avoided discussing its politics and political system (which may touch on negative political topics).

Although the document did not specify what constitutes “good citizenship”, the depoliticised

orientation and strong support for uncritical cultural patriotic education may have led to a decline in political awareness. It appeared that the government was trying to produce “good citizens” who were “uncritical and depoliticized patriots” (Y. W. Leung & Yuen, 2011).

(2) *Liberal Studies Curriculum* (2009 onward)

The year 2009 could be perceived as a watershed for the curriculum of Liberal Studies (LS) being proposed as a mandatory subject for senior secondary students (Curriculum Development Council & The Hong Kong Examinations and Assessment Authority, 2014). This curriculum, for the first time, explicitly allowed all Hong Kong senior secondary students to study and explore political issues, although the official curriculum guidelines confined the political element to a limited scope and conservative attitude (Y. W. Leung & Yuen, 2011).

The *Contemporary China* module of the LS was to introduce the current situation in the Mainland from a relative neutral and positive perspective, emphasizing its achievements after the Reform and Opening Up (since the 1980s). The discourse of the official LS curriculum generally emphasized the bright side of the mainland, although the curriculum committee did not receive any intervention from the Beijing or the HKSAR Governments (Fok, 2016). Emphasis was placed on the economic achievements of the mainland.

(3) *Moral and National Education Curriculum Guide* -National domain (Primary 1 to Secondary 6) (Consultation Draft) (2009 onward)

In parallel with the implementation of Liberal Studies, the Central Government and the local pro-Beijing camp had been calling for the strengthening of national education for Hong Kong's young people. Against this backdrop, the Moral and National Education Curriculum Guide (Primary 1 to Secondary 6) (Consultation Draft) was announced in May 2011 after the

release of the Chief Executive's Policy Address in 2010. The syllabus included five domains of study: personal, family, social, national and global. Of these, the national domain was the most controversial.

In fact, the MNE curriculum was still depoliticized, although there was a small amount of discussion of Chinese politics. The national domain aimed at Chinese culture, history, traditions, people's livelihoods, economics, technologies and advancements, and paid little attention to the PRC's politics. Only three of the national domain's 20 learning goals were related to politics (Curriculum Development Council, 2012). For example, the CCP and political parties did not appear in the curriculum, and the National People's Congress (NPC) and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) only appeared twice. Of course, the syllabus did not mention the politically sensitive issues in China and avoided "critical thinking" about them (Y. W. Leung & Yuen, 2011).

However, although the MNE bypassed political issues and the cultivation of political identity, it emphasized national sentiments. In the Learning and Teaching session of the syllabus, according to the curriculum evaluation criteria, students had to be assessed against the criteria of "to identify with my national identity and feel happy to be a Chinese", and "be happy and proud of the achievements of our counterparts" (Curriculum Development Council, 2012).

Educational circles, parents and students opposed Morality and National Education because of its "political brainwashing" tendency. The National Education Service Centre, a government-funded organization, described the Communist Party of China as a "ruling group of progress, selflessness and unity" in its 2012 book "Teaching Handbook on National conditions of the Chinese Model" (中國模式國情專題教學手冊) (National Education Service Centre, 2012, p.10). Moreover, it described that "China's democratic centralism can ensure the continuation of political power, but the Democratic and Republican parties in the

United States take turns in power, with the fierce struggles making a disaster for the people" (p.10). Besides that, it avoided politically sensitive topics such as the historical mistakes of the CCP. This content aroused resentment from stakeholders such as parents and students and eventually triggered a massive "anti-national religion" protest in 2012.

(4) *Chinese History*

National history plays a prominent role in the construction of a national identity (Berger, 2007). The history section mainly talks about the past of the state or community, so it will not only impact the legitimacy of the current regime (F. L. F. Kan, 2011) but also affect the establishment of the current community through the discussion of "collective memory". The importance of history in standardised educational curricula and identity formation has never been doubted. People often refer to history when tracing their national identities since people can examine the development of their nation through exploring the nation's history (Sulaymanov, 2008). Learning Chinese history can impact upon the interpretation of "Chineseness" because such learning may affect how Hongkongers perceive China (Kuah-Pearce & Fong, 2010).

The independence of Chinese History from the (foreign) History subject highlights its importance and uniqueness. As early as 1975, during the colonial period, a proposal was made to launch a new Social Studies subject that would integrate Chinese history with several other courses, which Chinese history teachers and scholars vehemently opposed because it was regarded as an attempt by the colonists to dispel the Chinese identity of Hong Kong students. Then the Chinese History subject continued to maintain its status as an independent curriculum (Morris et al., 1997). In 2000, the Education Bureau proposed that the schools decide the Chinese History on a discretionary basis, which could be an independent subject or merged into others. This proposal, which seemed to weaken the status of Chinese History,

aroused objections from the stakeholders, mainly its teachers, and triggered the discontent of the Central Government (F. L. F. Kan, 2011). The subject of Chinese History seems to have spontaneously become the "spokesman" for the identity of the Chinese nation.

From the previous narrative way of keeping a distance from China under the rule of the Communist Party of China, the Chinese History subject was adjusted to increase its attention in textbooks after the handover. Based on the depoliticalizing idea, it tended to avoid the content related to the CCP and its regime before the Sino-British Joint Declaration (Kam, 2012). After Hong Kong's return to the Motherland, several adjustments gradually increased the content of modern and contemporary Chinese history and emphasised the role of the CCP regime than before the reunification (Vickers & Kan, 2013). The Chinese History curriculum shaped Hong Kong's national identity in the historical narrative way of Han centralism. Although this nation-building model of ignoring ethnic minorities is not so consistent with the mainland, it is of great significance for the centre (i.e. Central authority) to build nationalism in the periphery (i.e. Hong Kong).

3.6 Extra-curricular activities: study tours of culture and politics of China

The origin of exchanges between China and Hong Kong

As early as in the 1998 Policy address, the Chief Executive at the time, Tung Chee-hwa (Tung, 1998), proposed that "I also encourage our young people to participate in more activities that will deepen their knowledge of the Mainland". However, this was treated as a general study activity "to enhance the students' knowledge of Chinese culture, geography and history, as well as to promote civic education and improve their standard of Mandarin" (Education Department, 1997b). At that time, the Education Bureau did not have large-scale or systematic exchanges, and exchange activities were organized mainly by non-

governmental education organizations or conducted in cooperation with the Education Bureau.

Until former President Hu Jintao proposed, in June 2007, that Hong Kong needed national education (Hu, 2007), the then Chief Executive Donald Tsang (D. Y. Tsang, 2007) mentioned in his 2007-2008 Policy address: "...the HKSAR Government will make every effort to promote national education. In particular, we will attach great importance to promoting national education among our young people so that they grow to love our Motherland and Hong Kong, aspire to win honour and make contributions for our country, and have a strong sense of pride as nationals of the People's Republic of China". The "extra-curricular activities and exchanges with young people from the Mainland" were defined as part of national education, which could "enhance our young people's awareness and understanding of our country's development, the land and the people, the history and the culture". Since then, youth exchanges occupied a place in the policy address for the next ten years.

Arrangement of the activities

The mainland exchange programme, mainly funded by the Education Bureau, Home Affairs Bureau and other government funds (such as the Quality Education Fund) in Hong Kong, was implemented for more than ten years from 2007. The Education Bureau's exchange programme was divided into three main modes of operation: (1) Education Bureau entrusts: including regular mainland exchange programmes, such as "One route, one heart" (同根同心) and "Traveling Thousands of Miles Together" (同行萬里), which subsidised students and teachers of junior secondary and upper primary school students and secondary school students for 70% of the tour fee. (2) In addition to the school-based subsidy scheme, the Education Bureau subsidized schools to run their own subsidy schemes for senior high school

student exchange activities and the “Understanding Our Motherland” (赤子情 中國心) scheme. The former was aimed at senior high school students and teachers, while the latter was for senior and junior high school students and teachers. The subsidy ratio was 50% (for activities in Hong Kong) and 70% (for mainland activities). (3) Other schemes were introduced, such as the "Sister School Scheme", which offered primary and secondary schools in Hong Kong an annual subsidy of \$120000. Of all these activities, "one root, one heart" (OROH) was the most representative plan with the most significant number of participants and greatest investment. According to its content, the guiding ideology could be divided into two stages (Fung & Leong, 2019):

In the first stage, between 2008 and 2014, the main goal of the central government was to cultivate the Hong Kong students' feelings of loving the country and Hong Kong. In addition, the Central Government was also concerned about the life planning of young people in Hong Kong and hoped they could be emotionally patriotic and understand the development of the Motherland from ancient to modern times. The policy addresses of the SAR Government since 2008 had mentioned measures to develop exchanges among young people in the mainland. At this stage, Hong Kong's national education and mainland exchanges were mainly led by the HKSAR Government, while the vision and objectives of young people's exchanges in the mainland were relatively general.

The second stage considered the development of culture, nationality and country. After 2015, the Central Government put forward specific directions for developing youth exchanges between Hong Kong and Macao in reports and meetings every year. It also proposed some specific proposals for the HKSAR Government as implementation guidelines, including increasing experiential learning and inspection, accurately understanding "one country, two systems", loving the country and Hong Kong, and enhancing national, ethnic and cultural

identity. At this stage, most of the exchange delegations of the HKSAR Government still focused on the themes of culture, history, and conservation. The direction of the HKSAR Government's policy on exchanges with the mainland has not changed much since 2008. Although the theme and location were extensive, the focus of the exchange delegation was still on Chinese culture and history. Little attention had been paid to "one country, two systems" and participation in national development rather than mere cognition and personal experience.

The changes in the themes of the two stages also show the thinking of the Central Government in promoting young Hong Kong people to identify with China. It started from Hong Kong's long-standing "cultural China" identity and then took the mainland's economic development achievements as a window to guide young Hong Kong people to identify with China, especially in a political sense.

Number of participants and financial support

According to the figures from the past decade (Table 3-2), the Hong Kong Education Bureau's expenditure on subsidizing exchanges in the mainland for post-secondary, secondary and primary schools rose, with the highest being \$115.6 million in 2018-2019. The number of students participating was also the highest in that year, with more than 76,000. From 2007 to 2020, the number of students going to the mainland for exchange was more than 560,000, with the subsidy exceeding HK \$740 million.

In addition, the SAR Government also supports young Hong Kong people to go to the mainland for exchanges and internships through the Funding Scheme for Youth Exchange in

the Mainland (FSYEM)¹⁰ and the Funding Scheme for Youth Internship in the Mainland (FSYIM)¹¹. These two schemes have funded more than 132 thousand Hong Kong youths for exchange or internship in Mainland China, with HK\$639 million fiscal appropriation from 2015-2021 (Home Affairs Bureau, 2020).

Table 3-2. Number of Students Receiving Government Subsidies for Mainland Exchange Programs and Relevant Government Expenditures, 2007/2008 to 2019/2020.

Financial year	Number of students				Expenditure (HK\$ million)			
	Post-secondary school students	Secondary school students	Primary school students	Total	Post-secondary school students	Secondary school students	Primary school students	Total
2007-2008	-	7,937		7,937	-	4.0		4.0
2008-2009	-	10,300		10,300	-	12.0		12.0
2009-2010	-	34,800		34,800	-	43.6		43.6
2010-2011	-	22,000	16,500	38,500	-	36.0	12.4	48.4
2011-2012	1,200	19,700	19,900	40,800	3.7	33.1	13.6	50.4
2012-2013	5,900	12,800	7,400	26,100	17.8	27.8	4.5	50.1
2013-2014	7,100	26,200	16,700	50,000	21.4	30.6	10.6	62.6
2014-2015	4,000	31,700	18,900	54,600	12.0	40.1	12.6	64.7
2015-2016	3,900	35,800	23,400	63,100	11.9	46.8	15.1	73.8
2016-2017	3,400	35,300	24,500	63,200	10.4	50.3	13.9	74.6
2017-2018	2,700	40,200	26,800	69,700	8.4	57.6	27.8	93.8
2018-2019	2,200	42,100	32,400	76,700	6.7	66.7	42.2	115.6
2019-2020	4,000	9,300	11,200	24,500	15.0	18.9	16.2	50.1
Cumulative total (Number of students)				560,237	Cumulative total (Expenditures)			743.7

Source: Replies to initial written questions raised by Finance Committee Members in examining the Estimates of Expenditure-Director of Bureau (Year 2013-2014, Reply serial No. EDB019; Year 2018-2019, Reply serial No. EDB008; Year 2019-2020, Reply serial No. EDB067; Year 2020-2021, Reply serial No. EDB289.)

¹⁰ Refer to "Youth Development Commission--Funding Scheme for Youth Exchange in the Mainland" at https://www.ydc.gov.hk/en/programmes/ep/ep_fundingscheme.html

¹¹ Refer to "Youth Development Commission--Funding Scheme for Youth Internship in the Mainland" at https://www.ydc.gov.hk/en/programmes/ip/ip_fundingscheme.html

3.7 The 'failure' of constructing Chinese nationalist identification among Hong Kong youth

The effect of exchange activities to Mainland China to promote national identity

Study tours and exchange programmes to the mainland may promote students' understanding of the social and economic aspects of the mainland, but it is uncertain whether these activities will lead to these students forming a strong political identification with China (Kuah-Pearce & Fong, 2010).

In a survey conducted in 2017 (S. W. K. Chiu et al., 2017), most of the respondents who had participated in mainland exchange activities said the experience was effective in changing their stereotyped and negative impressions of China. The experience gave them a more comprehensive view of China and they thought it would lead to a more critical understanding of the images of China they might receive through various channels in the future. However, the breaking down of stereotypes does not mean a change of identity, so the impact of short-term exchanges on students' identity may well be minimal. Fung and Leong (2019) reached a similar conclusion in a survey of relevant instructors in the mainland. The teachers surveyed believed the role of exchange activities in the mainland to be mainly to cultivate students' abilities and personal growth, "enable students to have real Chinese experiences" and "enable students to learn Chinese history". However, for issues related to China, such as "one country, two systems", "great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation", and "patriotism", the exchanges are not effective, or at least fall far short of teachers' expectations.


The decline of Chinese identity and rise of localism among Hong Kong youth

Although there have been many measures added to the Chinese nationalist education project, due to the "one country, two systems" formula and the lack of adequate control on the media

and information distribution in Hong Kong, the effectiveness of its national education reduced in Hong Kong and even backfired (Morris & Vickers, 2015).

According to a summary of identity polls conducted by the Hong Kong Public Opinion Research Institute (HKPORI) from 1997 to 2020 (HKPORI, 2020), in a broad sense of Hongkonger and Chinese identity, Hong Kong youth's (18-29 years old) identification with China was consistently lower than the older group's (30+) (Figure 3-2). At the same time, the identification with China was consistently lower than the Hongkonger identity, and the gap has continued to widen since 2008. The Hongkonger identity reached its peak of 96.4% in 2018, and the Chinese identity declined to its lowest at 3.6% correspondingly (Figure 3-2).

Figure 3-2. National identity of Hong Kong people from 1997 to 2020 (by age group)



**Hongkonger + Hongkonger in China, Chinese + Chinese in Hong Kong*

Source: HKPORI, 2020

In a survey conducted by the Chinese University of Hong Kong on Hong Kong youth, in line

with the HKPORI's survey above, the respondents showed a strong sense of identification as Hongkongers, with 47.6% identifying themselves as "Hongkongers," while 37.5% said that they were "Hongkongers but also Chinese". Only 3.7% reported themselves as being "Chinese", with 9.9% identifying themselves as "Chinese but also Hongkongers" (Centre for Youth Studies, 2017).

In recent years, these young people have become more vocal in their opposition and taken a more active and aggressive stance. For example, Joshua Wong Chi-fung, born in 1996, became well known in Hong Kong for promoting the "Anti-National Education Movement" from 2011 to 2012. The massive "Umbrella Movement" in 2014 and the "Anti-Extradition Bill Movement" were also dominated by young people (J. Chan, 2014; Ortmann, 2015; Shek, 2020).

On 31 August 2014, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (SCNPC) adopted the *Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on the Question of Universal Election of the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and the Method for the Formation of the Legislative Council in 2016* (August 31 Decision) (The Tenth Session in 2014). Failing to provide a proposal for universal suffrage for electing Hong Kong's Chief Executive that the Democrats camp in Hong Kong expected led directly to the "Umbrella Movement", a protest that involved 1.2 million people from September to December that year. Young students were at the centre of the protest. The Hong Kong Federation of Students (HKFS) and the "Scholarism", two student organisations, launched the strike. This campaign aroused a strong sense of local identity of Hong Kong people, especially the younger generation, and a strong recognition of the particularity of the Hong Kong identity. The variation of identity between 2013 and 2014 also reflects the "Umbrella Movement" effect. The "Hongkonger" identity rose 4.9 percentage points between

the end of 2013 and the middle of 2014, while the "Chinese" identity dropped 5.6 percentage points in the same period (Figure 3-2).

Apart from the lower levels of "Chinese" identity, the youth group also emerged as a vital force of the radical "localism". Hong Kong's pan-Democrat camp has been fighting for democracy in Hong Kong for decades. However, all along, especially as the Central Government tightened its control over Hong Kong after 2003, the pan-Democrats have been unable to achieve remarkable results; the number of their seats in the Legislative Council has been reduced and they seemed to fall into a kind of "transit fatigue" state. Against this backdrop, a growing number of radicals was not content with the filibuster by traditional pro-democracy, which they saw as having little success (Kwong, 2016). As a result, there were divisions within the democratic camp, with radical advocates of "localism". The localists advocated "Hong Kong First", to put the interests of Hong Kong first, oppose the Chinese Government and its people (mainlanders); completely abandon the identity of "Chinese" and establish the identity of "Hong Kong people"; advocate a high degree of autonomy or even independence; and not rule out the use of violence and other radical means to achieve these goals (Kwong, 2016).

Although the ordinary Democrats often opposed the control policies of the Central Government and the HKSAR Government, they still flaunted their "patriotism" at the root and included themselves in the category of "the Chinese nation". For example, in the case of the Diaoyu Islands dispute, a territorial dispute over a group of uninhabited islands in the East China Sea, they appeared to be more active than the mainlanders in defending the national interest. They included the mainland in their pursuit of democratization and were concerned about mainland democracy campaigners. Therefore, they held annual vigils to commemorate the 4 June incident. That is to say, the arguments among the Democrats were all conducted

within the framework of "one country" and recognizing the cultural unity of Hong Kong and the mainland. The "localists", on the other hand, advocated cutting ties with the mainland and focusing only on Hong Kong's local issues. It is worth noting that the localists were represented mostly by youth groups (Table 3-3).

Table 3-3. Age of principal members of localism organizations

Name	Core Political Advocacies	Key Founder	Year of Birth
Youngspiration	Advocating self-determination and putting "independence" as one of the options	Baggio Leung (participant in the Umbrella Movement)	1986
Hong Kong Indigenous	Advocating independence to resist political control	Edward Leung (participant in the Umbrella Movement)	1991
Hong Kong National Party	Establishing a "Republic of Hong Kong" to curb intervention by China	Chan Ho-tin (participant in the Umbrella Movement)	1990
Studentlocalism	Establishing a "Republic of Hong Kong" and do not rule out violent protest	Tony Chung Han-lam	2001
Demosisto	Right to external self-determination (including the options of "independence")	Nathan Law Kwun-chung	1993

Source: adapted from Kwong (2016), p.65; adapted by the author from Wikipedia.

The youngest localism activist listed in in Table 1 was only 17 years old in 2018, and grew up entirely in the post-1997 era; this offers a glimpse of the localism and more extreme sense of local identity among Hong Kong youth.

In sharp contrast, as mentioned before, the outcomes of soaring nationalism in China satisfied the endeavours of patriotic education campaigns in the Chinese nation-building process.

Therefore, since Hong Kong had been in the process of reforming its national education curriculum and identity before the handover, and with a similar Chinese nationalist education process in Mainland China, however, why have young people, who have grown up with this educational content similar to that of the mainland, become more assertive about their Hong

Kong identity and even repelled the Chinese identity?

Indeed, under the OCTS formula, there are still many differences in the political socialization environment of Hong Kong and the mainland since the reunification. As a hybrid regime, the freedom of the mass media and of expression was ensured largely by Hong Kong's liberal authoritarianism political system (B. C. H. Fong, 2017a). The Anti-National Education Movement in 2012 also showed that the mode of the state relying on total (information) control to achieve the purpose of education seemed to be no longer effective in the multi-channel information environment (Morris & Vickers, 2015). The national education curriculum was effective in the mainland because of the Central Government's comprehensive and strict information control.

Nevertheless, Hong Kong's legacy from colonial times and its plural information channels made it impossible to rely solely on education to change its national consciousness.

Therefore, the puzzle of this study lay in why the Chinese nationalist education, represented by the education reform, has failed with Hong Kong youth and how other information represented by other socialization agents, including family, peers, teachers, and media, affects their national identity.

3.8 Conclusion

After the reunification, the HKSAR Government has constantly put forward policy requirements to promote the integration of China and Hong Kong and the national identity of Hong Kong youth and has instigated a series of reforms in the education domain to cultivate Hong Kong students' recognition of Chinese identity. The education for Hong Kong people's "Chinese" identity has shifted gradually from cultural to political. Contemporary Chinese affairs were no longer avoided as sensitive content in textbooks, and political affairs in

mainland China were also discussed. The Hong Kong Government even implemented the MNE curriculum to cultivate Hong Kong people's national sentiments beyond the cultural level of identity from the heart.

Apart from the regular school curriculum, the Hong Kong Government, at the request of the Central Government, organizes extra-curricular activities to actively promote exchange visits by young Hong Kong people to the mainland, to enhance their awareness of the mainland and change their stereotypes or prejudices.

However, these nation-building measures implemented in education have failed to achieve the desired results or are even counterproductive. On the contrary, the identification of Hong Kong youth with China is even lower. Curricula like the MNE, which are suspected of "brainwashing" students, have come to nought because they are at odds with the views of the critical thinking of Hong Kong people. Upholding core values of freedom, the rule of law, democracy and integrity, Hong Kong people are full of mistrust and even resistance in the face of the authoritarian regime of the CCP. This difference in values may determine that the indoctrinating type of patriotic and nationalist education used in the mainland is difficult to implement in Hong Kong.

Therefore, why did the nation-building efforts in the education domain in Hong Kong fail?

Why do young students form opinions that are at odds with what they are taught at school?

This issue may attract our attention to another factor, political socialization.

Chapter 4

Research Design:

Theories, hypotheses, and operationalization

4.1 Introduction

Since the return of Hong Kong to China, a series of educational efforts to enhance Hong Kong students' identity as Chinese people have not achieved the official objectives or have even resulted in a counterproductive rise of youth-led localist movements. So, what are the factors that have brought about such a powerful "counterreaction"? Since the identity of "Chinese" is essentially a political identity (F. L. F. Lee & Chan, 2005), this study started with several main factors that affect youths' political views and explores whether and what kind of influence these factors may have.

"Political socialization" is a fundamental theory for analysing political influence. It is linked to several critical factors, including family, school, peer and media, that significantly influence young people's political attitudes and political participation. This study built upon these theoretical constructs and a mixed method research design was adopted to explore mechanisms underlying the formation of Hong Kong youths' national identity.

This chapter discusses the theory of political socialization, puts forward the research hypothesis, and finally introduces the paths and methods used to investigate the hypothesis.

4.2 Youngsters' formation of national identity

Approaches to national identity formation

The essential and primordial viewpoint is that "nations are defined by a shared heritage, which usually includes a common language, a common faith, and a common ethnic ancestry" (Muller, 2008, p. 20). The identity involves "relatively stable, role-specific understandings and expectations about self" (Wendt, 1992, p. 397), and is "the way individuals and groups define themselves and are defined by others on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, language, and culture" (F. M. Deng, 2011, p. 1). This means that the formation of national identity is based on inherent rather than arbitrary elements.

But from the modernist and constructivist viewpoints, a nation is a "socially constructed community, imagined by the people who perceive themselves as part of that group" (Anderson, 2006, pp. 6–7). Ang (2001) suggested that identity is strategically fabricated to present oneself to the outside world for the purpose of communication. In other words, national identity is an identity construction with a specific purpose that can be shaped from the outside.

Based on its long-standing close ties with Mainland China, Hong Kong's national identity has, on the one hand, essentialist/primordial elements, such as a shared history with the Mainland, a common cultural lineage and extensive blood ties. But on the other hand, because of over a century of colonial experience, Hong Kong's national identity has a strong modernist/constructivist element, especially in the civic sense. Hong Kong has a legal system, values and behaviour that are very different from those of mainland China. It is for this reason that it is important to explore the specific national identity of Hong Kong people.

National identity formation in youngsters

Given that national identity is a form of cognition and attitude, its formation in adolescents is first and foremost a matter of psychology. Academics have explored the formation and

development of national identity based on the research of Piaget and Weil (1951) on the psychology of children's cognitive development (Jahoda, 1963; Lambert & Klineberg, 1966; Piaget & Weil, 1951). This research has focused on children's geographical knowledge of countries and their attitudes towards foreign nationals. One study found that children typically develop clear attitudes towards nationality between the ages of 5 and 11, which exceeds the predictions of their cognitive development (Jahoda, 1963). This finding highlights the important influence of external factors on the formation of national identity, including family, education, media, peers and other factors that children are exposed to on a daily basis.

Young people's psychological maturity and stability develop as they move into adolescence, with cognitive abilities and knowledge growing. Young people's identities are often formed through direct, micro-level experiences in specific contexts (Deaux, 2008), and national identity, although abstract, is also formed through concrete experiences. These experiences include political and civic participation (Jensen & Flanagan, 2008; Youniss & Levine, 2009), media coverage of political issues, family attitudes (Flanagan et al., 1998), school climate (Flanagan et al., 2007), and classroom learning. These experiences dominate adolescence, an important period of identity formation (Erikson, 1968), when various features of identity begin to emerge. These formative experiences occur in a variety of contexts, such as the family, peers, the school and the community. The influence of political socialization is of great concern for the establishment and development of adolescent national identity.

In addition, national identity can be formed in collective identity or a sense of belonging to a particular group, typically, for example, as participation in various social or political movements. As Polletta and Jasper (2001, p. 284) claimed, "if people choose to participate because doing so accords with who they are, the forms of protest they choose are also

influenced by collective identities models of strategic choice that had movement leaders reflect what we believe, what we are comfortable with, what we like, who we are." Given the aforementioned social movements and political activities that have been emerging in Hong Kong since the handover from Britain to China, in which many young people have been active, this could be an important pathway for them to form a collective identity.

4.3 The importance of the “political socialization environment” on the political attitudes/participation of youths

Overall discussion


The concept of political socialization was first put forward by Hyman (1959) in his landmark work of the same name. There were many studies in the 1950s-60s, mainly focusing on voting behaviour in American political elections, and gradually extended to the study of political socialization. In a narrow sense, political socialization is the deliberate instillation of political information, values and practices by teaching staff who formally assume this responsibility. The broader concept covers all political learning at every stage of the life cycle, formal and informal, deliberate and unplanned, including not only explicit political learning but also non-political learning that nominally affects political behaviour, such as learning politics-related social attitudes and acquiring politics-related personality traits (Greenstein, 1968).

The researchers first paid more attention to the influence of family and parents (primary group) on their children's political attitudes, that is, the vital role of the family in the process of political socialization. In addition to the family factor, there is also the influence of school, peers, media and current affairs (secondary group). Family, school, peers, media and key events can influence the process of political socialization in many ways and through some

intermediary factors. They influence the political socialization of different groups and types of people, and there are potential socialization differences in age, political status, gender, education, social economy, race and intergenerational differences (Bouché, 2011).

Inspired by psychological theories (Conover & Searing, 1994; Lave & Wenger, 1991), a political socialization model, also referred to as an “octagonal model”, was proposed by the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA) to summarize and echo the previous political socialization theories (Figure 4-1). The "octagonal model", adopted for the IEA's Civic Education Research, reflects the concept of interaction between the environment and the individual. The model includes both personal and social aspects.

Figure 4-1. Model for IEA Civic Education (CIVED)



Source: Torney-Purta, Schwille & Amadeo (1999)

In the octagonal centre are individual students, surrounded by the discussion of the goals, values and practices of civic education. Surrounding the centre are the political socialization agents, including families, peers, formal/informal communities, and schools. Macroscopic systems that show constrained interaction processes on the periphery of the octagon, such as politics, economy, education, media, symbols and religion, mean that the influence of the agents of political socialization is limited to the institutional and cultural environment (Torney-Purta et al., 1999).

Based on his Social Learning Theory, Bandura (2019) argued that behaviour can be influenced by the environment. Adolescents will repeat (political) behaviours that have been reinforced by parents, peers or other agents of socialization. Political participation is a habit that is developed early in life (Aldrich et al., 2011; Valentino et al., 2009). Thus, political socialization already has an impact in the early stages of human development, i.e. adolescence (Campbell, 2006; Youniss & Yates, 1997). Civic identity can be formed relatively early in life, as adolescents' life experiences, such as group identity, rights and responsibilities, are relevant to political issues (Flanagan, 2003). At the same time, attitudes related to politics develop in tandem with habits of political participation. Politically active adolescents perceive participation as a moral and collective value (Metzger & Smetana, 2009).

The next section will discuss the role of family, teachers, peers and the mass media in the process of political socialization. These are the four agents that are related closely to adolescents in the early years of their social lives.

Family:

Davies drew lessons from behavioural theories such as Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs Theory

to demonstrate the influence of family, especially in the early stages, on children's psychology, thus implying the family's influence on individual political ideas (Davies, 1965). The socioeconomic status of the family can also affect political socialization. As far as political participation is concerned, as important as political learning in the family is the range of opportunities brought about by the socio-economic status of the original family, especially access to education (Verba et al., 2005).

In the family environment, parents are most likely to be agents of socialization and are crucial to forming their children's worldviews and political behaviours, as children usually spend much time with their parents from a very young age. Direct socialization occurs when the parents are involved actively in politics (Jennings & Niemi, 1974; Nesbit, 2012). Some earlier studies emphasized the importance of parents' socio-economic influence (Davies, 1965; Jennings & Niemi, 1974; Langton & Jennings, 1968; Merelman, 1980). The students whose parents are in an advantageous socioeconomic status are likely to grow up in a politically rich environment and to have experiences related to future political activities and to obtain high levels of education themselves, which in turn increases the possibility of acquiring many other attributes that promote political participation. Later studies have pointed out the importance of parents' civic participation, political knowledge and political participation (Andolina et al., 2003; McIntosh et al., 2007; Meirick & Wackman, 2004).

Teachers:

First, schools, where teachers are in a position to exert the political socialization effect, have long been regarded as "incubators of democratic participation" (in democratic countries) (Pasek et al., 2008). Most young people are educated in schools in which political education is one of the essential functions. Political socialization is critical for developing citizen participation, which constitutes the basis of attaching importance to and being eager to

establish and develop a national identity. The education systems that take advantage of the influence of political socialization must create functional models of citizenship and political participation so that young people can acquire the values and habits of civic participation. These socialization processes are aimed at promoting "civic orientation" and fostering "psychological attachment to politics and the community" in young people (Crystal & DeBell, 2002). The teachers, the performers who have the direct contact with young students, can play a crucial role in political socialization.

Although earlier studies have shown that, for most students, traditional teaching and teacher-student interactions do not have a systematic or significant impact on youths' political attitudes and behaviours (Ehman, 1980; Patrick, 1977), there is evidence that these factors play a role in specific subgroups under exceptional circumstances. Students' attitudes from low socio-economic and/or ethnic minority backgrounds are susceptible to the influence of courses in civic and social studies (Langton & Jennings, 1968; Merelman, 1971). Children with lower social status seem to be influenced more easily by their teachers' political attitudes (R. D. Hess et al., 2006). In some cases, innovative curricula and/or teaching methods are associated with changes in behaviour and attitudes (Jones, 1975). The roles, personal beliefs and teaching methods of civic education teachers can help students establish a civic concept of active participation. Students gradually form a strong sense of civic responsibility and civic ability in the process of socialization through social inquiry and political action (S. W. Ng, 2009).

Teachers may exercise their influence through their instruction based on the established courses. Formal courses on political socialization, such as civic courses, can influence the results of civic knowledge (Ehman, 1980; R. D. Hess & Easton, 1962; Ichilov, 1991; Langton & Jennings, 1968). Promoting discussions and using the internet in classrooms can increase

students' knowledge and participation in politics (Feldman et al., 2007). Discussing politics openly in class can also increase these youths' voting participation in the future (D. Hess, 2000) – given that voting is not compulsory in Hong Kong. In addition, students' activities and participation at school can also impact positively on their participation and civic skills.

Some researchers have pointed out that schools have achieved only limited success in spurring political outcomes (Quintelier, 2015) or favourable political attitudes towards a country (Langton & Jennings, 1968; Rosenberg, 1985). Some studies have revealed that teachers might partly invalidate attempts by the authorities to implement change through the curriculum by exercising their professional judgment to negotiate between the expected curriculum and its implementation (Clark & Yinger, 1979; Morris, 1998). However, in the context of Hong Kong, a study by Leung and Print (2002) pointed out that civic education teachers reject totalitarian nationalism education in favour of cosmopolitan, civic and cultural nationalism education (T. Yuen & Byram, 2007), which often runs counter to official nationalist advocacy. In particular, the controversial Liberal Studies curriculum has long been criticized by the pro-establishment camp for its disputed content, teaching about political issues and initiating of young students' participation in social movements (J. Lam & Chiu, 2019). Therefore, the influence of teachers needed to be examined in this study in the Hong Kong context.

Peers:

Interacting with others of a similar age is an integral part of young people's lives. Youths develop their views and political skills through discussions with peers (Verba et al., 1995). Political discussions among peers have led to more political participation because they serve as mechanisms for recruitment (Klofstad, 2011; McClurg, 2003). In addition, some studies have suggested that contact with diverse interpersonal networks with different political views

is associated with low political participation (Mutz, 2002), while other studies have held the opposite view (Pattie & Johnston, 2009; Quintelier et al., 2012). In general, peers have a specific influence on political participation. The friendship network established with peers has an independent influence on youths' political attitudes and political participation in adulthood, even in the school environment or controlling indicators such as their parents' socio-economic status and civic participation (Settle et al., 2011).

Coleman (1961) expressed the belief that peer groups of students play a role in setting the values of their members. Newcomb (1962) found evidence that college peers or prestigious groups may impact upon the process of political re-socialization. However, perhaps one of the functions of a peer group is to spread the culture of the wider society to which it belongs. Although peer groups of students may have their own subcultures, they also teach the adult subculture they belong to and strengthen adult society's norms and social patterns. Social class, religion and ethnic subculture can be spread through peer groups (Langton, 1967). In other words, the political attitude acquired in the family may be strengthened further among peers from the same background. Whether the political attitude of national identity is also affected by this needs to be explored explicitly.

Media:

The political social media of recent years is probably creating more discussion than ever before, with the increasing popularity of the internet (Quintelier, 2015). As early as 1970, studies showed that mass communication played a role in political socialization in political knowledge, and that the media was an independent factor for political socialization, not just attached to other factors such as family or peers. At least there is ample evidence that mass media can influence access to political information (Chaffee et al., 1970).

Media use is important in shaping citizens' orientations towards democratic values by providing information on public affairs and increasing their understanding of democratic politics. In this role, media use can contribute to the socialization of democracy and then more political participation (Chang, 2017). On the other hand, media under political control will also have the opposite effect on its audience. In China, where the Government controls the media, for example, the higher the level of media consumption, the higher the trust in administrative and legal institutions. People's trust in the national system is the product of Chinese traditional values and the result of government indoctrination (Q. Yang & Tang, 2010).

4.4 The importance of family, peers, and teachers in structuring the political attitudes/participation of youths

The value acquisition process is regarded widely as an essential aspect of adolescent identity formation (Erikson, 1994; Marcia, 1983). *Parents* are deemed to play a primary role in children's value acquisition through establishing basic cultural norms and values for the next generation in the early stage of socialization of their children (Schmid, 2012). Parents' political participation can have a significant influence on the political participation of youths (Warren & Wicks, 2011). Parents talking with their young children about public affairs as they occur can have a considerable positive impact on the civic development of these young people (Ekström & Östman, 2013; McIntosh et al., 2007). The frequency of communication with parents on political issues will affect the formation of a young person's sense of social responsibility (Schmid, 2012). Kioussis and McDevitt (2008) and Hively and Eveland (2009) found that citizen talk seems to increase youths' political knowledge and political participation. Informal conversations in daily life are essential to people's civic orientation. Empirical research provides convincing evidence that talking about political and social issues

is also an essential resource for youth political development (Ekström & Östman, 2013).

However, by adolescence, as socialization expands and *peers* become more prominent in adolescents' social networks (e.g., Furman & Buhrmester, 1992), the influence of other factors such as friendships, school, and mass media may become increasingly significant. Based on the premise that adolescents cannot choose their parents but have the freedom to choose their friends, Kerr et al. (2003) suggested that if adolescents have low levels of trust with their parents or feel rejected or over-controlled, they are likely to have negative similar feelings towards other adults. Youths usually choose friends with the same interests and attitudes (Hartup, 1996, 2005). In other words, peers complement the influence of the family on young people's values formation and even play a "replacement" role when the influence of the family is insufficient.

Two studies in Sweden and Belgium have shown that peers are more influential in getting young people to socialize politically than other agents such as parents or teachers (Ekström & Östman, 2013). Peers can promote socialization through pressure on social networks (Sinclair, 2012) or discussions about politics and current affairs (Klofstad, 2011). As Flanagan and Galloway (1995) emphasised, peer influence is one of the promoting factors in the process of behaviour transformation of political participation. The research of Cho et al. (2006) confirmed that the neighbourhood environment has a social influence on the behaviour of political participation. In Hong Kong, pro-democracy protesters tend to see their peers as the most prominent force to mobilize them to join protests (F. L. F. Lee & Chan, 2011). Other studies based in Hong Kong have also suggested that peers influence political socialization mainly through interpersonal communication within peer groups and major political events (C. W. Lee, 2016).

In Hong Kong, school education can be seen as a vital force in promoting young people's

political socialization and encouraging them to participate actively in political activities, especially younger people studying Liberal Studies in secondary schools, as this course was designed to develop their awareness and understanding of political issues (C. W. Lee, 2016). This is the active core school subject and teachers play an essential role in it. Teachers may affect students' political attitudes and participation. They can influence students' political attitudes and participation through guidance in teaching, resorting to their own authority, using the power to judge students and even their personal charisma.

Teachers are the most critical factor influencing the subjects' commitment to radical politics (Kane, 2013). Some studies suggested that teachers play a crucial role in helping middle school students to become political active in Hong Kong (Y. W. Leung, 2006). Although teachers may not be the key to cultivating traditional forms of political participation, they may play a more influential role in influencing students to develop critical attitudes towards the current situation and some may even go as far as to radicalize their students (C. W. Lee, 2016). For example, for the sensitive political event in the mainland - the 4 June incident, which has had a significant influence in Hong Kong, the teacher's description has become the primary mechanism by which the memory of this event is passed on to the next generation (F. L. F. Lee & Joseph, 2013).

In Hong Kong, the definition of national identity, the roles of schools, and teachers' responsibilities are far from clear. In practice, teachers sometimes have to elaborate their own answers to questions, which also leaves some space for expressions of their own views (T. Yuen & Byram, 2007). At least before the implementation of the National Security Law in Hong Kong, secondary school teachers enjoyed greater autonomy in their teaching, especially in Liberal Studies, for which they could choose their textbooks and teaching kits. Most Hong Kong teachers prefer cultural or cosmopolitan orientations to the nationalism civic education

rather than authoritarian, a preference that is far different from Mainland China (K. E. Chong et al., 2020). For this study it was considered worthwhile to probe the teacher's role in shaping the political attitudes of Hong Kong youngsters and their national identity formation and development.

4.5 The importance of media in structuring the political attitudes/participation of youth

The influence of the media is everywhere, and it plays a vital role in the formation and development of youths' political consciousness (Henslin, 2015). The media plays one of the key roles in political propaganda and social movements. Political and social movements need the help of media publicity to win more support and sympathy for their demands (Gamson & Wolfsfeld, 1993). Hong Kong has a freer and more diverse media environment for various views to be expressed which is very different from the mainland. In addition to the official discourse, the public can also have easy access to many alternative voices.

Social movements usually need media coverage to expand their influence. The dissemination of information in the media can create a kind of "collective awareness", in which the dissatisfaction expressed by the protesters will resonate with the dissatisfaction in the lives of the audience (Kielbowicz & Scherer, 1986). Media reports can maintain protesters because they justify their efforts to seek national propaganda through their campaigns. They can also expand the scope of a struggle by attracting sympathy and new members from "third parties" such as the public and interest groups (Rucht, 2004). However, on the other hand, media reports can also have independent points of view and narrative frameworks, which may not be consistent with those of the social movement. Different media narration will show different effects. However, the social movement itself will also use various means to influence the media coverage and strive for the media narrative to be consistent with its own (Kutz-Flamenbaum et al., 2012).

With the development of networking and communication technology, everyone can become a publisher of information, and it is very convenient for people to get information. Social media, represented by social platforms such as Facebook and Twitter, have become essential for information dissemination. These non-professional media organizations usually constitute "alternative media" different from the traditional media. Alternative media often present ideologically partisan or anti-establishment points of view. Content is usually produced by ordinary citizens or amateurs, who are not restricted by mainstream media practices and news practices, and do not follow the news practices of mainstream news professionals. Party coverage in alternative media also includes producing and maintaining content that benefits the protagonist, criticizes opponents, and arouses the sympathy of bystanders. This view was endorsed by Boyle and Schmidbach (2009), who explored the use of mainstream and alternative media in an American city. They found that alternative print media and alternative online news heralded participation in protests. This suggests that exposure to alternative media may affect the political socialization of youths (M. Chan, 2017).

Some studies have suggested that alternative media exposure may make people radical. Through the study of social movements in Hong Kong, Lee (2018b) found a link between alternative media consumption and radical ideas about guerrilla tactics in social movements, which he described as being only the result of "message learning". That is, users of alternative media channels will accept ideas that are less available or not available elsewhere.

Alternative media, especially social media, have provided an important public arena for Hong Kong people to disagree with China since 1997. Since most of the local mainstream media (e.g. newspapers, TV) are in co-operation with the authority, alternative media have offered a secondary public domain (F. L. F. Lee, 2018a). Young people who prefer to read Apple Daily usually have higher expectations for local autonomy and respect for press freedom, and tend

to obtain social and political information from social media (P. S. N. Lee et al., 2017).

According to a survey conducted in 2016 with young Hong Kong people aged 15-29, social media was their major source of public affairs information (46.6%), followed by television (21.7%), websites (15.5%), newspapers and magazines (13.1%) then radio (2.8%). (Centre for Youth Studies, 2017). Social media have penetrated so deeply among Hong Kong's young population that they have become key agents in political socialization.

4.6 The value and shortcomings of the political socialization approach

The construction of national identity requires relevant cultural and collective narratives, which change in response to these discourses. The formation of national identity requires a combination of collective discourses and individual experiences, the interaction between which is part of the political socialization procedure (Habashi, 2017). It can, therefore, be argued that political socialization is one of the most important tools for analysing the formation of national identity. However, two issues that have often been overlooked in the existing research on political socialization are the relationships and interactions within the political socialization system, or between the individual agents, and the initiative of the person as an object, especially the adolescent, in the political socialization process.

Firstly, political socialization and its main agents have been discussed above. However, it is a complex ecosystem and further research is needed on what other influences are present within this system, how these factors work and how they interact with each other. Amna et al. (2009) argued that the role of these influences varies across political and social contexts, and that there is a need to investigate it from perspectives of sociology, social psychology, political psychology, political science, anthropology, mass communication, education, and other fields. However, many studies have focused on only one of the key factors in political socialization and have neglected the interrelationships and influences between them (e.g.

Camino & Zeldin, 2002; Dudley & Gitelson, 2002). For example, mass media can be connected to other agents in the political socialization procedure, and the socialising influence on adolescents is often complemented and reinforced by communication with parents, schools and peers (McLeod & Shah, 2009).

Secondly, most studies of the political socialization of adolescents have treated these minors as passive recipients and have failed to scrutinise their subjective agency. Most notably, the shaping of national identity by the government is usually placed in a top-down model of political socialization, focusing on the institutionalization of national identity such as ideological structures and education (Edensor, 2020). In fact, adolescents do have the ability to act as agents themselves (McDevitt & Chaffee, 2002; Sapiro, 2004).

Learning theory suggests that learning is reciprocal and that parents' political socialisation of their minor children is, therefore, also a reciprocal process (McDevitt & Ostrowski, 2009). In the process of communication between parents and children, changes are also made in response to their reactions and other information they receive, which is known as the “trickle-up” effect. The top-down view has been challenged by those advocating “trickle-up” socialization (N. J. Lee et al., 2013; McDevitt & Chaffee, 2000). Rather than children learning by a direct top-down transmission of information, a “social interaction approach” is a more inclusive model (Habashi, 2017).

Young people are not shaped passively by political socialization agents from the top down, but rather through an interactive process. They also have the initiative to choose, accept or resist external political socialization, especially in Hong Kong, an environment of fierce political conflict and even confrontation, where the different messages conveyed by political socialization agents make it all the more important for young people to use their own initiative, as political socialization attempts to convey political awareness, including the

shaping of political identity. In the Hong Kong context, however, there are at least two different political identity camps or identity priorities, the Chinese identity promoted by the authorities and the Hong Kong identity that exists among the people. Furthermore, political socialization initially focused on the issue of youths' political apathy, arguing that many young people are apathetic and disengaged (Mindich, 2005; Putnam, 2000; Turow, 1997). However, the opposite seems to be true in the Hong Kong context, where the active political participation of youth (as the opposition) has even caused concern to the authorities. The application of political socialization as a tool in Hong Kong is unique and may contribute to the development of the theory.

4.7 Political socialization in the context of the rise of social media and intensive political mobilization

Over the years, the influence of parents as political socialization agents for their children has been challenged, and research has found that the political values conveyed by parents often do not align with the values of their children (Hatemi & Ojeda, 2021). An important change is that the media has had more influence than parents on young people's political socialization. The increased use of media, the exposure to wider information, and the consequent freedom of choice experienced by adolescents has led to changes in their political knowledge, norms, attitudes, values and participation (de Vreese & Möller, 2014; Ohme & Vreese, 2020). The development of information technology has changed the shape of communication and the forms in which information is generated and accessed. The spread of mobile devices and the internet and the ease of sharing information have facilitated young people's access to political information. They learn about social norms and values from the political information they receive, build their knowledge, and eventually internalise it into their behaviour. Media outlets, and especially social media, clearly play a more important role in the dissemination

of political information than do other political socialization agents (Walker & Matsa, 2021). Today's young people "sample their information more broadly as media genres blur and information channels proliferate" (Bennett et al., 2010, p. 399).

The use of the internet as the primary means of communication has made it easier for young people to bypass parents, teachers and other traditional authority channels to access information directly, to communicate with a wider range of peers, and to communicate directly with the political elite. These have changed the traditional patterns of political socialisation (Denton Jr & Kuypers, 2007; Gainous & Wagner, 2011). Van Deth et al. (2011, p. 158) noted that "media should not simply be regarded as a separate socialization influence, but as one that exists in relation to other main influences".

However, it is worth noting that this is accompanied by the influence of false or alternative information on young people. The ease of information generation and dissemination has also led to a proliferation of disinformation, to which adolescents with lower discernment skills are more susceptible (Edgerly et al., 2019). Disinformation is more likely to spread and be prevalent during particular times such as social movements or elections (Vosoughi et al., 2018). Disinformation exploits people's inherent biases to promote the political claims it connotes and can even consequently reduce the information recipients' trust and confidence in politics and government (Tynes et al., 2021), or contribute to the polarisation of ideology and politics.

In addition to providing greater access to political information, the Internet offers unique avenues for political participation, including public discussion and online voting, which have greatly reduced the cost of political participation. It has also facilitated connections and interactions between various political groups and encouraged individuals with common goals to combine and even form a collective identity (Bimber, 2001; Farrell & Drezner, 2008). This

feature of the Internet increases the capacity for political mobilisation and makes Internet-based civic mobilisation and group behaviour more dynamic. Moreover, political participation is less costly and can include more voices, including those of politically excluded social groups (Norris, 2001; Vegh, 2003).

While participation in social movements during adolescence may not necessarily be sufficiently mature or successful, these experiences can lead to increased political responsibility and expectations of social change (Youniss et al., 1997). Young people who have participated in social movements can develop political awareness by learning about politics and by gaining direct political experience. In addition, some successful social movement experiences can encourage them to become more involved in social movements in the future. Social movement experiences do not only affect those who are active participants, but are equally effective for most occasional and passive participants (Polletta & Jasper, 2001). Examining the process of political socialisation and its theoretical changes in the context of large-scale political mobilisation is a new topic. In the face of the social movements of recent years in Hong Kong, there is a need for a new consideration of the use of political socialisation in this political environment.


4.8 The analysis model

Based on the role of nationalist education in fostering national education, mentioned in Chapter 1, and the officially initiated nationalist education reform in the field of education in Hong Kong (see Chapter 3), combined with the influence of political socialization agents discussed above, the analytical model for this study was developed. This is shown in Figure 4-2.

The first step in this model was to analyse the impact of nationalist education and possibly its

opposing agents of competitive political socialization, including family, teachers, peers and media, on national identity. The analysis also included the relationship between these five factors.

Figure 4-2 *The analysis model of nationalist education and competitive political socialization environment impacting on national identity*



Source: Compiled by the author

4.9 Hypotheses: Testing the impact of nationalist education and agents of competitive political socialization

There has been a sharp contrast between the declining Chinese identity and rapid rise of nativist identity in young people in Hong Kong, and the efforts invested by the HKSAR Government to reform the curriculum in the direction of China's national identity since the reunification. Education, as one of the agents of political socialization and one of the main tools of nation-building, plays an important role in cultivating national identity generally (E. A. Cole & Barsalou, 2006; L. Hein & Selden, 2000; Podeh, 2000), and specifically in the context of Hong Kong (Tse, 2007, 2013a; Vickers, 2011). Identity-related knowledge education (e.g., national flag, national emblem, patriotism), extracurricular activities (e.g., exchange activities to the Mainland), and participation in activities organized by the Central

Government in Hong Kong are common forms of nationalist education initiatives.

Citizen participation constitutes the basis for attaching importance and eagerness to establish and develop a national identity. However, citizen participation in Hong Kong is more about promoting local (Hong Kong) identity than national (Chinese) identity. It may be assumed that other agents of political socialization have contributed to dispelling the role of education in developing national identity since the rise of Hong Kong nativism and the prevalence of Hong Kong core values in Hong Kong society. In other words, it can be supposed that political discussions between young people in Hong Kong and their families, peers and teachers have an opposite effect on national identity because political discussion itself represents a positive political consciousness and a practical method of political socialization.

The idea that *discussion* is essential to democracy (Dahlgren, 2006) has been explored in different theoretical contexts (Dahlgren, 2009; Eveland, 2004). Talking about politics is considered a fundamental activity in the public domain (Habermas, 1984). It is also considered to be a way to foster knowledge and democratic values, promote people's sense of identity as citizens and encourage all forms of civic behaviour (Barber, 2003; Dahlgren, 2009).

Classroom activities involved in consultation and democratic peer norms contribute to civic action by youth. However, the influence of these peers and teachers is mainly indirect, with the expression and discussion of political opinion outside the classroom and family acting as a bridge (N. J. Lee et al., 2013). Talking about politics and civic participation between parents and children and parents' role models of political and civic behaviour are all related to the increase in the same levels of behaviour in their children (Zukin et al., 2006). Civic talk in daily life is vital for young people to develop political knowledge, democratic values and different forms of civic practice. Civic conversation in a peer environment makes a unique

contribution to all aspects of young people's civic orientation (Ekström & Östman, 2013).

However, the impact of democratic and civic discussion on youth citizen participation usually requires media intermediaries to play a role, which needs media to provide information for it.

In particular, online political participation relies more on news consumption and political expression, in which the media plays a key role (N. J. Lee et al., 2013).

The previous studies also revealed that Hong Kong has a relatively free media and public opinion environment, which challenges the function of legacy media in political socialization of the youth (Kwong, 2015; F. L. F. Lee, Chen, et al., 2017). Young people who take social media as the primary source of public affairs are more likely to be dissatisfied with and distrust the HKSAR Government, participate in online and offline political activities, and identify as Hongkongers more than those who obtain public affairs information from other types of media (Centre for Youth Studies, 2017). Therefore, it can be assumed that Hong Kong youths' exposure to "opposition media" such as local social media/forums has a negative effect on their national identity as Chinese.

The research presented in this thesis endeavoured to advance the study of Hong Kong youths' national identity by building a multiple linear regression model. The essence of the model is to simultaneously test the variation in the potential predictors of Hong Kong youths' national identity. The hypotheses for the model were built upon the existing research described in this and earlier chapters.

H1. Nationalist education experiences could promote youngsters' Chinese identity.

H1-1: Students who have more experiences of national identity knowledge education will have a higher probability of having a stronger Chinese identity vis-à-vis Hongkonger identity.

H1-2: Students who have more experiences of extra-curricular activities in Mainland China will have a higher probability of having a stronger Chinese identity vis-à-vis Hongkonger identity.

H1-3: Students who have more experiences of participating in activities of Central Government institutions in Hong Kong will have a higher probability of having a stronger Chinese identity vis-à-vis Hongkonger identity.

H2. Political interaction with family members could promote youngsters' Hongkonger identity.

H2-1. Students who discuss political issues with family members will have a higher probability of having a stronger Hongkonger identity vis-à-vis Chinese identity.

H2-2. Students who co-participate in political movements with family members will have a higher probability of having a stronger Hongkonger identity vis-à-vis Chinese identity.

H3. Political interaction with peers could promote youngsters' Hongkonger identity.

H3-1. Students who discuss political issues with peers will have a higher probability of having a stronger Hongkonger identity vis-à-vis Chinese identity.

H3-2. Students who co-participate in political movements with peers will have a higher probability of having a stronger Hongkonger identity vis-à-vis Chinese identity.

H4. Political interaction with teachers could promote youngsters' Hongkonger identity.

H4-1. Students who discuss political issues or co-participate in political movements with teachers will have a higher probability of having a stronger Hongkonger identity vis-à-vis Chinese identity.

H4-2. Students who co-participate in political movements with teachers will have a higher

probability of having a stronger Hongkonger identity vis-à-vis Chinese identity.

H5. Being exposed to local media could promote youngsters' Hongkonger identity.

H5-1. Students who are frequently exposed to local traditional media will have a higher probability of having a stronger Hongkonger identity vis-à-vis Chinese identity.

H5-2. Students who are frequently exposed to local social media will have a higher probability of having a stronger Hongkonger identity vis-à-vis Chinese identity.

H5-3. Students who are frequently exposed to local online forums will have a higher probability of having a stronger Hongkonger identity vis-à-vis Chinese identity.

4.10 Operationalization of the variables

Independent and control variables

A questionnaire was developed to ask the participating students about their experiences relating to these variables.

-Hypothesis 1: Nationalist education experiences

To test this hypothesis, a selection was made of several forms of education promoting national identity in Hong Kong that secondary school students are often exposed to, as described in the previous section, including curriculum instruction, related extracurricular activities, and activities of central government institutions in Hong Kong. The participants were asked 1) whether they had ever learned knowledge about national identity (such as the national constitution, national flag, national anthem, patriotism) at school, 2) whether they had ever participated in extra-curricular activities in Mainland China (such as study tours, exchange activities, volunteer activities, internship programs), and 3) whether they had ever participated in any activities related to Central Government institutions in Hong Kong (such

as the Hong Kong Youth Military Summer Camp, the Open Day of the Military Camp of the People's Liberation Army in Hong Kong, the Liaison Office of the Central People's Government, the Office of the Special Commissioner of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Hong Kong, etc.). All of these questions required “Yes” or “No” responses.

-Hypotheses 2-1, 3-1 & 4-1: Discussion of political issues with Family members/Peers/Teachers

To address these hypotheses, the students were asked how often they discuss political issues with their parents/friends or classmates/teachers. Their responses were expressed through a five-point Likert-type scale, representing: "often" (5), "quite a lot" (4), "sometimes" (3), "rarely" (2), "never" (1) and "have no idea/hard to say" (0). For those who answered “often” or “quite a lot” an open-ended question was attached to ask them about the main political topic(s) they discuss.

-Hypotheses 2-2, 3-2 & 4-2: Co-participation in political movements with Family members/Peers/Teachers

In the questionnaire, the respondents were asked a yes/no question about whether they had ever participated in protests or rallies with family/friends or classmates/teachers. For those who answered “yes”, an open-ended question asked about the theme of the protests or rallies they participated in.

-Hypothesis 5: Exposure to local media.

The respondents were asked how often they had access to local traditional media, local social media, and local online forums. This question was answered on a five-point Likert scale where: "often" (5), "quite a lot" (4), "sometimes" (3), "rarely " (2) and "never" (1) to reflect

the degree of contact with different media types. According to previous studies, the local social media represented by Facebook and Instagram have a high rate of utilization by young students in Hong Kong. According to a survey conducted in 2016, Facebook was the social media platform (67.7%) used most frequently by Hong Kong youth (Centre for Youth Studies, 2017), and this can be regarded as a pro-democracy alternative, that is, opposition media (M. Chan, 2020; F. L. F. Lee, Lee, et al., 2017; D. K. K. Leung & Lee, 2014). A local online forum represented by HKGolden (高登) and LIHKG (連登) was also a base for the pro-democracy camp and has played a significant role during the social movements in Hong Kong (e.g. Anti-Extradition Bill Movement) (F. L. F. Lee, 2020). Therefore, those with frequent exposure to local social media and online forums will have a much higher probability of receiving pro-democracy and pro-localist information. Hong Kong's traditional media, such as television, radio, newspapers and magazines, except for Apple Daily, which is a now folded tabloid known for its criticism of the authorities, can be regarded as having neutral or pro-establishment standpoints, given that most of them have been influenced by the Central Government (Frisch et al., 2018; F. L. F. Lee, 2018a). All of the media in Mainland China can be regarded as pro-establishment media because of the strict information censorship.

Dependent variables

In this study, the "Linz-Moreno Question" (LMQ) was used to measure the respondents' subjective sense of local national identity vis-à-vis national identity. The LMQ here was adapted from a questionnaire designed by Moreno (2006) in 1992, which initially aimed to survey and describe the dual national identity in Scotland. The LMQ also fits the Hong Kong case given its dual identity situation (Chinese and Hongkonger).

Although there may be some flaws in the LMQ (Guinjoan & Rodon, 2016), it has been used

to investigate dual identities or national/regional identities for a long time. It has thus been included in the Eurobarometer since 1992 (Serricchio, 2012). Many studies have adopted LMQ (see, for instance, Bond & Rosie, 2008; A. Cole, 2006; Lago & Montero, 2009; Munõz & Tormos, 2015). Most of the literature on regional politics uses LMQ to assess the existence of dual identities in territories with higher self-government requirements and even secessionist tendencies. Hong Kong's subordinate and autonomous relationship with China is also suitable for using LMQ to investigate identity, using a 5-point Likert scale as follows:

Which of the statements below best describes how you regard yourself?

- *Hongkonger, not Chinese*
- *More Hongkonger than Chinese*
- *Equally Hongkonger and Chinese*
- *More Chinese than Hongkonger*
- *Chinese, not Hongkonger*
- *Others/Don't know/No answer*

4.11 Data collection

This study used mixed methods to investigate and analyse the relationship between political socialization agents and national identity. A campus survey was used first to investigate and analyse the relationship between each political socialization agent and the participating youths' national identity. The mechanisms of these relationships were then explored further through extended interviews.

(1) Quantitative method: Campus survey

Campus survey of more than 1,000 sampled students (operationalized as Form 3 to 6

secondary students) from three schools in Hong Kong.

This study adopted the method of purposive quota sampling from schools using English as the medium of instruction and those using Chinese. Students from Forms 3 to 6 in three six-year secondary schools were selected to participate in the questionnaire survey. Language has a strong national character, and it is also a symbol of identity (Calhoun, 1997; Colley, 2003; Jenkins, 1994, 2006; Miller, 1995). Especially in Hong Kong, bilingualism is one of the factors that Hong Kong people use to identify their identity (S. Chow et al., 2020). Medium of instruction thus needed to be considered as a possible distinguishing factor when selecting the sample. Therefore, this study considered medium of instruction to be the index, with the sample selected from both Chinese as Medium of Instruction (CMI) schools and English as Medium of Instruction (EMI) schools. It was also necessary to control school factors such as teachers, teaching environments, and textbooks within each school to more accurately examine the relationship between the political socialization environment to which the students were exposed and their national identity.

The ratio of CMI and EMI middle schools in Hong Kong is 1.6:1 (286 CMI and 181 EMI schools) (Schooland, 2020). The author's base institution, the Academy of Hong Kong Studies, has maintained an extensive network with more than 100 local secondary schools. Through referrals from Academy colleagues, it was possible to complete the purposive quota sampling by securing the support of two CMI schools and one EMI to participate in the

campus survey.¹² Written consent from these three schools was obtained before conducting the surveys. The information about the sample schools is shown below (Table 4-1):

Table 4-1: Profiles of sample schools

School	Location	Band	Sex	Scheme	Medium of Instruction	Religion background	Form	Students
I	Kowloon	1	All are Mixed-Sex	Direct Subsidy	English	Christian	3 to 6	503
II	Kowloon	2		Caput	Chinese	Christian	3 to 6	498
III	N.T.	1		Aided	Chinese	Secular	3 to 6	484
				Sum				1485

In conducting the campus surveys, Form 4-6 students were the principal targets because they focus on Liberal Studies, which is a controversial curriculum concerned with political issues between China and Hong Kong. The study also included Form 3 students because they usually have primary political cognitive ability and orientation, which can be seen from many junior high school age students participating in the Anti-Extradition Bill Movement in 2019-2020 (Adolfo, 2020).

(2) Qualitative method: Extended interviews

The interview methodology was used to investigate the question of to what extent and how the political socialization agents have shaped Hong Kong youths' national identity and how the effects can be measured. The respondents were asked in detail about their perceptions of

¹² Apart from purposive quota sampling, the author also tried to send invitations to about 200 secondary schools, based on random sampling from the official list of the Education Bureau of Hong Kong; unfortunately, no response was returned from this random sampling owing to the lack of manpower and expertise to follow up with the schools.

national identity and whether and how the various political socialization agents influenced their national identity. The interactions between the various agents were also examined, especially their relationship with nationalist education. Details of the interview outline are described in Appendices C and D.

Table 4-2: Profiles of interviewees

Interviewee Code	School	Form	Birthplace	Sex	Interview mode
I-1	II	3	/	Female	Group
I-2	II	3	/	Female	Group
I-3	II	3	/	Female	Group
I-4	II	4	/	Female	Group
I-5	II	4	/	Female	Group
I-6	II	5	/	Female	Group
I-7	II	5	/	Female	Group
I-8	II	6	/	Female	Group
I-9	II	6	/	Female	Group
I-10	II	6	/	Female	Group
I-11	III	4	HK	Male	Individual
I-12	III	6	HK	Female	Individual
I-13	I	6	HK	Male	Individual
I-14	I	6	HK	Male	Individual
I-15	/	6	China	Female	Individual
I-16	/	6	HK	Male	Individual
I-17	/	6	HK	Male	Individual

The campus survey provided a broad picture of the relationship between the independent and dependent variables, while the extended interviews helped to further inform the national identity formation process in detail. In this study, the interviewees were obtained through the students' voluntary participation and teachers' invitations in the three sampled schools. The interviewees were asked in the questionnaire if they were willing to leave their contact information to be invited to participate in the extended interviews. At the same time, the author also asked teachers' help to invite students to join in. Finally, 17 interviewees were enrolled, of whom seven each participated in a one-hour online one-to-one interview each,

while the other ten had a one-hour face-to-face group interview (Table 4-2).

The recruitment of the interviewees was unavoidably affected adversely by the sensitivity of the research topic and the Covid-19 epidemic in Hong Kong. Therefore, the author had to conduct interviews remotely via an online meeting platform. All interviews were conducted in Cantonese, the interviewees first language, to enable them to talk smoothly. Interview audio recordings were transcribed into manuscripts and then encoded in Nvivo software for scrutiny and analysis.



Chapter 5

Research findings and analysis:

How does the competitive political socialization in Hong Kong push back against the Chinese nation-building?

Of the 1485 students of Forms 3 to 6 from three schools who were invited to complete the survey, 1146 valid questionnaires were returned (i.e. those that were completed according to the requirements, without too many blanks or multiple choices). This was a response rate of 77.2%. In terms of region, religion, sex and MI distribution, the sample met the needs of analysis and had a certain degree of representativeness since extreme cases were avoided, such as sex bias (boys' or girls' schools), or obvious political tendencies (patriotic schools). In addition, other similar surveys are also cited below to verify the representativeness of this study.

Demographical information of the sample

The distribution of the sample across grades (Forms 3-6) was relatively balanced, being 28.9%, 23.6%, 22.1% and 25.3%, respectively. The sex distribution was roughly the same, with 39.0% of males and 40.8% of females. Most of the respondents were born in Hong Kong, accounting for 81.6%, while only 10.9% were born in the mainland (Table 5-1).

Table 5-1. Frequency of demographic information of samples

	Frequency	Percent
Form		
3	331	28.9
4	271	23.6
5	253	22.1

	6	290	25.3
	No Answer	1	0.1
Sex			
	Male	447	39.0
	Female	468	40.8
	No Answer	231	20.2
Birthplace			
	Hong Kong	935	81.6
	Mainland China	125	10.9
	Other	18	1.6
	No Answer	68	6.0

5.1 Quantitative findings and discussion

Table 5-2. Descriptive statistics (percentage of respondents)

		Secondary school students (N = 1146)
Independent variables		
<i>Learning knowledge about national identity</i>		
Yes		56.0
No		39.8
No answer		4.2
<i>Participating in extra curricular activities in Mainland China</i>		
Yes		27.0
No		70.5
No answer		2.5
<i>Participating in activities of Central Government in Hong Kong</i>		
Yes		3.1
No		94.2
No answer		2.7
<i>Discussion of political issues with family members</i>		
Often		6.6
Quite a lot		12
Sometimes		33.3
Rarely		31.1
Never		9.7
Don't know/Hard to say/Refuse to answer		7.4
<i>Co-participation in political movements with family members</i>		
Yes		10.3

No	87.6
Don't know/Hard to say/Refuse to answer	2.1
<i>Discussion of political issues with peers</i>	
Often	7.2
Quite a lot	13.7
Sometimes	32.7
Rarely	28.4
Never	10.8
Don't know/Hard to say/Refuse to answer	7.2
<i>Co-participation in political movements with peers</i>	
Yes	18.3
No	79.4
Don't know/Hard to say/Refuse to answer	2.3
<i>Discussion of political issues with teachers</i>	
Often	0.8
Quite a lot	1.4
Sometimes	13.7
Rarely	35
Never	39.1
Don't know/Hard to say/Refuse to answer	10.0
<i>Co-participation in political movements with teachers</i>	
Yes	1.0
No	96.7
Don't know/Hard to say/Refuse to answer	2.3
<i>Exposure to local traditional media</i>	
Often	20.7
Quite a lot	26.9
Sometimes	29.8
Rarely	14.7
Never	6.3
No answer	1.7
<i>Exposure to local social media</i>	
Often	50.3
Quite a lot	23.8
Sometimes	14
Rarely	6.4
Never	4.2
No answer	1.4
<i>Exposure to local online forums</i>	
Often	11.9
Quite a lot	12.9
Sometimes	21.6
Rarely	21.8
Never	29.5
No answer	2.4
Dependent variable	
<i>Subjective sense of national identity vis-à-vis local identity</i>	
Hongkonger, not Chinese	35.4
More Hongkonger than Chinese	20.1
Equally Hongkonger and Chinese	21.6
More Chinese than Hongkonger	1.2
Chinese, not Hongkonger	1.3
Don't know/Hard to say/Refuse to answer	20.4

-Limited nationalist education experiences

More than half (56.0%) of the interviewees reported having ever learned knowledge about national identity at school, and nearly 40% of the respondents reported not having done so (or having forgotten that they had). Only a low percentage indicated that they had participated in exchange activities in the Mainland (27.0%), and the majority (70.5%) of students indicated that they had not participated in those activities. Despite the aforementioned subsidies from the SAR government for youth exchanges to the Mainland, it seems that their participation was not very active. There were very few interviewees who indicated they had ever participated in the Central Government's activities in Hong Kong (Table 5-2).

-Moderate political discussion frequency

The students surveyed indicated that they did not discuss political issues very frequently, the least interactions being with teachers, followed by parents, and the most with peers.

Similarly, their participation in social movements was not very high as a whole. Those who did participate did so mostly with their peers (18.3%), while 10.3% joined these activities with their family members, and only 1.0% with teachers (Table 5-2).

-Long exposure to local social media

The survey in this study is consistent with the 2016 survey on Hong Kong youth media preferences conducted by the Centre for Youth Studies of the Chinese University of Hong Kong (Centre for Youth Studies, 2017). More than half (50.3%) of the respondents "often" consumed local social media. They had less exposure to local traditional media and online forums, with only 20.7% reading traditional local media often. Perhaps contrary to common impressions, only 11.9% of respondents said they browsed local online forums such as HKGolden (高登) and LIHKG (连登) often (Table 5-2).

-Overwhelming Hongkonger identity

There was a overwhelming identity of "Only Hongkonger" to that of "Chinese", the former accounting for the majority (35.4%) and the latter accounting for the least (1.3%). With the "More Hongkonger than Chinese" included, the proportion of people more likely to identify with the identity of "Hongkonger" reached 55.6%. In contrast, only 2.5% of the respondents identified with "Chinese" and "More Chinese than Hongkonger" (Table 5-2). These figures are consistent with the survey of 15-29-year-olds conducted by the Chinese University of

Table 5-3. Multiple linear regression analysis (predictors of subjective sense of national identity vis-à-vis local identity)

	Secondary school students
<i>Independent variables</i>	
Learning knowledge about national identity[H1-1]	-.064
Participating in extra curriculum activities in Mainland China[H1-2]	-.081
Participating in activities of Central Government in Hong Kong[H1-3]	-.114**
Discussion of political issues with family members [H2-1]	-.071
Co-participation in political movements with family members [H2-2]	.006
Discussion of political issues with peers [H3-1]	.234***
Co-participation in political movements with peers [H3-2]	.040
Discussion of political issues with teachers [H4-1]	-.056
Co-participation in political movements with teachers [H4-2]	-.010
Exposure to local traditional media [H5-1]	-.061
Exposure to local social media [H5-2]	.160***
Exposure to local online forum [H5-3]	.247***
<i>Control factors</i>	
Sex	-.014
Age	-.019
Place of birth	.134
Number of years living in Hong Kong	-.088
Father's place of birth	.081
Mother's place of birth	.032
Household income	.057
<i>Total R²</i>	34.3

*Note: Regression entries are standardised beta coefficients; *** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$.*

Hong Kong in 2016 (in which 47.6% identified as "Hongkongers," while 37.5% were

"Hongkongers but also Chinese", and only 3.7% reported themselves as being "Chinese," with 9.9% identifying as "Chinese but also Hongkongers.") (Centre for Youth Studies, 2017).

***-Hypothesis 1:** Students who have more nationalist education experiences will have a higher probability of having a stronger Chinese identity vis-à-vis Hongkonger identity.*

Regression analysis showed that the hypothesis was partially supported. Firstly, students' nationalist education knowledge learning and participation in exchange activities in the Mainland had no significant predictive power on their national identity ($p > .05$). This means that nationalist education and exchanges in the Mainland did not have a significant effect on the students' national identity. However, participation in the activities of the central government agencies in Hong Kong had a significant predictive power on the youth's national identity ($\beta = -.114, p < .01$) (Table 5-3). This means that respondents who had participated in such activities identified more as "Chinese". However, it is not possible to conclude that participation in such activities by the central government agencies in Hong Kong was effective in promoting the youth's identification as Chinese, because the linear relationship here was not directional. It is also possible that respondents who preferred a Chinese identity were more likely to participate in such activities. The directionality of this effect and if/how participation in such activities influenced respondents' national identity requires the use of further research methods such as interviews. Unfortunately, however, given the very small number of survey respondents who had participated in such activities (3.1%, see Table 5-2), it turned out that none of the interviewees in this study had done so. Therefore, the data from this study did not yet allow for an in-depth analysis of the question.

***-Hypothesis 2-1:** Students who discuss political issues with family members will have a high probability of having a stronger Hongkonger identity vis-à-vis Chinese identity.*

This hypothesis could not be confirmed for there was no significant predictive power of the variable “Discuss political issues with family members” for “National identity” ($p > .05$) (Table 5-3). Thus, it cannot state that students who frequently discuss political issues with family members identified more with Hongkonger identity vis-à-vis Chinese identity.

-Hypothesis 2-2: Students who co-participate in political movements with family members will have a high probability of having a stronger Hongkonger identity vis-à-vis Chinese identity.

This hypothesis could not be supported since the variable of “Co-participate in political movements” was found to have no significant predictive power for national identity ($p > .05$) (Table 5-3). There was no relationship between co-participating in political movements with family members and national identity.

However, the main reason this hypothesis could not be confirmed may be the insufficient sample size, which means that there are too few respondents, accounting for only 10.8% of the total sample, indicating that they had participated in social movements with their families (Table 5-3). Furthermore, this factor does not appear to have been critical since the respondents tended to have Hongkonger identity regardless of whether they had participated in social movements with their families.

-Hypothesis 3-1: Students who discuss political issues with peers will have a high probability of having a stronger Hongkonger identity vis-à-vis Chinese identity.

This hypothesis validated as the "peers" factor had a relative strong predictive power for national identity ($\beta = .234, p < .001$) (Table 5-3). In other words, the young people who often discussed political issues with peers or had ever participated in social movements were more likely to identify with the identity of "Hongkonger", and accordingly, less likely to

identify with the "Chinese" identity.

-Hypothesis 3-2: Students who co-participate in political movements with peers will have a high probability of having a stronger Hongkonger identity vis-à-vis Chinese identity.

This hypothesis could not be supported due to its insignificant predictive power for national identity in the multiple linear regression analysis ($p > .05$) (Table 5-3). Therefore, it cannot be claimed that the students who co-participated in political movements with peers would identify more with the Hongkonger identity than with the Chinese.

-Hypothesis 4-1: Students who discuss political issues with teachers will have a high probability of having a stronger Hongkonger identity vis-à-vis Chinese identity.

The variable of "Discuss political issues with teachers" had no significant predictive power for "National identity" ($p > .05$) (Table 5-3), which means it could not be confirmed that the students who discussed political issues more frequently with their teachers would identify more with the Hongkonger than with the Chinese identity.

-Hypothesis 4-2: Students who co-participate in political movements with teachers will have a high probability of having a stronger Hongkonger identity vis-à-vis Chinese identity.

This hypothesis could not be accepted as the variable of "Co-participate in political movements with teachers" had no significant predictive power for "National identity" ($p > .05$) (Table 5-3). However, this may have been because there were too few (1.0%) respondents ($N = 12$) (Table 5-3) who indicated they had ever co-participated in social movements with teachers.

As mentioned earlier, most secondary school teachers in Hong Kong maintain a neutral role and do not guide their students' political tendencies directly, so they usually do not encourage

their students to participate in social movements.

Overall, the analyses suggest that the influence of peers on national identity among Hong Kong youth is more significant than the other two political socialization agents of families and teachers.

-Hypothesis 5-1: Students who are exposed to local traditional media will have a high probability of having a stronger Hongkonger identity vis-à-vis Chinese identity.

This hypothesis was not supported due to its insignificant predictive power for “National identity” as indicated by the regression analysis ($p > .05$) (Table 5-3). This means that the students’ exposure to local traditional media had no evident impact on their national identity.

-Hypothesis 5-2: Students who are exposed to local social media will have a high probability of having a stronger Hongkonger identity vis-à-vis Chinese identity.

Hypothesis 5-2 was confirmed due to the significant predictive power of local social media exposure for “National identity” as regression analysis indicates ($\beta = .160, p < .001$) (Table 5-3). This means that the students who were exposed more to local social media had a higher probability of having a stronger Hongkonger identity vis-à-vis Chinese identity.

-Hypothesis 5-3: Students who are exposed to local online forums will have a higher probability of having a stronger Hongkonger identity vis-à-vis Chinese identity.

Hypothesis 5-3 was accepted, with a significant predictive power of local online forum exposure for “National identity” ($\beta = .247, p < .001$) (Table 5-3). This means that the students who were exposed more to local social media had a higher probability of having a stronger Hongkonger identity vis-à-vis Chinese identity.

5.2 Qualitative findings and discussion

The interviews focused on the factors of nationalist education, peers, media, family and teachers to explore their influence on the process of adolescents' national identity. Because the purpose of this study was to explore reasons for the high level of Hong Kong identity and the corresponding low level of Chinese identity in Hong Kong youths, the qualitative analysis was concerned with the reasons why they identify as Hongkonger rather than Chinese and the role of the political socialization agents in this process.

Overall, the extended interviews qualitatively validated the quantitative findings from the campus surveys. Discussion of political issues with peers, exposure to local social media, and exposure to local online forums were highlighted by the interviewees as contributing to the conception of their national identity.

The feeble impact of nationalist education

Uncertainty about the impact of Chinese History on the identity of Hong Kong youth

The subject of Chinese History is one of the important national education courses in Hong Kong. The changes in this subject's curriculum before and after the handover were described in Chapter 3. Chinese History is a subject that focuses on China and its common past with Hong Kong, Chinese national culture, glory and trauma, and other topics related to national identity. It is, therefore, a subject that is inseparable from the study of nationalist education.

According to the interviews, the impact of Chinese History on the identity of Hong Kong youth is uncertain. From a cultural dimension, this course may foster some appreciation of traditional Chinese culture among students. And from a political perspective, students could learn about the political mistakes of the past. Some treat it as “dark history”, but others just see it as policy mistakes that do not necessarily lead to a negative impression of the current

regime. Typical comments included:

“The influence of Chinese History course on national identity half and half, there are some positive ones such as the prosperity of the Han and the Tang Dynasty. Some are not so good, such as the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms, the Northern and Southern Dynasties, or the Song Dynasty.

Modern history seems to have no effect. I remember that the most impressive thing was the Cultural Revolution. There were some policies of Mao Zedong in the founding of the country. For example, the land reform, I think that was really good, so that the peasants would no longer be so inferior.

I thought that the Chinese people are not really bad. Then there were some ones like Mao Zedong who was better at the beginning, but what he did later really made a lot of Chinese people die in vain, then I changed my mind.” (I-12)

Obvious impact of Liberal Studies

From the interviews, the impact of the Liberal Studies (LS) subject was relatively obvious. It was connected directly to the participants’ resistance to Chinese identity and their affiliating to Hongkonger identity.

First, in the “Modern China” module students may learn about the remarkable achievements in economics and technology since the reform. However, they may also be exposed to some negative issues behind the development, such as environmental pollution, migrant workers,

left-behind children¹³, or the gap between the rich and poor. Students may know about the development, but may also understand the costs behind it. Thus, the bright facet of China cannot cover its dark corners. The strong academic achievement may not be enough to motivate young students' pride in or admiration of China. As some interviewees said:

"I learned about some negative issues in China from the Liberal Studies. I remember that it was called "Modern China" and talked about the system of petitions and letters of appeal, that is, some peasants had to appeal to the government because their houses were demolished, but the government ignored them. They failed the petition and were left in a terrible situation. Then I felt so sad about such events in the dark and from the injustice I learned about in the LS, I felt that it is not good to live in China." (I-17)

"I learned more about China through Liberal Studies. Maybe I understand that there are some aspects of China that are very good, such as their technology and industries. But at the same time, we got to know about many problems arising from these developments. That is, we learned how China is so powerful, and what is behind it, such as migrant workers, the left-behind children. That is, we know what is great in China, but at the same time we all understand that there are so many (negative) things." (I-14)

Another module, "Hong Kong Today", introduces core Hong Kong values which have been

¹³ The term "left-behind children" refers to children who are left in their hometowns, lodged in the homes of rural relatives, because one or both of their parents have gone to work in cities or towns. These children live separately from their parents for a long time.

built on universal values. As mentioned before, the Chinese and Hongkonger identities are distinguished by different values.

Extra-curricular activities (exchange to Mainland)

The first reason the interviewees did not participate in extra curricular activities was “lack of interest”, which may have been linked to the negative images of China in their minds.

Frequently they attached the word “dangerous” to the Mainland. This may have resulted from some criminal cases reported in local media or just to their fear of unfamiliar surroundings.

But a more critical issue was they concerns they expressed about the lack of freedom and prevalence of surveillance in the Mainland. The most notorious of these are its strict restrictions on foreign network access and the rigorous censorship of online content, which was mentioned several times in the interviews.

For the students who had participated in Mainland exchange activities, this experience was also not necessarily effective in promoting positive perceptions of the Mainland or even Chinese identity. Most of these students viewed the Mainland exchange as an ordinary trip, and some of them were impressed by the local food and recalled it with great fondness. However, the deep impressions about the Mainland that were often mentioned were negative ones. such as 'dirty and messy' and people spitting everywhere.

Going to the Mainland to experience it first-hand can help improve students’ understanding of China, but it was not clear from the interviews whether it promoted understanding or aspiration. Some interviewees mentioned that they were touched by seeing scenes of urban construction that showcased the country's rapid development and modernization, but that this did not seem to add to their 'patriotic feelings'. Even though some of the interviewees had participated in aerospace technology, which demonstrates the strength of a great nation, the

novelty and amazement of the technology would only go so far and would not rise to the level of their national identity.

Apart from some adverse experiences, for the interviewees who had participated, the exchange activities may have built some personal emotional ties with China. An interested case was that of a boy who went to Beijing on an excursion related to space technology during his primary school years. The very warm hospitality he received from his host family there touched him so much that it made him feel better about the Chinese people.

“I went on a tour to Beijing to learn about space technology when I was in elementary school. I went to a host family for a few days. Wow, the family was really nice! They really took care of me, they looked after me, the kids in their house were my friends, they protected me. They impressed me almost as much as my peers in secondary school. As I said that I stick to my Hongkonger identity because my peers were very supportive of me as I grew up. I think the value of my host family was the same.” (I-12)

It is clear from the analysis here that, as described in Chapter 3, Hong Kong officials have launched numerous initiatives in the field of education aimed at fostering young students' identification with Chinese identity. However, nationalist education itself may have been implemented with many contradictions, at least in terms of failing to have the desired effect in fostering national education among young students.

The attempt to cultivate a common memory and cultural connection to China through promoting Chinese history and traditional culture focuses on the "perception" of China, which seems to perpetuate the sense of "cultural China" or even "Chinese national" identity since the colonial period. However, the contradiction appears in the current political identity.

Interviewees often mentioned the conflict between the "values" of China and Hong Kong. Apart from the media and other factors, the education system in Hong Kong has always emphasized values education based on universal values. When the concepts of democracy, freedom, human rights, rule of law, and clean government are deeply rooted in people's minds, the alternative discourse by Chinese officials have aroused a sense of self-protection and even hostility among the Hong Kong youth. The "Chinese" identity, which is based on political sense, has to be avoided. While superficial exchanges with the Mainland may be able to enhance the youth's sensory perceptions of China, it is doubtful whether a short period of exposure can elicit positive feelings towards the Mainland. However, using exchange programs to strengthen the emotional ties between Hong Kong youth and mainlanders (students, host families, etc.) may be an approach worth considering.

In short, in the past, the official nationalist education initiatives in Hong Kong have been contradictory in their implementation. In addition to the widespread social media information and peer influence among secondary school students, social movements and other key events reveal the social and value conflicts between Hong Kong and China, which make it difficult for young students to identify themselves as "Chinese", as represented by the Mainland and its authority.

Peers

Just as the quantitative analysis revealed the peer factor to be a significant predictor of national identity, this emerged as a key theme from the qualitative interview data. According to the interviews, this influence of peers on national identity is manifested in two ways. The first of these is the attention to political issues reflected in the political discussion itself among peers, and the identification and mutual reinforcement of cohorts with the same political orientation by the discussion of political topics. Second, there is also a collective

identity among peers based on emotional ties.

The discussion of political issues between teenagers and their peers seems to reflect, first and foremost, the respondents' concerns about political issues, which often lead to politically controversial topics and thus reinforce dissatisfaction with government policies. Discussion of political issues spreads and reinforces young people's perceptions of China, especially its negative aspects. Political issues are often related to the policies of the Beijing government towards Hong Kong and the SAR government, and these discussions often include controversial topics. Thus, reflections on political issues are often accompanied by discontent with Beijing and the Hong Kong government, which affects their identity as Chinese:

“I usually discuss political topics with my classmates and friends, mainly about what is happening in Hong Kong and the society. For example, people with different political views were arrested because of the National Security Law, and our views on these things are not very positive. Because I think Hong Kong's freedom seems to be getting less and less, academic freedom are getting less and less these issues we will discuss.” (I-14)

In fact, however, the main source of topics for political discussion among peers is mostly the media. In this respect, the influence of the peer and media factors seems to be inter-related, which will be considered in more detail later, in the section on the media factor.

In addition to political discussions, the emotional connection between peers also emerged from the interviews as an important factor in the development of a national identity. The concept of a collective based on emotional connections is one of the key features of national identity (Edwards, 1985). The participants in the interviews for this study revealed that the peers who are classmates or friends create a collective identity and influence each other. The

experience of spending time with each other provides an emotional bond that sustains the collective identity, which in turn reinforces the identification with their common “Hongkonger” identity. In addition, peers sometimes exclude “deviants” (e.g. peers who are close to China) to reinforce the collective identity.

The collective identity of peers is particularly evident in Hong Kong's social movements. The youth indicated in their interviews that they were more likely to be infected to identify with Hongkonger and resist Chinese identity by even just witnessing their peers participation in social movements. This is an interesting contradiction since the regression analysis described above found that the variable of co-participation in social movements with peers had no significant predictive power for students' national identity. The interviewees sympathized with peers involved in social movements and were emotionally inspired even if they, themselves, had never participated. Several respondents mentioned the impacts their peers had on their national identity during the 2019 social movement.

"Generally speaking, the peer factor has had the greatest impact on my identity. In fact, I am a bit resistant to the Chinese identity now, because I think that the things I come into contact with actually come from my peers. I think if I identify as Chinese, on the one hand, I am really uneasy. If I had accused those anti-government peers during the social movement, no one would have criticised me, but then I think my own heart would be very uneasy, I just don't have enough peace of mind. We can't write off what they've done

I was touched by the fact that my peers took good care of me during the movements. Why do I cling to the identity of Hongkonger? It's because of my classmates who have given me a lot of support in my growth. During the 2019 social movement, I would feel uneasy if I accused them of being anti-government

or such, because when I was just in junior high school, my peers grew up with me every day, and they were very important to me. " (I-12)

"Through the social movement in 2019, I could see that Hong Kong people are very caring (有愛). They helped each other in the protests. When the police caught the participants, even strangers would rush to rescue them. This kind of brotherhood moved me so much. " (I-17)

"I think the main reason why (my peers) identify with Hong Kong people is because of the influence of their peers because, for example, the Anti-Extradition Bill Movement, at the beginning, many young people actually felt a sense of sympathy for them. They felt like their own peers, they were in the same generation, so they felt a sense of empathy. "(I-12)

"The source of information, my friends, has the greatest influence on my thoughts about national identity. Earlier it was my family, when I was young. But later, the influence of friends has gradually increased. Because it's usually the media or some platform that someone around us uses, we will follow them. The media we use often change, but we usually choose information around a specific political orientation if we have the same group of friends. "(I-13)

"The male students might then ostracise those who go to China for fun. Maybe there's a guy who went to China and then came back, then he'd get ostracised. Don't know why, they would say things like, 'Don't stay in Hong Kong, go back to China' for fun, and things like that that didn't make much sense. " (I-11)

Exposure to local social media

Hong Kong's relatively free media environment and professionalism (Kwong, 2015; F. L. F.

Lee, 2018a; F. L. F. Lee & Chan, 2008) enabled the media to provide fair, or at least pluralistic, political views, making them more able to win the trust of readers. The interviewees in this study generally preferred news media that they perceived as “fair and balanced” (持平) and “rational” (理性) rather than overtly biased, in fact mainly local news media based on the internet.

First, the local media in Hong Kong, especially the online media, tend to be negative in their coverage of China (W. Chen, 2012), which is also reflected in our interviews. Even respondents who were fond of China admitted that the local media they used were mostly negative about China. To some extent, these negative messages shaped the respondents' negative images of China, such as regarding it as unjust, unfree, and backward. They explained that they often see news in the local news media reflecting injustice in the mainland, such as petitions, the wide gap between the rich and the poor and corruption. There is also information reflecting the lack of freedom in the mainland, such as the control of the press. In addition, as the mainland population is large, there is naturally more negative social news, and frequent exposure to such information will also affect readers' impressions. For example, the interviewees pointed out that reports on vicious crimes, even if only occasional, may give the impression that the mainland is "dangerous". These negative images of Mainland China tend to influence the perceptions of young people towards China, and hence their identity as Chinese.

"The two media outlets I follow, Apple Daily and The Stand News, have more negative stories about China than positive..... which have influenced my view of the mainland for sure to a certain extent. Because when the local pro-democracy media talk about human rights issues in China, of course, they will give me a relatively bad impression. But other media may not report or even ignores these

problems. But I think it's a good thing to have a report that tells what kind of problems there are in China. And this definitely has affected my identity with the Chinese." (I-14)

Second, young people are exposed to news of conflicts and contradictions between China and Hong Kong on social media (e.g. social movements), which, on one hand, reinforces their resistance to being Chinese and, on the other, strengthens their identity as Hongkongers. The conflict between Hong Kong and China reflects, first and foremost, the differences in "values" between the two sides, mainly in terms of their understanding of and adherence to (western) "universal values". The respondents felt that the concepts of respect for human rights, democracy and freedom in China and Hong Kong are contradictory and difficult to coexist with. They also found it difficult to reconcile Hongkonger with Chinese, as expressed in the "Hong Kong core values".

In addition to this, other past conflicts between Hong Kong and China, such as excessive parallel importers, the double non-permanent residents giving birth in Hong Kong, and the milk powder stashing, have also made respondents feel that there is an incompatibility between Chinese and Hong Kong people. Such discourses have been spread extensively on social media, and this contributed to reducing the respondents' sense of Chinese identity, while reinforcing their identity as Hongkongers.

"Maybe if I had filled in the questionnaire six or seven years ago, I think I would have chosen 'Hongkonger of China'. But in the past three to four years, I would have chosen "Hongkonger", probably because the influence of some social events has strengthened my identity as a Hongkonger. For example, the conflict between China and Hong Kong, the "doubly non-permanent resident" issue, the milk powder scramble, although it was actually many years ago. I feel the conflict and

contradiction between Hong Kong people and mainlanders. The Individual Visit Scheme has changed to several times per week. Hong Kong people's rejection of Chinese people has been strengthened, and the concept of identifying as Hongkongers has also been strengthened." (I-13)

"I think that at this stage, the identities of Chinese and Hongkonger seem to be incompatible. I have seen that apart from the Chinese who have a high level of xenophobiahave a strong sense of local identity. In fact, many Hong Kong people do too. Because we have different histories and cultures. That means there are conflicts. The Chinese don't accept that Hong Kong people have the same mindset. Hong Kong people also think that Chinese people are selfish and self-serving, and that they are only doing it for themselves." (I-12)

In addition, the discourse describing the conflict between Hong Kong and China, which has been circulated widely in local social media, has also triggered a crisis among young people about the uniqueness of the Hong Kong identity, which in turn has made them more likely to defend it. The media discourses received by the respondents suggested that the Central Government's policy towards Hong Kong would change its characteristics and it would "become the same as the mainland", which led to an identity crisis. This is also in line with the discourse of peripheral identity rising in Hong Kong from the centre-periphery perspective mentioned earlier (B. C. H. Fong, 2017b; Lave & Wenger, 1991; Wu, 2016).

"The central government's control of Hong Kong makes me think that it will become one of the cities in China and lose its flavour..... Hong Kong may lose a lot of local things, such as the Cantonese language, which may become less and less common... ..I would feel much more comfortable living in Hong Kong for there are less injustice or so. I think the characteristics of Hong Kong need to be

preserved and not made identical to Mainland China... ..not to say exactly the same, even if it's not as good as it is now, life is not comfortable. So I would want to preserve this 'Hongkonger' identity even more." (I-17)

Exposure to the local online forum

Local online forums, represented by LIHKG, became a space disseminating radical opinions during the Anti-Extradition Bill Movement period in Hong Kong. Although this study did not intend to focus on a particular event, it was inevitably affected since the survey was carried out just after this large-scale movement had been de-escalated. The particular role of local online forums arose with this movement. In a newspaper poll conducted during the Anti-Extradition Bill Movement on July 1, 2019, 55% of respondents regarded the LIHKG as the most popular form of media (Apple Daily, 2019). Since then, LIHKG has increasingly become the primary source of information for participants in the Anti-Extradition Bill Movement (F. L. F. Lee et al., 2021). More noteworthy is that protesters using LIHKG have more positive attitudes towards radical action and show a stronger sense of solidarity (F. L. F. Lee et al., 2021).

The relationship between online forum use and social movement participation can also be verified from the correlation between the two in this survey (Table 5-4).

Table 5-4: Correlation between local media and family/peers/teachers factor

	1. Discuss political issues with families	3. Discuss political issues with peers	5. Discuss political issues with teachers	2. Political participation with families	4. Political participation with peers	6. Political participation with teachers
7-2. Exposure to social media of HK	.240**	.360**	.178**	.104**	.240**	.012
7-3. Exposure to online forums of HK	.310**	.496**	.327**	.133**	.392**	.093**

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

* . Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

The correlation of co-participation in movements with exposure to online forums was

stronger than with exposure to social media. More important is that the correlation was also stronger between online forum exposure and political discussion (with family/peers/teachers). As well, it had a moderate correlation with the factor of “political discussion with peers” ($r = .496, p < .05$). At the same time, the regression analysis described earlier in this chapter showed a close relationship between political discussions with peers and national identity.

Online forums have, first and foremost, the main attribute of social media, namely the sharing of information. Therefore, the impact of social media exposure on national identity, including differences in values, negative images of China and the preservation of Hong Kong's identity, as described above, is largely present in online forums. At the same time, the free discussion mode of online forums allows users to be exempt from the journalistic norms required of professional news media, and they may be filled with radical political views and statements. Exposure to or endorsement of these views may lead to or reinforce youth antipathy towards China. In addition, the freedom of users to participate in discussions and express their views on forums is a feature that follows on from the aforementioned political discussions among peers, and therefore affects the national identity of young people. But the most striking feature of online forums, mainly the LIHKG, has to be its focus on social movements in 2019.

The interviewees revealed that they often browsed the LIHKG for information about the social movement during 2019, including analyses of the Extradition Bill and tactics or acts of demonstration. However, most of the discussion turned into emotional catharsis after the movement subsided, which also implied that lots of fierce objections were gathered on the forum. Then the youths who were often exposed to online forums side with or were affected by the radical opinions presented on this medium.

"I often used LIHKG during the 2019 social movement to learn some information

about it. Some users there analyzed the impact of the Extradition Bill, which was very different from what the Government had said. The government only talked about the good side, but it was analyzed on LIHKG that this Bill may allow Hong Kong people to be arrested and sent to the mainland arbitrarily. " (I-15).

"During the 2019 social movement, I often browsed on LIHKG to learn about the discussion on the actions of the movement. But later (after the movement subsided), most of the discussion was to vent their emotions or 'blow water' (meaningless gossip) or to abuse each other, which was meaningless. [Now] I only take a look at it once in a while when I am bored. " (I-16)

To sum up, youths who often used the local online forum (under the influence of the Anti-Extradition Bill Movement) preferred or were more likely to be exposed to radical political views and related more closely to social movement participation and political discussion. Those who preferred LIHKG content were more likely to prefer the Hongkonger identity.

Parents: Effect faded after the youths entered into secondary school and accessed media

Quantitatively, parents have limited influence on their children's national identity. Although the frequency of youths' political discussions with their parents was found to be similar to their discussion with peers (Table 5-2), its predictive power for national identity was much lower than that of the latter. The interview found that just because they do not often discuss political issues with their parents does not mean these youth do not care about politics, but they just disagree with their parents. Furthermore, the parents may influence youths' perceptions of and identity with China before they enter junior secondary school. After that, the youths will gradually form political views and their own national identity because of the convenient access to social media on their mobile phones.

There are two aspects of political discussion in Hong Kong youths' families since the members (i.e. parents) may be pro-democracy or pro-establishment/China. Political discussions in pro-democracy families may work with the factors of peers and media to promote young people's preferences for the Hongkonger identity.

Nonetheless, the youths were interviewed in this study suggested that when they started secondary school they were unlikely be affected by their parents' pro-China views. The influence of this kind of family may provide one more dimension (mainly positive) to the information about China for their children to consider. They suggested that some junior secondary school students are more likely to identify with Chinese identity due to the earlier influence of their families, but then their political orientation can take a sharp turn after being affected by the media, peers and school education. Then they no longer discuss political issues with families too much because of widening discrepancy with them on political issues.

"In the past, I had many discussions on political issues with my parents, but now they are less, because of different views. They are more supportive of China or what the Government does. Of course, I don't agree with them. So, there will be arguments in these topics. No one give way to each other, so there is less discussion than before. " (I-14)

A student whose mother was pro-China indicated the change in his political attitude:

"I used to spend much time with my family when I was young, and I believed what they said. I didn't know what "yellow silk" and "blue silk" [indicate the pro- and anti-social movement camps respectively] are, I had no idea of politics, and I believed entirely what my mother said. I thought my classmates would hold the same political views as me before the 2019 social movement. However, it was

unexpectedly found that both students and teachers were in favour of those who opposed the government in private. So I began to reflect that what my mother had always said was not all correct, if there was something wrong. " (I-12)

The interviews revealed two different directions of influence in the political discussions between young people and their parents, which may be pro-Hong Kong or pro-China. However, because of the increase in knowledge, the respondents explained that when they entered secondary school they had more pro-Hong Kong political discussions with their parents and fewer pro-China. Therefore, those who had more political discussions with their families were more likely to identify with the Hongkonger identity vis-à-vis Chinese.

According to the interviews, family factors' impact on youth's political views may be diverted by the media. As they developed different sources of information from their family members (parents), this led to discrepancies in their political views. The story of one of the interviewees is representative:

"I don't quite agree with my parents' political views because we have different sources of information. They prefer "Ming Pao", "Ta Kung Pao" and "TVB News"¹⁴. We get information in different ways. The way I get information is usually online, which I think is relatively unbiased. I watched TV and other media with them before 2014 (Umbrella Movement) and we didn't have much difference in political views, though I seldom discussed it with them. Since 2014, the differences went greater as I browsed on the internet more often. " (I-14)

¹⁴ Three media deemed as pro-China.

The interviewees thought that parents who prefer traditional media may tend to be more pro-China than teenagers. On the other hand, they suggested that young students who rely on online media due to the popularity of mobile phones are more likely to be pro-democracy and to identify with Hongkonger identity vis-à-vis Chinese. Therefore, to some extent, it can be said that the political discussion between youths and family members is also based on the factor of media.

Teachers: Indirect influence

Quantitatively, the factor of political discussion with teachers was shown to have little effect on students' national identity. The primary reason may be that the students were less likely to discuss political issues with their teachers (Table 5-2), which was also reflected in the interviews. The students indicated that they seldom discussed political issues with their teachers, and that teachers were usually more cautious about exposing their own political standpoints.

"In fact, I seldom discuss political issues with my teachers. Different students have different understandings of what they say as teachers. So they will be more careful of what they say. They try not to affect us because of their political positions The lessons that teachers teach about politics or national identity can tell us much knowledge, but they may not help us much with our national identity. " (I-14)

"Usually the teachers are not bold enough to talk about political topics. They just gloss over in classes and then say it's not going to be tested. Basically, it's an avoidance attitude, because it's important to have a job." (I-16)

Nevertheless, this is not to say that teachers have no influence on students' political attitudes or national identity. It appears from the interviews that the influence of teachers on students is

mainly indirect. Several students in the interview mentioned that they learned "universal values" in school (and the media) and then resisted Chinese identity based on the conflict between the Chinese authorities and those values.

The correlation analysis showed that the agents of media and peers stand out from the other two (parents, teachers) in taking leading roles in political socialization contributing to the national identity of Hong Kong youth. Nevertheless, the extent of their contributions to the dependent variable (i.e. national identity) and the internal relationship among the independent variables warranted further regression analysis, which will be discussed later.

5.3 Supplementary empirical findings and analysis

Variety of national identity among schools and grades

Since the schools from which the sample was drawn for this study had different backgrounds with regard to religion, region and band (the system in Hong Kong of classifying schools according to academic achievement), it was deemed helpful to observe whether the differences in these factors were related to the national identities of students in these different types of schools. grade and educational levels, and especially whether or not the students have studied "Liberal Studies", may impact upon national identity, so it was necessary to observe whether there were significant differences in national identity among the different schools and forms (i.e. grades) from which the respondents were drawn.

Among different schools

A one-way ANOVA analysis indicated no significant difference in national identity indicators among the three schools ($p > .05$) (Table 5-5, 5-6).

The data indicated that there was no significant difference in national identity among the

three sample schools in this case. In other words, there was no significant difference in national identity between religious (school-I&II) and non-religious schools (school-III), or between Band-1, the highest level of the three-band system) (school-I) and Band-2 (schools-II&III). In other words, students from different religious beliefs and academic levels in this

Table 5-5. Variety of national identity between schools by One-way ANOVA analysis (1)

School	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval for Mean		Minimum	Maximum
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound		
I	244	1.91	.918	.059	1.79	2.02	1	5
II	388	1.92	.929	.047	1.83	2.02	1	5
III	280	1.88	1.032	.062	1.76	2.00	1	5
Total	912	1.91	.958	.032	1.84	1.97	1	5

Table 5-6. Variety of national identity between schools by One-way ANOVA analysis (2)

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	0.267	2	0.134	0.145	0.865
Within Groups	835.623	909	0.919		
Total	835.89	911			

case all showed strong Hongkonger identity vis-à-vis Chinese identity. However, due to the limitation of the sample, this result cannot confirm or falsify the influence of religion or schools at different levels on students' national identity.

Among different forms

In terms of national identity, from the perspective of the sample as a whole, there was a significant difference found between Form 3 and Forms 4/6. That is to say, the Form 3 seemed to have a higher degree of "Chinese" identity than those in the senior forms ($M=2.10$) (Table 5-7). There was no significant difference, however, between Form 3 and Form 5 on national identity (Table 5-8). Therefore, based on this survey it cannot be claimed that the junior students identifies more as Chinese than the senior students.

Table 5-7. Variety of national identity between Forms by One-way ANOVA analysis (1)

Form	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval for Mean		Minimum	Maximum
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound		
3	269	2.10	1.042	0.064	1.98	2.23	1	5
4	216	1.75	0.936	0.064	1.62	1.88	1	5
5	204	1.89	0.925	0.065	1.76	2.02	1	5
6	223	1.83	0.863	0.058	1.72	1.94	1	5
Total	912	1.91	0.958	0.032	1.84	1.97	1	5

Table 5-8. Variety of national identity between Forms by One-way ANOVA analysis (2)*Multiple Comparisons**Tukey HSD*

(I) Form	(J) Form	Mean Difference			95% Confidence Interval	
		(I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	Lower Bound	Upper Bound
3	4	.354*	0.087	0	0.13	0.58
	5	.212	0.088	0.077	-0.01	0.44
	6	.274*	0.086	0.008	0.05	0.5
4	3	-.354*	0.087	0	-0.58	-0.13
	5	-.142	0.093	0.418	-0.38	0.1
	6	-.080	0.091	0.816	-0.31	0.15
5	3	-.212	0.088	0.077	-0.44	0.01
	4	.142	0.093	0.418	-0.1	0.38
	6	.063	0.092	0.905	-0.17	0.3
6	3	-.274*	0.086	0.008	-0.5	-0.05
	4	.080	0.091	0.816	-0.15	0.31
	5	-.063	0.092	0.905	-0.3	0.17

*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.

Given this interesting finding, regression analysis was used to look further at whether there were differences in the predictive power of individual political socialization agents for different grades. Similar to the above, the predictive power of each independent variables on the national identity was calculated separately for each of Form-3 to Form-6 as the demographic variables were controlled. The results are presented below in Table 5-9.

Table 5-9 indicates that there were no significant patterning differences between the different independent variables in relation to the coefficients of national identity across grades. At least the Form-3 results did not show significant variability when compared to the other three grades.

Table 5-9. The standardized regression coefficients ^a for the national identity on political socialization agents in different grade levels

	F3		F4		F5		F6	
	β	Sig.	β	Sig.	β	Sig.	β	Sig.
Sex	.065	.429	-.064	.515	-.031	.673	-.036	.653
Year of birth	.007	.940	.002	.982	-.127	.094	-.011	.894
Birthplace	.124	.212	.149	.238	.144	.171	.123	.297
Years lived in HK	-.009	.931	-.053	.665	-.064	.540	-.201	.105
Father's birthplace	.074	.460	.132	.251	.138	.093	-.072	.463
Mother's birthplace	.093	.383	.060	.621	-.051	.551	.075	.470
Household income	.021	.809	.082	.427	.061	.440	.153	.087
1-1.Learning Knowledge of national identity	-.072	.382	-.043	.665	-.083	.276	.002	.984
1-2.Participating extra curriculum activities to mainland China	-.104	.192	-.016	.875	-.024	.744	-.092	.253
1-3.Participating activities of institutions of the Central People' s Government in Hong Kong	-.117	.143	-.127	.203	-.014	.853	-.200	.011
2-1. Discuss political issues with families	-.095	.330	-.089	.425	-.063	.480	-.024	.799
2-2. Political participation with families	.074	.375	.025	.805	-.067	.410	-.031	.721
3-1. Discuss political issues with peers	.207	.046	.138	.274	.262	.006	.171	.106
3-2. Political participation with peers	.046	.570	.120	.290	.048	.582	.007	.942
4-1. Discuss political issues with teachers	-.043	.622	-.112	.302	-.116	.187	-.001	.995
4-2. Political participation with teachers	/ ^b	/	-.022	.827	-.031	.714	.053	.496
5-1. Exposure to traditional media of HK	-.057	.483	-.038	.700	-.078	.310	-.076	.373
5-2. Exposure to social media of HK	.130	.154	.074	.492	.208	.019	.176	.062
5-3. Exposure to online forums of HK	.241	.017	.339	.010	.251	.005	.248	.017

^a Dependent Variable: National identity

^b The variable here was deleted from analysis given no respond of “yes”

Possible reasons why senior high school students identify as Chinese significantly less than lower grades can be inferred from the differences between the grade levels. The first difference is the age. The process of political socialisation differs for those in early (12-14 years) and late adolescence (15-17 years) (Gotlieb et al., 2015), these being the two stages that also correspond roughly to the age distribution of junior and senior secondary school students in Hong Kong. From early to late adolescence there are significant political shifts in

identity formation, cognitive development, parent and peer relationships, school environment and communication practices (Flanagan, 2013; Jennings & Stoker, 2001; Ruck et al., 2002; Smetana et al., 2006). There are, therefore, differences in the development of national identities. The second is the difference in curricula. As mentioned earlier, Liberal Studies, which is started in Form 4, may promote students' identification with the Hongkonger identity. The third is the growth of overlapping perceptions of key social events. In the year before the survey, Hong Kong experienced a vigorous Anti-Extradition Bill Movement. During that period, through media information dissemination and peer discussion, the cohort was confronted visually with the contradictions and conflicting values of China and Hong Kong. This event may have had a greater impact on the older students and those who were about to enter senior secondary school at that time, thus making the senior students more supportive of the Hong Kong identity and more distant from the Chinese identity.

Internal relationship of the political socialization agents and nationalist education factor

Hierarchical regression analysis

In order to further analyse the influence of each variable, that is, each political socialization agent and nationalist education factor, on the national identity of Hong Kong adolescents, the author conducted a regression analysis of the variables. This was followed by a further analysis of the contributions of the media factors which had been found in the preceding regression analysis to have the most substantial predictive power for national identity.

Hierarchical regression analysis was conducted to examine the power of the five sets of independent variables, nationalist education/family/teacher/peer/local media, to predict the dependent variable, “National identity”. First, the demographic information, including “Sex”, “Age”, “Birthplace”, “Parents' birthplace”, “Household income”, and “Years lived in Hong

Kong”, were input into Block 1, then the related variables of *nationalist education experiences, family, teachers, peers* and *local media* were put into Blocks 2 to 6 step by step. Six prediction models were output by the regression analysis, as shown in Table 5-10 & 5-11:

Table 5-10. Model summary of the hierarchical regression analysis

Model	R	R ²	Adjusted R ²	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics				
					ΔR^2	ΔF	df1	df2	Sig. ΔF
1	.319 ^a	.102	.090	.914	.102	8.242	7	508	< .001
2	.367 ^b	.135	.117	.900	.033	6.342	3	505	< .001
3	.386 ^c	.149	.129	.894	.014	4.252	2	503	.015
4	.397 ^d	.158	.134	.891	.009	2.603	2	501	.075
5	.515 ^e	.265	.242	.834	.107	36.437	2	499	< .001
6	.586 ^f	.343	.318	.791	.078	19.618	3	496	< .001

^a Predictors: (Constant), Household income, Sex, Year of birth, Father's birthplace, Birthplace, Mother's birthplace, Years lived in HK

^b Predictors: (Constant), Household income, Sex, Year of birth, Father's birthplace, Birthplace, Mother's birthplace, Years lived in HK, 1-3. Participating activities of institutions of the Central People's Government in Hong Kong, 1-1. Learning Knowledge of national identity, 1-2. Participating extra curriculum activities to mainland China

^c Predictors: (Constant), Household income, Sex, Year of birth, Father's birthplace, Birthplace, Mother's birthplace, Years lived in HK, 1-3. Participating activities of institutions of the Central People's Government in Hong Kong, 1-1. Learning Knowledge of national identity, 1-2. Participating extra curriculum activities to mainland China, 2-1. Discuss political issues with families, 2-2. Political participation with families

^d Predictors: (Constant), Household income, Sex, Year of birth, Father's birthplace, Birthplace, Mother's birthplace, Years lived in HK, 1-3. Participating activities of institutions of the Central People's Government in Hong Kong, 1-1. Learning Knowledge of national identity, 1-2. Participating extra curriculum activities to mainland China, 2-1. Discuss political issues with families, 2-2. Political participation with families, 4-2. Political participation with teachers, 4-1. Discuss political issues with teachers

^e Predictors: (Constant), Household income, Sex, Year of birth, Father's birthplace, Birthplace, Mother's birthplace, Years lived in HK, 1-3. Participating activities of institutions of the Central People's Government in Hong Kong, 1-1. Learning Knowledge of national identity, 1-2. Participating extra curriculum activities to mainland China, 2-1. Discuss political issues with families, 2-2. Political participation with families, 4-2. Political participation with teachers, 4-1. Discuss political issues with teachers, 3-2. Political participation with peers, 3-1. Discuss political issues with peers

^f Predictors: (Constant), Household income, Sex, Year of birth, Father's birthplace, Birthplace, Mother's birthplace, Years lived in HK, 1-3. Participating activities of institutions of the Central People's Government in Hong Kong, 1-1. Learning Knowledge of national identity, 1-2. Participating extra curriculum activities to mainland China, 2-1. Discuss political issues with families, 2-2. Political participation with families, 4-2. Political participation with teachers, 4-1. Discuss political issues with teachers, 3-2. Political participation with peers, 3-1. Discuss political issues with peers, 5-1. Exposure to traditional media of HK, 5-2. Exposure to social media of HK, 5-3. Exposure to online forums of HK
Dependent Variable: D. National identity

First, all six models except the *teachers* factor were found to have significant explanatory power for “National identity”. Demographic factors contributed 10.2% of the “National identity” of the survey respondents. The nationalist education factor contributed 3.3%, peer

factor contributed 10.7% when the nationalist education, family and teacher factors are controlled. With the above variables controlled, there was still a 7.8% contribution left for exposure to the “Local media” model. The family-related factors thus appeared to have a minor influence on the respondents’ national identity, and the media factors affected it the most.

Table 5-11. ANOVA^a of hierarchical regression analysis

Model		Sum of Squares	Df	M ²	F	Sig.
1	Regression	48.194	7	6.885	8.242	.000 ^b
	Residual	424.345	508	0.835		
	Total	472.54	515			
2	Regression	63.601	10	6.36	7.854	.000 ^c
	Residual	408.938	505	0.81		
	Total	472.54	515			
3	Regression	70.401	12	5.867	7.338	.000 ^d
	Residual	402.139	503	0.799		
	Total	472.54	515			
4	Regression	74.537	14	5.324	6.702	.000 ^e
	Residual	398.003	501	0.794		
	Total	472.54	515			
5	Regression	125.254	16	7.828	11.248	.000 ^f
	Residual	347.286	499	0.696		
	Total	472.54	515			
6	Regression	162.092	19	8.531	13.63	.000 ^g
	Residual	310.448	496	0.626		
	Total	472.54	515			

^a Predictors: (Constant), Household income, Sex, Year of birth, Father's birthplace, Birthplace, Mother's birthplace, Years lived in HK

^b Predictors: (Constant), Household income, Sex, Year of birth, Father's birthplace, Birthplace, Mother's birthplace, Years lived in HK, 1-3.Participating activities of institutions of the Central People's Government in Hong Kong, 1-1.Learning Knowledge of national identity, 1-2.Participating extra curriculum activities to mainland China

^c Predictors: (Constant), Household income, Sex, Year of birth, Father's birthplace, Birthplace, Mother's birthplace, Years lived in HK, 1-3.Participating activities of institutions of the Central People's Government in Hong Kong, 1-1.Learning Knowledge of national identity, 1-2.Participating extra curriculum activities to mainland China, 2-1. Discuss political issues with families, 2-2. Political participation with families

^d Predictors: (Constant), Household income, Sex, Year of birth, Father's birthplace, Birthplace, Mother's birthplace, Years lived in HK, 1-3.Participating activities of institutions of the Central People's Government in Hong Kong, 1-1.Learning Knowledge of national identity, 1-2.Participating extra curriculum activities to mainland China, 2-1. Discuss political issues with families, 2-2. Political participation with families, 4-2. Political participation with teachers, 4-1. Discuss political issues with teachers

^e Predictors: (Constant), Household income, Sex, Year of birth, Father's birthplace, Birthplace, Mother's birthplace, Years lived in HK, 1-3. Participating activities of institutions of the Central People's Government in Hong Kong, 1-1. Learning Knowledge of national identity, 1-2. Participating extra curriculum activities to mainland China, 2-1. Discuss political issues with families, 2-2. Political participation with families, 4-2. Political participation with teachers, 4-1. Discuss political issues with teachers, 3-2. Political participation with peers, 3-1. Discuss political issues with peers

^f Predictors: (Constant), Household income, Sex, Year of birth, Father's birthplace, Birthplace, Mother's birthplace, Years lived in HK, 1-3. Participating activities of institutions of the Central People's Government in Hong Kong, 1-1. Learning Knowledge of national identity, 1-2. Participating extra curriculum activities to mainland China, 2-1. Discuss political issues with families, 2-2. Political participation with families, 4-2. Political participation with teachers, 4-1. Discuss political issues with teachers, 3-2. Political participation with peers, 3-1. Discuss political issues with peers, 5-1. Exposure to traditional media of HK, 5-2. Exposure to social media of HK, 5-3. Exposure to online forums of HK

Dependent Variable: D. National identity

Further examination of the *Coefficients* of the variables in each Model showed that (Table 5-12):

The results indicated the change in the predictive power of nationalist education on national identity when the four agents of political socialization were entered step-by-step. First, it is worth noting that, in contrast to the results reported at the beginning of this chapter, national identity knowledge learning had a weak but significant predictive power ($\beta = -.085, p < .05$) in Model 2 at the beginning, and this predictive power changed little after the entry of family, teacher, and peers-related variables. It was not until the media factor was entered that the predictive power of national identity knowledge learning became insignificant. Therefore, it can be speculated that the effect of local media on adolescents' national identification dissipated the already weak effect of national identity knowledge learning. In addition, as in the linear regression analysis at the beginning of this chapter, participation in extracurricular activities also had no significant predictive power in this round of analysis. Participation in Central Government institutions' activities had significant predictive power in the first three levels of the regression analysis, with little variation ($\beta = -.127, -.128, -.124, p < .05$), decreasing only slightly after the entry of peers and media factors ($\beta = -.115, -.114, p < .05$).

In Model 5, the variable "Discuss political issues with peers" was found to play an important

role ($\beta = .353, p < .001$) once the Peers factor stepped in. In Model 6, with the greatest contribution to “National identity”, with all the other factors controlled, the local media factor, with the exception of traditional media, still had significant predictive power. The variable of “Exposure to local online forum” had a significant predictive power ($\beta = .247, p < .001$), followed by “Exposure to local social media” ($\beta = .160, p < .001$). In other words, the Hong Kong local media (i.e. online forum and social media) still had a significant predictive power for national identity even with all other variables controlled.

Table 5-12. Coefficients of the hierarchical regression analysis

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	β		
1	(Constant)	1.471	.559		2.633	.009
	Sex	.021	.081	.011	.254	.800
	Year of birth	.002	.002	.043	.891	.373
	Birthplace	.446	.177	.150	2.524	.012
	Years lived in HK	-.048	.017	-.162	-2.771	.006
	Father's birthplace	.155	.099	.079	1.562	.119
	Mother's birthplace	.071	.103	.037	.688	.492
	Household income	.018	.019	.041	.925	.355
2	(Constant)	3.276	.719		4.557	.000
	Sex	.009	.080	.005	.109	.914
	Year of birth	.004	.003	.076	1.507	.132
	Birthplace	.443	.174	.149	2.546	.011
	Years lived in HK	-.047	.017	-.161	-2.790	.005
	Father's birthplace	.129	.098	.066	1.322	.187
	Mother's birthplace	.086	.102	.045	.840	.401
	Household income	.013	.019	.031	.693	.489
	1-1.Learning Knowledge of national identity	-.164	.082	-.085	-2.004	.046
	1-2.Participating extra curriculum activities to mainland China	-.149	.098	-.070	-1.527	.127
	1-3.Participating activities of institutions of the Central People's Government in Hong Kong	-.699	.230	-.127	-3.035	.003
3	(Constant)	2.962	.764		3.879	.000
	Sex	.010	.080	.005	.124	.901

	Year of birth	.004	.002	.071	1.415	.158
	Birthplace	.438	.173	.148	2.532	.012
	Years lived in HK	-.049	.017	-.166	-2.882	.004
	Father's birthplace	.120	.097	.061	1.238	.216
	Mother's birthplace	.061	.102	.032	.598	.550
	Household income	.018	.019	.042	.937	.349
	1-1.Learning Knowledge of national identity	-.184	.082	-.095	-2.249	.025
	1-2.Participating extra curriculum activities to mainland China	-.174	.097	-.081	-1.788	.074
	1-3.Participating activities of institutions of the Central People's Government in Hong Kong	-.705	.229	-.128	-3.081	.002
	2-1. Discuss political issues with families	.107	.040	.116	2.655	.008
	2-2. Political participation with families	.058	.137	.019	.425	.671
4	(Constant)	2.458	1.107		2.221	.027
	Sex	.001	.080	.001	.015	.988
	Year of birth	.003	.003	.058	1.157	.248
	Birthplace	.447	.174	.150	2.570	.010
	Years lived in HK	-.046	.017	-.157	-2.710	.007
	Father's birthplace	.115	.097	.058	1.180	.239
	Mother's birthplace	.061	.102	.032	.604	.546
	Household income	.017	.019	.038	.859	.391
	1-1.Learning Knowledge of national identity	-.193	.082	-.099	-2.363	.019
	1-2.Participating extra curriculum activities to mainland China	-.169	.097	-.079	-1.738	.083
	1-3.Participating activities of institutions of the Central People's Government in Hong Kong	-.684	.228	-.124	-2.992	.003
	2-1. Discuss political issues with families	.080	.042	.087	1.907	.057
	2-2. Political participation with families	.044	.138	.014	.318	.751
	4-1. Discuss political issues with teachers	.115	.052	.099	2.229	.026
	4-2. Political participation with teachers	.061	.394	.007	.155	.877

5	(Constant)	2.518	1.036		2.431	.015
	Sex	-.021	.075	-.011	-.286	.775
	Year of birth	.001	.002	.019	.391	.696
	Birthplace	.414	.163	.140	2.547	.011
	Years lived in HK	-.033	.016	-.112	-2.055	.040
	Father's birthplace	.131	.091	.067	1.441	.150
	Mother's birthplace	.051	.095	.027	.538	.591
	Household income	.016	.018	.037	.897	.370
	1-1.Learning Knowledge of national identity	-.164	.077	-.084	-2.142	.033
	1-2.Participating extra curriculum activities to mainland China	-.168	.091	-.079	-1.850	.065
	1-3.Participating activities of institutions of the Central People's Government in Hong Kong	-.632	.214	-.115	-2.951	.003
	2-1. Discuss political issues with families	-.031	.041	-.034	-.756	.450
	2-2. Political participation with families	.013	.132	.004	.095	.924
	4-1. Discuss political issues with teachers	-.048	.052	-.041	-.921	.357
	4-2. Political participation with teachers	-.213	.372	-.023	-.573	.567
	3-1. Discuss political issues with peers	.312	.043	.353	7.275	< .001
	3-2. Political participation with peers	.254	.111	.104	2.294	.022
6	(Constant)	2.120	.989		2.143	.033
	Sex	-.013	.071	-.007	-.184	.854
	Year of birth	.001	.002	.015	.337	.736
	Birthplace	.392	.154	.132	2.541	.011
	Years lived in HK	-.026	.015	-.088	-1.692	.091
	Father's birthplace	.143	.086	.073	1.659	.098
	Mother's birthplace	.060	.090	.031	.668	.504
	Household income	.025	.017	.056	1.428	.154
	1-1.Learning Knowledge of national identity	-.110	.073	-.057	-1.506	.133
	1-2.Participating extra curriculum activities to mainland China	-.144	.087	-.067	-1.657	.098
	1-3.Participating activities of institutions of the	-.627	.203	-.114	-3.087	.002

Central People's Government in Hong Kong					
2-1. Discuss political issues with families	-.062	.040	-.067	-1.532	.126
2-2. Political participation with families	.025	.125	.008	.198	.843
4-1. Discuss political issues with teachers	-.069	.050	-.060	-1.395	.164
4-2. Political participation with teachers	-.113	.353	-.012	-.321	.749
3-1. Discuss political issues with peers	.206	.043	.233	4.783	< .001
3-2. Political participation with peers	.088	.108	.036	.822	.412
5-1. Exposure to traditional media of HK	-.051	.032	-.062	-1.607	.109
5-2. Exposure to social media of HK	.135	.036	.160	3.746	< .001
5-3. Exposure to online forums of HK	.174	.033	.247	5.278	< .001

Dependent Variable: National identity

Overlapped Effectiveness: Media Vs Peers

Both the factors of peer (Political discussion with peers) and local media (Exposure to local social media/Online forum) had prominent predictive power for “National identity” in the regression analysis (Table 5-3). It was necessary to distinguish the relationship between the two independent factors, for which commonality analysis (Nimon et al., 2008) was deployed.


To identify the unique contributions of peers and media factors towards national identity, two hierarchical multiple regression analyses were conducted separately. Table 5-13 shows the summary of the results from the two fixed-order multiple regression analyses with national identity as the outcome. In each model, controlling for the demographic variables in step 1, two independent factors, “Peer” (Political discussion with peers) and “Media exposure” (Exposed to local social media/online forums) were entered step-by-step. In Model 1, the “Political discussion with peers” was entered first (in step 2), followed by “Exposed to local social media” & “Exposed to local online forums”, and vice versa for Model 2.

Table 5-13. Prediction of national identity: multiple regression results

	R ²	ΔR ²
Model 1		
Step 1: Demographic	.102***	.102***
Step 2: Peers	.222***	.120***
Step 3: Media	.304***	.082***
Model 2		
Step 1: Demographic	.102***	.102***
Step 2: Media	.279***	.177***
Step 3: Peers	.304***	.025***

Note: *** $p < .001$

First, the results show that the Peer and Media factors explained 20.2% of the variance of “National identity”. Second, according to Model 1, the unique contribution of the “Media exposure to national identity” was 8.2% ($p < .001$). Third, according to Model 2, the Peers factor explained a variance of 2.5% in “National identity” after controlling for Media exposure ($p < .001$). The shared and unique contributions of the two factors are illustrated in Figure 5-1.

Figure 5-1. Decomposition of variance accounted for by Peers and Media exposure factors in National identity

This result is also reflected in the interviews described earlier in this chapter. In addition to discussing hot political issues face-to-face with classmates and friends, students also share information online through likes, posts or reposts, which occurs more frequently than face-to-face discussions. It could also be argued that the political discussions among peers also stem

from the media. It can be said that the political discussion among peers is a further extension of media exposure.

5.4 Conclusion

The influential factor: Exposure to local social media and local online forums

The multiple linear regression model of this study found that peers, local social media, and local online forums are strong predictors of Hong Kong youths' national identity. In other words, peers, local social media and local online forums were the most influential political socialization agents identified in this study. Together, these agents create a competitive political socialization environment that competes with, or even pushes back against, the official Chinese nationalist education initiatives introduced by the Hong Kong government.

The respondents who discussed politics frequently with peers and were exposed more to local social media and online forums were more likely to identify with Hongkonger identity vis-à-vis Chinese identity. Nevertheless, there was no significant correlation found between youths' exposure to traditional media and their national identity, despite the fact that most of the traditional media in Hong Kong have been tamed by the authorities to take a pro-China or neutral standpoint (J. M. Chan & Lee, 2007; M. Chan, 2017; Frisch et al., 2018; F. L. F. Lee, 2018a).

The relatively free cyberspace in Hong Kong provides young people with multi-perspective information. This is coupled with journalism ethics, which are more conducive to winning readers' trust, thus making young people more inclined to trust the local online media. At the same time, young people in Hong Kong are more likely to have access to negative news about China through their access to online media, thus affecting their perceptions of China.

Moreover, the regression analysis also found the important role of media factors in other political socialization agents, the family and peers, which will be discussed below.

A significant impact of the peer factor combined with the local media

In addition to the media, the peer factor, especially political discussions with peers, was found to have a strong predictive power for the national identity of teenagers. The more they discuss political issues with peers or co-participate in social movements, the more likely it is that they will identify themselves as Hongkongers. It seems that the impact of the peer factor is stronger when it is combined with the local media.

The collective consciousness or personal emotional connection established by youths, based on communicating and interacting with their peers, strengthened the Hongkonger identity, in particular when it was combined with discussion or participation in social movements, which further forged personal emotions and identity (C. W. Lee, 2016; Ortmann, 2021). However, although peer factors were found to have a strong predictive power for national identity, this power can be reduced sharply once media factors are added in. In other words, the influence of peer factors on national identity overlaps considerably with the local media factors. It can be conjectured that social network-based likes, reposting, sharing and other behaviours are the main approaches through which youth discuss political issues, especially for the forwarding and sharing of political-related news and topics since they rely on online platforms to connect with their peers. Therefore, it can be said that the media factor was in part a substitute for political discussion with peers.

An indirect impact of family and teacher factors

Family and teacher factors, which are also considered crucial political socialization agents, were found to have an insignificant correlation with the national identity of Hong Kong youths. Family and teacher factors seem to have less of a relationship with the national

identity of young students in this survey from the perspective of regression analysis.

With regard to the factor of family, its contribution to national identity is significantly lower than that of peers, even though the frequencies of discussing political issues and co-participating in social movements were similar for these two factors. A plausible explanation is that parents' influence on their children may be most effective during the childhood period. The youths' attitudes will be adjusted through access to media information and school education. In fact, the children will probably be inclined towards the pro-democracy camp once they have gained access to pro-democracy/pro-localist information through their mobile phones after entering secondary school—regardless of the political standpoints of their family members.

The unimpressive relation of the teacher factor with the youths' national identity is understandable due to the scarcity of politics-related interactions. This also corresponds to the claims that most secondary school teachers in Hong Kong usually adopt politically neutral positions in their teaching (K. L. Wong et al., 2015; T. Yuen & Byram, 2007). However, this cannot support a claim that Hong Kong teachers have nothing to do with their students' national identity. Teachers' contributions to the formation of the national identity is mingled with the education requirements that are in line with the universal values or Hong Kong values, which echo the spread of pro-democracy/pro-localist information through local social media/local online forums.

Feeble effect of nationalist education

In this case, there was uncertainty about the effect of nationalist education on the formation of the national identity of adolescent students. First, according to the results of quantitative data analysis, no significant association was found between national identity knowledge

learning experiences / exchange activities in the Mainland and the respondents' national identity. That is to say, the respondents' learning of national identity-related course content and the experience of visiting the Mainland may have had limited influence on their national identity. These two forms are the common approaches of education related to national education in schools. The results of the qualitative data analysis also confirmed the conclusions of the quantitative data analysis. In terms of learning about national identity, for example, the study of Chinese History, which was expected to promote students' identity with China by disseminating the common history and culture of the Chinese nation, did not achieve its expected goal. The students showed detached attitudes toward knowledge of Chinese history and culture, preferring to learn about it objectively rather than necessarily being emotionally invested in it. This may be related to the teaching mode of the subject (e.g., mechanical memorization), but also to the fact that the Hongkonger identity is more focused on civic identity.

In the interviews, the adolescent students also showed a clear tendency towards modernists/constructivists rather than essentialists/primordially in relation to national identity, and they emphasized the central role of "values" in national identity. As a result, Liberal Studies, another curriculum subject intended to promote students' national identity, not only failed to achieve its purpose, but even reinforced the respondents' local identity and correspondingly weakened their Chinese identity. An important reason for this is the promotion of universal values and Hong Kong's core values in Liberal Studies. When such values conflict with the Chinese authorities and the 'Chinese' identity they represent, Hong Kong youth tend to choose the Hongkonger identity and the local values and on which it is based.

Exchange activities in the Mainland may be beneficial in terms of experiencing traditional

Chinese culture at close quarters and promoting a visual understanding of the current situation in China among young people in Hong Kong, but they do not seem to have had a significant impact in terms of national identity. Firstly, these young students were not very motivated to participate in such activities even if they were promoted actively by the authorities. The mindset of these young people towards the usual (short-term) exchange activities is closer to that of tourism. So-called visits that showcase the Mainland's developmental achievements and cultural splendour do not seem to be effective in promoting emotional attachment or even identity among Hong Kong youths. Such activities usually do not involve the 'values' factor that is crucial for Hong Kong people. Sometimes they even confirm the negative impressions that young Hong Kong people have of the Mainland, such as the lack of access to information.



Chapter 6

Conclusion:

Rethinking Chinese nation-building under the One Country Two Systems model

6.1 Summary of findings

The failure of the Chinese nation-building project in Hong Kong, with local identity rising

Hong Kong was retroceded to China in 1997 and enjoyed a high degree of autonomy in the executive, legislative and judicial domain, which was guaranteed by the "one country, two systems" formula. China's Central Government did not interfere in Hong Kong's internal affairs in the years after the retrocession. Since 2003, contacts between China and Hong Kong have become more frequent due to the signing of the CEPA and the Individual Visit Scheme. Since then, contradictions have gradually emerged, such as the social problems caused by a large number of mainland tourists coming to Hong Kong, that have led to the dissatisfaction of some residents. In 2007, then-President of China Hu Jintao proposed that Hong Kong needed to promote national education to enhance the youths' identification with China (Hu, 2007).

However, the Chinese nation-building project, effective in the mainland, could not be implemented directly and fully in Hong Kong, hindered by the OCTS arrangement. Despite the influence of Chinese nation-building, national education in Hong Kong has not achieved its aim of promoting national identity, and may even have backfired.

Since the 2007-2008 Policy Address, the HKSAR Government has stressed repeatedly the need to implement national education to foster the national identity of young people (D. Y.

Tsang, 2007). In the education domain, the curricula of "Liberal Studies" and "Moral and National Education" were implemented, young students were organized to participate in exchange visits or to study in the mainland, and the Quality Education Fund provided funding to support national education-related projects.

However, since its peak in 2008, Hong Kong people's national identity with China has declined steadily, accompanied by the rise of localism (HKPORI, 2020; Yew & Kwong, 2014). In particular, young people are more resistant to the Chinese identity and more aggressive in dealing with the contradictions between China and Hong Kong, as can be seen in their participation as the backbone of several large-scale anti-government social movements.

Revisit the failure: Political socialization perspective

Based on the theoretical framework of political socialization borrowed from the IEA's "octagonal model" of civic education, this study comprehensively examined the reasons why Hong Kong national education has failed to achieve the authority's expectations for promoting national identity. With young students in Hong Kong secondary schools as the research object, this study explored several of the main factors influencing youths' national identity through questionnaires and interviews.

This study found that of all the main political socialization agents, including family, teachers, and peers, the media has the most critical influence on national identity of youths.

Media: First, regression analyses indicated that exposure to Hong Kong's local social media and online forum had a strongest predictive power for youth's national identity than did the other agents. The higher the frequency of exposure to local media, the more likely the study participants were to identify with the Hongkonger identity rather than as Chinese.

The relatively free speech environment in Hong Kong can accommodate a variety of voices, which enables young Hong Kong people to have access to different views. Because of its professionalism, the local opposition media can attract and win readers' trust more than pro-China media. As youths begin to have their own mobile phones in secondary school, they gain more access to online media on social platforms, which in turn increase their exposure to opposition media. The credibility of the Hong Kong media is more conducive to guiding young people to Hongkonger identity than media of mainland China.

In addition, according to the regression analysis conducted in this study, media factors had a strong predictive power for the participants' national identity and covered or mediated the predictive power of other agents, even the peer factor that also has a strong influence.

Peer: The peer factor was found to be significantly related to national identity, second only to the media. This suggests that the more young people discuss political issues with their peers, the more likely they are to identify as Hongkongers. The emotions and interactions with peers can affect their political orientations. The basis of peer friendship can guide youths to identify with each other. Furthermore, the factors of "Local media exposure" and "Political discussion with peers" together made most of the contribution to the variance in National Identity.

Information sharing and discussion among peers can also influence or strengthen youth's political orientations and national identity. The exchanges of information and political discussions between peers are related to the media's influence because the discussion of political topics among youths comes mostly from media coverage. In other words, the Peer factor combined with the Media can prompt Hong Kong youths to identify more as Hongkongers than with China.

Family: According to the results of this study, the impact of families on youths' political orientations seems to happen mostly before they enter junior secondary school. Most Hong

Kong students will have mobile phones at this time, which gives them convenient access to social and news media. The media gradually took over this parental influence in the sample studied here. As a result, most of the youth tended to identify with Hongkonger identity regardless of whether their parents' influence was pro-China or pro-Hong Kong.

Teacher: Most of the teachers in secondary schools in Hong Kong adhere to professional ethics and stand politically neutral in teaching and avoid guiding students' political tendencies in public or private. However, it seems that the value-neutrality itself is enough to have a negative impact on students' identification with China. There are some differences between the "universal values" and "Hong Kong core values" upheld by Hong Kong education and China's political values advocated by the authorities. Hong Kong people's understanding of values such as "democracy", "freedom", and "human rights" is different from that of these concepts in China. On one hand, this causes Hong Kong youth to resist the Chinese identity after recognizing the contradictions between China and its values. On the other hand, the common understanding of these "Hong Kong core values" has strengthened their Hongkonger identity.

The feeble impact of nationalist education

- Contradictions in the implementation

Along with the continuous promotion of nationalist education initiatives by the Hong Kong authorities at the urging of the Central Government, the identity of "Chinese" has declined and that of "Hong Kong people" has increased. In this sense, official nationalist education can be said to be a failure. Firstly, nationalist education itself has not been effective in promoting Chinese identity in young students.

With regard to intellectual education about national identity, the essentialist discourses of

shared history, culture and descent are inadequate in the face of a constructivist identity based on Hong Kong's core values. In other words, the national identity discourse in Chinese History is not able to compete with the persuasive power of Liberal Studies for students. Participation in short-term exchange activities in the Mainland is also limited to some discourses on tracing traditional culture and blood ties, similar to the History of China section, and does not effectively promote participants' identification with China. Moreover, the young people in this study did not seem to have been very motivated to participate in such activities. It is evident from the cases in this study that increasing opportunities to interact with their Mainland counterparts and promoting mutual trust and understanding may be a more effective pathway to enhance Hong Kong youths' understanding of Mainland China.

- Offset of competitive political socialization environment

In addition to the education factor, the study participants' daily contact with family members, teachers, peers and the media created a whole environment that influenced their national identity formation. In Hong Kong, there is a wide range of freedom of expression that is different from the official nationalist education initiatives, due to the relatively free speech environment in which young people have easy access to these messages. In particular, after several recent major social movements, such as the "Umbrella" and "Anti-Extradition Bill" movements, the various media discourses focusing on these undertakings have highlighted the contradictions between Hong Kong and China, especially the fierce conflict between the two places in terms of values. These discourses have intensified Hong Kong people's embrace of their local identity. This can contribute more directly to young people's identification with their local identity, coupled with the collective identity formed by peer influence.

6.2 Additional discussion

Impact of school context on national identity formation

The micro level of school background is also worthy of attention, since this study aimed to examine the impact of political socialization agents on the national identity of adolescent students in Hong Kong at a macro level. In most of the time that adolescent students spend in school, contexts such as the quality of education, teacher quality, peer quality, alumni resources and even the economic status of the school, may influence the process of political socialization (S.-W. Leung, 1997). For example, schools with better financial resources may organize more extra-curricular activities; students in high-quality schools usually perform better academically and may be exposed to and understand more aspects of social events and thinking; and a more educated teacher may bring a more diverse range of perspectives to students. These factors may influence political socialization agents themselves and even their patterns of influence on students' national identity. That is, the performances of individual agents, including media exposure, political discussion with family members/teachers/peers, and participation in social movements, will vary across school contexts, as was the case in Leung's (1997) study.

It is worth considering whether these different patterns of political socialization agents in different school contexts also have different paradigms of influence on students' national identity formation. In order to see whether there were differences in the effects of the independent variables (i.e. political socialization agents) on students' national identity across school contexts, regression analyses were conducted for each school. The results are shown in Table 6-1.

From the analysis, it was clear that the main difference between the three schools was that

Participating in activities of Central Government institution activities in Hong Kong was only significant in School-III and *Exposure to social media* was not significant in School- I. The former difference can be ignored in this case because there were too few ‘Yes’ responses to this variable (only 6 in School-III). The focus should be on the difference in social media exposure.

Table 6-1. Standardized regression coefficients for the national identity on political socialization agents in different schools

Coefficients ^a	School-I		School-II		School-III	
	β	Sig.	β	Sig.	β	Sig.
Sex	-.092	.215	-.002	.978	.030	.661
Year of birth	-.062	.498	.005	.949	.008	.933
Birthplace	.183	.057	.143	.169	.048	.602
Years lived in HK	.032	.716	-.120	.232	-.132	.166
Father’s birthplace	-.006	.932	.083	.294	.100	.211
Mother’s birthplace	.082	.324	.014	.863	.053	.510
Household income	.006	.929	.041	.575	.079	.266
1-1.Learning Knowledge of national identity	-.051	.478	-.055	.446	-.047	.493
1-2.Participating extra curriculum activities to mainland China	-.009	.909	-.111	.133	-.019	.816
1-3.Participating activities of institutions of the Central People’s Government in Hong Kong	-.081	.259	-.091	.198	-.189**	.006
2-1 Discuss political issues with families	-.064	.457	-.060	.478	-.089	.261
2-2. Political participation with families	.074	.368	-.034	.640	.002	.982
3-1. Discuss political issues with peers	.264**	.005	.237*	.011	.219*	.017
3-2. Political participation with peers	.115	.205	.054	.521	-.023	.758
4-1. Discuss political issues with teachers	.011	.898	-.156	.051	.030	.700
4-2. Political participation with teachers	-.062	.433	.012	.861	-.017	.811
5-1. Exposure to traditional media of HK	-.037	.619	.007	.928	-.133	.058
5-2. Exposure to social media of HK	.115	.166	.176*	.028	.168*	.041
5-3. Exposure to online forums of HK	.216*	.018	.270**	.003	.247**	.005

^a *Dependent Variable: National identity*

** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$

From Table 4-1 (see Chapter 4, Section 4.11), School-I was a Band 1 (as was School-III) Christian secondary school (as was School-II). It differed from both of these comparably schools in that it used English as the medium of instruction (EMI). It might then be speculated that the EMI students in this case were less exposed to local political information when browsing social media, and therefore local social media exposure did not have a

significant impact on their national identity. It is also worth noting that the *political discussion with peers* factor had a significantly greater effect on School-I than on the other two schools ($\beta = .264, p < .01$). This may have been related to the school's political climate, teaching style, students' study habits, etc. But all the speculations need to be explored further, based on more data.

Reflection on political socialization agents' impact on national identity

The findings of this study show that some theories about political discussion and political participation were somewhat inapplicable in an environment that is not fully democratic. Political discussion and political participation are not fully utilised in the political climate of Hong Kong. These two indicators were somewhat weak predictors of people's political attitudes in this study.

In Hong Kong, where information flows freely, media exposure does influence or reflect people's political attitudes. In this study, the local online forum exposure was one media platform having a significant impact on the national identity of teenagers. However, rather than being influenced by these forums, the youths in this study were influenced more by social movements. This is because most of the respondents indicated that their main purpose of browsing local forums was to follow the social movements of that time (2019). In addition to giving participants a collective identity, the social movements themselves were also influenced bystanders through the extensive discussions they generated. This influence is reflected in the national identity, mainly in the discussion of the values of China and Hong Kong, which has led to concerns and reflections.

6.3 Implications

Hong Kong youth in the political socialization environment of the past two decades have

found it difficult to develop the same patriotism as their counterparts in the Mainland. This study shows that the free flow of information and the contradiction between the belief in universal values and reality have made it difficult, or even counterproductive, for the narrative of “patriotism” to win hearts and minds in Hong Kong. After identifying some of the problems, it is desirable to identify possible ways to address them. This study found that, with little change in the information and education environment, increasing practical exchanges and cooperation between young people in Hong Kong and China may be a more effective pathway.

Although short-term exchange activities in the Mainland seemed to have little impact on Hong Kong youths' national identity in this study, several interviewees mentioned that their exchanges with their Mainland peers had changed their images of the Mainland greatly. Even if they only interacted in online gaming platforms, the Hong Kong youths could actually feel the friendly side of their Mainland counterparts.

Changing the national identity based on the difference in values will not be achieved overnight. Hong Kong students are also hardly passive recipients of educational transformation, and they in turn have their own critical views on the discourse about Chinese and Hongkonger identity (Lai & Byram, 2011). How to find a consensus between Hong Kong and China to mitigate the conflict in the light of the real situation is an issue that both nationalist education and the local media should focus on.

6.4 Further research agenda

Keep observing Hong Kong youths' national identity in paradigm-shifting political socialization environment

The political environment of Hong Kong has changed dramatically since the implementation

of the Hong Kong National Security Law on 30 June 2020. Several political socialization agents that have influenced the national identity of Hong Kong youth greatly, as indicated in the conclusion of this study, have been intervened with by the authorities under the National Security Law. The implementation of the Security Law initially demonstrated the power to exclude radical dissidents. Politically sensitive books were taken off the shelves; localist groups were disbanded or banned; and activists were shunned, arrested, or kept a low profile. Furthermore, with the overhaul of the electoral system, the pan-democracy (the de facto opposition) was suppressed in the political arena.

Curriculum reform: In 2021 the long-controversial "Liberal Studies" was replaced by a similar curriculum. *Citizenship and Social Development*. The curriculum aim of "develop(ing) critical thinking skills" was removed from this, and patriotic content added, requiring official approval of textbooks. The status of this subject was lowered by reducing class hours and lowering assessment requirements. In addition, visiting the mainland was set as a compulsory module (Education Bureau, 2021).

The inculcation of Western Universal Values in Hong Kong's civic education in the past has, on the one hand, strengthened local identity while, on the other hand, highlighting the differences between Hong Kong and the Mainland. As the Beijing government instil its discourse of "positive values" in Hong Kong's citizenship education domain, it remains to be seen whether it will be able to bridge the conflict of values between Hong Kong and the Mainland.

Media intervention: The HKSAR Government has also started to intervene more in the media. The most obvious case is the severe sanctions imposed on the Apple Daily tabloid, which has long been known for expressing dissent. Its founder and executives were arrested for violating the National Security Law, and funds were frozen. In the end, the last local

radical (traditional) form of media that had operated for 26 years was closed entirely (T. Cheung, 2021). The Stand News, a popular online news outlet (alternative media) that was mentioned frequently in the interviews, was also shut down at the end of 2021 due to legal sanctions for its coverage during the social movement of 2019 (C. Leung et al., 2021).

Whether the changed political socialization environment will lead to new problems, such as rebellious psychology or a fierce rebound, is a question that can continue to be observed and discussed. As to whether the national identity of youth growing up in this new political environment will be affected differently, Hong Kong, as a sample that can be compared before and after, is worthy of continued observation and study, allowing for further inspections of the impact of the authoritarian system in a free-oriented region.


Comparative studies of Hong Kong and Macao

The identity of Macao, which is also a special administrative region under the arrangement of "one country, two systems", is in sharp contrast to that of Hong Kong. According to a survey conducted by Hong Kong Public Opinion Research Institute (PORI, formerly HKPOP), Macao maintains a high recognition of both "Macao citizens" and "Citizens of the PRC", with the latter often higher than the former (Figure 6-1). This is very different from the Hong Kong situation, in which the people's recognition of "Citizens of the PRC" is always lower than that of "Hongkongers", with the gap getting wider and wider.

The low level of Hong Kong youths' political identification with the mainland is the main reason for their low national identity, although their cultural identification with China is similar to their mainland counterparts and even higher than their pan-economic identity (Pang & Jiang, 2019). In Macao, the Chinese nation-building programmes have been carried out smoothly and in an orderly way in Macao, and the National Education which was boycotted

in Hong Kong, has been implemented successfully there (E. K. Chong, 2018).

Figure 6-1. National identity in Hong Kong and Macao



Source: Compiled by the author based on data of PORI

Hong Kong and Macao share a similar OCTS model but different national identity outcomes. Both territories were European colonies for a long time and are Cantonese-speaking cultural regions, and both were returned to China under the OCTS arrangement in the 1990s. It would be interesting, therefore, to find out more about why, as stated above, the young people in Macao identify significantly more strongly as Chinese than those in Hong Kong. The media

factor had a significant influence on the national identity of youths in Hong Kong, but there is very little difference between the media in Hong Kong and Macao.

In fact, Hong Kong media have always been used in Macao (H. Wang, 2017). Since it has the same OCTS arrangement and a similar media environment, it would be worthwhile to conduct a comparative study to explore why the national identify effects are so different there.

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Appendix A: Questionnaire (Chinese)



香港青少年國家身份認同研究

訪問對象：中學生（中三至中六）

調查方法：透過學校進行郵遞問卷調查、由受訪者在學校課堂內自行填寫

目標樣本：500 個以上

香港教育大學香港研究學院的博士生王星星先生，正在進行一項「青少年國民身份」研究，旨在瞭解青少年對國民身份的看法，所收集的資料將用於其博士論文的研究分析。

本研究將會透過問卷調查收集資料，現誠邀您參與，完成這份問卷。您的參與純屬自願性質，不會為您帶來任何風險或不良後果。所有學生填寫的資料將會絕對保密，任何可以辨識身份的資料並不會記錄在資料分析內，一切資料只有研究人員可以接觸。是次研究的資料只會用於學術研究用途，日後亦只會發表整體性資料而不會顯示 貴校及受訪者的資料。

如您對本研究有任何查詢，請聯絡香港教育大學香港研究學院王星星先生（電話：[REDACTED]）；您亦可以聯絡香港教育大學人類實驗物件操守委員會（電話：29486708）。

請您回答以下的問題，在合適的 ☐ 上寫「✓」（除特別注明外，每題只選一項）；請在「_____」上填寫答案。所有答案不分對錯，如實填寫即可。

第一部分：研究題目

I1) 你有幾經常和家人一起討論政治？

- ☐ 1. 經常
- ☐ 2. 頗多
- ☐ 3. 間中
- ☐ 4. 甚少
- ☐ 5. 沒有
- ☐ 6. 不知道／沒有意見／很難說

【開放式問題】如選擇「經常」或「頗多」，請簡單說明你和家人討論的政治話題：_____

I2) 你有幾經常和朋友或同學一起討論政治？

- ☐ 1. 經常
- ☐ 2. 頗多
- ☐ 3. 間中
- ☐ 4. 甚少
- ☐ 5. 沒有
- ☐ 6. 不知道／沒有意見／很難說

【開放式問題】如選擇「經常」或「頗多」，請簡單說明你和朋友或同學討論的政治話題：_____

I3) 你有幾經常和老師一起討論政治？

- ☐ 1. 經常
- ☐ 2. 頗多
- ☐ 3. 間中
- ☐ 4. 甚少
- ☐ 5. 沒有
- ☐ 6. 不知道／沒有意見／很難說

【開放式問題】如選擇「經常」或「頗多」，請簡單說明你和老師討論的政治話題：_____

I4) 你曾經有和家人一起參加遊行集會嗎？

- ☐ 1. 有
- ☐ 2. 沒有

【開放式問題】如選擇「有」，請簡單說明你和家人參加的遊行或集會的主題：_____

I5) 你曾經有和朋友或同學一起參加過遊行集會嗎？

- ☐ 1. 有
- ☐ 2. 沒有

【開放式問題】如選擇「有」，請簡單說明朋友或同學參加的遊行或集會的主題：_____

I6) 你曾經有和老師一起參加過遊行集會嗎？

- ☐ 1. 有
- ☐ 2. 沒有

【開放式問題】如選擇「有」，請簡單說明你和老師參加的遊行或集會的主題：_____

I7) 你最經常使用以下哪個媒體或平台接收新聞資訊？

	經常	頗多	間中	甚少	沒有
1. 本地的傳統媒體 (例如電視、電台、報紙、雜誌)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2. 本地常用的社交媒體 (例如 Facebook、WhatsApp、Telegram、 Twitter、YouTube、Instagram)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3. 本地常用的網上討論區 (例如連登討論區、高登討論區)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4. 中國內地的傳統媒體 (例如電視、電台、報紙、雜誌)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
5. 中國內地常用的社交媒體 (例如 WeChat、微博、QQ、優酷網、抖 音)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
6. 中國內地常用的網上討論區 (例如百度貼吧)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
7. 其他媒體或平台（請註明）： _____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

I8) 你自就讀中學以來，在課堂上有學習過有關國民身份認同的知識嗎（例如國家憲法、國旗、國歌、愛國情懷等等）？

- ☐ 1. 有（請註明堂數：_____）
- ☐ 2. 沒有

I9) 你自就讀中學以來，有參加過到訪中國內地的課外活動嗎（例如考察團、交流活動、義工活動、實習計劃等等）？

- ☐ 1. 有（請註明堂數：_____）
- ☐ 2. 沒有

I10) 你自就讀中學以來，有參加過有關中央駐港機構的活動嗎（例如解放軍駐港部隊軍營開放日、香港青少年軍事夏令營、中聯辦開放日、外交部駐港特派專員公署開放日等等）？

- ☐ 1. 有（請註明堂數：_____）
- ☐ 2. 沒有

第二部分：延伸題目**D1) 以下是一些有關身份認同的說法，你認為哪一種最能夠描述你自己？**

- ☐ 1. 我只是香港人
☐ 2. 我是香港人多於中國人
☐ 3. 我同時是香港人和中國人
☐ 4. 我是中國人多於香港人
☐ 5. 我只是中國人
☐ 6. 其它 (請註明) : _____
☐ 7. 不知道／沒有意見／很難說

D2) 你日後會否願意到中國內地實習、工作及定居？

	非常願意	願意	一半半	不願意	完全不願意	不知道／沒有意見／很難說
到中國內地實習						
到中國內地工作						
到中國內地定居						

【開放式問題】請簡單說明你*願意/不願意到中國內地實習、工作及定居的原因：_____

第三部分：個人資料

C1) 你的性別： ☐ 1. 男 ☐ 2. 女

C2) 你的出生年月： _____年 _____月

C3) 你的年級： _____ **班別：** _____

C4) 你的出生地：

- ☐ 1. 香港 ☐ 2. 中國內地
☐ 3. 其他(請註明)：_____

C5) 你在香港居住了多少年： _____年

C6) 你父母的出生地：

父親	母親
<input type="checkbox"/> 1. 香港	<input type="checkbox"/> 1. 香港
<input type="checkbox"/> 2. 中國內地	<input type="checkbox"/> 2. 中國內地
<input type="checkbox"/> 3. 其他(請註明)：_____	<input type="checkbox"/> 3. 其他(請註明)：_____

C7) 你家庭每月收入大概是 (請選擇最近似答案)

- ☐ 1. 無收入
☐ 2. HK \$4,999 或以下
☐ 3. HK\$5,000-9,999
☐ 4. HK\$10,000-14,999
☐ 5. HK\$15,000-19,999
☐ 6. HK\$20,000-29,999

- ☐ 7. HK\$30,000-39,999
- ☐ 8. HK\$40,000-49,999
- ☐ 9. HK\$50,000 或以上
- ☐ 10. 無固定收入／不穩定

C8) 本研究後續會有小組訪談，如您有興趣參加，請留下聯絡方式：

Phone/WhatsApp/Messenger/Telegram/WeChat/E-mail/Other : _____

===問卷完===

Appendix B: Questionnaire (English)*



Survey on the national identity of Hong Kong youth

Respondents: secondary school students (Forms 3 to 6).

Survey method: Posted questionnaire survey conducted through the school, with the interviewees filling these out in the school classroom.

Target sample: More than 500.

Mr Wang Xingxing, a doctoral student at the Academy of Hong Kong Studies at the Education University of Hong Kong, is conducting a study on "National identity of Hong Kong youth", which aims to understand Hong Kong young people's views on national identity. The data collected will only be used for the research and analysis of his doctoral thesis.

You are cordially invited to participate and complete this questionnaire survey. Your participation is voluntary and will not bring you any risks or adverse consequences. The information filled in by all students will be kept strictly confidential, any identifiable data will not be recorded in the data analysis, and all data will only be accessible to researchers. The materials of this study will only be used for academic research purposes, and the overall data will only be published in the future without showing the information of the school and the informants.

If you have any enquiries about this study, please contact Mr Wang Xingxing (Tel: [REDACTED]), or you can also contact the Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC) of the Education University of Hong Kong (Tel: 29486708).

Please answer the following questions and insert "✓" in the appropriate ☐ (only one choice for each question unless otherwise indicated). Please fill in your subjective answer (if any) on "_____". There are no right or wrong answers, so please just fill in truthfully.

* The English version was not be used in this study

Part I: Research Questions

I1) Do you often discuss political issues with your family?

- ☐ 1. Often
- ☐ 2. Quite a lot
- ☐ 3. Sometimes
- ☐ 4. Rarely
- ☐ 5. Never
- ☐ 6. No idea/Hard to say

[Open Question] Please list the political issues you have discussed with your family if you answered *Often* or *Quite a lot* : _____

I2) Do you often discuss political issues with your friends or classmates?

- ☐ 1. Often
- ☐ 2. Quite a lot
- ☐ 3. Sometimes
- ☐ 4. Rarely
- ☐ 5. Never
- ☐ 6. No idea/Hard to say

[Open Question] Please list the political issues you have discussed with your friends or classmates if you answered *Often* or *Quite a lot* : _____

I3) Do you often discuss political issues with your teachers?

- ☐ 1. Often
- ☐ 2. Quite a lot
- ☐ 3. Sometimes
- ☐ 4. Rarely
- ☐ 5. Never
- ☐ 6. No idea/Hard to say

[Open Question] Please list the political issues you have discussed with your teachers if you answered *Often* or *Quite a lot* : _____

I4) Have you ever participated demonstrations or rallies with your families?

- ☐ 1. Yes
- ☐ 2. No

[Open Question] Please list the themes of demonstrations or rallies you have participated with your family if you answered *Yes* : _____

I5) Have you ever participated demonstrations or rallies with your friends or classmates?

- ☐ 1. Yes
- ☐ 2. No

[Open Question] Please list the themes of demonstrations or rallies you have participated with your friends or classmates if you answered *Yes* : _____

I6) Have you ever participated demonstrations or rallies with your teachers?

- ☐ 1. Yes
- ☐ 2. No

[Open Question] Please list the themes of demonstrations or rallies in which you have participated with _____

your teachers if it's Yes : _____

I7) How often do you use the media or platforms below for receiving news and information?

	Often	Quite a lot	Sometimes	Rarely	Never
1. Local traditional media (i.e. TV, radio, newspaper, magazine)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2. Local social media (i.e. Facebook、WhatsApp、Telegram、 Twitter、YouTube、Instagram)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3. Local online forums (i.e. LIHKG, HKGolden)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4. Traditional media of China (i.e. TV, radio, newspaper, magazine)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
5. Social media of China (i.e. WeChat, Weibo, QQ, Youku, TikTok)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
6. Forums of China (i.e. Baidu Tieba)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
7. Other media or platforms _____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

I8) Have you ever learned anything about national identity (such as national constitution, national flag, national anthem, patriotism, etc.) in class since you have been in secondary school?

- ☐ 1. Yes (Please specify the number of classes : _____)
- ☐ 2. No

I9) Have you ever participated in extracurricular activities (such as study tours, exchange activities, volunteer activities, internship programs, etc.) in mainland China since you have been in secondary school?

- ☐ 1. Yes (Please specify the number of times : _____)
- ☐ 2. No

I10) Since you have been in secondary school, have you ever participated in any activities related to institutes of the Central Government in Hong Kong (such as the Hong Kong Youth Military Summer Camp, the Open Day of the Military Camp of the People's Liberation Army in Hong Kong, the Liaison Office of the Central People's Government, the Office of the Special Commissioner of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Hong Kong, etc.)

- ☐ 1. Yes (Please specify the number of times : _____)
- ☐ 2. No

Part II: Extension Questions

D1) Which of the statements below best describes how you regard yourself?

- ☐ 1. Hongkonger, not Chinese
☐ 2. More Hongkonger than Chinese
☐ 3. Equally Hongkonger and Chinese
☐ 4. More Chinese than Hongkonger
☐ 5. Chinese, not Hongkonger
☐ 6. Others (please specify) : _____
☐ 7. No idea/Hard to say

D2) Are you willing to intern, work or settle in mainland China in the future?

	Very Willing	Willing	Half and Half	Unwilling	Very Unwilling	No idea/Hard to say
Intern in mainland China						
Work in mainland China						
Settle in mainland China						

[Open Question] Please state briefly the reasons you are Willing/Unwilling to intern, work or settle in mainland China : _____

Part III: Personal Information

C1) Your Sex : ☐ 1. Male ☐ 2. Female

C2) Your Birthday : _____ Year _____ Month

C3) Your Form : _____ **Class** _____

C4) Your Birthplace

- ☐ 1. Hong Kong ☐ 2. Mainland China
☐ 3. Others (please specify) : _____

C5) How many years have you lived in Hong Kong? : _____

C6) Your parent's birthplaces :

Father	Mother
<input type="checkbox"/> 1. Hong Kong <input type="checkbox"/> 2. Mainland China <input type="checkbox"/> 3. Others (Please Specify) : _____	<input type="checkbox"/> 1. Hong Kong <input type="checkbox"/> 2. Mainland China <input type="checkbox"/> 3. Others (Please Specify) : _____

C7) What is your monthly household income? (Please choose the nearest number)

- ☐ 1. No income
☐ 2. HK \$4,999 or below
☐ 3. HK\$5,000-9,999
☐ 4. HK\$10,000-14,999

- ☐ 5. HK\$15,000-19,999
- ☐ 6. HK\$20,000-29,999
- ☐ 7. HK\$30,000-39,999
- ☐ 8. HK\$40,000-49,999
- ☐ 9. HK\$50,000 or above
- ☐ 10. No fixed income/Unstable

C8) There will be a follow-up interview (Focus Group) to find out more about these topics. Please leave your contact information here if you would like to participate :

Phone/WhatsApp/Messenger/Telegram/WeChat/E-mail/Other : _____

Thank you!



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Appendix C: Outline of the interview (Chinese)

導入

1. 您在哪裡出生？
2. （若非內地出生）之前有去過內地嗎？做什麼？有什麼印象？

同伴影響

3. 你平時上網多嗎？一般都看些什麼？會關注政治話題嗎？
4. 你會跟同學朋友討論政治問題嗎？通常都討論什麼問題呢？比如說最近會討論什麼？
5. 你們的觀點通常一致嗎？
6. 跟同伴之間的政治討論會影響你對中國內地或香港的看法嗎？為什麼？

媒體影響

7. 你通常是看本地還是中國內地或是外國的媒體（電視、電台、報紙、雜誌）？為甚麼？
8. 你通常是使用本地還是中國內地的社交媒體？為甚麼？
9. 你通常是使用本地還是中國內地的網上討論區？為甚麼？
10. 媒體新聞是否會影響你對內地的看法？為什麼？
11. 媒體新聞是否會影響你對香港政府的看法？為什麼？
12. 你覺得看新聞媒體上的內容會影響你的國民身份認同嗎？

國民教育/活動

13. 是否對國民教育相關的內容有印象（例如國家憲法、國旗、國歌、愛國情懷等等）？
14. 是否以及大概甚麼時候開始在課堂上學習有關國民身份認同的知識（例如國家憲法、國旗、國歌、愛國情懷等等）？
15. 你如何看待這些內容？（你是否認同這些課程的內容？為甚麼？）
16. 這些課程有否增加你的中國人身份認同？為甚麼？

17. 你覺得學校教育（老師，教科書，課程）對你的國民身份認同有什麼影響嗎？
為什麼？
18. 你有參加過到訪中國內地的課外活動（例如考察團、交流活動、義工活動、實習計劃等等）嗎？
19. （若否）（為什麼沒有參加？）
20. 這些活動是否有影響到你對內地的看法？
21. 這些活動有否增加你的中國人身份認同？為甚麼？
22. 你有參加過中央駐港機構的活動嗎？
23. 這些活動是否有影響到你對內地或中央政府的看法？
24. 這些活動有否增加你的中國人身份認同？為甚麼？

關於國民身份認同

25. 你對國民身份這個問題是怎麼看的？或者說你怎麼看待中國人和香港人這兩個身份？
26. 你覺得是什麼影響了你的國民身份認同？
27. 你最早意識到自己是香港人/中國人身份大概是什麼時候？
28. 在你的印象裡，你的國家身份認同有變化過麼？在什麼時候？因為什麼原因？
29. 你認同/不認同中國人身份的主要原因是什麼？
30. 你有多堅持你的身份認同？為甚麼？
31. 你認為你將來會改變你的身份認同嗎？在甚麼情況下可能改變？為甚麼？
32. 關於國民身份認同這個話題你還有其他要分享的嗎？

感謝您參與本次訪談！

Appendix D: Outline of the interview (English)

Introduction

1. Where were you born?
2. (If not born in the Mainland China) Have you been to the Mainland before? What did you do? What are your impressions?

Peers influence

3. Do you usually go online a lot? What do you usually browse? Do you follow political topics?
4. Do you discuss political issues with your classmates and friends? What issues do you usually discuss? For example, what have you been discussing recently?
5. Do you usually share the same views?
6. Do political discussions with your peers affect your views on Mainland China or Hong Kong? Why?

Media influence

7. Do you usually watch local, Mainland China or foreign media (TV, radio, newspapers, magazines)? Why?
8. Do you usually use local or Mainland China social media? Why?
9. Do you usually use local or Mainland China online discussion forums? Why?
10. Does media news affect your opinion of the Mainland? Why?
11. Does media news affect your opinion of the Hong Kong Government? Why?
12. Do you think that watching what is in the news media affects your national identity?

National education/activities

13. Do you have any impressions of content related to national education (e.g. national constitution, national flag, national anthem, patriotism, etc.)?
14. Did you and when did you start learning about national identity in class (e.g. national constitution, national flag, national anthem, patriotism, etc.)?
15. How do you feel about the content? (Do you agree with the content of these courses? Why?)

16. Have these courses enhanced your Chinese identity? Why?
17. Do you think school education (teachers, textbooks, curriculum) has had any impact on your national identity? Why?
18. Have you participated in any extra-curricular activities visiting Mainland China? (e.g. study tours, exchange activities, volunteer activities, internship programs, etc.)
19. (If no) Why did not?
20. Have these activities influenced your view of the Mainland?
21. Have these activities influenced your Chinese identity? Why?
22. Have you ever participated in any activities organized by the Central Government in Hong Kong?
23. Have these activities affected your perception of the Mainland or the Central Government?
24. Have these activities influenced your Chinese identity? Why?

About national identity

25. How do you feel about the issue of national identity? Or how do you see the two identities of Chinese and Hongkonger?
26. What do you think has influenced your national identity?
27. When did you first realise your identity as a Hongkonger/Chinese?
28. Has your national identity ever changed in your memory? At what point in time? For what reasons?
29. What are the main reasons why you identify/do not identify as Chinese?
30. How strongly do you hold on to your national identity? Why?
31. Do you think you will change your identity in the future? For what circumstances is it likely to change? Why?
32. Is there anything else you would like to share on the topic of national identity?

Thank you for your participation in this interview!